SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR

THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD

Translated from the Chinese with Introduction and Critical Notes

BY

LIONEL GILES, M.A.

Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. in

the British Museum

First Published in 1910

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——-

To my brother  Captain Valentine Giles,

R.G.  in the hope that  a work 2400

years old  may yet contain lessons worth

consideration  by the soldier of

today  this translation  is affectionately dedicated.

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Preface to the Project Gutenberg Etext —————————————

——————

When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR,

the work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to Europe

began in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in China, Joseph

Amiot, acquired a copy of it, and translated it into French. It was not a

good translation because, according to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great

deal that Sun Tzu did not write, and very little indeed of what he did."

The first translation into English was published in 1905 in Tokyo by

Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation is, in the words

of Dr. Giles, "excessively bad." He goes further in this criticism: "It is not merely a question of downright blunders, from which none can

hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages

were willfully distorted or slurred over. Such offenses are less

pardonable. They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or

Greek classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted

upon in translations from Chinese." In 1908 a new edition of Capt.

Calthrop's translation was published in London. It was an

improvement on the first — omissions filled up and numerous

mistakes corrected — but new errors were created in the process. Dr.

Giles, in justifying his translation, wrote: "It was not undertaken out of

any inflated estimate of my own powers; but I could not help feeling

that Sun Tzu deserved a better fate than had befallen him, and I

knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on the work of my

predecessors." Clearly, Dr. Giles' work established much of the

groundwork for the work of later translators who published their own

editions. Of the later editions of the ART OF WAR I have examined;

two feature Giles' edited translation and notes, the other two present

the same basic information from the ancient Chinese commentators

found in the Giles edition. Of these four, Giles' 1910 edition is the

most scholarly and presents the reader an incredible amount of

information concerning Sun Tzu's text, much more than any other

translation. The Giles' edition of the ART OF WAR, as stated above,

was a scholarly work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time

and an assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and

Manuscripts in the British Museum. Apparently he wanted to produce

a definitive edition, superior to anything else that existed and perhaps

something that would become a standard translation. It was the best

translation available for 50 years. But apparently there was not much

interest in Sun Tzu in English- speaking countries since it took the

start of the Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several

people published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzu. In

1944, Dr. Giles' translation was edited and published in the United

States in a series of military science books. But it wasn't until 1963

that a good English translation (by Samuel B. Griffith and still in print)

was published that was an equal to Giles' translation. While this

translation is more lucid than Dr. Giles' translation, it lacks his

copious notes that make his so interesting. Dr. Giles produced a work

primarily intended for scholars of the Chinese civilization and

language. It contains the Chinese text of Sun Tzu, the English

translation, and voluminous notes along with numerous footnotes.

Unfortunately, some of his notes and footnotes contain Chinese

characters; some are completely Chinese. Thus, a conversion to a

Latin alphabet etext was difficult. I did the conversion in complete

ignorance of Chinese (except for what I learned while doing the

conversion). Thus, I faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it while

retaining as much of the important text as I could. Every paraphrase

represents a loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the text

as possible. Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance,

I was able to transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the

risk of making the text more obscure. However, the text, on the

whole, is quite satisfactory for the casual reader, a transformation

made possible by conversion to an etext. However, I come away from

this task with the feeling of loss because I know that someone with a

background in Chinese can do a better job than I did; any such

attempt would be welcomed.

Bob Sutton al876@cleveland.freenet.edu bobs@gnu.ai.mit.edu

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——- INTRODUCTION

Sun Wu and his Book —————————-

Ssu-ma Chìen gives the following biography of Sun Tzu: [1]  —

Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Chì State. His ART OF WAR

brought him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him:

"I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory

of managing soldiers to a slight test?" Sun Tzu replied: "You may."

Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" The answer was

again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180

ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu divided them into two companies,

and placed one of the King's favorite concubines at the head of each.

He then bade them all take spears in their hands, and addressed

them thus: "I presume you know the difference between front and

back, right hand and left hand?" The girls replied: Yes. Sun Tzu went

on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. When I say

"Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When I say

"About turn," you must face right round towards your back." Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus explained,

he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill.

Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the

girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzu said: "If words of command are

not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then

the general is to blame." So he started drilling them again, and this

time gave the order "Left turn," whereupon the girls once more burst

into fits of laughter. Sun Tzu: "If words of command are not clear and

distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to

blame. But if his orders ARE clear, and the soldiers nevertheless

disobey, then it is the fault of their officers." So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. Now the king of Wu

was watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion; and when

he saw that his favorite concubines were about to be executed, he

was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message:

"We are now quite satisfied as to our general's ability to handle

troops. If We are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink

will lose their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded."

Sun Tzu replied: "Having once received His Majesty's commission to

be the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His

Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept."

Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway

installed the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this

had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more; and

the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the

left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with

perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then

Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers, Sire,

are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your majesty's

inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may

desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey."

But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to

camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the

troops." Thereupon Sun Tzu said: "The King is only fond of words,

and cannot translate them into deeds." After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun

Tzu was one who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed

him general. In the west, he defeated the Chù State and forced his

way into Ying, the capital; to the north he put fear into the States of

Chì and Chin, and spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal

princes. And Sun Tzu shared in the might of the King.

About Sun Tzu himself this is all that Ssu-ma Chìen has to tell us in

this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant,

Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor's

death, and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The

historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu, and in his preface we read:

"Sun Tzu had his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of

war." [3] It seems likely, then, that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless the story was invented in order to

account for the name. The crowning incident of his career, the

crushing defeat of his treacherous rival Pàng Chuan, will be found

briefly related in Chapter V. ss. 19, note. To return to the elder Sun

Tzu. He is mentioned in two other passages of the SHIH CHI: —

In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the

field with Tzu-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po Pèi, and attacked Chù. He

captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince's sons who had

formerly been generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on

Ying [the capital]; but the general Sun Wu said: "The army is

exhausted. It is not yet possible. We must wait"…. [After further

successful fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu

addressed Wu Tzu-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared

that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?"

The two men replied: "Chù's general Tzu-chàng, [4] is grasping and

covetous, and the princes of Tàng and Tsài both have a grudge

against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack,

you must win over Tàng and Tsài, and then you may succeed." Ho

Lu followed this advice, [beat Chù in five pitched battles and

marched into Ying.] [5]

This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun  Wu.

He does not appear to have survived his patron, who died  from the

effects of a wound in 496.  In another chapter there occurs this

passage: [6]

From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after

the other: Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-

tzu, [8] in the service of Chì; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu.

These men developed and threw light upon the principles of war.

It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Chìen at least had no doubt about

the reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one

exception, to be noticed presently, he is by far the most important

authority on the period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore,

to say much of such a work as the WU YUEH CHÙN CHÌU, which is

supposed to have been written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D.

The attribution is somewhat doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his

account would be of little value, based as it is on the SHIH CHI and

expanded with romantic details. The story of Sun Tzu will be found,

for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth noting

are: (1) Sun Tzu was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzu-hsu. (2)

He is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired life,

and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability. The following

passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzu: "When sovereign and ministers

show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzu to

encounter the foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto

no doubt has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest direct

reference for Sun Tzu, for Huai-nan Tzu died in 122 B.C., many years

before the SHIH CHI was given to the world. Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.)

says: "The reason why Sun Tzu at the head of 30,000 men beat Chù

with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined." Teng Ming-shih

informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun Wu's

grandfather by Duke Ching of Chì [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu's father

Sun Pìng, rose to be a Minister of State in Chì, and Sun Wu himself,

whose style was Chàng-chìng, fled to Wu on account of the

rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of Tìen Pao. He

had three sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of

Sun Pin. According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu,

which, considering that Sun Pin's victory over Wei was gained in 341

B.C., may be dismissed as chronological impossible. Whence these

data were obtained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course

no reliance whatever can be placed in them. An interesting document

which has survived from the close of the Han period is the short

preface written by the Great Tsào Tsào, or Wei Wu Ti, for his edition

of Sun Tzu. I shall give it in full: —

I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their

advantage. [10] The SHU CHU mentions "the army" among the "eight

objects of government." The I CHING says: "'army' indicates firmness

and justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The SHIH

CHING says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshaled

his troops." The Yellow Emperor, Tàng the Completer and Wu Wang

all used spears and battle-axes in order to succor their generation.

The SSU-MA FA says: "If one man slay another of set purpose, he

himself may rightfully be slain." He who relies solely on warlike

measures shall be exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful

measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Chài [11] on the one

hand and Yen Wang on the other. [12] In military matters, the Sage's

rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when

occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by

necessity. Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting;

but the work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all.

[Sun Tzu was a native of the Chì state, his personal name was Wu.

He wrote the ART OF WAR in 13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its

principles were tested on women, and he was subsequently made a

general. He led an army westwards, crushed the Chù state and

entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Chì and Chin in awe. A

hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was a

descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation and planning,

the importance of rapidity in taking the field, [14] clearness of

conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzu stands beyond the reach of

carping criticism. My contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp

the full meaning of his instructions, and while putting into practice the

smaller details in which his work abounds, they have overlooked its

essential purport. That is the motive which has led me to outline a

rough explanation of the whole.

One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the

13 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is

supported by the internal evidence of I. ss. 15, in which it seems clear

that some ruler is addressed. In the bibliographic section of the HAN

SHU, there is an entry which has given rise to much discussion: "The

works of Sun Tzu of Wu in 82 PÌEN (or chapters), with diagrams in 9

CHUAN." It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters

known to Ssu-ma Chìen, or those we possess today. Chang Shou-

chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR of which the "13

chapters" formed the first CHUAN, adding that there were two other

CHUAN besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk of

these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzu — we

should call them apocryphal — similar to the WEN TA, of which a

specimen dealing with the Nine Situations [15] is preserved in the

TÙNG TIEN, and another in Ho Shin's commentary. It is suggested

that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzu had only written the 13

chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in the form of

question and answer between himself and the King. Pi I-hsun, the

author of the SUN TZU HSU LU, backs this up with a quotation from

the WU YUEH CHÙN CHÌU: "The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzu,

and asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth

a chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to praise

him." As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the same

scale as in the above- mentioned fragments, the total number of

chapters could not fail to be considerable. Then the numerous other

treatises attributed to Sun Tzu might be included. The fact that the

HAN CHIH mentions no work of Sun Tzu except the 82 PÌEN,

whereas the Sui and Tàng bibliographies give the titles of others in

addition to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of these were contained in the 82 PÌEN. Without pinning our faith to the

accuracy of details supplied by the WU YUEH CHÙN CHÌU, or

admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun,

we may see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery.

Between Ssu-ma Chìen and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a

luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of

Sun Tzu, and the 82 PÌEN may very well represent a collected

edition of these lumped together with the original work. It is also

possible, though less likely, that some of them existed in the time of

the earlier historian and were purposely ignored by him. [16] Tu Mu's

conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu

Ti strung together Sun Wu's Art of War," which in turn may have

resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Tsào King's

preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of

saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase, or in other words,

wrote a commentary on it. On the whole, this theory has met with

very little acceptance. Thus, the SSU KÙ CHÙAN SHU says: "The

mention of the 13 chapters in the SHIH CHI shows that they were in

existence before the HAN CHIH, and that latter accretions are not to

be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu's assertion can

certainly not be taken as proof." There is every reason to suppose,

then, that the 13 chapters existed in the time of Ssu-ma Chìen

practically as we have them now. That the work was then well known

he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzu's 13 Chapters and Wu Chì's

Art of War are the two books that people commonly refer to on the

subject of military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I

will not discuss them here." But as we go further back, serious

difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is

that the TSO CHUAN, the greatest contemporary record, makes no

mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a general or as a writer. It

is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, that many scholars

should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given in the

SHIH CHI, but even show themselves frankly skeptical as to the

existence of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of this

side of the case is to be found in the following disposition by Yeh

Shui-hsin: [17] —

It is stated in Ssu-ma Chìen's history that Sun Wu was  a

native of the Chì State, and employed by Wu; and that in  the reign

of Ho Lu he crushed Chù, entered Ying, and was a  great general.

But in Tso's Commentary no Sun Wu appears at  all. It is true that

Tso's Commentary need not contain  absolutely everything that

other histories contain. But Tso  has not omitted to mention vulgar

plebeians and hireling  ruffians such as Ying Kào-shu, [18] Tsào

Kuei, [19], Chu  Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of

Sun Wu, whose  fame and achievements were so brilliant, the

omission is much  more glaring. Again, details are given, in their

due order,  about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister

Pèi. [21]  Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been

passed  over?  In point of literary style, Sun Tzu's work

belongs to  the same school as KUAN TZU, [22] LIU TÀO, [23] and

the YUEH  YU [24] and may have been the production of some

private  scholar living towards the end of the "Spring and Autumn"

or  the beginning of the "Warring States" period. [25] The

story  that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State,

is  merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his

followers.  From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty

[26]  down to the time of the "Spring and Autumn," all

military  commanders were statesmen as well, and the class

of  professional generals, for conducting external campaigns,

did  not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six  States"

[27] that this custom changed. Now although Wu was  an

uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso should have  left

unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and  yet held

no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about  Jang-chu [28]

and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the  reckless fabrication of

theorizing pundits. The story of Ho  Lu's experiment on the women,

in particular, is utterly  preposterous and incredible.

Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Chìen as having said that Sun Wu

crushed Chù and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt

the impression left on the reader's mind is that he at least shared in

these exploits. The fact may or may not be significant; but it is

nowhere explicitly stated in the SHIH CHI either that Sun Tzu was

general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went

there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po Pèi both

took part in the expedition, and also that its success was largely due

to the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu's younger brother, it is

not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very

prominent part in the same campaign. Chèn Chen-sun of the Sung

dynasty has the note: —

Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the

fact that he does not appear in the TSO CHUAN, although he is said

to have served under Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what

period he really belonged to.

He also says: —

The works of Sun Wu and Wu Chì may be of genuine antiquity.

It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Chèn Chen-sun, while

rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Chìen's

history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the

work which passes under his name. The author of the HSU LU fails to

appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on

Chèn Chen-sun really misses its mark. He makes one of two points,

however, which certainly tell in favor of the high antiquity of our "13

chapters." "Sun Tzu," he says, "must have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he is frequently plagiarized in subsequent

works of the Chou, Chìn and Han dynasties." The two most

shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Chì and Huai-nan Tzu,

both of them important historical personages in their day. The former

lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzu, and his death

is known to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to

Liu Hsiang, that Tseng Shen delivered the TSO CHUAN, which had

been entrusted to him by its author. [29] Now the fact that quotations

from the ART OF WAR, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found

in so many authors of different epochs, establishes a very strong

anterior to them all, — in other words, that Sun Tzu's treatise was

already in existence towards the end of the 5th century B.C. Further

proof of Sun Tzu's antiquity is furnished by the archaic or wholly

obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list

of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the HSU LU;

and though some of the interpretations are doubtful, the main

argument is hardly affected thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten

that Yeh Shui- hsin, a scholar and critic of the first rank, deliberately

pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to belong to the early part of

the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually engaged in an attempt to

disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he

would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he not

honestly believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that

the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other

internal evidence is not far to seek. Thus in XIII. ss. 1, there is an

unmistakable allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had

already passed away by the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see

it revived in a modified form. [30] The only warfare Sun Tzu knows is

that carried on between the various feudal princes, in which armored

chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have entirely died out

before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a

state which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch

presently.

But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances

of its being other than a bona fide production are sensibly diminished.

The great age of forgeries did not come until long after. That it should

have been forged in the period immediately following 473 is

particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify himself

with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin's theory, that the author was a

literary recluse, that seems to me quite untenable. If one thing is

more apparent than another after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu, it is

that their essence has been distilled from a large store of personal

observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of a born

strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but also of a

practical soldier closely acquainted with the military conditions of his

time. To say nothing of the fact that these sayings have been

accepted and endorsed by all the greatest captains of Chinese

history, they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity,

acuteness and common sense, which quite excludes the idea that

they were artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, that the

13 chapters were the genuine production of a military man living

towards the end of the "CHÙN CHÌU" period, are we not bound, in

spite of the silence of the TSO CHUAN, to accept Ssu-ma Chìen's

account in its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian,

must we not hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for

Sun Wu's biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I

fear, must be in the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal,

objection to the chronology involved in the story as told in the SHIH

CHI, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed out. There

are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he alludes to contemporary

affairs. The first in in VI. ss. 21: —

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our

own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of

victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.

The other is in XI. ss. 30: —

Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN, I should

answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies;

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a

storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand

helps the right.

These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the

date of composition. They assign the work to the period of the

struggle between Wu and Yueh. So much has been observed by Pi I-

hsun. But what has hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously

impair the credibility of Ssu-ma Chìen's narrative. As we have seen

above, the first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512

B.C. He is then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential adviser

to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already

taken place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been written

earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the

capture of Ying in 506, Chù and not Yueh, was the great hereditary

enemy of Wu. The two states, Chù and Wu, had been constantly at

war for over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu

and Yueh was waged only in 510, [32] and even then was no more

than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle

with Chù. Now Chù is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The

natural inference is that they were written at a time when Yueh had

become the prime antagonist of Wu, that is, after Chù had suffered

the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be

found useful.

B.C. | | 514 | Accession of Ho Lu. 512 | Ho Lu attacks Chù, but is

dissuaded from entering Ying, | the capital. SHI CHI mentions Sun

Wu as general. 511 | Another attack on Chù. 510 | Wu makes a

successful attack on Yueh. This is the first | war between the two

states. 509 | or | Chù invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-

chang. 508 | 506 | Ho Lu attacks Chù with the aid of Tàng and

Tsài. | Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last | mention

of Sun Wu in SHIH CHI. 505 | Yueh makes a raid on Wu in the

absence of its army. Wu | is beaten by Chìn and evacuates Ying.

504 | Ho Lu sends Fu Chài to attack Chù. 497 | Kou Chien becomes

King of Yueh. 496 | Wu attacks Yueh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at

Tsui-li. | Ho Lu is killed. 494 | Fu Chài defeats Kou Chien in the great

battle of Fu- | chaio, and enters the capital of Yueh. 485 | or | Kou

Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzu-hsu. 484 | 482 | Kou

Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Chài. 478 | to | Further

attacks by Yueh on Wu. 476 | 475 | Kou Chien lays siege to the

capital of Wu. 473 | Final defeat and extinction of Wu.

The sentence quoted above from VI. ss. 21 hardly strikes me as one

that could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather

to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu,

and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may

conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which

date Yueh does not appear to have scored any notable success

against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him,

it must have been during the period 505-496, when there was a lull in

the hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort

against Chù. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the

tradition connecting Sun Wu's name with Ho Lu, it might equally well

have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period

482-473, when Yueh was once again becoming a very serious

menace. [33] We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he

may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his own

day. On this point the negative testimony of the TSO CHUAN far

outweighs any shred of authority still attaching to the SHIH CHI, if

once its other facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes

a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from the great

commentary. It was Wu Tzu-hsu, he says, who got all the credit of

Sun Wu's exploits, because the latter (being an alien) was not

rewarded with an office in the State. How then did the Sun Tzu

legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity of the book

imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It was

felt to be only right and proper that one so well versed in the science

of war should have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the

capture of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu's

reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on all the surrounding

states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of her power. Hence,

what more natural, as time went on, than that the acknowledged

master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly identified with that

campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his brain conceived

and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by him in

conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po Pèi and Fu Kai? It is obvious that

any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzu's life must be

based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I

should say that he probably entered the service of Wu about the time

of Ho Lu's accession, and gathered experience, though only in the

capacity of a subordinate officer, during the intense military activity

which marked the first half of the prince's reign. [35] If he rose to be a

general at all, he certainly was never on an equal footing with the

three above mentioned. He was doubtless present at the investment

and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu's sudden collapse in the

following year. Yueh's attack at this critical juncture, when her rival

was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that

this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort

would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-

seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous book, which

according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the end,

rather than the beginning of Ho Lu's reign. The story of the women

may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about

the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any

source, he is hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken

part in the death-struggle with Yueh, which began with the disaster at

Tsui- li. If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a

certain irony in the fate which decreed that China's most illustrious

man of peace should be contemporary with her greatest writer on

war.

The Text of Sun Tzu —————————-

I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzu's

text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the

"13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma Chìen speaks were essentially the

same as those now extant. We have his word for it that they were

widely circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from

discussing them on that account. Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:

—

During the Chìn and Han dynasties Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR was in

general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have

treated it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to

expound it for the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that Wei

Wu was the first to write a commentary on it.

As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose

that Tsào Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so

obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time

onward so great, especially during the Tàng and Sung dynasties,

that it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed

to creep in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all

the chief commentaries on Sun Tzu were in existence, a certain Chi

Tìen-pao published a work in 15 CHUAN entitled "Sun Tzu with the

collected commentaries of ten writers." There was another text, with

variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing, which also had

supporters among the scholars of that period; but in the Ming

editions, Sun Hsing- yen tells us, these readings were for some

reason or other no longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of

the 18th century, the text in sole possession of the field was one

derived from Chi Tìen-pao's edition, although no actual copy of that

important work was known to have survived. That, therefore, is the

text of Sun Tzu which appears in the War section of the great

Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the KU CHIN TÙ SHU CHI

CHÈNG. Another copy at my disposal of what is practically the same

text, with slight variations, is that contained in the "Eleven

philosophers of the Chou and Chìn dynasties" [1758]. And the

Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop's first edition is evidently a similar

version which has filtered through Japanese channels. So things

remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished

antiquarian and classical scholar, who claimed to be an actual

descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered a copy of Chi

Tìen-pao's long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of the Hua-

yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the I SHUO of Cheng Yu-Hsien,

mentioned in the TÙNG CHIH, and also believed to have perished.

This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or

text)" — a rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim

to set before us the text of Sun Tzu in its pristine purity. Chi Tìen-pao

was a careless compiler, and appears to have been content to

reproduce the somewhat debased version current in his day, without

troubling to collate it with the earliest editions then available.

Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzu, even older than the newly

discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the TÙNG TIEN, Tu

Yu's great treatise on the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in

the TÀI PÌNG YU LAN encyclopedia. In both the complete text is to

be found, though split up into fragments, intermixed with other matter,

and scattered piecemeal over a number of different sections.

Considering that the YU LAN takes us back to the year 983, and the

TÙNG TIEN about 200 years further still, to the middle of the Tàng

dynasty, the value of these early transcripts of Sun Tzu can hardly be

overestimated. Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem to have

occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government

instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his

own account: —

Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu which his

editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient

edition [of Chi Tìen-pao] should be used, and that the text should be

revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the

Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all

devoted themselves to this study, probably surpassing me therein.

Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook

for military men.

The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on

the text of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsing-yen's commission, but we are

left in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the

new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of

Sun Hsing-yen and only one co- editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the

"original edition" as their basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and other sources of

information such as the I SHUO, succeeded in restoring a very large

number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what

must be accepted as the closes approximation we are ever likely to

get to Sun Tzu's original work. This is what will hereafter be

denominated the "standard text." The copy which I have used

belongs to a reissue dated 1877. it is in 6 PEN, forming part of a well-

printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 PEN. [38] It opens

with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this introduction),

vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzu's life and performances,

and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its

favor. This is followed by Tsào Kung's preface to his edition, and the

biography of Sun Tzu from the SHIH CHI, both translated above.

Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien's I SHUO, [39] with author's

preface, and next, a short miscellany of historical and bibliographical

information entitled SUN TZU HSU LU, compiled by Pi I-hsun. As

regards the body of the work, each separate sentence is followed by

a note on the text, if required, and then by the various commentaries

appertaining to it, arranged in chronological order. These we shall

now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one.

The Commentators ————————

Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of

commentators, which would do honor to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu

remarks on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was complete,

and rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the artifices of war,

being inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a

great variety of ways.

1. TSÀO TSÀO or Tsào Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti

[A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest

commentary on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of this

extraordinary man, whose biography in the SAN KUO CHIH reads

like a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses that the world

has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations, he was

especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches, which has

found expression in the line "Talk of Tsào Tsào, and Tsào Tsào

will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a great captain

who "measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two

Yuan, father and son, and vanquished them all; whereupon he

divided the Empire of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king.

It is recorded that whenever a council of war was held by Wei on the

eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all his calculations ready;

those generals who made use of them did not lose one battle in ten;

those who ran counter to them in any particular saw their armies

incontinently beaten and put to flight." Tsào Kung's notes on Sun

Tzu, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the

stern commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive

of them as the work of a mere LITTERATEUR. Sometimes, indeed,

owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely intelligible and

stand no less in need of a commentary than the text itself. [40]

2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under

this name is comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is

known. Even his personal name has not been recorded. Chi Tìen-

pao's edition places him after Chia Lin,and Chào Kung- wu also

assigns him to the Tàng dynasty, [41] but this is a mistake. In Sun

Hsing-yen's preface, he appears as Meng Shih of the Liang dynasty

[502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng Kàng of the 3rd

century. He is named in one work as the last of the "Five

Commentators," the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Chèn Hao and

Chia Lin.

3. LI CHÙAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military

tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the

present day. The TÙNG CHIH mentions "Lives of famous generals

from the Chou to the Tàng dynasty" as written by him. [42] According

to Chào Kung-wu and the TÌEN-I-KO catalogue, he followed a

variant of the text of Sun Tzu which differs considerably from those

now extant. His notes are mostly short and to the point, and he

frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes from Chinese history.

4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun

Tzu, his notes being taken from the TÙNG TIEN, the encyclopedic

treatise on the Constitution which was his life- work. They are largely

repetitions of Tsào Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed

that he drew on the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others.

Owing to the peculiar arrangement of TÙNG TIEN, he has to explain

each passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes

his own explanation does not agree with that of Tsào Kung, whom

he always quotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of

the "Ten Commentators," he was added to their number by Chi Tìen-

pao, being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu.

5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet — a bright

star even in the glorious galaxy of the Tàng period. We learn from

Chào Kung-wu that although he had no practical experience of war,

he was extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover

well read in the military history of the CHÙN CHÌU and CHAN KUO

eras. His notes, therefore, are well worth attention. They are very

copious, and replete with historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzu's

work is thus summarized by him: "Practice benevolence and justice,

but on the other hand make full use of artifice and measures of

expediency." He further declared that all the military triumphs and

disasters of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Tzu's

death would, upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate,

in every particular, the maxims contained in his book. Tu Mu's

somewhat spiteful charge against Tsào Kung has already been

considered elsewhere.

6. CHÈN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu.

Chào Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new

commentary on Sun Tzu because Tsào Kung's on the one hand was

too obscure and subtle, and that of Tu Mu on the other too long-

winded and diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the middle of the 11th

century, calls Tsào Kung, Tu Mu and Chèn Hao the three chief

commentators on Sun Tzu, and observes that Chèn Hao is

continually attacking Tu Mu's shortcomings. His commentary, though

not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his predecessors.

7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the Tàng dynasty, for his

commentary on Sun Tzu is mentioned in the Tàng Shu and was

afterwards republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together

with those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture,

and in point of quality, too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven.

8. MEI YAO-CHÈN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as

Mei Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary

was published with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu,

from which we may cull the following: —

Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu, distorting his words and trying

to make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though

commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved equal

to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has not fallen into this mistake. In

attempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun Tzu's work, he

does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for

states engaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not

concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns

of the three ancient dynasties, [43] nor with the nine punitive

measures prescribed to the Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu

loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is always deep. Whether the

subject be marching an army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the

enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it is always systematically

treated; the sayings are bound together in strict logical sequence,

though this has been obscured by commentators who have probably

failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Sheng-yu

has brushed aside all the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and

has tried to bring out the true meaning of Sun Tzu himself. In this

way, the clouds of confusion have been dispersed and the sayings

made clear. I am convinced that the present work deserves to be

handed down side by side with the three great commentaries; and for

a great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will

have constant reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu.

Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am

inclined to endorse this favorable judgment, and would certainly place

him above Chèn Hao in order of merit.

9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some

of his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-chèn,

and on the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of

comparing his own commentary with that of Tsào Kung, but the

comparison is not often flattering to him. We learn from Chào Kung-

wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text of Sun Tzu, filling up

lacunae and correcting mistakes. [45]

10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this

commentator is given as above by Cheng Chìao in the TUNG CHIH,

written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply

as Ho Shih in the YU HAI, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Chào Kung-wu as

saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no

reason to doubt Cheng Chìao's statement, otherwise I should have

been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one Ho Chù-

fei, the author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the latter part of

the 11th century. Ho Shih's commentary, in the words of the TÌEN-I-

KO catalogue, "contains helpful additions" here and there, but is

chiefly remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form,

from the dynastic histories and other sources.

11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great

originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid

exposition. His commentator is based on that of Tsào Kung, whose

terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly

fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Tsào

Kung's commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine

obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the

Sung history, the TÙNG KÀO, or the YU HAI, but it finds a niche in

the TÙNG CHIH, which also names him as the author of the "Lives

of Famous Generals." [46] It is rather remarkable that the last-named

four should all have flourished within so short a space of time. Chào

Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: "During the early years of the

Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men

ceased to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao's

rebellion came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated

time after time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in

war, and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high

officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzu in our dynasty

belong mainly to that period. [47]

Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose

work has not come down to us. The SUI SHU mentions four, namely

Wang Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzu); Chang Tzu- shang;

Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu. The TÀNG SHU adds

Sun Hao, and the TÙNG CHIH Hsiao Chi, while the TÙ SHU

mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that

some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other

commentaries, like Chi Tìen-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above.

Appreciations of Sun Tzu ————————————

Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some

of China's greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known

to have studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han

Hsin (d. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (d. 34 A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (d. 219),

[51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of Tsào Kung, who

disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese military annals,

has already been recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one way, is

the testimony of purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of

Su Tung-pò), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of

which owe their chief inspiration to Sun Tzu. The following short

passage by him is preserved in the YU HAI: [54] —

Sun Wu's saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering,

[55] is very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu

Chì was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote

books on war, and they are linked together in popular speech as "Sun

and Wu." But Wu Chì's remarks on war are less weighty, his rules

are rougher and more crudely stated, and there is not the same unity

of plan as in Sun Tzu's work, where the style is terse, but the

meaning fully brought out.

The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the

Garden of Literature" by Cheng Hou: —

Sun Tzu's 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military

men's training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars

and men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet

profound, perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the

LUN YU, the I CHING and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the

writings of Mencius, Hsun Kùang and Yang Chu, all fall below the

level of Sun Tzu.

Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism,

although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated

classical works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler's

bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism."

Apologies for War ————————-

Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving

nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her

experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern

State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point at

which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall

and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier

centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube.

What with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the

grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the

centralization of government, the terrific upheavals which

accompanied the overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the

countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have flamed up and

flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that the

clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another

of the Empire. No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious

captains to whom China can point with pride. As in all countries, the

greatest are fond of emerging at the most fateful crises of her history.

Thus, Po Chì stands out conspicuous in the period when Chìn was

entering upon her final struggle with the remaining independent

states. The stormy years which followed the break-up of the Chìn

dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin.

When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and

baleful figure of Tsào Tsào dominates the scene. And in the

establishment of the Tàng dynasty,one of the mightiest tasks

achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards

the Emperor Tài Tsung) was seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li

Ching. None of these generals need fear comparison with the

greatest names in the military history of Europe. In spite of all this, the

great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzu downwards, and

especially as reflected in the standard literature of Confucianism, has

been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any

form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending

warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and

translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The

following, by Ssu-ma Chìen, shows that for all his ardent admiration

of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any price: —

Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence

and cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties

and dangers, and to succor those who are in peril. Every animal with

blood in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked.

How much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of

love and hatred, joy and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of

affection springs up within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is

brought into play. That is the natural law which governs his being….

What then shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great

issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can only

bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization,"

condemning the use of military weapons? They will surely bring our

country to impotence and dishonor and the loss of her rightful

heritage; or, at the very least, they will bring about invasion and

rebellion, sacrifice of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they

obstinately refuse to modify the position they have taken up. The truth

is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare the rod, and

punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military

chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the

Empire. All one can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by

some, foolishly by others, and that among those who bear arms some

will be loyal and others rebellious. [58]

The next piece is taken from Tu Mu's preface to his commentary on

Sun Tzu: —

War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of

government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Chìu, both

disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of

litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their execution by

flogging in the market- place, are all done by officials. But the

wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the

hauling of women and children into captivity, and the beheading of

traitors — this is also work which is done by officials. The objects of

the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is

no intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting

off heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily

dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the

use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases,

however, the end in view is to get rid of wicked people, and to give

comfort and relief to the good…. Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying:

"Have you, Sir, acquired your military aptitude by study, or is it

innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been acquired by study." [59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of

Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by Confucius.

It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military

functions, though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has

not yet gone very far." Now, who the author was of this rigid

distinction between the "civil" and the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in what year of which dynasty

it was first introduced, is more than I can say. But, at any rate, it has

come about that the members of the governing class are quite afraid

of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner.

If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set

down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This

is an extraordinary instance in which, through sheer lack of

reasoning, men unhappily lose sight of fundamental principles. When

the Duke of Chou was minister under Chèng Wang, he regulated

ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship

and learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60]

he sallied forth and chastised them. When Confucius held office

under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku, [61]

he said: "If pacific negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations

should have been made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the

Marquis of Chì, who cowered under him and dared not proceed to

violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages had no

knowledge of military matters?

We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu in high esteem.

He also appeals to the authority of the Classics: —

Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have

never studied matters connected with armies and battalions." [62]

Replying to Kùng Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about

buff-coats and weapons." But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we

find that he used armed force against the men of Lai, so that the

marquis of Chì was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi

revolted, the ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon they

were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I

fight, I conquer." [63] And Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil and military functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never

studied or received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that

he did not specially choose matters connected with armies and

fighting to be the subject of his teaching.

Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzu, writes in similar strain: —

Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said:

"If I fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated

music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State

ceremonial, [66] and must not be treated as an independent branch

of study. Hence, the words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean

that there are things which even an inspired Teacher does not know.

Those who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn

the art of war. But if one can command the services of a good general

like Sun Tzu, who was employed by Wu Tzu-hsu, there is no need to

learn it oneself. Hence the remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I

conquer." The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret

these words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he

meant that books on the art of war were not worth reading. With blind

persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over

his father's books to no purpose, [67] as a proof that all military theory

is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have to do with such

things as opportunism in designing plans, and the conversion of

spies, they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These

people ignore the fact that the studies of our scholars and the civil

administration of our officials also require steady application and

practice before efficiency is reached. The ancients were particularly

chary of allowing mere novices to botch their work. [68] Weapons are

baneful [69] and fighting perilous; and useless unless a general is in

constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men's lives in battle.

[70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzu's 13 chapters should be

studied. Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art

of war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but

would not pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the

consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown. He

did not realize that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal

computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were

brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity. The treacherous

and underhand nature of war necessitates the use of guile and

stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on record of

Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath, [72] and also of

his having left the Sung State in disguise. [73] Can we then recklessly

arraign Sun Tzu for disregarding truth and honesty?

Bibliography ——————

The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after  Sun

Tzu. The notes on each have been drawn principally from the  SSU

KÙ CHÙAN SHU CHIEN MING MU LU, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq.

1. WU TZU, in 1 CHUAN or 6 chapters. By Wu Chì (d. 381  B.C.).

A genuine work. See SHIH CHI, ch. 65.

2. SSU-MA FA, in 1 CHUAN or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to Ssu-

ma Jang-chu of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early,

as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly to be

met within its pages. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64. The SSU KÙ CHÙAN

SHU (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three treatises on war, SUN

TZU, WU TZU and SSU-MA FA, are, generally speaking, only

concerned with things strictly military — the art of producing,

collecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with

regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, transport of goods

and the handling of soldiers — in strong contrast to later works, in

which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics,

divination and magical arts in general.

3. LIU TÀO, in 6 CHUAN, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or

Lu Shang, also known as Tài Kung) of the 12th century B.C. [74] But

its style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. Lu Te-

ming (550-625 A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the

headings of the six sections so that the forgery cannot have been

later than Sui dynasty.

4. WEI LIAO TZU, in 5 CHUAN. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent.

B.C.), who studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzu. The work appears

to have been originally in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess

contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main, though the

strategical devices differ considerably from those of the Warring

States period. It is been furnished with a commentary by the well-

known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai.

5. SAN LUEH, in 3 CHUAN. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a

legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang

(d. 187 B.C.) in an interview on a bridge. But here again, the style is

not that of works dating from the Chìn or Han period. The Han

Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently quotes from it in one of

his proclamations; but the passage in question may have been

inserted later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We

shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478

A.D.], or somewhat earlier.

6. LI WEI KUNG WEN TUI, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a

dialogue between Tài Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it is

usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a

forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art of war.

7. LI CHING PING FA (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a

short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the Tùng Tien, but not

published separately. This fact explains its omission from the SSU

KÙ CHÙAN SHU.

8. WU CHÌ CHING, in 1 CHUAN. Attributed to the legendary minister

Feng Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the Han

dynasty (d. 121 B.C.), and said to have been eulogized by the

celebrated general Ma Lung (d. 300 A.D.). Yet the earliest mention of

it is in the SUNG CHIH. Although a forgery, the work is well put

together.

Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang has

always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on

war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the SHIH LIU TSÈ (1 CHUAN),

preserved in the YUNG LO TA TIEN; (2) CHIANG YUAN (1 CHUAN);

and (3) HSIN SHU (1 CHUAN), which steals wholesale from Sun Tzu.

None of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine. Most

of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections

devoted to the literature of war. The following references may be

found useful: —

TÙNG TIEN (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162.  TÀI PÌNG YU

LAN (983), ch. 270-359.  WEN HSIEN TUNG KÀO (13th cent.),

ch. 221.  YU HAI (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.  SAN TSÀI TÙ

HUI (16th cent).  KUANG PO WU CHIH (1607), ch. 31,

32.  CHÌEN CHÌO LEI SHU (1632), ch. 75.  YUAN CHIEN

LEI HAN (1710), ch. 206-229.  KU CHIN TÙ SHU CHI CHÈNG

(1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81-  90.  HSU WEN HSIEN

TÙNG KÀO (1784), ch. 121-134.  HUANG CHÀO CHING SHIH

WEN PIEN (1826), ch. 76, 77.

The bibliographical sections of certain historical works  also

deserve mention: —

CHÌEN HAN SHU, ch. 30.  SUI SHU, ch. 32-35.  CHIU

TÀNG SHU, ch. 46, 47.  HSIN TÀNG SHU, ch.

57,60.  SUNG SHIH, ch. 202-209.  TÙNG CHIH (circa 1150),

ch. 68.

To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of

the  Imperial Library: —

SSU KÙ CHÙAN SHU TSUNG MU TÌ YAO (1790), ch. 99, 100.

Footnotes ————-

1. SHI CHI, ch. 65.

2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C.

3. SHI CHI, ch. 130.

4. The appellation of Nang Wa.

5. SHI CHI, ch. 31.

6. SHI CHI, ch. 25.

7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year

637.

8. Wang-tzu Chèng-fu, ch. 32, year 607.

9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the

Han dynasty, which says: "Ten LI outside the WU gate [of the city of

Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to

commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Chì, who excelled in

the art of war, by the King of Wu."

10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened

wood to make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the

Empire in awe."

11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and

overthrown by Kou chien, King of Yueh, in 473 B.C. See post.

12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says

in his preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction."

13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the TÙ  SHU,

and may be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang  Shou-

chieh of the Tàng dynasty, and appears in the TÀI PÌNG YU  LAN.

14. Tsào Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II,

perhaps especially of ss. 8.

15. See chap. XI.

16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that WU TZU, which is not in 6

chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the HAN CHIH. Likewise, the

CHUNG YUNG is credited with 49 chapters, though now only in one

only. In the case of very short works, one is tempted to think that

PÌEN might simply mean "leaves."

17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223].

18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins.

19. See Chapter 7, ss. 27 and Chapter 11, ss. 28.

20. See Chapter 11, ss. 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his

name.

21. I.e. Po Pèi. See ante.

22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large

additions have been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645

B.C.

23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION.

24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of

another work. Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is

not clear.

25. About 480 B.C.

26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung.

27. In the 3rd century B.C.

28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was Tìen, lived in the

latter half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to have written

a work on war. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64, and infra at the beginning of

the INTRODUCTION.

29. See Legge's Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks

that the TSO CHUAN must have been written in the 5th century, but

not before 424 B.C.

30. See MENCIUS III. 1. iii. 13-20.

31. When Wu first appears in the CHÙN CHÌU in 584, it is already at

variance with its powerful neighbor. The CHÙN CHÌU first mentions

Yueh in 537, the TSO CHUAN in 601.

32. This is explicitly stated in the TSO CHUAN, XXXII, 2.

33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would

tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully

justify the language used in XI. ss. 30.

34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse: — a spurious

treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a

great general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun

Wu, on the other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in

the 5th century.

35. From TSO CHUAN: "From the date of King Chao's accession

[515] there was no year in which Chù was not attacked by Wu."

36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really

descended from Sun Tzu. I am ashamed to say that I only read my

ancestor's work from a literary point of view, without comprehending

the military technique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings

of peace!"

37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from Tùng-kuan on the eastern border

of Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the

ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in a text as

being "situated five LI east of the district city of Hua-yin. The temple

contains the Hua-shan tablet inscribed by the Tàng Emperor Hsuan

Tsung [713-755]."

38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no.

40.

39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzu.

40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His

commentary is frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does not

fully develop the meaning."

41. WEN HSIEN TÙNG KÀO, ch. 221.

42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered

chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand

Buddhas." See B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p. 525.

43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was

nominally existent in Sun Tzu's day, it retained hardly a vestige of

power, and the old military organization had practically gone by the

board. I can suggest no other explanation of the passage.

44. See CHOU LI, xxix. 6-10.

45. TÙNG KÀO, ch. 221.

46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie's "Notes," p. 91 (new

edition).

47. TÙNG KÀO, loc. cit.

48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the SAN

KUO CHIH, ch. 10.

49. See XI. ss. 58, note.

50. HOU HAN SHU, ch. 17 ad init.

51. SAN KUO CHIH, ch. 54.

52. SUNG SHIH, ch. 365 ad init.

53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of

acquainting themselves with Sun Tzu are not behindhand in their

praise. In this connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting from

a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work

were submitted previous to publication: "Many of Sun Wu's maxims

are perfectly applicable to the present day, and no. 11 [in Chapter

VIII] is one that the people of this country would do well to take to

heart."

54. Ch. 140.

55. See IV. ss. 3.

56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2.

57. The TSO CHUAN.

58. SHIH CHI, ch. 25, fol. I.

59. Cf. SHIH CHI, ch 47.

60. See SHU CHING, preface ss. 55.

61. See SHIH CHI, ch. 47.

62. Lun Yu, XV. 1.

63. I failed to trace this utterance.

64. Supra.

65. Supra.

66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests,

and festive rites. See SHU CHING, ii. 1. III. 8, and CHOU LI, IX. fol.

49.

67. See XIII. ss. 11, note.

68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the TSO CHUAN, where Tzu-

chàn says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not

employ a mere learner to make it up."

69. Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 31.

70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See LUN YU,

XIII. 29, 30.

71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.].

72. SHIH CHI, ch. 47.

73. SHIH CHI, ch. 38.

74. See XIII. ss. 27, note. Further details on Tài Kung will be found in

the SHIH CHI, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a

former minister of Chou Hsin, two other accounts of him are there

given, according to which he would appear to have been first raised

from a humble private station by Wen Wang.

——————————————————————————————

——-

I. LAYING PLANS

[Tsào Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of

this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected

by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent.

See. ss. 26.]

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. 2. It

is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it

is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. 3. The

art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into

account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the

conditions obtaining in the field. 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2)

Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by "Moral Law" a

principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral

aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," were it not

considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss. 13.]

5, 6. The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete accord

with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives,

undismayed by any danger.

[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant practice, the

officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle;

without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute

when the crisis is at hand."]

7. HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and

seasons.

[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two

words here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and

waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that

what is meant is "the general economy of Heaven," including the five

elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.]

8. EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and security;

open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. 9.

The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity,

benevolence, courage and strictness.

[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or

benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self- control, or

"proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here

"wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or benevolence,"

and the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self- respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"]

10. By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the

marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of

rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies

may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure. 11.

These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows

them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. 12.

Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the

military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in

this wise: — 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the

Moral law?

[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. ss. 5.]

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?  (3) With whom

lie the advantages derived from Heaven and  Earth?

[See ss. 7,8]

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Tsào Tsào (A.D. 155-

220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance

with his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he

condemned himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into

a field of corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded

to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Tsào Tsào's

own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt:

"when you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is

disobeyed the offender must be put to death."]

(5) Which army is stronger?

[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-chèn puts it, freely

rendered, "ESPIRIT DE CORPS and 'big battalions.'"]

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant practice, the

officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle;

without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute

when the crisis is at hand."]

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in  reward

and punishment?

[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that  merit will

be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?]

14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or

defeat. 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it,

will conquer: —let such a one be retained in command! The general

that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat: —

let such a one be dismissed!

[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise was

composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the

Wu State.]

16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any

helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. 17.

According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's

plans.

[Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish

theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles;

"for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be

guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a

favorable position in actual warfare." On the eve of the battle of

Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke

of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were

for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find

himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans

in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who

will attack the first tomorrow — I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his,

how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ]

18. All warfare is based on deception.

[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every

soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many

military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary

skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both

friend and foe."]

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using

our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make

the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make

him believe we are near. 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy.

Feign disorder, and crush him.

[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder,

crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still

illustrating the uses of deception in war.]

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If  he is in

superior strength, evade him.  22. If your opponent is of choleric

temper, seek to  irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow

arrogant.

[Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with

his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness

and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.]

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-chèn has the note:

"while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out."

The YU LAN has "Lure him on and tire him out."]

If his forces are united, separate them.

[Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the

commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division

between them."]

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you

are  not expected.  25. These military devices, leading to victory,

must not be  divulged beforehand.  26. Now the general who wins

a battle makes many  calculations in his temple ere the battle is

fought.

[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple

to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the

field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.]

The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations

beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few

calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by

attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser.

——————————————————————————————

——-

II. WAGING WAR

[Tsào Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count

the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the

chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a

consideration of ways and means.]

1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field

a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred

thousand mail-clad soldiers,

[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu,

used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed

for purposes of defense. Li Chùan, it is true, says that the latter were

light, but this seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note the

analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric

Greeks. In each case, the war- chariot was the important factor,

forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain

number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we

are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen,

and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would

be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two

chariots and a hundred men.]

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI,

[2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly

since Sun Tzu's time.]

the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of

guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on

chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver

per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. 2. When

you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's

weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay

siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. 3. Again, if the

campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to

the strain. 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor

damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other

chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no

man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must

ensue. 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,

cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the

commentators. Tsào Kung, Li Chùan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and

Mei Yao-chèn have notes to the effect that a general, though

naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of

rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves

expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be

very clever, but they bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades

the difficulty by remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army

growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and

distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the

occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory

can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness."

Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by implication,

about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy

operations. What he does say is something much more guarded,

namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness

can never be anything but foolish — if only because it means

impoverishment to the nation. In considering the point raised here by

Sun Tzu, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur

to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of

Rome against that of Hannibals's isolated army, because it seemed

to him that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in

a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics

would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal it is true,

led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption in

their favor.]

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged

warfare. 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils

of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it

on.

[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a

long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it

to a close. Only two commentators seem to favor this interpretation,

but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He

who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is

distinctly pointless.]

8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his

supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for

reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but

crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. This may seem an

audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from

Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time — that is,

being a little ahead of your opponent — has counted for more than

either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to

commissariat.]

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy.

Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means

"things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.]

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained

by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at

a distance causes the people to be impoverished.

[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the

next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement,

moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some

corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese

commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense,

and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tzu

used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment clearly

have reference to some system by which the husbandmen sent their

contributions of corn to the army direct. But why should it fall on them

to maintain an army in this way, except because the State or

Government is too poor to do so?]

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go

up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained

away.

[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own

territory. Tsào Kung understands it of an army that has already

crossed the frontier.]

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be

afflicted by heavy exactions. 13, 14. With this loss of substance and

exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,

and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;

[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of

3/10, but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted

from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The PEOPLE being

regarded as the essential part of the State, and FOOD as the

people's heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value

and be careful of both?"]

while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,

breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,

protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to

four-tenths of its total revenue. 15. Hence a wise general makes a

point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's

provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single

PICUL of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.

[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of

transporting one cartload to the front. A PICUL is a unit of measure

equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger;

that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must

have their rewards.

[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers

see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture

spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your

men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."]

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have

been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own

flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots

mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers

should be kindly treated and kept. 18. This is called, using the

conquered foe to augment one's own strength. 19. In war, then, let

your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzu

here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to

enforce."]

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of

the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation

shall be in peace or in peril.

——————————————————————————————

——-

III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to

take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is

not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to

destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire

than to destroy them.

[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted

nominally of 12500 men; according to Tsào Kung, the equivalent of a

regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists

from any number between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a

company contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last two, however,

Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.]

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme

excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's

resistance without fighting.

[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the

old Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the

huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.]

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans;

[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defense, whereby one

might be content to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another, but

an active policy of counter- attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in

his note: "When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we

must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."]

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces;

[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzu, in

speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or

principalities into which the China of his day was split up.]

the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;

[When he is already at full strength.]

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be

avoided.

[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it

in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before

Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that

they would have been masters of the situation before the British were

ready seriously to oppose them.]

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various

implements of war, will take up three whole months;

[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as

"mantlets", described. Tsào Kung simply defines them as "large

shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Chùan, who says

they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city

walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman

TESTUDO, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles

used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by Chèn Hao. See supra

II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the

"movable shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several

commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on four

wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides, and used

in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls, for the

purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that

they are now called "wooden donkeys."]

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three

months more.

[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the

level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak points in the

defense, and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the

preceding note.]

5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to

the assault like swarming ants,

[This vivid simile of Tsào Kung is taken from the spectacle of an

army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing

patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm

the place before his engines of war are ready.]

with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still

remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port

Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.]

6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without

any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he

overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no

harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after

having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and

mother of the people."]

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and

thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of

the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus,

the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."]

This is the method of attacking by stratagem. 8. It is the rule in war, if

our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one,

to attack him;

[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.]

if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it

appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts'ao Kung,

however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning: "Being two to the

enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way,

and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu thus further

elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as numerous as that of the

enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy

in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack,

he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be

crushed in front." This is what is meant by saying that 'one part may

be used in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.'

Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army is simply an

irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular, strategical method,

and he is too hasty in calling this a mistake."]

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;

[Li Chùan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If

attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able

general will fight."]

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;

[The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is certainly a great

improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no

very good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the

saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in

numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and

discipline.]

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. 10. Hence,

though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it

must be captured by the larger force. 11. Now the general is the

bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State

will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

[As Li Chùan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the

general's ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his

profession), his army will lack strength."]

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon

his army:— 13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat,

being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling

the army.

[Li Chùan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a

thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think

of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators

understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of Tài Kung: "A

kingdom should not be governed from without, and army should not

be directed from within." Of course it is true that, during an

engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, the general

should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart.

Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and

give wrong orders.]

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he

administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain

in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.

[Tsào Kung's note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the

civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle an army in kid

gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles

on which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and

flexibility, on the other hand, are military rather than civil virtues to

assimilate the governing of an army"—to that of a State, understood.]

15. (3) By employing the officers of his army

without  discrimination,

[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the  right place.]

through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to

circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

[I follow Mei Yao-chèn here. The other commentators refer not to the

ruler, as in SS. 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu

says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must

not be entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The

skillful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the

covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in

establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in

action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the

stupid man has no fear of death."]

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to

come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy

into the army, and flinging victory away. 17. Thus we may know that

there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when

to fight and when not to fight.

[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive;

if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will

invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive

or the defensive.]

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior

forces.

[This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers correctly,

as Li Chùan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the saying

more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a

lesser force to defeat a greater, and vice versa. The secret lies in an

eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu

says: 'With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior

one, make for difficult ground.'"]

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same

spirit  throughout all its ranks.  (4) He will win who, prepared

himself, waits to take the  enemy unprepared.  (5) He will win who

has military capacity and is not  interfered with by the sovereign.

[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "It is the sovereign's function to

give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of the

general." It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have

been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on the

part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of

his extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by

central authority.]

18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you

need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but

not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

[Li Chùan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Chìn, who in 383

A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When

warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services of

such men as Hsieh An and Huan Chùng, he boastfully replied: "I

have the population of eight provinces at my back, infantry and

horsemen to the number of one million; why, they could dam up the

Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into the stream.

What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon

after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat

a hasty retreat.]

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every

battle.

[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the

offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive."

He adds: "Attack is the secret of defense; defense is the planning of

an attack." It would be hard to find a better epitome of the root-

principle of war.]

——————————————————————————————

——-

IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS

[Tsào Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title

of this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two

armies with a view to discovering each other's condition." Tu Mu

says: "It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition may

be discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will

remain secret, which leads to victory,; show your dispositions, and

your condition will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi

remarks that the good general can "secure success by modifying his

tactics to meet those of the enemy."]

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond

the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of

defeating the enemy. 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our

own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by

the enemy himself.

[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part.]

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,

[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his

troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."]

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. 4. Hence the saying:

One may KNOW how to conquer without being able to DO it. 5.

Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the

enemy means taking the offensive.

[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1-3, in spite of the

fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they

give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible

enough.]

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient  strength;

attacking, a superabundance of strength.  7. The general who is

skilled in defense hides in the most  secret recesses of the earth;

[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not

know his whereabouts."]

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of

heaven.

[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a

thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the

opinion of most of the commentators.]

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the

other, a victory that is complete. 8. To see victory only when it is

within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

[As Tsào Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has

germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li

Chùan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack

the vastly superior army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in

the city of Chèng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going

to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers

hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But

Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever

stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city

and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."]

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and

the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move

surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk his schemes, so

that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood."

Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things that "the world's coarse

thumb And finger fail to plumb."]

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common

one in Chinese writers.]

to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise

of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick

hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu,

who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger

than a mustard seed; and Shih Kùang, a blind musician who could

hear the footsteps of a mosquito.]

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins,

but excels in winning with ease.

[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy

conquering." Mei Yao-chèn says: "He who only sees the obvious,

wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of

things, wins with ease."]

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor

credit for courage.

[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained

over circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large

knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom;

inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any

bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."]

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

[Chèn Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no

futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang

Yu: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he

may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be

vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future and discern

conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and

therefore invariably win."]

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it

means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. 14. Hence the

skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat

impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It

includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general

will make to increase the safety of his army.]

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle

after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat

first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which

will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not

begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no

longer be assured."]

16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly

adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control

success. 17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly,

Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation;

fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. 18. Measurement owes

its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement;

Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to

Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese.

The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground,

which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's strength, and to

make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led

to a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy's chances with

our own; if the latter turn the scale, then victory ensues. The chief

difficulty lies in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators

take as a calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making it nearly

synonymous with the second term. Perhaps the second term should

be thought of as a consideration of the enemy's general position or

condition, while the third term is the estimate of his numerical

strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative

strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources of

cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens

it. However, it points to the third term as being a calculation of

numbers.]

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight

placed in the scale against a single grain.

[Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed against a

SHU (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a SHU weighed against an I." The

point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force,

flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by defeat." Legge, in

his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the I to be 24 Chinese ounces,

and corrects Chu Hsi's statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li

Chùan of the Tàng dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.]

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up

waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

——————————————————————————————

——-

V. ENERGY

1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as

the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their

numbers.

[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with

subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han

Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him:

"How large an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than

100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!"

he answered, "the more the better."]

2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different

from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting

signs and signals. 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand

the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken - this is effected

by maneuvers direct and indirect.

[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu's

treatise, the discussion of the CHENG and the CHÌ." As it is by no

means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to

render them consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as

well to tabulate some of the commentators' remarks on the subject

before proceeding further. Li Chùan: "Facing the enemy is CHENG,

making lateral diversion is CHÌ. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy,

your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to

secure victory abnormal maneuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-

chèn: "CHÌ is active, CHENG is passive; passivity means waiting for

an opportunity, activity beings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is

secretly designed, and vice versa; thus CHENG may also be CHÌ,

and CHÌ may also be CHENG." He instances the famous exploit of

Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against Lin- chin (now

Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow

River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. [Chìen Han

Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was CHENG,

and the surprise maneuver was CHÌ." Chang Yu gives the following

summary of opinions on the words: "Military writers do not agree with

regard to the meaning of CHÌ and CHENG. Wei Liao Tzu [4th cent.

B.C.] says: 'Direct warfare favors frontal attacks, indirect warfare

attacks from the rear.' Tsào Kung says: 'Going straight out to join

battle is a direct operation; appearing on the enemy's rear is an

indirect maneuver.' Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war,

to march straight ahead is CHENG; turning movements, on the other

hand, are CHÌ.' These writers simply regard CHENG as CHENG,

and CHÌ as CHÌ; they do not note that the two are mutually

interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a circle

[see infra, ss. 11]. A comment on the Tàng Emperor Tài Tsung goes

to the root of the matter: 'A CHÌ maneuver may be CHENG, if we

make the enemy look upon it as CHENG; then our real attack will be

CHÌ, and vice versa. The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy,

so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'" To put it perhaps a little

more clearly: any attack or other operation is CHENG, on which the

enemy has had his attention fixed; whereas that is CHÌ," which takes

him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy

perceives a movement which is meant to be CHÌ," it immediately

becomes CHENG."]

4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed

against an egg - this is effected by the science of weak points and

strong. 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining

battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding

the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of

"indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord

Roberts' night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan

war. [1]

6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and

Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and

moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass

away to return once more.

[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of CHÌ

and CHENG." But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG at

all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause

relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been

pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military

operations, that they cannot really be considered apart. Here we

simply have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost

infinite resource of a great leader.]

7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations

of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. 8.

There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white,

and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever

been seen. 9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour,

acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors

than can ever be tasted. 10. In battle, there are not more than two

methods of attack - the direct and the indirect; yet these two in

combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. 11. The

direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in

a circle - you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the

possibilities of their combination? 12. The onset of troops is like the

rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course. 13.

The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which

enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is

used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word

as "the measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning

does not quite fit the illustrative simile in ss. 15. Applying this

definition to the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct of SELF

RESTRAINT which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until

the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right

moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly

important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very instant

at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several

minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a

single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close range,

when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the

enemy's nearest ships.]

14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt

in his decision.

[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of

distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking.

But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use the word in a

figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf.

Wang Hsi's note, which after describing the falcon's mode of attack,

proceeds: "This is just how the 'psychological moment' should be

seized in war."]

15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to

the releasing of a trigger.

[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile

of energy and the force stored up in the bent cross- bow until

released by the finger on the trigger.]

16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming

disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos,

your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against

defeat.

[Mei Yao-chèn says: "The subdivisions of the army having been

previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating

and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the

course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real

disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your

dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out of

the question."]

17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear

postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone

down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Tsào Kung throws

out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to

destroy formation and conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu is the first

to put it quite plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure

the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to

display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme

courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the

enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."]

18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of

subdivision;

[See supra, ss. 1.]

concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of

latent energy;

[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here

differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says:

"seeing that we are favorably circumstanced and yet make no move,

the enemy will believe that we are really afraid."]

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical

dispositions.

[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han

Emperor: "Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report

on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed

all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm

soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies

one and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou

Ching alone opposed them, saying: "When two countries go to war,

they are naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their

strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity.

This is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, and it would be

unwise for us to attack." The Emperor, however, disregarding this

advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at Po-teng."]

19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move

maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will

act.

[Tsào Kung's note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu

says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's, weakness

may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be

led to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In

fact, all the enemy's movements should be determined by the signs

that we choose to give him." Note the following anecdote of Sun Pin,

a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the Chì State being at war

with Wei, sent Tìen Chi and Sun Pin against the general Pàng

Chuan, who happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later.

Sun Pin said: "The Chì State has a reputation for cowardice, and

therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to

account." Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into

Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night,

50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. Pàng Chuan

pursued them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these men of Chì

were cowards: their numbers have already fallen away by more than

half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow defile, which he

calculated that his pursuers would reach after dark. Here he had a

tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the words: "Under this

tree shall Pàng Chuan die." Then, as night began to fall, he placed a

strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to shoot

directly if they saw a light. Later on, Pàng Chuan arrived at the spot,

and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written

on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his

whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu's version of

the story; the SHIH CHI, less dramatically but probably with more

historical truth, makes Pàng Chuan cut his own throat with an

exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] ]

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then  with a

body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads,  "He

lies in wait with the main body of his troops."]

21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined  energy,

and does not require too much from individuals.

[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the

bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses

each men according to his capabilities. He does not demand

perfection from the untalented."]

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined

energy. 22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men

become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature

of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move

when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-

shaped, to go rolling down.

[Tsàu Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."]

23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the

momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of

feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's opinion, is the paramount

importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great

results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."]

[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46.

——————————————————————————————

——-

VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG

[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows:

"Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the

defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect

methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of

attack and defense, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect

methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two

methods before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points.

For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and

defense, and the perception of weak and strong points depends

again on the above methods. Hence the present chapter comes

immediately after the chapter on Energy."]

1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of

the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field

and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. 2. Therefore the

clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow

the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or fights

not at all. [1] ]

3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to

approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it

impossible for the enemy to draw near.

[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will

strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.]

4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;

[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-

  Chèn's interpretation of I. ss. 23.]

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped,

he can force him to move. 5. Appear at points which the enemy must

hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not

expected. 6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it

marches through country where the enemy is not.

[Tsào Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a

bolt from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are

defended, attack in unexpected quarters."]

7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack

places which are undefended.

[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit;

where the walls are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict

enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or

the defenders are variance amongst themselves."]

You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions

that cannot be attacked.

[I.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned above.

There is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later

clause. Tu Mu, Chèn Hao, and Mei Yao-chèn assume the meaning

to be: "In order to make your defense quite safe, you must defend

EVEN those places that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu

adds: "How much more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken

thus, however, the clause balances less well with the preceding—

always a consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural

to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark

in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost

heights of heaven [see IV. ss. 7], making it impossible for the enemy

to guard against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are

precisely those that the enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in

defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it

impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so,

the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot

attack."]

8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not

know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent

does not know what to attack.

[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.]

9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we  learn to

be invisible, through you inaudible;

[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of  course with

reference to the enemy.]

and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. 10. You may

advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's

weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your

movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. 11. If we wish to

fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be

sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is

attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line

of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to

return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the

sovereign himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in

the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.]

12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from

engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely

traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd

and unaccountable in his way.

[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia

Lin: "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li

Chùan says: "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;"

and Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative

anecdotes—one of Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying Yang-pìng

and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colors,

stopped the beating of the drums, and flung open the city gates,

showing only a few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling the

ground. This unexpected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-

ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated.

What Sun Tzu is advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less

than the timely use of "bluff."]

13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible

ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's

must be divided.

[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei

Yao-chèn) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy's dispositions are

visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own

dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his

forces in order to guard against attack from every quarter."]

14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up

into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate

parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's

few. 15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a

superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. 16. The spot where

we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will

have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points;

[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's victories by

saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering

what he was going to do, HE was thinking most of what he was going

to do himself."]

and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers

we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear;

should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he

strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his

right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere,

he will everywhere be weak.

[In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we

read: "A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent

detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience

attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted

with their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard

against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid

greater."]

18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against

possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary

to make these preparations against us.

[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words, is "to compel

the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior

force against each fraction in turn."]

19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may

concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

[What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of

distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a

general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march,

and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the

right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength.

Among many such successful junctions which military history records,

one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of

Blucher just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.]

20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be

impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the

left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van.

How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything

under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are separated by

several LI!

[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but

the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army

advancing towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of

which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the

various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise

instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be

able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu's note may be worth

quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents

mean to concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity

will be forfeited through our preparations for defense, and the

positions we hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a

powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and

no mutual support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear,

especially if there is any great distance between the foremost and

hindmost divisions of the army."]

21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our

own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of

victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.

[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states

ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its

incorporation in Yueh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzu's death.

With his present assertion compare IV. ss. 4. Chang Yu is the only

one to point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to

explain: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, 'One may

KNOW how to conquer without being able to DO it,' whereas here we

have the statement that 'victory' can be achieved.' The explanation is,

that in the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are

under discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one

cannot make certain of beating him. But the present passage refers

particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who, according to Sun Tzu's

calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the

impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be

achieved."]

22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him

from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood

of their success.

[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all

plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's failure."

23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.

[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the

enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether

his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-

ku Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman's head-dress to

Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.]

Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. 24.

Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may

know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.

[Cf. IV. ss. 6.]

25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is

to conceal them;

[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment

is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra ss. 9) as

"showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are

formed in your brain.]

conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the

subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable

officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."]

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the

enemy's  own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot

comprehend.  27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,

but what  none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.

[I.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they

cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has

preceded the battle.]

28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but

let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.

[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root- principle

underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in

number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy

are few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be

taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such

knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon

than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."]

29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its  natural

course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.  30.

So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to  strike at what is

weak.

[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.]

31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground

over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the

foe whom he is facing. 32. Therefore, just as water retains no

constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. 33.

He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby

succeed in winning, may be called a heaven- born captain. 34. The

five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally

predominant;

[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."]

the four seasons make way for each other in turn.

[Literally, "have no invariable seat."]

There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning

and waxing.

[Cf. V. ss. 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the

want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature.

The comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of

the phenomena which Sun Tzu mentions is by no means paralleled in

war.]

[1] See Col. Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed.,

vol. II, p. 490.

——————————————————————————————

——-

VII. MANEUVERING

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the

sovereign. 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces,

he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before

pitching his camp.

["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence

between the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;"

and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without

harmony in the State, no military expedition can be undertaken;

without harmony in the army, no battle array can be formed." In an

historical romance Sun Tzu is represented as saying to Wu Yuan: "As

a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all the

domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe."]

3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing

more difficult.

[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Tsào

Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign's

instructions until our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics

to be pursued are most difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or

maneuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has sallied forth

and encamped, and Chìen Hao's note gives color to this view: "For

levying, concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there

are plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes when

we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favorable

position."]

The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious

into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and

somewhat enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond. This

is how it is explained by Tsào Kung: "Make it appear that you are a

long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene

before your opponent." Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he

may be remiss and leisurely while you are dashing along with utmost

speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly different turn: "Although you may

have difficult ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter

this is a drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by

celerity of movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by

the two famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which

laid Italy at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later,

which resulted in the great victory of Marengo.]

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy

out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the

goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.

[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the

town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Chìn army. The King

of Chao first consulted Lien Pò on the advisability of attempting a

relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening

country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She,

who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said:

"We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole—and the pluckier one

will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had only gone a

distance of 30 LI when he stopped and began throwing up

entrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his

fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the intelligence to

the enemy. The Chìn general was overjoyed, and attributed his

adversary's tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the

Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies

had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting

for two days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with

such astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding

position on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his

movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Chìn forces, who

were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat across

the border.]

5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined

multitude, most dangerous.

[I adopt the reading of the TÙNG TIEN, Cheng Yu-hsien and the TÙ

SHU, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order

to make sense. The commentators using the standard text take this

line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable, or they may be

dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general.]

6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an

advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other

hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice

of its baggage and stores.

[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese

commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own

rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is

some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that

Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being undertaken

without supplies. Cf. infra, ss. 11.]

7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make

forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the

usual distance at a stretch,

[The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 LI; but on one

occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Tsào Tsào is said to have covered

the incredible distance of 300 li within twenty-four hours.]

doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all

your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. 8. The

stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on

this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

[The moral is, as Tsào Kung and others point out: Don't march a

hundred LI to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without

impedimenta. Maneuvers of this description should be confined to

short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of forced

marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle." He did

not often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only

when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative,

that he sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ]

9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will

lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach

the goal.

[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be  TORN AWAY."]

10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds  of your

army will arrive.

[In the TÙNG TIEN is added: "From this we may know

the  difficulty of maneuvering."]

11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage- train is

lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

[I think Sun Tzu meant "stores accumulated in depots." But Tu Yu

says "fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."]

12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the

designs of our neighbors. 13. We are not fit to lead an army on the

march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its

mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and

swamps. 14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account

unless we make use of local guides.

[ss. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. ss. 52.]

15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.

[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to

the numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position.

[2] ]

16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must  be

decided by circumstances.  17. Let your rapidity be that of the

wind,

[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift

but, as Mei Yao-chèn points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."]

your compactness that of the forest.

[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly

marching, order and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard

against surprise attacks. But natural forest do not grow in rows,

whereas they do generally possess the quality of density or

compactness.]

18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,

[Cf. SHIH CHING, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man

can check."]

in immovability like a mountain.

[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to

dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice

you into a trap.]

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you

move, fall like a thunderbolt.

[Tu Yu quotes a saying of Tài Kung which has passed into a proverb:

"You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the

lighting—so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so

quickly that it cannot be parried.]

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst

your men;

[Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by

insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which

may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.]

when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit

of the soldiery.

[Chèn Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow

and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands

they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some

of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of

Pan Chào who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years,

those of Fu-kàng-an and Tso Tsung-tàng.]

21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not break

camp until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the

cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I.

ss. 13.]

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.

[See supra, SS. 3, 4.]

Such is the art of maneuvering.

[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But

there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an

earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when

Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different

from that of Sun Tzu himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as

to its genuineness.]

23. The Book of Army Management says:

[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us

any information about this work. Mei Yao- Chèn calls it "an ancient

military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries

before Sun Tzu's time between the various kingdoms and

principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable that a collection of

military maxims should have been made and written down at some

earlier period.]

On the field of battle,

[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.]

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of

gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough:

hence the institution of banners and flags. 24. Gongs and drums,

banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host

may be focused on one particular point.

[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the

same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be

like those of a single man."!]

25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either

for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.

[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance

against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a

story in this connection of Wu Chì, when he was fighting against the

Chìn State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man

of matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from

the enemy, and returned to camp. Wu Chì had the man instantly

executed, whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying:

"This man was a good soldier, and ought not to have been

beheaded." Wu Chì replied: "I fully believe he was a good soldier,

but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders."]

This is the art of handling large masses of men. 26. In night-fighting,

then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by

day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and

eyes of your army.

[Chèn Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi's night ride to Ho-yang at the head

of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with

torches, that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large

army, he did not dare to dispute their passage.]

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;

["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be

irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy's soldiers will be keenest

when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our

cue not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm

have worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be

robbed of their keen spirit." Li Chùan and others tell an anecdote (to

be found in the TSO CHUAN, year 10, ss. 1) of Tsào Kuei, a protege

of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Chì, and the

duke was about to join battle at Chàng-cho, after the first roll of the

enemy's drums, when Tsào said: "Not just yet." Only after their

drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack.

Then they fought, and the men of Chì were utterly defeated.

Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay,

Tsào Kuei replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now

the first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second

it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I

attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence

our victory." Wu Tzu (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a whole

army—a mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man

alone: such is the influence of spirit!"]

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general's most important

asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to

inspire courage into the panic- stricken." The great general Li Ching

(A.D. 571-649) has a saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in

assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must

include the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium."]

28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;

[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle

of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting,

whereas Hannibal's men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy,

XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.]

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent

only on returning to camp. 29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an

army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and

inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods. 30. Disciplined

and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst

the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. 31. To be

near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while

the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is

famished:—this is the art of husbanding one's strength. 32. To refrain

from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to

refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident

array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. 33. It is a military

axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him

when he comes downhill. 34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates

flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. 35. Do not

swallow bait offered by the enemy.

[Li Chùan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor,

take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been

poisoned by the enemy. Chèn Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out

that the saying has a wider application.]

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by

saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to

the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too

dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of

Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth

homewards." A marvelous tale is told of Tsào Tsào's courage and

resource in ch. 1 of the SAN KUO CHI: In 198 A.D., he was besieging

Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view

to cutting off Tsào's retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his

troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who

were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged

himself. In this desperate plight Tsào waited until nightfall, when he

bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As

soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his

rear, while Tsào himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that

they were thrown into confusion and annihilated. Tsào Tsào said

afterwards: "The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and

brought me to battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to

overcome them."]

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The

object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road

to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair."

Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."]

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

[Chèn Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to

bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to

stake all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to

extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from

the life of Yen-chìng. That general, together with his colleague Tu

Chung-wei was surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in

the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desert-like, and the little

Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells

they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of

mud and sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at

last Fu Yen-chìng exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to

die for our country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A

strong gale happened to be blowing from the northeast and darkening

the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for

waiting until this had abated before deciding on a final attack; but

luckily another officer, Li Shou- cheng by name, was quicker to see

an opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are few, but in the

midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory

will go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally."

Accordingly, Fu Yen-chìng made a sudden and wholly unexpected

onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in

breaking through to safety.]

37. Such is the art of warfare.

[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426.

[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne"

(Longmans, 1907), p. 29.

——————————————————————————————

——-

VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS

[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzu

does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already

told us (V SS. 6-11) that such deflections from the ordinary course

are practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang

Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost

degree…. I do not know what Tsào Kung makes these Nine

Variations out to be, but it has been suggested that they are

connected with the Nine Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view

adopted by Chang Yu. The only other alternative is to suppose that

something has been lost—a supposition to which the unusual

shortness of the chapter lends some weight.]

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the

sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.

[Repeated from VII. ss. 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may

have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to

the chapter.]

2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high

roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in

dangerously isolated positions.

[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the

beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. ss. 43. q.v.). Chang

Yu defines this situation as being situated across the frontier, in

hostile territory. Li Chùan says it is "country in which there are no

springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin,

"one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to

advance."]

In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate

position, you must fight. 3. There are roads which must not be

followed,

["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says

Li  Chùan, "where an ambush is to be feared."]

armies which must be not attacked,

[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be

attacked." Chèn Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival

advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from

attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men's strength."]

towns which must not be besieged,

[Cf. III. ss. 4 Tsào Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own

experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the

city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the

heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the

subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities.

Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot

be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." Hsun Ying, when

urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and well-fortified;

even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great feat of arms; whereas if

I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In the seventeenth

century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne

who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches

and maneuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in taking

a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province."

[1] ]

positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign

which must not be obeyed.

[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for

authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:

"Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a

military commander is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable

fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be

subordinated to military necessity.]

4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that

accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. 5.

The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted

with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his

knowledge to practical account.

[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only

securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in

every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is

characterized by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a

certain variability of plan. How it is possible to turn these natural

features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented

by versatility of mind?"]

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying

his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages,

will fail to make the best use of his men.

[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally

advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it

must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town

is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can be

stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military

operations, the ruler's commands must be obeyed." But there are

circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these

advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for

him, but if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the

enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile

force may be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed

and likely to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and

so on.]

7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and

of disadvantage will be blended together.

["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,"

says Tsào Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to

your mind."]

8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may

succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.

[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we

must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the

enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into

our calculations."]

9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always

ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from

misfortune.

[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I

must consider not only the enemy's ability to injure me, but also my

own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels

these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in

liberating myself…. For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy

and only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy

will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better

to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the

advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy's toils." See the

story of Tsào Tsào, VII. ss. 35, note.]

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;

[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of

which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the

enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left without

counselors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the government

policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus

sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By means of

every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and

waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading

him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with

lovely women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different

interpretation of Sun Tzu here: "Get the enemy into a position where

he must suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord."]

and make trouble for them,

[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble

should be make for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we

might say, "assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of

commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.]

and keep them constantly engaged;

[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent  the from having any rest."]

hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given

point.

[Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use

of: "cause them to forget PIEN (the reasons for acting otherwise than

on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."]

11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the

enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on

the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have

made our position unassailable. 12. There are five dangerous faults

which may affect a general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to

destruction;

["Bravery without forethought," as Tsào Kung analyzes it, which

causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such

an opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute

force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzu, chap.

IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to

pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only

one out of many qualities which a general should possess. The

merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights

recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be

condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the incisive remark: "Simply

going to one's death does not bring about victory."]

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;

[Tsào Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice"

as being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize

an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight

of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent

on returning alive," this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as

Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing

to take risks. Tài Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will

subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu

pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval

battle with him at the island of Chèng-hung. The loyal troops

numbered only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great

force. But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him

should be be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his

war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment's

notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers

was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from

windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in

the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were routed, had to burn all their

baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu

tells a somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-chì, a general of the

Chin State who during a battle with the army of Chù in 597 B.C. had

a boat kept in readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat

to be the first to get across.]

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;

[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang

Mei, Teng Chìang and others shut himself up behind his walls and

refused to fight. Teng Chìang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric

temper and easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break

down his walls, then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can

bring his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was

acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-

yuan by the enemy's pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.]

(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;

[This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is really a

defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an

exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned

man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-

chèn truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: "The seek

after glory should be careless of public opinion."]

(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and

trouble.

[Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be

careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is

the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to the

immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because

in the long run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best,

the prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A

mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a

beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary

to his military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated

efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many

strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the

end, relief came through the very man who started out with the

distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to

sentiment in favor of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who

failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to

defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his

men." By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him

out of Sun Tzu's mouth.]

13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the

conduct of war. 14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain,

the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let

them be a subject of meditation.

[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.

——————————————————————————————

——-

IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH

[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in ss. 1

than by this heading.]

1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the

army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over

mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.

[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to

supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural

ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu Chìang was a robber captain in the time of the

Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his gang. Chìang

having found a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force

a battle, but seized all the favorable positions commanding supplies

of water and forage. Chìang was soon in such a desperate plight for

want of provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He

did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of

valleys."]

2. Camp in high places,

[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the

surrounding country.]

facing the sun.

[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Chèn Hao "facing

east." Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13.

Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.

3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.

["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Tsào

Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your

evolutions." The TÙNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY crosses a

river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an

interpolation.]

4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not

advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army

get across, and then deliver your attack.

[Li Chùan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung

Chu at the Wei River. Turning to the CHÌEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, fol. 6

verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were

drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin

ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand

and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading half his army across,

he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, pretending to have failed in

his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was

much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure

that Han Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued him and began

crossing the river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open

the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume of water, which swept

down and prevented the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from

getting across. He then turned upon the force which had been cut off,

and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The

rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all

directions.]

5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader

near a river which he has to cross.

[For fear of preventing his crossing.]

6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.

[See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these words in connection with

water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops

marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself;

in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing

the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit.]

Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.

[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our

camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open

the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu- hou has

remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance against the

stream,' which is as much as to say that our fleet must not be

anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would be able to

take advantage of the current and make short work of us." There is

also the danger, noted by other commentators, that the enemy may

throw poison on the water to be carried down to us.]

So much for river warfare. 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole

concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.

[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage,

and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to

attack.]

8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass

near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.

[Li Chùan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous

where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect

the rear.]

So much for operations in salt-marches. 9. In dry, level country, take

up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and

on your rear,

[Tu Mu quotes Tài Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream

or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."]

so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for

campaigning in flat country. 10. These are the four useful branches of

military knowledge

[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3)

marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military Maxims," no.

1.]

which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several

sovereigns.

[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-chèn asks, with some

plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known of

Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The SHIH CHI (ch.

1 ad init.) speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Chìh Yu. In the

LIU TÀO it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified

the Empire." Tsào Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor

was the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of

whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li

Chùan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who

received it from his Minister Feng Hou.]

11. All armies prefer high ground to low.

["High Ground," says Mei Yao-chèn, "is not only more agreeable and salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low

ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for

fighting."]

and sunny places to dark. 12. If you are careful of your men,

[Tsào Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where  you

can turn out your animals to graze."]

and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every

kind,

[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent  the

outbreak of illness."]

and this will spell victory. 13. When you come to a hill or a bank,

occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will

at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural

advantages of the ground. 14. When, in consequence of heavy rains

up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with

foam, you must wait until it subsides. 15. Country in which there are

precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows,

[The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks,

with pools of water at the bottom.]

confined places,

[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by

precipices on three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."]

tangled thickets,

[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that

spears cannot be used."]

quagmires

[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable

for chariots and horsemen."]

and crevasses,

[Defined by Mei Yao-chèn as "a narrow difficult way between

beetling cliffs." Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague,

but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and

Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the

commentators certainly inclines to the rendering "defile." But the

ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure"

and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the

sentence indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think

that Sun Tzu is here speaking of crevasses.]

should be left with all possible speed and not approached. 16. While

we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to

approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have

them on his rear. 17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there

should be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass,

hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they

must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places

where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.

[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against

traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our

weaknesses and overhearing our instructions."]

18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying

on the natural strength of his position.

[Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much of

which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual

like Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."]

19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious

for the other side to advance.

[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes

to dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to

force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less

probability of our responding to the challenge."]

20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is  tendering

a bait.  21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that

the  enemy is advancing.

[Tsào Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and

Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places

and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are

moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to

clear a passage for the enemy's march."]

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass

means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.

[Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Tsào Kung's, is as follows: "The

presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick

vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit,

has constructed these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an

ambush." It appears that these "screens" were hastily knotted

together out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened

to come across.]

22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade.

[Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying

along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers

are in ambush at the spot beneath."]

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. 23. When

there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots

advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it

betokens the approach of infantry.

["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat

exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the

phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than

men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-

track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many

abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the march must

have scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by

the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief."

Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you move along, say, in a hostile

country, your eyes should be looking afar for the enemy or any signs

of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ]

When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have

been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro

signify that the army is encamping.

[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defenses for a cantonment, light

horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak

and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small

quantity of dust and its motion."]

24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the

enemy is about to advance.

["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack

us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of Tìen Tan of the Chì-mo

against the Yen forces, led by Chì Chieh. In ch. 82 of the SHIH CHI

we read: "Tìen Tan openly said: 'My only fear is that the Yen army

may cut off the noses of their Chì prisoners and place them in the

front rank to fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.'

The other side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the

suggestion; but those within the city were enraged at seeing their

fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should

fall into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend themselves more

obstinately than ever. Once again Tìen Tan sent back converted

spies who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is

that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town,

and by inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become

faint-hearted.' Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and

burned the corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo,

witnessing the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and

were all impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased

tenfold. Tìen Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any

enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in his

hands, and ordered others to be distributed amongst his best

warriors, while the ranks were filled up with their wives and

concubines. He then served out all the remaining rations and bade

his men eat their fill. The regular soldiers were told to keep out of

sight, and the walls were manned with the old and weaker men and

with women. This done, envoys were dispatched to the enemy's

camp to arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the Yen army began

shouting for joy. Tìen Tan also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from

the people, and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the

Yen general with the prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would

allow their homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated.

Chì Chieh, in high good humor, granted their prayer; but his army

now became increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, Tìen Tan

got together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk,

painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored stripes, and fastened

sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on their tails.

When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and drove

the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in the

walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The

animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the enemy's

camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for their

tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their

bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with

whom they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had

crept up with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the

enemy. At the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all

those that remained behind making as much noise as possible by

banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and

earth were convulsed by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army

fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Chì, who succeeded in

slaying their general Chì Chien…. The result of the battle was the

ultimate recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the

Chì State."]

Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that

he will retreat. 25. When the light chariots come out first and take up

a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for

battle. 26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant

indicate a plot.

[The reading here is uncertain. Li Chùan indicates "a treaty

confirmed by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the

other hand, simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."]

27. When there is much running about

[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental

banner.]

and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has

come. 28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is

a lure. 29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are

faint from want of food. 30. If those who are sent to draw water begin

by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.

[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a

whole  army from the behavior of a single man."]

31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes  no

effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.  32. If birds gather

on any spot, it is unoccupied.

[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Chèn  Hao

says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.]

Clamor by night betokens nervousness.

33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is

weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If

the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.

[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an

army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with

fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them.]

34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its  cattle

for food,

[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on  grain

and the horses chiefly on grass.]

and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-

fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know

that they are determined to fight to the death.

[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the HOU HAN SHU,

ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by the PÈI WEN YUN FU: "The

rebel Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Chèn- tsàng,

and Huang-fu Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung Cho

were sent out against him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but

Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly

worn out, and began to throw down their weapons of their own

accord. Sung was not advancing to the attack, but Cho said: 'It is a

principle of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a

retreating host.' Sung answered: 'That does not apply here. What I

am about to attack is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with

disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganized multitude, not a band

of desperate men.' Thereupon he advances to the attack

unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo

being slain."]

35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking

in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. 36.

Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his

resources;

[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is

always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the

men in good temper.]

too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.

[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed,

and  unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.]

37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at  the

enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.

[I follow the interpretation of Tsào Kung, also adopted by Li Chùan,

Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu,

Chia Lin, Mei Tao-chèn and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first

tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny,

etc." This would connect the sentence with what went before about

rewards and punishments.]

38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a

sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.

[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending

hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either

because their strength is exhausted or for some other reason." But it

hardly needs a Sun Tzu to draw such an obvious inference.]

39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for

a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again,

the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.

[Tsào Kung says a maneuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain

time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.]

40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply

sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made.

[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, CHENG tactics and

frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to

instead.]

What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength,

keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.

[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed

in squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li Chùan, who

appears to offer the simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets

more men will win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu to expound its

meaning to us in language which is lucidity itself: "When the numbers

are even, and no favorable opening presents itself, although we may

not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find

additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then,

concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy,

contrive to snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign

soldiers to help us." He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 3: "The

nominal strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real

value will be not more than half that figure."]

41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his

opponents is sure to be captured by them.

[Chèn Hao, quoting from the TSO CHUAN, says: "If bees and

scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a

puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt."]

42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you,

they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be

practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to

you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless. 43.

Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity,

but kept under control by means of iron discipline.

[Yen Tzu [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues

endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in

awe." Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander unites culture

with a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination

of hardness and tenderness."]

This is a certain road to victory.

44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army

will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. 45. If a general

shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being

obeyed,

[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly

confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that

when they come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and

discipline maintained, because they all trust and look up to him."

What Sun Tzu has said in ss. 44, however, would lead one rather to

expect something like this: "If a general is always confident that his

orders will be carried out," etc."]

the gain will be mutual.

[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his

command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus

the gain is mutual" He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao

Tzu, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor

blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and

fussiness are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an

army.]

[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26.

——————————————————————————————

——-

X. TERRAIN

[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising ss. ss. 1-13, deals with

"terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six calamities" are discussed in SS. 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is

again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting,

perhaps, on that account.]

1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain,  to wit:

(1) Accessible ground;

[Mei Yao-chèn says: "plentifully provided with roads and  means

of communications."]

(2) entangling ground;

[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which

you become entangled."]

(3) temporizing ground;

[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."]

(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great

distance from the enemy.

[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification.

A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman's

unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross- divisions such as the

above.]

2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called

ACCESSIBLE. 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the

enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard

your line of supplies.

[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu

says, "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of

Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the communications," [1]

we could wish that Sun Tzu had done more than skirt the edge of this

important subject here and in I. ss. 10, VII. ss. 11. Col. Henderson

says: "The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of

an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist

who finds his adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and

his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's

movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the

commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds

himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to

change all his plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated

detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he

has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary

failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army." [2]

Then you will be able to fight with advantage. 4. Ground which can be

abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called ENTANGLING. 5. From

a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth

and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and

you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will

ensue. 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by

making the first move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground.

[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and  the

situation remains at a deadlock."]

7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should  offer

us an attractive bait,

[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But

this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our

position.]

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing

the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we

may deliver our attack with advantage. 8. With regard to NARROW

PASSES, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly

garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.

[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and

by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy

at our mercy."]

9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after

him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.

10. With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if you are beforehand

with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots,

and there wait for him to come up.

[Tsào Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and

defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy."

[For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. ss. 2].

Chang Yu tells the following anecdote of Pèi Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-

682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes.

"At night he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been

completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders

that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly

displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the extra

fatigue which it would entail on the men. Pèi Hsing- chien, however,

paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as

quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which

flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve

feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned

that they had been in the wrong. 'How did you know what was going

to happen?' they asked. Pèi Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time

forward be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary

questions.' From this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high

and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also

because they are immune from disastrous floods."]

11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but

retreat and try to entice him away.

[The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D. against the

two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-chùng,

Prince of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spike of

which Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-

yang, was defeated and taken prisoner. See CHIU TÀNG, ch. 2, fol.

5 verso, and also ch. 54.]

12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the

strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle,

[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and

wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be

exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."]

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.

[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. ss.

8.]

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to

study them. 14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not

arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is

responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse;

(4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6) rout. 15. Other conditions being

equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the

result will be the FLIGHT of the former. 16. When the common

soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is

INSUBORDINATION.

[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of Tìen Pu [HSIN TÀNG SHU, ch.

148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army

against Wang Tìng-tsòu. But the whole time he was in command,

his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted

his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands

at a time. Tìen Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and

when, after some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage

the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction.

After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his

throat.]

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak,

the result is COLLAPSE.

[Tsào Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to  press

on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."]

17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on

meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of

resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he

is in a position to fight, the result is RUIN.

[Wang Hsìs note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause,

and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his

subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an

avalanche of ruin upon his head."]

18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders

are not clear and distinct;

[Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with

decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are

made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about

doing their duty." General Baden- Powell says, italicizing the words:

"The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in

one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf.

also Wu Tzu ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a military leader is

difference; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from

hesitation."]

when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men,

[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."]

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result

is utter DISORGANIZATION. 19. When a general, unable to estimate

the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one,

or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to

place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT.

[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues:

"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be

appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the

resolution of our own men and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the

primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).]

20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully

noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.

[See supra, ss. 13.]

21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's  best ally;

[Chèn Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season

are  not equal to those connected with ground."]

but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of

victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and

distances, constitutes the test of a great general. 22. He who knows

these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win

his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be

defeated. 23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight,

even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then

you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.

[Cf. VIII. ss. 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Chìn dynasty, who is said

to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the SAN

LUEH, has these words attributed to him: "The responsibility of

setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if

advance and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results

will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened

monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country's

cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that

"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military

commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying:

"Decrees from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a

camp."] 24. The general who advances without coveting fame and

retreats without fearing disgrace,

[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing  of all

for a soldier is to retreat.]

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for

his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior."

Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment,

would not regret his conduct."]

25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you

into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons,

and they will stand by you even unto death.

[Cf. I. ss. 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging

picture of the famous general Wu Chì, from whose treatise on war I

have frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes

and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to

have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own

surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with

his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu

Chì himself sucked out the virus. The soldier's mother, hearing this,

began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do

you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-

in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The woman

replied, 'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my

husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death at

the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for my

son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.'" Li Chùan mentions

the Viscount of Chù, who invaded the small state of Hsiao during the

winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of the soldiers are

suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round of the whole

army, comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt

as if they were clothed in garments lined with floss silk.]

26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority

felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and

incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be

likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.

[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you,

they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of

stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng

was occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders

to his army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them

by force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner,

who happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a

bamboo hat belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over

his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng

considered that the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should

not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly

he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face,

however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the army with

wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles dropped in the

highway were not picked up.]

27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are

unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only

halfway towards victory.

[That is, Tsào Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."]

28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that

our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only

halfway towards victory.

[Cf. III. ss. 13 (1).]

29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that

our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature

of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only

halfway towards victory. 30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in

motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at

a loss.

[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his

measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does

not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move,

he makes no mistakes."]

31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your

victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth,

you may make your victory complete.

[Li Chùan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three things—

the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages

of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."]

[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47.

[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2.

[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.

——————————————————————————————

——-

XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground:

(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4)

open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground;

(7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. 2.

When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.

[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and

anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the

opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their

advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valor of desperation,

and when they retreat, they will find harbors of refuge."]

3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great

distance, it is facile ground.

[Li Chùan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating,"

and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu

remarks: "When your army has crossed the border, you should burn

your boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that

you have no hankering after home."]

4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either

side, is contentious ground.

[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Tsào

Kung says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the

many and the strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Chùan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this classification because the

possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire

invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzu,

ch. V. ad init.: "For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten,

there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was

returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D.,

and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator

of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of

Chìn, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the

province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-chàng, counseled him, saying:

"Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are

vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of

the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a

different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the

Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when

his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms

without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off,

we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer.

The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be expended in

vain against the enormous strength of these two positions." Liang

Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away

by the invader.]

5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open

ground.

[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this

type of ground. Tsào Kung says it means "ground covered with a

network of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on

which intercommunication is easy."]

6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

[Tsàu Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy's and

a third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the

small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by

Chì, on the west by Chin, and on the south by Chù.]

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his

command,

[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can  constrain

most of them to become his allies.]

is a ground of intersecting highways. 7. When an army has

penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of

fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.

[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has

reached such a point, its situation is serious."]

8. Mountain forests,

[Or simply "forests."]

rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to

traverse: this is difficult ground. 9. Ground which is reached through

narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths,

so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large

body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. 10. Ground on which we

can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is

desperate ground.

[The situation, as pictured by Tsào Kung, is very similar to the

"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible:

"A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible,

retreat blocked." Chèn Hao says: "to be on 'desperate ground' is like

sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu

quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus

entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid

of local guides: — it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's

mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so

perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots

carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no

choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to

range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming

strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere

take a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We

seek a pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none

of us has a moment's respite. If we simply maintain our ground,

whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move,

we have to sustain the enemy's attacks on front and rear. The

country is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in

the necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out,

all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow

that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten thousand;

all means of offense in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage

already forfeited by ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we

had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could

they be employed with the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history

may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the

agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See

Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].]

11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt

not. On contentious ground, attack not.

[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the

advantageous position first. So Tsào Kung. Li Chùan and others,

however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already

forestalled us, sot that it would be sheer madness to attack. In the

SUN TZU HSU LU, when the King of Wu inquires what should be

done in this case, Sun Tzu replies: "The rule with regard to

contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage

over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the

enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to

flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for

other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise

a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best

troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will

sally forth to the rescue."]

12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.

[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking

force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available

here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Tsào Kung's

brief note: "Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut off.]

On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.

[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighboring states."]

13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.

[On this, Li Chùan has the following delicious note: "When an army

penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be taken not to

alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the

Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Chìn territory was marked

by no violation of women or looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was

in 207 B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies

that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In

the present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not

'plunder,' but 'do not plunder.'" Alas, I fear that in this instance the

worthy commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least,

has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on 'serious ground,'

there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no

possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted

resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close

watch on the enemy."]

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

[Or, in the words of VIII. ss. 2, "do not encamp.]

14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

[Tsàu Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu

Yu amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must

be devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed

in deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped." This is exactly

what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed

in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all

appearances entrapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which

Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which

Tìen Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before.

[See IX. ss. 24, note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were

fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified

animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards

the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of

these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans

that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army passed

safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.]

On desperate ground, fight.

[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is a

chance of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your corner."]

15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how  to

drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;

[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch  with each

other."]

to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to

hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from

rallying their men. 16. When the enemy's men were united, they

managed to keep them in disorder. 17. When it was to their

advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped

still.

[Mei Yao-chèn connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded

in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to

secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be

gained, they would remain where they were."]

18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly

array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin

by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be

amenable to your will."

[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind. Tsào Kung thinks it

is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu

Mu says: "The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on

the accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to

capture our favorable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3)

to guard his own communications." Our object then must be to thwart

his plans in these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf.

III. ss. 3.] By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw

the other side on the defensive.]

19. Rapidity is the essence of war:

[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in

warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military

science, and the chief business of the general." The following

anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the importance attached to speed

by two of China's greatest generals. In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor

of Hsin-chèng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating

defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence

with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-

ma I was then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng

Ta's treachery, he at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt,

having previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly

import. Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has

leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly

investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is

an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once,

while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask."

Then, by a series of forced marches, be brought his army under the

walls of Hsin-chèng with in a space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had

previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 LI from here.

When the news of my revolt reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform

his imperial master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can

be taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-

ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will be sent

against us are not worth troubling about." The next letter, however,

was filled with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed

since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates.

What miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- chèng had

fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See CHIN SHU, ch. 1, f. 3.] In

621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from Kùei-chou in Ssu-chùan to reduce

the successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the

modern Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze

being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary

would venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently

made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss

of time, and was just about to start when the other generals implored

him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous

state for navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming

speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss

opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even

knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the present

moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before his capital

with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before you

have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII. ss. 19, note.] This is

the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he

will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to

oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about

as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly

stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer the

penalty of death.]

take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by

unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. 20. The following

are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further

you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your

troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. 21. Make

forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.

[Cf. supra, ss. 13. Li Chùan does not venture on a note here.]

22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,

[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give

them plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."]

and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your

strength.

[Chèn recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous

general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the

success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Chù State, where

a universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the

temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained

strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Chù general try to force a

battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not

come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the

affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be

well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for

bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld

them into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had

elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were

amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were contending

with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping. When Wang

Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he

knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch and

that they were now ready for fighting. By this time the Chù army,

after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away

eastwards in disgust. The Chìn general immediately broke up his

camp and followed them, and in the battle that ensued they were

routed with great slaughter. Shortly afterwards, the whole of Chù

was conquered by Chìn, and the king Fu-chù led into captivity.]

Keep your army continually on the move,

[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It

has struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your

army together."]

and devise unfathomable plans. 23. Throw your soldiers into

positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to

flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.

[Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): "If one man were

to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else

tried to get our of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had

courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is,

that a desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not

meet on even terms."]

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.

[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will

surely exert their united strength to get out of it."]

24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there

is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country,

they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight

hard. 25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be

constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do

your will;

[Literally, "without asking, you will get."]

without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they

can be trusted. 26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with

superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need

be feared.

[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate

into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes

Huang Shih-kung: "'Spells and incantations should be strictly

forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the

fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers' minds should be seriously

perturbed.' The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and

scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution

until they die."]

27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because

they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is

not because they are disinclined to longevity.

[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life

are things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they

burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that

they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is

slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general

to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown

in their way.]

28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your  soldiers may

weep,

[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to  indicate

more genuine grief than tears alone.]

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting

the tears run down their cheeks.

[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Tsào Kung says, "all

have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember

that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their

emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River

between Ching Kò and his friends, when the former was sent to

attempt the life of the King of Chìn (afterwards First Emperor) in 227

B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell

and uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the

burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ]

But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage

of a Chu or a Kuei.

[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State

and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by

Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his

sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly of

a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was

immediately hacked to pieced by the king's bodyguard. This was in

515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Tsào Kuei (or Tsào Mo),

performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years

earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Chì, and was just

about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when

Tsào Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung, the Duke of Chì, as he

stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of

the duke's retainers dared to move a muscle, and Tsào Kuei

proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring the Lu was being

unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker state. Huan

Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Tsào

Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the

terrified assemblage without having so much as changed color. As

was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the

bargain, but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him

the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold

stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched

battles.]

29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI-JAN. Now the

SHUAI-JAN is a snake that is found in the Chàng mountains.

["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements.

Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be

used in the sense of "military maneuvers."]

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail,

and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will

be attacked by head and tail both. 30. Asked if an army can be made

to imitate the SHUAI-JAN,

[That is, as Mei Yao-chèn says, "Is it possible to make the front and

rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as

though they were part of a single living body?"]

I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are

enemies;

[Cf. VI. ss. 21.]

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a

storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand

helps the right.

[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of

common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army,

bound together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling.

Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through

lack of cooperation, especially in the case of allied armies.]

31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses,

and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.

[These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running away recall

the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the

battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one

spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to

render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not

succeed unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and,

above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which

can be learned from the SHUAI-JAN.]

32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one

standard of courage which all must reach.

[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that

the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same

quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard.

Wellington's seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo

as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that it

was deficient in this important particular—unity of spirit and courage.

Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those

troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the

day.]

33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question

involving the proper use of ground.

[Mei Yao-chèn's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences

of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize

accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in

strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more

exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority

in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the

text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think

that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means

sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions… and to

the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are

defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural features."

[2] ]

34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as  though he

were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.

[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with  which he

does it."]

35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus  ensure

secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.  36. He must

be able to mystify his officers and men by  false reports and

appearances,

[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."]

and thus keep them in total ignorance.

[Tsào Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops

must not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they

may only rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify,

mislead, and surprise the enemy," is one of the first principles in war,

as had been frequently pointed out. But how about the other

process—the mystification of one's own men? Those who may think

that Sun Tzu is over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Col.

Henderson's remarks on Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign: "The

infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even

from his most trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions,

and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would have

pronounced useless"—etc. etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in

ch. 47 of the HOU HAN SHU, "Pan Chào took the field with 25,000

men from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of

crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief

commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the

kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-tòu, totaling 50,000 men. Pan

Chào summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a

council of war, and said: 'Our forces are now outnumbered and

unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is for

us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. The King of

Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I will then return

myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening drum has

sounded and then start.' Pan Chào now secretly released the

prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha was thus

informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set off at

once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Chào's retreat in

the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in

order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Chào knew

that the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got

them well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of

Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in

confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Chào. Over 5000 heads

were brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape

of horses and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then

capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective

forces. From that time forward, Pan Chào's prestige completely

overawed the countries of the west." In this case, we see that the

Chinese general not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real

plans, but actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to

deceive the enemy.]

37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,

[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem

twice.]

he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.

[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that

war is based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the

enemy. You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow

you, but without letting them know why."]

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the

enemy from anticipating his purpose. 38. At the critical moment, the

leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then

kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into

hostile territory before he shows his hand.

[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. ss. 15), that is, takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like

Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Chèn Hao,

followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as "puts forth

every artifice at his command."]

39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd

driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and

nothing knows whither he is going.

[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or

retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and

conquering."]

40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed

the business of the general.

[Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no delay in

aiming a blow at the enemy's heart. Note how he returns again and

again to this point. Among the warring states of ancient China,

desertion was no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil

than it is in the armies of today.]

41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of  ground;

[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting  the

rules for the nine varieties of ground.]

the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the

fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most

certainly be studied. 42. When invading hostile territory, the general

principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a

short way means dispersion.

[Cf. supra, ss. 20.]

43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army

across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground.

[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. ss. 2, but it does not

figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X.

One's first impulse would be to translate it distant ground," but this, if

we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here.

Mei Yao-chèn says it is "a position not far enough advanced to be

called 'facile,' and not near enough to home to be 'dispersive,' but

something between the two." Wang Hsi says: "It is ground separated

from home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to

cross in order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our

business there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare

occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the

Nine Situations.]

When there are means of communication on all four sides, the

ground is one of intersecting highways. 44. When you penetrate

deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a

little way, it is facile ground. 45. When you have the enemy's

strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in

ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate

ground. 46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men

with unity of purpose.

[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining  on

the defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.]

On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between

all parts of my army.

[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible

contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden

attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. ss. 17. Mei Yao-chèn says:

"On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an

encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications."]

47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

[This is Tsào Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We

must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach

the goal." That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way

apart. Mei Yao-chèn offers another equally plausible explanation:

"Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and

we are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to

dispute its possession." Chèn Hao, on the other hand, assuming that

the enemy has had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. ss. 1,

where Sun Tzu warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His

own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a

favorable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops

to occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to

make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main

body, and victory will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao

She beat the army of Chìn. (See p. 57.)]

48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On

ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. 49.

On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of

supplies.

[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not,

as one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home

base.]

On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. 50. On

hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.

[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the

position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the

enemy's lines." Mei Yao-chèn says: "in order to make my soldiers

fight with desperation." Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be

tempted to run away." Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of

VII. ss. 36, where it is the enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao

Huan, afterwards Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, was

surrounded by a great army under Erh- chu Chao and others. His

own force was comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse

and something under 30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not

been drawn very closely together, gaps being left at certain points.

But Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape, actually made a shift to

block all the remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number

of oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men

saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits

rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they charged with

such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled

under their onslaught.]

On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the

hopelessness of saving their lives.

Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your

stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-

stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but

must fight to the death." Mei Yao-chèn says: "The only chance of life

lies in giving up all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzu has to

say about "grounds" and the "variations" corresponding to them.

Reviewing the passages which bear on this important subject, we

cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in

which it is treated. Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII. ss. 2 to enumerate

"variations" before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is

not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier

portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with

six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again,

though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the

next chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par

excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us

down to ss. 14. In SS. 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5,

6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground

noticed in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated

once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and

7, being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible

to account for the present state of Sun Tzu's text, a few suggestive

facts maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the

title, should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It

is an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine

Grounds. Several of these are defined twice over, besides which

there are two distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The

length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any

other except IX. I do not propose to draw any inferences from these

facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzu's work cannot

have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap.

VIII is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems

to contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought

to appear elsewhere.]

51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance

when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to

obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.

[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Chào's devoted followers in

73 A.D. The story runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU, ch. 47: "When

Pan Chào arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country,

received him at first with great politeness and respect; but shortly

afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden change, and he became

remiss and negligent. Pan Chào spoke about this to the officers of

his suite: 'Have you noticed,' he said, 'that Kuang's polite intentions

are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have come from the

Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a state of

indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That surely

is the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things

before they have come to pass; how much more, then, those that are

already manifest!' Thereupon he called one of the natives who had

been assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where

are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some day ago?'

The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he

presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Chào, keeping his

informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general

gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them.

When the wine had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse

their spirit still further by addressing them thus: 'Gentlemen, here we

are in the heart of an isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and

honor by some great exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador

from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and

the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our

royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to

seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will

become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?' With

one accord, the officers replied: 'Standing as we do in peril of our

lives, we will follow our commander through life and death.' For the

sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. ss. 1, note.]

52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we

are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on

the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its

mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and

swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account

unless we make use of local guides.

[These three sentences are repeated from VII. SS. 12-14 — in order

to emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I

prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an

antecedent to the following words. With regard to local guides, Sun

Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of going wrong,

either through their treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy

records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him

into the neighborhood of Casinum, where there was an important

pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the

pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand

Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he

took the army in that direction, the mistake not being discovered until

they had almost arrived.]

53. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles

does not befit a warlike prince. 54. When a warlike prince attacks a

powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the

concentration of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents,

and their allies are prevented from joining against him.

[Mei Tao-chèn constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so

much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you

can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you

have a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you

overawe the enemy, the neighboring states will be frightened; and if

the neighboring states are frightened, the enemy's allies will be

prevented from joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning:

"If the great state has once been defeated (before she has had time

to summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and

refrain from massing their forces." Chèn Hao and Chang Yu take the

sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a

prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise

enough troops, and must rely to some extent on external aid; if he

dispenses with this, and with overweening confidence in his own

strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be

defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: "If we recklessly attack a

large state, our own people will be discontented and hang back. But if

(as will then be the case) our display of military force is inferior by half

to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to

join us."]

55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor

does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own

secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.

[The train of thought, as said by Li Chùan, appears to be this: Secure

against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject

entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his

prestige enable him to dispense with external friendships."]

Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.

[This paragraph, though written many years before the Chìn State

became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by

which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her

final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up his

previous note, thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this attitude of cold-

blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.]

56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,

[Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded

and retreat be heavily punished."]

issue orders

[Literally, "hang" or post up."]

without regard to previous arrangements;

["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning

is made clear by Tsào Kung's quotation from the SSU-MA FA: "Give

instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see

deserving deeds." Tsào Kung's paraphrase: "The final instructions

you give to your army should not correspond with those that have

been previously posted up." Chang Yu simplifies this into "your

arrangements should not be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin

says: "there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not

only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often

necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last moment.]

and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do

with but a single man.

[Cf. supra, ss. 34.]

57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know

your design.

[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no

reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to

a general than to a judge.]

When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them

nothing when the situation is gloomy. 58. Place your army in deadly

peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will

come off in safety.

[These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in

explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant

battles, already alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against

the army of Chao, and halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-

hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at

midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man of

which was furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make

their way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the

enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in full flight," Han Hsin said,

"they will abandon their fortifications and give chase. This must be

the sign for you to rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set up

the red banners of Han in their stead." Turning then to his other

officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong position, and is

not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and

drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and

escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent out a

division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of

battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this maneuver, the

whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By this time it was

broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo's flag,

marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately

engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time;

until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums

and banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where

another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue

them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of

men; but the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which

was fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for

the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of

Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted

walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of Han.

When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these

red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in

and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every

effort of their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han

army fell on them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a

number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was King Ya

himself…. After the battle, some of Han Hsin's officers came to him

and said: "In the ART OF WAR we are told to have a hill or tumulus

on the right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears

to be a blend of Sun Tzu and Tài Kung. See IX ss. 9, and note.] You,

on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our

back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the

victory?" The general replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not studied

the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: 'Plunge your

army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in

deadly peril and it will survive'? Had I taken the usual course, I should

never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the

Military Classic—'Swoop down on the market-place and drive the

men off to fight.' [This passage does not occur in the present text of

Sun Tzu.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were

obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his

own discretion, there would have been a general debandade, and it

would have been impossible to do anything with them." The officers

admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These are higher

tactics than we should have been capable of." [See CHÌEN HAN

SHU, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ]

59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that is

capable of striking a blow for victory.

[Danger has a bracing effect.]

60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating

ourselves to the enemy's purpose.

[Tsào Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding

and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note makes the

meaning clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure

him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he

may carry out his intention." The object is to make him remiss and

contemptuous before we deliver our attack.]

61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank,

[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy

in one direction." Tsào Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for

the enemy." But such a violent displacement of characters is quite

indefensible.]

we shall succeed in the long run

[Literally, "after a thousand LI."]

in killing the commander-in-chief.

[Always a great point with the Chinese.]

62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by

sheer  cunning.  63. On the day that you take up your command,

block the  frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,

[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued

as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the

"border-warden" of LUN YU III. 24, who may have had similar duties.

When this half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was

authorized to open the gate and let the traveler through.]

and stop the passage of all emissaries.

[Either to or from the enemy's country.]

64. Be stern in the council-chamber,

[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the

sovereign.]

so that you may control the situation.

[Mei Yao-chèn understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the

strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.]

65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. 66. Forestall

your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,

[Cf. supra, ss. 18.]

and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

[Chèn Haòs explanation: "If I manage to seize a favorable position,

but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus

obtained cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends

therefore, to occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must

begin by making an artful appointment, so to speak, with his

antagonist, and cajole him into going there as well." Mei Yao-chèn

explains that this "artful appointment" is to be made through the

medium of the enemy's own spies, who will carry back just the

amount of information that we choose to give them. Then, having

cunningly disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting

after the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. ss. 4). We must start after

him in order to ensure his marching thither; we must arrive before him

in order to capture the place without trouble. Taken thus, the present

passage lends some support to Mei Yao-chèn's interpretation of ss.

47.]

67. Walk in the path defined by rule,

[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot

be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is unfortunate

that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is

certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according

to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won his battles

by violating every accepted canon of warfare.]

and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive

battle.

[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a favorable

opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall

prove decisive."]

68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy

gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running

hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.

[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly

appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was thinking only of its

speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the

enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by

Tu Mu.]

[1] Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.

[2] "The Science of War," p. 333.

[3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421.

——————————————————————————————

——-

XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE

[Rather more than half the chapter (SS. 1-13) is devoted to the

subject of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.]

1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is

to burn soldiers in their camp;

[So Tu Mu. Li Chùan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers"

(when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Chào, sent on a

diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. ss. 51, note],

found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an

envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In

consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never

win! [1] The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire

on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to

discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate

them completely; this will cool the King's courage and cover us with

glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.' the officers all

replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the

Intendant. Pan Chào then fell into a passion: 'It is today,' he cried,

'that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum

civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and

everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy

fate for valiant warriors.' All then agreed to do as he wished.

Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly

made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at

the time. Pan Chào ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide

behind the enemy's barracks, it being arranged that when they saw

flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their

might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he

posted in ambuscade at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the

place from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums

and shouting arose on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who

rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Chào slew three of them

with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of the

envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in

all, perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Chào, divining

his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: 'Although you did not go with us

last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.'

This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan Chào, having sent for Kuang, King

of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. The

whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Chào

took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the

king's sons as hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku."

HOU HAN SHU, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ]

the second is to burn stores;

[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the

rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti

of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of

grain, a policy which in the long run proved entirely successful.]

the third is to burn baggage trains;

[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shaòs wagons and

impedimenta by Tsào Tsào in 200 A.D.]

the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;

[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines"

are the same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion

and clothing. Cf. VII. ss. 11.]

the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.

[Tu Yu says in the TÙNG TIEN: "To drop fire into the enemy's camp.

The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows

alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from

powerful crossbows into the enemy's lines."]

2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available.

[T`sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy's camp" are referred to.

But Chèn Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have

favorable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us."

Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."]

the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.

[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter,

reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material

cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting

fires."]

3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special

days for starting a conflagration. 4. The proper season is when the

weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in

the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar;

[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-

eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius,

Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.]

for these four are all days of rising wind. 5. In attacking with fire, one

should be prepared to meet five possible developments: 6. (1) When

fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond at once with an

attack from without. 7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the

enemy's soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into

confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is

ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.]

8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up

with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.

[Tsào Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find

the difficulties too great, retire."]

9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not

wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favorable

moment.

[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire

breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency

of incendiaries) inside the enemy's camp. "But," he continues, "if the enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or if

he has pitched his camp in a position which can be burnt out, we

must carry our fire against him at any seasonable opportunity, and

not await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our

opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation,

and thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once

baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking

advantage of a favorable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese

general's camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation

in the neighborhood had already been burnt down. On the other

hand, Po-tsài, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly

defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple precaution. "At

the head of a large army he was besieging Chàng-she, which was

held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general

feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called

his officers together and said: "In war, there are various indirect

methods of attack, and numbers do not count for everything. [The

commentator here quotes Sun Tzu, V. SS. 5, 6 and 10.] Now the

rebels have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass which will

easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will

be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on

all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of Tìen Tan.' [See

p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu

Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and

mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of

daring men, who stealthily made their way through the lines and

started the fire with loud shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of

light shot up from the city walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his

drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the rebels into confusion and

put them to headlong flight." [HOU HAN SHU, ch. 71.] ]

10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from

the leeward.

[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy

will retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then,

he will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A

rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in

the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the

attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side,

and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your

enemy."]

11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze

soon falls.

[Cf. Lao Tzu's saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a

morning." (TAO TE CHING, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-chèn and Wang Hsi

say: "A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at

daybreak. This is what happens as a general rule." The phenomenon

observed may be correct enough, but how this sense is to be

obtained is not apparent.]

12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be

known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for

the proper days.

[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the

stars, and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making

our attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently:

"We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but

also be on our guard against similar attacks from them."]

13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show

intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an

accession of strength. 14. By means of water, an enemy may be

intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.

[Tsào Kung's note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy's road or

divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores."

Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power

of fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is

dismissed in a couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is

discussed in detail. Wu Tzu (ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements:

"If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy ground, from which the

water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, it may be

submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands

thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent

gales, it may be exterminated by fire."]

15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and

succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for

the result is waste of time and general stagnation.

[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu. Tsào Kung

says: "Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day."

And Tu Mu: "If you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the

deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and

disaster will ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the

formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the

interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-chèn alone, whose words I will

quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their battles

and assaults must seize the favorable moments when they come and

not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they

must resort to such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What

they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply

hold to the advantages they have got."]

16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well

ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.

[Tu Mu quotes the following from the SAN LUEH, ch. 2: "The warlike

prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by

good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays,

there will be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not be

respected."]

17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops

unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is

critical.

[Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes

so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the TAO TE

CHING, ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the

defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."]

18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own

spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. 19. If it is

to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.

[This is repeated from XI. ss. 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an

interpolation, for it is evident that ss. 20 ought to follow immediately

on ss. 18.]

20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may

be  succeeded by content.  21. But a kingdom that has once been

destroyed can never  come again into being;

[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of  this

saying.]

nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. 22. Hence the

enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This

is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.

[1] "Unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger's

cubs."

——————————————————————————————

——-

XIII. THE USE OF SPIES

1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and

marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and

a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will

amount to a thousand ounces of silver.

[Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.]

There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop

down exhausted on the highways.

[Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered,

brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be

reminded of the saying: 'On serious ground, gather in plunder.' Why

then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the

highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of

munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the

injunction to 'forage on the enemy' only means that when an army is

deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided

against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for

corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow

of supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where

provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be

dispensed with."]

As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their

labor.

[Mei Yao-chèn says: "Men will be lacking at the plough- tail." The

allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each

consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on

behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also,

so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be

used by all in common. [See II. ss. 12, note.] In time of war, one of

the families had to serve in the army, while the other seven

contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning

one able- bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000

families would be affected.]

2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the

victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in

ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the

outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments,

["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned

at this point.]

is the height of inhumanity.

[Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting

to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure

which war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept

informed of the enemy's condition, and are ready to strike at the right

moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get this

information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain

trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their services. But

it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount

for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an

incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders

of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of

spies is nothing less than a crime against humanity.]

3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his

sovereign, no master of victory.

[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the

national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C.,

these memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Chù

State: "The [Chinese] character for 'prowess' is made up of [the

characters for] 'to stay' and 'a spear' (cessation of hostilities). Military

prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of

weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm

establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people,

putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."]

4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to

strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary

men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE.

[That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what

he  means to do.]

5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;  it

cannot be obtained inductively from experience,

[Tu Mu's note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be  gained by

reasoning from other analogous cases."]

nor by any deductive calculation.

[Li Chùan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and

magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination;

human actions cannot be so calculated."]

6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from

other men.

[Mei Yao-chèn has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the

spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural

science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the

universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the

dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies

alone."]

7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local

spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5)

surviving spies. 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none

can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of

the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.

[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry

leaders, had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose business it was to

collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts

and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the

previous knowledge of the enemy's moves thus gained." [1] ]

9. Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of

the  inhabitants of a district.

[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by  kind

treatment, and use them as spies."]

10. Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of

the  enemy.

[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service

in this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office,

criminals who have undergone punishment; also, favorite concubines

who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in

subordinate positions, or who have been passed over in the

distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side should be

defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying their

ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in

each boat. Officials of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one's interests by means of rich

presents. In this way you will be able to find out the state of affairs in

the enemy's country, ascertain the plans that are being formed

against you, and moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach

between the sovereign and his ministers." The necessity for extreme

caution, however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears from an

historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou,

sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his

stronghold at Pì. After each side had experienced a number of

victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a

certain Pò-tài, a native of Wu-tu. He began to have him whipped

until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he

was to delude by offering to cooperate with him from inside the city,

and to give a fire signal at the right moment for making a general

assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, march out all his best

troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head with orders to

attack at Pò-tài's bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, Li

Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; and Pò-

tài, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now

lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal

and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others

were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of

Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom

was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces,

both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely."

[This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the

story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that of his

father Li Tè, CHIN SHU, ch. 120, 121.]

11. Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's spies

and using them for our own purposes.

[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from

the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back false

information as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the

other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have

detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false impression of

what is going on. Several of the commentators accept this as an

alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzu meant is

conclusively proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the

converted spy generously (ss. 21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three

occasions on which converted spies were used with conspicuous

success: (1) by Tìen Tan in his defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90);

(2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the wily

Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien Pò was conducting a defensive

campaign against Chìn. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of

Lien Pò's cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to

avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the

reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and

were already in Fan Chu's pay. They said: "The only thing which

causes Chìn anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. Lien

Pò they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in

the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a sun of the famous Chao

She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study

of war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there

was no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against

him. His father was much disquieted by this overweening conceit, and

the flippancy with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and

solemnly declared that if ever Kua was appointed general, he would

bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man who, in spite of

earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman Lin

Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien Pò. Needless to say, he

proved no match for the redoubtable Po Chì and the great military

power of Chìn. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into

two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance

lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one

another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force,

amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword.]

12. Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for

purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and

report them to the enemy.

[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously

do thing calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to

believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these

spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they will make an entirely

false report, and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to

find that we do something quite different. The spies will thereupon be

put to death." As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the

prisoners released by Pan Chào in his campaign against Yarkand.

(See p. 132.) He also refers to Tàng Chien, who in 630 A.D. was

sent by Tài Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied

security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against

him. Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing

Tàng Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the

New Tàng History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that

he escaped and lived on until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar

part in 203 B.C., when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful

negotiations with Chì. He has certainly more claim to be described a

"doomed spy", for the king of Chì, being subsequently attacked

without warning by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he considered

the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled

alive.]

13. SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news from

the enemy's camp.

[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a

regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a

man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby

exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed

with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all

sorts of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with

shame and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the following story of Tàhsi Wu

of the Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of Eastern Chìn, Shen-

wu of Chì made a hostile movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor

Tài Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was

accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and

wore the enemy's uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few

hundred feet away from the enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to

listen, until they succeeded in catching the passwords used in the

army. Then they got on their horses again and boldly passed through

the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once,

happening to come across a soldier who was committing some

breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound

cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible

information about the enemy's dispositions, and received warm

commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report

was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."]

14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are

more  intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.

[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-chèn point out that the spy is  privileged to

enter even the general's private sleeping-tent.]

None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should

greater secrecy be preserved.

[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be

carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be

quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any

previous commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them

most, he who pays them ill is never served. They should never be

known to anybody; nor should they know one another. When they

propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your

possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity.

Never communicate anything to them but what is absolutely

necessary that they should know. [2] ]

15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive

sagacity.

[Mei Yao-chèn says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from

falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and double-

dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along the

lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves: "Before

using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity of character

and the extent of their experience and skill." But he continues: "A

brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than

mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." So

that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the passage."]

16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and

straightforwardness.

[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial

offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work

for you with all their might."]

17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make  certain of

the truth of their reports.

[Mei Yao-chèn says: "Be on your guard against the  possibility of

spies going over to the service of the enemy."]

18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind  of

business.

[Cf. VI. ss. 9.]

19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is

ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the

secret was told.

[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard

before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzu's main point in this

passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for

letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, as

Chèn Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any

further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would not

be gained. Either way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of

inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man

deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told

the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him."]

20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to

assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding

out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- camp,

[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with information," which naturally

necessitates frequent interviews with him.]

and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies

must be commissioned to ascertain these.

[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of  these

important functionaries can be won over by bribery.]

21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought

out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus

they will become converted spies and available for our service. 22. It

is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are

able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.

[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy's spies we learn the

enemy's condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the

converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows which of

the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are

open to corruption."]

23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can  cause the

doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how

the  enemy can best be deceived."]

24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used

on appointed occasions. 25. The end and aim of spying in all its five

varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be

derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.

[As explained in ss. 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but

makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.]

Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost

liberality. 26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty

[Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name

was changed to Yin by Pàn Keng in 1401.

was due to I Chih

[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman  who

took part in Chèng Tàng's campaign against Chieh Kuei.]

who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou

dynasty was due to Lu Ya

[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he

afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as Tài Kung, a title

bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a

treatise on war, erroneously identified with the LIU TÀO.]

who had served under the Yin.

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