HEGEL AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY

HERBERT MARCUSE

2nd Edition

with Supplementary Chapter

LONDON

ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD

BROADWAY HOUSE: te-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.4

First Published in England in 1941

2nd Edition

with Supplementary Chapter

Reprinted 1955

Printed in the United States of America

TO

MAX HORKHEIMER

AND THE

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

Preface

> ) ceo c-

THE content of a truly philosophical work does not remain

unchanged with time. If its concepts have an essential

bearing upon the aims and interests of men, a fundamental

change in the historical situation will make them see its

teachings in a new light. In our time, the rise of Fascism

calls for a reinterpretation of Hegel's philosophy. We hope

that the analysis offered here will demonstrate that Hegel's

basic concepts are hostile to the tendencies that have led

into Fascist theory and practice.

We have devoted the first part of the book to a survey

of the structure of Hegel's system. At the same time, we

have tried to go beyond mere restatement and to elucidate

those implications of Hegel's ideas that identify them

closely with the later developments in European thought,

particularly with the Marxian theory.

Hegel's critical and rational standards, and especially

his dialectics, had to come into conflict with the prevailing

social reality. For this reason, his system could well be

called a negative philosophy, the name given to it by its

contemporary opponents. To counteract its destructive

tendencies, there arose, in the decade following Hegel's

death, a positive philosophy which undertook to subordi-

nate reason to the authority of established fact. The strug-

gle that developed between the negative and positive

philosophy offers, as we haVe attempted to show in the

second part of this book, many clues for understanding

the rise of modern social theory in Europe.

There is in Hegel a keen insight into the locale of pro-

gressive ideas and movements. He attributed to the Ameri-

can rational spirit a decisive role in the struggle for an

vil

Vlll PREFACE

adequate order of life, and spoke of 'the victory of some

future and intensely vital rationality of the American

nation . . .' Knowing far better than his critics the forces

that threatened freedom and reason, and recognizing these

forces to have been bound up with the social system

Europe had acquired, he once looked beyond that conti-

nent to this as the only 'land of the future/

In the use of texts, I have frequently taken the liberty

of citing an English translation and changing the trans-

lator's rendering where I thought it necessary, without

stipulating that the change was made. Hegelian terms are

often rendered by different English equivalents, and I

have attempted to avoid confusion on this score by giving

the German word in parenthesis where a technical term

was involved.

The presentation of this study would not have been

possible without the assistance I received from Mr. Ed-

ward M. David who gave the book the stylistic form it

now has. I have drawn upon his knowledge of the Ameri-

can and British philosophic tradition to guide me in se-

lecting those points that could and that could not be

taken for granted in offering Hegel's doctrine to an Ameri-

can and English public.

I thank the Macmillan Company, New York, for grant-

ing me permission to use and quote their translations of

Hegel's works, and I thank the following publishers for

authorizing me to quote their publications: International

Publishers, Longmans, Green and Co., Charles H. Kerr

and Co., The Macmillan Co., The Viking Press, The

Weekly Foreign Letter (Lawrence Dennis).

My friend Franz L. Neumann, who was gathering ma-

terial for his forthcoming book on National Socialism, has

given me constant advice, especially on the political phi-

losophy.

PREFACE IX

Professor George H. Sabine was kind enough to read the

chapter on Hegel's Philosophy of Right and to offer valu-

able suggestions.

I am particularly grateful to the Oxford University

Press, New York, which encouraged me to write this book

and undertook to publish it at this time.

HERBERT MARCUSE

Institute of Social Research

Columbia University

New York, N. Y.

March 1941.

Contents

*/Jr "fj9 CCC* K*

PART I

THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

1. The Socio-Historical Setting 3

2. The Philosophical Setting 16

I. HEGEL'S EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 30

II. TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

1. The First Philosophical Writings 43

2. The First Political Writings 49

sf. The System of Morality 56

III. HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM

1. The Logic 62

2. The Philosophy of Mind 73

\iy) THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND /QL

V. THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 121

VI. THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 169

VII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 224

PART II

THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY

INTRODUCTION: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIAL

THEORY 251

I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF

SOCIETY

1. The Negation of Philosophy 258

2. Kierkegaard 262

3. Feuerbach 267

^4. Marx: Alienated Labor 273

5. The Abolition of Labor 287

6. - The Analysis of the Labor Process 295

7. ^-The Marxian Dialectic 312

xi

Xll CONTENTS

II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF

SOCIOLOGY

1. Positive and Negative Philosophy 323

2. Saint-Simon 330

3. The Positive Philosophy of Society:

Auguste Comte 340

4. The Positive Philosophy of the State:

Friedrich Julius Stahl 360

5. The Transformation of the Dialectic into

Sociology: Lorenz von Stein 374

CONCLUSION

THE END OF HEGELIANISM

1. British Neo-idealism 389

2. The Revision of the Dialectic 398

3. Fascist 'Hegelianism' 402

4. National Socialism Versus Hegel 409

BIBLIOGRAPHY 421

INDEX 429

PART I

The Foundations of Hegel's Philosophy

Introduction

i. THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL SETTING

GERMAN idealism has been called the theory of the French

Revolution. This does not imply that Kant, Fichte, Schel-

ling, and Hegel furnished a theoretical interpretation of

the French Revolution, but that they wrote their philoso-

phy largely as a response to the challenge from France to

reorganize the state and society on a rational basis, so that

social and political institutions might accord with the free-

dom and interest of the individual. Despite their bitter

criticism of the Terror, the German idealists unanimously

welcomed the revolution, calling it the dawn of a new

era, and they all linked their basic philosophical princi-

ples to the ideals that it advanced.

The ideas of the French Revolution thus appear in the

very core of the idealistic systems, and, to a great extent,

determine their conceptual structure. As the German

idealists saw it, the French Revolution not only abolished

feudal absolutism, replacing it with the economic and po-

litical system of the middle class, but it completed what

the German Reformation had begun, emancipating the

individual as a self-reliant master of his life. Man's posi-

tion in the world, the mode of his labor and enjoyment,

was no longer to depend on some external authority, but

on his own free rational activity. Man had passed the long

period of immaturity during which he had been victim-

ized by overwhelming natural and social forces, and had

become the autonomous subject of his own development.

From now on, the struggle with nature and with social

3

4 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

organization was to be guided by his own progress in

knowledge. The world was to be an order of reason.

The ideals of the French Revolution found their rest-

ing place in the processes of industrial capitalism. Napo-

leon's empire liquidated the radical tendencies and at the

same time consolidated the economic consequences of the

revolution. The French philosophers of the period inter-

preted the realization of reason as the liberation of indus-

try. Expanding industrial production seemed capable of

providing all the necessary means to gratify human wants.

Thus, at the same time that Hegel elaborated his system,

Saint-Simon in France was exalting industry as the sole

power that could lead mankind to a free and rational so-

ciety. The economic process appeared as the foundation of

reason.

Economic development in Germany lagged far behind

that in France and England. The German middle class,

weak and scattered over numerous territories with di-

vergent interests, could hardly contemplate a revolution.

The few industrial enterprises that existed were but small

islands within a protracted feudal system. The individual

in his social existence was either enslaved, or was the en-

slaver of his fellow individuals. As a thinking being, how-

ever, he could at least comprehend the contrast between

the miserable reality that existed everywhere and the hu-

man potentialities that the new epoch had emancipated;

and as a moral person, he could, in his private life at least,

preserve human dignity and autonomy. Thus, while the

French Revolution had already begun to assert the reality

of freedom, German idealism was only occupying itself

with the idea of it. The concrete historical efforts to estab-

lish a rational form of society were here transposed to the

philosophical plane and appeared in the efforts to elabo-

rate the notion of reason.

The concept of reason is central to Hegel's philosophy.

THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL SETTING 5

He held that philosophical thinking presupposes nothing

beyond it, that history deals with reason and with reason

alone, and that the state is the realization of reason. These

statements will not be understandable, however, so long

as reason is interpreted as a pure metaphysical concept,

for Hegel's idea of reason has retained, though in an ideal-

istic form, the material strivings for a free and rational

order of life. Robespierre's deification of reason as the

tre supreme is the counterpart to the glorification of

reason in Hegel's system. The core of Hegel's philosophy

is a structure the concepts of which freedom, subject,

mind, notion are derived from the idea of reason. Unless

we succeed in unfolding the content of these ideas and the

intrinsic connection among them, Hegel's system will seem

to be obscure metaphysics, which it in fact never was.

Hegel himself related his concept of reason to the French

Revolution, and did so with the greatest of emphasis. The

revolution had demanded that 'nothing should be recog-

nized as valid in a constitution except what has to be rec-

ognized according to reason's right.' * Hegel further elabo-

rated this interpretation in his lectures on the Philosophy

of History: 'Never since the sun had stood in the firma-

ment and the planets revolved around it had it been per-

ceived that man's existence centres in his head, i.e. in

Thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of

reality. Anaxagoras had been the first to say that Noi>

governs the World; but not until now had man advanced

to the recognition of the principle that Thought ought to

govern spiritual reality. This was accordingly a glorious

mental dawn. All thinking beings shared in the jubilation

of this epoch.' 2

In Hegel's view, the decisive turn that history took with

i Ueber die Verhandlung der Wurttembergischen Landstande, in

Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie, ed. Georg Lasson, Leipzig

1913, p. 198.

* Philosophy of History f trans. J. Sibbree, New York 1899, p. 447.

6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

the French Revolution was that man came to rely on his

mind and dared to submit the given reality to the stand-

ards of reason. Hegel expounds the new development

through a contrast between an employment of reason and

an uncritical compliance with the prevailing conditions

of life. 'Nothing is reason that is not the result of think-

ing.' Man has set out to organize reality according to the

demands of his free rational thinking instead of simply

accommodating his thoughts to the existing order and

the prevailing values. Man is a thinking being. His rea-

son enables him to recognize his own potentialities and

those of his world. He is thus not at the mercy of the facts

that surround him, but is capable of subjecting them to a

higher standard, that of reason. If he follows its lead, he

will arrive at certain conceptions that disclose reason to be

antagonistic to the existing state of affairs. He may find

that history is a constant struggle for freedom, that man's

individuality requires that he possess property as the

medium of his fulfillment, and that all men have an equal

right to develop their human faculties. Actually, however,

bondage and inequality prevail; most men have no liberty

at all and are deprived of their last scrap of property. Con-

sequently the 'unreasonable* reality has to be altered until

it comes into conformity with reason. In the given case,

the existing social order has to be reorganized, absolutism

and the remainders of feudalism have to be abolished, free

competition has to be established, everyone has to be made

equal before the law, and so on.

According to Hegel, the French Revolution enunciated

reason's ultimate power over reality. (He sums this up by

saying that the principle of the French Revolution asserted

that^thought ought to govern reality. The implications in-

volved in this statement lead into the very center of his

philosophy. Thought ought to govern reality. What men

think to be true, right, and good ought to be realized in

THE SOCIO-HISTORJCAL SETTING 7

the actual organization of their societal and individual life.

Thinking, however, varies among individuals, and the re-

sulting diversity of individual opinions cannot provide a

guiding principle for the common organization of life.

Unless man possesses concepts and principles of thought

that denote universally valid conditions and norms, his

thought cannot claim to govern reality. In line with the

tradition of Western philosophy, Hegel believes that such

objective concepts and principles exist. Their totality he

calls reason.

The philosophies of the French Enlightenment and

their revolutionary successors all posited. reason as an ob-

jective historical force which, once freed from the fetters

of despotism, would make the world a place of progress

and happiness. They held that C the power of reason, and

not the force of weapons, will propagate the principles of

our glorious revolution.' * By virtue of its own power, rea-

son would triumph over social irrationality and overthrow

the oppressors of mankind. 'All fictions disappear before

truth, and all follies fall, before reason/ A

The implication, however, that reason will immedi-

ately show itselt in practice is a dogma unsupported by

the course of history. Hegel believed in the invincible

power of reason as much as Robespierre did. 'That faculty

which man can call his own, elevated above death and de-

cay, ... is able to make decisions of itself. It announces

itself as reason. Its law-making depends on nothing else,

nor can it take its standards from any other authority on

earth or in heaven.' 8 (But to Hegel. rea$on_cannot_gQy,-

ern reality unless^ reality has become rational in itself j

3 Robespierre, quoted by Georges Michon, Robespierre et la guerre

revolutionnaire, Paris 1937, p. 134.

* Robespierre in his report on the cult of the Etre supreme, quoted by

Albert Mathiez, Autour de Robespierre, Paris 1936, p. 112.

5 Hegel, Theologische Jugendschriften, ed. H. Nohl, Tubingen 1907, p.

89.

8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

This rationality is made possible through the subject's en-

tering the very content of nature and history. The ob-

jective reality is thus also the realization of the subject. It

is this conception that Hegel summarized in the most fun-

damental of his propositions, namely, that Being is, in its

substance, a 'subject/ The meaning of this proposition

can only be understood through an interpretation of

Hegel's Logic, but we shall attempt to give a provisional

explanation here that will be expanded later. 7

The idea of the 'substance as subject* conceives reality

as a process wherein all being is the unification of con-

tradictory forces. 'Subject* denotes not only the epistemo-

logical ego or consciousness, but a mode of existence, to

wit, that of a self-developing unity in an antagonistic proc-

ess. Everything that exists is 'real* only in so far as it oper-

ates as a 'self through all the contradictory relations that

constitute its existence. It must thus be considered a kind

of 'subject* that carries itself forward by unfolding its in-

herent contradictions. For example, a stone is a stone only

in so far as it remains the same thing, a stone, throughout

its action and reaction upon the things and processes that

interact with it. It gets wet in the rain; it resists the axe;

it withstands a certain load before it gives way. Being-a-

stone is a continuous holding out against everything that

acts on the stone; it is a continuous process of becoming

and being a stone. To be sure, the 'becoming* is not con-

summated by the stone as a conscious subject. The stone

is changed in its interactions with rain, axe, and load; it

does not change itself. A plant, on the other hand, un-

folds and develops itself. It is not now a bud, then a blos-

som, but is rather the whole movement from bud through

blossom to decay. The plant constitutes and preserves itself

in this movement. It comes much nearer to being an actual

See Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, Lpndon (The

Macmillan Company, New York), 1910, p. 15.

T See below, pp. 63 ff., 1*3 ff.

THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL SETTING 9

'subject* than does the stone, for the various stages of the

plant's development grow out of the plant itself; they are

its 'life* and are not imposed upon it from the outside.

The plant, however, does not 'comprehend* this devel-

opment. It does not 'realize* it as its own and, therefore,

cannot reason its own potentialities into being. Such 'reali-

zation* is a process of the true subject and is reached only

with the existence of man. Man alone has the power of

self-realization, the power to be a self-determining subject

in all processes of becoming, for he alone has an under-

standing of potentialities and a knowledge of 'notions.*

His very existence is the process of actualizing his poten-

tialities, of molding his life according to the notions of

reason. We encounter here the most important category

of reason, namely, freedom. Reason presupposes freedom,

the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the

truth, the power to shape reality in line with its poten-

tialities. The fulfillment of these ends belongs only to the

subject who is master of his own development and who

understands his own potentialities as well as those of the

things around him. Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason,

for it is comprehending knowledge, alone, that enables

the subject to gain and to wield this power. The stone

does not possess it; neither does the plant. Both lack com-

prehending knowledge and hence real subjectivity. 'Man,

however, knows what he is, only thus is he real. Reason

and freedom are nothing without this knowledge.* 8

Reason terminates in freedom^ and freedom is the very

existence ofjthe subject. On the other hand, reason itself

exists only through its realization, the process of its being

made real. Reason is an objective force and an objective

reality only because all modes of being are more or less

modes of subjectivity, modes of realization. Subject and

VorUsungen liber die Geschichte der Philosophic, ed. J. Hoffmeister,

Leipzig 1958, p. 104.

1O THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

object are not undered by an impassable gulf, because

the object is in itself a kind of subject and because all

types of being culminate in the free 'comprehensive* sub-

ject who is able to realize reason. Nature thus becomes

a medium for the development of freedom.

The life of reason appears in man's continuous struggle

to comprehend what exists and to transform it in accord-

ance with the truth comprehended. Reason is also essen-

tially a historical force. Its fulfillment takes place as a

process in the spatio-temporal world, and is, in the last

analysis, the whole history of mankind. The term that

designates reason as history is mind (Geist) which denotes

the historical world viewed in relation to the rational

progress of humanity the historical world not as a chain

of acts and events but as a ceaseless struggle to adapt the

world to the growing potentialities of mankind.

History is organized into different periods, each mark-

ing a separate level of development and representing a

definite stage in the realization of reason. Each stage is to

be grasped and understood as -a whole, through the pre-

vailing ways of thinking and living which characterize it,

through its political and social institutions, its science,

religion and philosophy. Different stages occur in the reali-

zation of reason, but there is only one reason, just as there

is only one whole and one truth: the reality of freedom.

'This final goal it is, at which the process of the world's

history has been continually aiming, and to which the sac-

rifices that have ever and anon been laid on the vast altar

of the earth, through the long lapse of ages, have been

offered. This is the only final aim that realizes and fulfills

itself; the only pole of repose amid the ceaseless chain of

events and conditions, and the sole true reality in them/ 9

An immediate unity of reason and reality never exists.

The unity comes only after a lengthy process, which be-

Philosophy of History f pp. 19-80.

THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL SETTING 1 1

gins at the lowest level of nature and reaches up to the

highest form of existence, that of a free and rational

subject, living and acting in the self-consciousness of

its potentialities. As long as there is any gap between real

and potential, the former must be acted upon and changed

until it is brought into line with reason. As long as reality

is not shaped by reason, it remains no reality at all, in the

emphatic sense of the word. Thus reality changes its mean-

ing within the conceptual structure of Hegel's system.

'Real' comes to mean not everything that actually exists

(this should rather be called appearance), but that which

exists in a form concordant with the standards of reason.

'Real' is the reasonable (rational), and that alone. For ex-

ample, the state becomes a reality only when it corre-

sponds to the given potentialities of men and permits

their full development. Any preliminary form of the state

is not yet reasonable, and, therefore, not yet real.

Hegel's concept of reason thus has a distinctly critical

and polemic character. It is opposed to all ready accept-

ance of the given state of affairs. It denies the hegemony

of every prevailing form of existence by demonstrating the

antagonisms that dissolve it into other forms. We shall

attempt to show that the 'spirit of contradicting' is the pro-

pulsive force of Hegel's dialectical method. 10

In 1793, Hegel wrote to Schelling: 'Reason and freedom

remain our principles.' In his early writings, no gap exists

between the philosophical and the social meaning of these

principles, which are expressed in the same revolutionary

language the French Jacobins used. For example, Hegel

says the significance of his time lies in the fact that 'the

halo which has surrounded the leading oppressors and

gods of the earth has disappeared. Philosophers demon-

1 Hegel himself once characterized the essence of his dialectic as the

'spirit of contradicting' (Eckermann, Gesprdche mil Goethe in den letzten

Jahren seines Lebens, October 18, 1827).

12 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

strate the dignity of man; the people will learn to feel

it and will not merely demand their rights, which have

been trampled in the dust, but will themselves take them,

make them their own. Religion and politics have played

the same game. The former has taught what despotism

wanted to teach, contempt for humanity and the incapac-

ity of man to achieve the good and to fulfill his essence

through his own efforts.' u We even encounter more ex-

treme statements, which urge that the realization of rea-

son requires a social scheme that contravenes the given

order. In the Erstes Systemprogramm des Deutschen Ideal-

ismuSf written in 1796, we find the following: 'I shall dem-

onstrate that, just as there is no idea of a machine, there

is no idea of the State, for the State is something mechani-

cal. Only that which is an object of freedom may be called

an idea. We must, therefore, transcend the State. For

every State is bound to treat free men as cogs in a machine.

And this is precisely what it should not do; hence, the

State must perish. 1 12

However, the radical purport of the basic idealistic con-

cepts is slowly relinquished and they are to an ever in-

creasing extent made to fit in with the prevailing societal

form. This process is, as we shall see, necessitated by the

conceptual structure of German idealism, which retains

the decisive principles of liberalistic society and prevents

any crossing beyond it.

The particular form, however, that the reconciliation

between philosophy and reality assumed in Hegel's system

was determined by the actual situation of Germany in the

period when he elaborated his system. Hegel's early philo-

sophical concepts were formulated amid a decaying Ger-

man Reich. As he declared at the opening of his pamphlet

11 Hegel, Letter to Schelling, April 1795, in Briefe von und an Hegel,

ed. Karl Hegel, Leipzig 1887.

12 Dokumente iu Hegels Entwicklung, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Stuttgart 19*6,

p. 219!.

THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL SETTING 1J

on the German Constitution (1802), the German state of

the last decade of the eighteenth century was 'no longer

a State.' The remains of feudal despotism still held sway

in Germany, the more oppressive because split into a mul-

titude of petty despotisms, each competing with the other.

The Reich 'consisted of Austria and Prussia, the Prince-

Electors, 94 ecclesiastical and secular princes, 103 barons,

40 prelates, and 51 Reich towns; in sum, it consisted of

nearly 300 territories.' The Reich itself 'possessed not a

single soldier, its yearly income amounting to only a few

thousand florins/ There was no centralized jurisdiction;

the Supreme Court (Reichskammergericht) was a breed-

ing ground 'for graft, caprice, and bribery.' 13 Serfdom was

still prevalent, the peasant was still a beast of burden.

Some princes still hired out or sold their subjects as mer-

cenary soldiers to foreign countries. Strong censorship op-

erated to repress the slightest traces of enlightenment. 14

A contemporary depicts the current scene in the following

words. 'Without law and justice, without protection from

arbitrary taxation, uncertain of the lives of our sons, and

of our freedom and our rights, the impotent prey of des-

potic power, pur existence lacking unity and a national

spirit ,\ .this is the status quo of our nation.' 15

In sharp contrast to France, Germany had no strong,

conscious, politically educated middle class to lead the

struggle against this absolutism. The nobility ruled with-

out opposition. 'Hardly anyone in Germany/ remarked

Goethe, 'thought of envying this tremendous privileged

mass, or of begrudging them their happy advantages/ 18

i* T. Perthes, Das Deutsche Staatsleben vor der Revolution, Hamburg

1845, PP *9 34 4 1 ' See also W. Wenck, Deutschland vor hundert Jahren,

Leipzig 1887.

i* K. T. von Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen

bis zur Auflosung des alien Reichs, Stuttgart 1899 ff., vol. I, p. 77.

15 J. MUller, in von Heigel, op. cit., p. 115.

i Dichtung und Wahrheit, in: Werke, Cottasche Jubilaumsausgabe, vol.

xxii, p. 51.

14 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL/S PHILOSOPHY

The urban middle class, distributed among numerous

townships, each with its own government and its own local

interests, was impotent to crystallize and effectuate any

serious opposition. To be sure, there were conflicts be-

tween the ruling patricians and the guilds and artisans.

But these nowhere reached the proportions of a revolu-

tionary movement. Burghers accompanied their petitions

and complaints with a prayer that God protect the Father-

land from 'the terror of revolution.' 1T

Ever since the German Reformation, the masses had be-

come used to the fact that, for them, liberty was an 'inner

value/ which was compatible with every form of bond-

age, that due obedience to existing authority was a pre-

requisite to everlasting salvation, and that toil and poverty

were a blessing in the eyes of the Lord. A long process of

disciplinary training had introverted the demands for free-

dom and reason in Germany. One of the decisive func-

tions of Protestantism had been to induce the emanci-

pated individuals to accept the new social system that

had arisen, by diverting their claims and demands from

the external world into their inner life. Luther estab-

lished Christian liberty as an internal value to be realized

independently of any and all external conditions. Social

reality became indifferent as far as the true essence of man

was concerned. Man learned to turn upon himself his de-

mand for the satisfaction of his potentialities and 'to seek

within* himself, not in the outer world, his life's fulfill-

ment. 18

German culture is inseparable from its origin in Protes-

tantism. There arose a realm of beauty, freedom, and mo-

rality, which was not to be shaken by external realities and

i* von Heigel, op. cit., pp. 305-6,

i g See Studien uber Autoritat und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem

Institut fur Sozialforschung, Paris 1936, p. 136 ff., and Zeitschrift fur Sozial-

forschung, Paris 1936, vol. v, p. i88ff.

THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL SETTING 15

it was detached from the miserable social world

and anchored in the 'soul' of the individual. This devel-

opment is the source of a tendency widely visible in Ger-

man idealism, a willingness to become reconciled to the

social reality. This reconciliatory tendency of the idealists

constantly conflicts with their critical rationalism. Ulti-

mately, the ideal that the critical aspects set forth, a ra-

tional political and social reorganization of the world,

becomes frustrated and is transformed into a spiritual

value.

\The 'educated' classes isolated themselves from practical

affairs and, thus rendering themselves im'potent to apply

their reason to the reshaping of society, fulfilled them-

selves in a realm of science, art, philosophy, and religion,)

That realm became for them the 'true reality* transcend-

ing the wretchedness of existing social conditions; it was

alike the refuge for truth, goodness, beauty, happiness,

and, most important, for a critical temper which could not

be turned into social channels. Culture was, then, essen-

tially idealistic, occupied with the idea of things rather

than with the things themselves. It set freedom of thought

before freedom of action, morality before practical justice,

the inner life before the social life of man. This idealistic

culture, however, just because it stood aloof from an in-

tolerable reality and thereby maintained itself intact and

unsullied, served, despite its false consolations and glori-

fications, as the repository for truths which had not been

realized in the history of mankind.

Hegel's system is the last great expression of this cul-

tural idealism, ^he last great attempt to render thought a

refuge for reason and liberty. BThe original critical impulse

of his thinking, however, was strong enough to induce

him to abandon the traditional aloofness of idealism from

l6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

history. He made philosophy a concrete historical factor

and drew history into phirosojphyj ' ~ "

History, however, wheii^comprehended, shatters the

idealistic framework.

Hegel's system is necessarily associated with a definite

political philosophy and with a definite social and political

order. The dialectic between civil society and the state of

the Restoration is not incidental in Hegel's philosophy,

nor is it just a section of his Philosophy of Right; its prin-

ciples already operate in the conceptual structure of his

system. His basic concepts are, on the other hand, but the

culmination of the entire tradition of Western thought.

They become understandable only when interpreted

within this tradition.

We have thus far attempted in brief compass to place

the Hegelian concepts in their concrete historical setting.

It remains for us to trace the starting point of Hegel's

system to its sources in the philosophical situation of his

time.

2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING

German idealism rescued philosophy from the attack of

British empiricism, and the struggle between the two be-

came not merely a clash of different philosophical schools,

but a struggle for philosophy as such. Philosophy had

never ceased to claim the right to guide man's efforts to-

wards a rational mastery of nature and society, or to base

this claim upon the fact that philosophy elaborated the

highest and most general concepts for knowing the world.

With Descartes, the practical bearing of philosophy as-

sumed a new form, which accorded with the sweeping

progress of modern technics. He announced a 'practical

philosophy by means of which, knowing the force and the

action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and all other

bodies that environ us ... we can employ them in all

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 17

those uses to which they are adapted, and thus render

ourselves the masters and possessors of nature.' 19

The achievement of this task was, to an ever increasing

extent, bound up with the establishment of universally

valid laws and concepts in knowledge. Rational mastery of

nature and society presupposed knowledge of the truth,

and the truth was a universal, as contrasted to the multi-

fold appearance of things or to their immediate form in

the perception of individuals. This principle was already

alive in the earliest attempts of Greek epistemology: the

truth is universal and necessary and thus contradicts the

ordinary experience of change and accident.

The conception, that the truth is contrary to the mat-

ters of fact of existence and independent of contingent

individuals, has run through the entire historical epoch

in which man's social life has been one of antagonisms

among conflicting individuals and groups. The universal

has been hypostatized as a philosophical reaction to the

historical fact that, in society, only individual interests

prevail, while the common interest is asserted only 'behind

the back* of the individual. The contrast between univer-

sal and individual took on an aggravated form when, in

the modern era, slogans of general freedom were raised

and it was held that an appropriate social order could be

brought about only through the knowledge and activity

of emancipated individuals. All men were declared free

and equal; yet, in acting according to their knowledge and

in the pursuit of their interest, they created and experi-

enced an order of dependence, injustice and recurring

crises. The general competition between free economic

subjects did not establish a rational community which

might safeguard and gratify the wants and desires of all

men. The life of men was surrendered to the economic

19 Discourse on Method, part vi, in: Philosophical Works, ed. E. S.

Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Cambridge 1951, vol. r, p, 119.

l8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL/S PHILOSOPHY

mechanisms of a social system that related individuals to

one another as isolated buyers and sellers of commodi-

ties. This actual lack of a rational community was re-

sponsible for the philosophical quest for the unity (Bin-

heit) and universality (Allgemeinheit) of reason.

Does the structure of individual reasoning (the subjec-

tivity) yield any general laws and concepts that might con-

stitute universal standards of rationality? Can a universal

rational order be built upon the autonomy of the indi-

vidual? In expanding an affirmative answer to these ques-

tions, the epistemology of German idealism aimed at a

unifying principle that would preserve the basic ideals of

individualistic society without falling victim to its an-

tagonisms. The British empiricists had demonstrated that

not a single concept or law of reason could lay claim

to universality, that the unity of reason is but the unity

of custom or habit, adhering to the facts but never gov-

erning them. According to the German idealists, this at-

tack jeopardized all efforts to impose an order on the pre-

vailing forms of life. Unity and universality were not to

be found in empirical reality; they were not given facts.

Moreover, the very structure of empirical reality seemed

to warrant the assumption that they could never be de-

rived from the given facts. If men did not succeed,

however, in creating unity and universality through their

autonomous reason and even in contradiction to the

facts, they would have to surrender not only their intel-

lectual but also their material existence to the blind pres-

sures and processes of the prevailing empirical order of

life: The problem was thus not merely a philosophical

one but concerned the historical destiny of humanity.

The German idealists recognized the concrete historical

manifestations of the problem; this is clear in the fact that

all of them connected the theoretical with the. practical

reason. There is a necessary transition from Kant's anal-

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 1Q

ysis of the transcendental consciousness to his demand

for the community of a Weltburgerreich, from Fichte's

concept of the pure ego to his construction of a totally

unified and regulated society (der geschlossene Handels-

staat)', and from t^egd's idea of reason to his designation

of the state as the unipji pf,the common and the indiyid-

ual interest, and thus as the realization of reasonj

The idealistic counterattack was provoked not by the

empiricist approaches of Locke and Hume, but by their

refutation of general ideas. We have attempted to show

that reason's right to shape reality depended upon man's

ability to hold generally valid truths. Reason could lead

beyond the brute fact of what is, to the realization of what

ought to be, only by virtue of the universality and neces-

sity of its concepts (which in turn are the criteria of its

truth). These concepts the empiricists denied. General

ideas, said Locke, are 'the inventions and creatures of the

understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern

only signs . . . When therefore we quit particulars, the

generals that rest are only the creatures of our own mak-

ing . . .' 20 For Hume, general ideas are abstracted from

the particular, ancl 'represent' the particular and the par-

ticular only. 21 They can never provide universal rules or

principles. If Hume was to be accepted, the claim of reason

to organize reality had to be rejected. For as we have seen,

this claim was based upon reason's faculty to attain truths,

the validity of which was not derived from experience and

which could in fact stand against experience. ' 'Tis not

. . . reason, which is the guide of life, but custom/ 22 This

conclusion of the empiricist investigations did more than

20 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book HI, ch. 3, section ii,

in: Philosophical Works, ed. J. A. St. John, London 1903, vol. 11, p. 14.

21 A Treatise of Human Nature, book I, part i, section VH, ed. L. A.

Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1928, pp. 17 ff.

22 Hume, An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature, published for

the first time in 1938, Cambridge University Press, p. 16.

2O THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

undermine metaphysics. It confined men within the limits

of 'the given/ within the existing order of things and

events. Whence could man obtain the right to go beyond

not some particular within this order, but beyond the en-

tire order itself? Whence could he obtain the right to sub-

mit this order to the judgment of reason? If experience and

custom were to be the sole source of his knowledge and

belief, how could he act against custom, how act in accord-

ance with ideas and principles as yet not accepted and es-

tablished? Truth could not oppose the given order or rea-

son speak against it. The result was not only skepticism

but conformism. The empiricist restriction of human na-

ture to knowledge of 'the given* removed the desire both

to transcend the given and to despair about it. Tor .noth-

ing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same

effect upon us as enjoyment, and that we are no sooner ac-

quainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire,

than the desire itself vanishes. When we see, that we have

arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down

contented/ 28

The German idealists regarded this philosophy as ex-

pressing the abdication of reason. Attributing the exist-

ence of general ideas to the force of custom, and the prin-

ciples by which reality is understood, to psychological

mechanisms, was, to them, tantamount to a denial of truth

and reason. Human psychology, they saw, is subject to

change is, in fact, a domain of uncertainty and chance

from which no necessity and universality could be de-

rived. And yet, such necessity and universality were the

sole guarantee of reason. Unless, the idealists declared,

the general concepts that claimed such necessity and uni-

versality could be shown to be more than the product of

imagination, could be shown to draw their validity neither

from experience nor from individual psychology, unless,

28 Hume, Treatise, Introduction, p. xxii.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 81

s~

in other words, they were shown applicable to experience

without arising from experience, reason would have to

bow to the dictates of the empirical teaching. And if cog-

nition by reason, that is, by concepts that are not derived

from experience, means metaphysics, then the attack upon

metaphysics was at the same time an attack upon the con-

ditions of human freedom, for the right of reason to guide

experience was a proper part of these conditions. v

Kant adopted the view of the empiricists that all human

knowledge begins with and terminates in experience, that

experience alone provides the material for the concepts

of reason. There is no stronger empiricist statement than

that which opens his Critique of Pure Reason. 'All

thought must, directly or inxjj&ectly, . . . relat^jjjti-

mately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility,

because in no other way can an object be given to usj

Kant maintains, however, that the empiricists had failed

to demonstrate that experience also furnishes the means

and modes by which this empirical material is organized.

If it could be shown that these principles of organization

were the genuine possession of the human mind and did

not arise from experience, then the independence and

freedom of reason would be saved. Experience itself would

become the product of reason, for it would then not be the

disordered manifold of sensations and impressions, but

the comprehensive organization of these.

Kant set out to prove that the human mind possessed

the universal 'forms' that organized the manifold of data

furnished to it by the senses. The forms of 'intuition'

(space and time) and the forms of 'understanding* (the

categories) are the universals through which the mind or-

ders the sense manifold into the continuum of experience,

They are a priori to each and every sensation and impres-

sion, so that we 'get* and arrange impressions under these

forms. Experience presents a necessary and universal

22 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL/S PHILOSOPHY

order only by virtue of the a priori activity of the human

mind, which perceives all things and events in the form

of space and time and comprehends them under the cate-

gories of unity, reality, substantiality, causality, and so on.

These forms and categories are not derived from experi-

ence, for, as Hume had pointed out, no impression or sen-

sation can be found that corresponds to them; yet experi-

ence, as an organized continuum, originates in them. They

are universally valid and applicable because they consti-

tute the very structure of the human mind. The world

of objects, as a universal and necessary order, is produced

by the subject hot by the individual, but by those acts

of intuition and understanding that are common to all in-

dividuals, since they constitute the very conditions of ex-

perience.

This common structure of the mind Kant designates as

'transcendental consciousness.' It consists of the forms of

intuition and of understanding, which, in Kant's analysis,

are not static frames, but forms of operation that exist only

in the act of apprehending and comprehending. The

transcendental forms of intuition or outer sense synthesize

the manifold of sense data into a spatio-temporal order.

By virtue of the categories, the results of this are brought

into the universal and necessary relations of cause and ef-

fect, substance, reciprocity, and so on. And this entire com-

plex is unified in the 'transcendental apperception,' which

relates all experience to the thinking ego, thereby giving

experience the continuity of being 'my' experience. These

processes of synthesis, a priori and common to all minds,

hence universal, are interdependent and are brought to

bear in to to in every act of knowledge.

What Kant calls the 'highest' synthesis, that of transcen-

dental apperception, is the awareness of an 'I think,'

which accompanies every experience. Through it, the

thinking ego knows itself as continuous, present, and

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 2J

active throughout the series of its experiences. The tran-

scendental apperception, therefore, is the ultimate basis

for the unity of the subject and, hence, for the universal-

ity and necessity of all the objective relations.

Transcendental consciousness depends on the material

received through the senses. The multitude of these im-

pressions, however, becomes an organized world of co-

herent objects and relations only through the operations

of transcendental consciousness. Since, then, we know the

impressions only in the context of the a priori forms of

the mind, we 'cannot know how or what the 'things-in-

themselves' are that give rise to the impressions. These

things-in-themselves, presumed to exist outside of the

forms of the mind, remain completely unknowable.

Hegel regarded this skeptical element of Kant's philoso-

phy as vitiating to his attempt to rescue reason from the

empiricist onslaught. yVs long as the things-in-themselves

were beyond the capacity of reason^ reason, remained a

mere_subjective principle without power over the ob^

jective structure of reality \ And the world thus fell into

two separate parts, subjectivity and objectivity, under-

standing and sensei thought and existence. This separa-

tion was not primarily an epistemological problem for

Hegel. Time and again he stressed that the relation be-

tween subject and object, their opposition, denoted a con-

crete conflict in existence, and that its solution, the union

of the opposites, was a matter of practice as well as of

theory. Later, he described the historical form of the con-

flict as the 'alienation* (Entfremdung) of mind, signifying

that the world of objects, originally the product of man's

labor and knowledge, becomes independent of man and

comes to be governed by uncontrolled forces and laws in

which man no longer recognizes his own self. At the same

time, thought becomes estranged from reality and the

truth becomes an impotent ideal preserved in thought

84 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

while the actual world is calmly left outside its influence.

Unless man succeeds in reuniting the separated parts of

his world and in bringing nature and society within the

scope of his reason, he is forever doomed to frustration.

The task of philosophy in this period of general disinte-

gration is to demonstrate the principle that will restore

the missing unity and totality.

Hegel sets forth this principle in the concept of reason.

We have attempted to sketch the socio-historical and the

philosophical roots of this concept which effect a tie be-

tween the progressive ideas of the French Revolution and

the prevailing currents of philosophical discussion. Reason

is the veritable form of reality in which all antagonisms

of subject and object are integrated to form a genuine

unity and universality. Hegel's philosophy is thus neces-

sarily a system, subsuming all realms of being under the

all-embracing idea of reason. The inorganic as well as the

organic world, nature as well as society, are here brought

under the sway of mind.

Hegel considered philosophy's systematic character to

be a product of the historical situation. History had

reached a stage at which the possibilities for realizing hu-

man freedom were at hand. Freedom, however, presup-

poses the reality of reason. Man could be free, could de-

velop all his potentialities, only if his entire world was

dominated by an integrating rational will and by knowl-

edge. The Hegelian system anticipates a state in which

this possibility has been achieved. The historical optimism

that it breathes provided the basis for Hegel's so-called

'pan-logism' which treats every form of being as a form

of reason. The transitions from the Logic to the Philoso-

phy of Nature, and from the latter to the Philosophy of

Mind are made on the assumption that the laws of nature

spring from the rational structure of being and lead in a

continuum to the laws of the mind. The realm of mind

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 5

achieves in freedom what the realm of nature achieves in

blind necessity the fulfillment of the potentialities in-

herent in reality. It is this state of reality which Hegel

refers to as 'the truth/

Truth is not only attached to propositions and judg-

ments, it is, in short, not only an attribute of thought, but

of reality in process. Something is true if it is what it can

be, fulfilling all its objective possibilities. In Hegel's lan-

guage, it is then identical with its 'notion.'

The notion has a dual use. It comprehends the nature

or essence of a subject-matter, and thus represents the true

thought of it. At the same time, it refers, to the actual

realization of that nature or essence, its concrete existence.

All fundamental concepts of the Hegelian system are char-

acterized by the same ambiguity. They never denote mere

concepts (as in formal logic), but forms or modes of being

comprehended by thought. Hegel does not presuppose a

mystical identity of thought and reality, but he holds that

the right thought represents reality because the latter, in

its development, has reached the stage at which it exists

in conformity with the truth. His 'pan-logism' comes close

to being its opposite: one could say that he takes the prin-

ciples and forms of thought from the principles and

forms of reality, so that the logical laws reproduce those

governing the movement of reality. The unification of op-

posites is a process Hegel demonstrates in the case of every

single existent. The logical form of the 'judgment' ex-

presses an occurrence in reality. Take, for example, the

judgment: this man is a slaVe. According to Hegel, it

means that a man (the subject) has become enslaved (the

predicate), but although he is a slave, he still remains man,

thus essentially free and opposed to his predicament. The

judgment does not attribute a predicate to a stable sub-

ject, but denotes an actual process of the subject whereby

the latter becomes something other than itself. Th& sub-

26 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

ject is the very process of becoming the predicate and of

contradicting it. This process dissolves into a multitude

of antagonistic relations the stable subjects that traditional

logic had assumed. Reality appears as a dynamic in which

all fixed forms reveal themselves to be mere abstractions.

Consequently, when in Hegel's logic concepts pass from

one form to another, this refers to the fact that, to correct

thinking, one form of being passes to another, and that

every particular form can be determined only by the to-

tality of the antagonistic relations in which this form

exists.

We have emphasized the fact that, to Hegel, reality has

reached a stage at which it exists in truth. This statement

now needs a correction. Hegel does not mean that every-

thing that exists does so in conformity with its potentiali-

ties, but that the mind has attained the self-consciousness

of its freedom, and become capable of freeing nature and

society. The realization of reason is not a fact but a task.

The form in which the objects immediately appear is not

yet their true form. What is simply given is at first nega-

tive, other than its real potentialities. It becomes true only

in the process of overcoming this negativity, w that the

birth of the truth requires the death of the given state of

being. \Hegel's optimism is based upon a destructive con-

ception of the given. All forms are seized by the dissolv-

ing movement of reason which cancels and alters them

until they are adequate to their notion. It is this move-

ment that thought reflects in the process of 'mediation 1

(Vermittlung). If we follow the true content of our per-

ceptions and concepts, all delimitation of stable objects

collapses. They are dissolved into a multitude of relations

that exhaust the developed content of these objects and

terminate in the subject's comprehensive activity.

Hegel's philosophy is indeed what the subsequent reac-

tion termed it, a negative philosophy. It is originally mo-

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 2?

tivated by the conviction that the given facts that appear

to common sense as the positive index of truth are in

reality the negation of truth, so that truth can only be es-

tablished by their destruction. The driving force of the

dialectical method lies in this critical conviction. Dialectic

in its entirety is linked to the conception that all forms of

being are permeated by an essential negativity, and that

this negativity determines their content and movement.

The dialectic represents the counterthrust to any form of

positivism. From Hume to the present-day logical posi-

tivists, the principle of this latter philosophy has been the

ultimate authority of the fact, and observing the imme-

diate given has been the ultimate method of verification.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, and primarily in

response to the destructive tendencies of rationalism, posi-

tivism assumed the peculiar form of an all-embracing

'positive philosophy,' which was to replace traditional

metaphysics. The protagonists of this positivism took great

pains to stress the conservative and affirmative attitude of

their philosophy: it induces thought to be satisfied with

the facts, to renounce any transgression beyond them, and

to bow to the given* state of affairs. To Hegel, the facts in

themselves possess no authority. They are 'posited'

(gesetzt) by the subject that has mediated them with the

comprehensive process of its development. Verification

rests, in the last analysis, with this process to which all

facts are related and which determines their content.

Everything that is given has to be justified before reason,

which is but the totality of nature's and man's capacities.

Hegel's philosophy, however, which begins with the

negation of the given and retains this negativity through-

out, concludes with the declaration that history has

achieved the reality of reason. His basic concepts were still

bound up with the social structure of the prevailing sys-

tem, and in this respect, too, German idealism may be said

28 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

to have preserved the heritage of the French Revolution.

However, the 'reconciliation of idea and reality,' pro-

claimed in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, contains a de-

cisive element that points beyond mere reconciliation.

This element has been preserved and utilized in the later

doctrine of the negation of philosophy. Philosophy reaches

its end when U ha* formulated it$ view of a world in which

reason is realizedMf at that point reality contains the con-

ditions necessary to materialize reason in fact, thought can

cease to concern itself with the ideal. The truth now would

require actual historical practice to fulfill it. With the re-

linquishment of the ideal, philosophy relinquishes its

critical task and passes it to another agency. The final

culmination of philosophy is thus at the same time its ab-

dication. Released from its preoccupation with the ideal,

philosophy is also released from its opposition to reality.

This means that it ceases to be philosophy. It does not

follow, however, that thought must then comply with the

existing order. Critical thinking does not cease, but as-

sumes a new form. The efforts of reason devolve upon so-

cial theory and social practice.

* * *

Hegel's philosophy shows five different stages of devel-

opment:

1. The period from 1790 to 1800 marks the attempt to for-

mulate a religious foundation for philosophy, exemplified in

the collected papers of the period, the Theologische Jugend-

schriften.

2. 1800-1801 saw the formulation of Hegel's philosophical

standpoint and interests through critical discussion of contem-

porary philosophical systems, especially those of Kant, Fichte,

and Schelling. Hegel's main works of this period are the

Different des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der

Philosophic, Glauben und Wissen, and other articles in the

Kritischc Journal der Philosophic.

3. The years 1801 to 1806 yielded the Jenenser system, the

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SETTING 2Q

earliest form of Hegel's complete system. This period was

documented by the Jenenser Logik und Metaphysik, Jenenser

Realphilosophie, and the System der Sittlichkeit.

4. 1807, the publication of the Phenomenology of Mind.

5. The period of the final system, which was outlined as

early as 1808-11 in the Philosophische Propadeutik, but was

not consummated until 1817. To this period belong the works

that make up the bulk of Hegel's writing: The Science of

Logic (1812-16), the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences

(1817, 1827, l8 3) tne Philosophy of Right (1821), and the

various Berlin lectures on the Philosophy of History, the His-

tory of Philosophy, Esthetics, and Religion.

The elaboration of Hegel's philosophic system is accom-

panied by a series of political fragments that attempt to

apply his new philosophical ideas to concrete historical

situations. This process of referring philosophical conclu-

sions to the context of social and political reality begins in

1798 with his historical and political studies; is followed

by his Die Verfassung Deutschlands in 1802; and contin-

ues right through to 1831, when he wrote his study on the

English Reform Bill. The connecting of his philosophy

with the historical developments of his time makes Hegel's

political writings a. part of his systematic works, and the

two must be treated together, so that his basic concepts are

given philosophical as well as historical and political ex-

planation.

I

) > < 4K-

Hegel's Early Theological Writings

(1790-1800)

IF we wish to partake of the atmosphere in which Hegel's

philosophy originated, we must go back to the cultural

and political setting of Southern Germany in the closing

decades of the eighteenth century. In Wiirttemberg, a

country under the sway of a despotism that had just con-

sented to some slight constitutional limitations on its

power, the ideas of 1789 were beginning to exert a strong

impact, particularly on intellectual youth. The period of

that earlier cruel despotism seemed to have passed: the

despotism under which the whole country was terrorized

by constant military conscriptions for foreign wars, heavy

arbitrary taxations, the sale of offices, the establishment

of monopolies that plundered the masses and enriched the

coffers of an extravagant prince, and sudden arrests that

followed the slightest suspicions or stirrings of protest. 1

The conflicts between Duke Charles Eugene and the es-

tates were mitigated by an agreement in 1770, and the

most striking obstacle to the functioning of a centralized

government was thus removed; but the result was only

to divide absolutism between the personal rule of the

duke and the interests of the feudal oligarchy.

The German enlightenment, however, this weaker coun-

terpart of the English and French philosophy that had

shattered the ideological framework of the absolutist state,

had filtered into the cultural life of Wiirttemberg: the

i See Karl Pfaff, Geschichte de$ Filrstenhauses und Landes Wirtcmbcrg,

Stuttgart 1839, Part HI, section 8, pp. 82 ff.

30

HEGEL'S EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 31

duke was a pupil of the 'enlightened despot/ Frederick II

of Prussia, and in the latter period of his rule he indulged

in an enlightened absolutism. The spirit of the enlighten-

ment went forward in the schools and universities that he

promoted. Religious and political problems were discussed

in terms of eighteenth century rationalism, the dignity of

man was extolled, as was his right to shape his own life

against all obsolete forms of authority and tradition, and

tolerance and justice were praised. But the young genera-

tion that was then attending the theological University of

Tubingen among them Hegel, Schelling, and Holderlin

was above all impressed by the contrast between these

ideals and the miserable actual condition of the German

Reich. There was not the slightest chance for the rights

of man to take their place in a reorganized state and so-

ciety. True, the students sang revolutionary songs and

translated the Marseillaise; they perhaps planted liberty

trees and shouted against the tyrants and their henchmen;

but they knew that all this activity was an impotent pro-

test against the still impregnable forces that held the

fatherland in their grip. All that could be hoped for was

a modicum of constitutional reform, which might better

balance the weight of power between the prince and the

estates.

In these circumstances, the eyes of the young genera-

tion turned longingly towards the past and particularly

to those periods of history in which unity had prevailed

between the intellectual culture of men and their social

and political life. Holderlin drew a glowing picture of an-

cient Greece, and Hegel wrote a glorification of the an-

cient city-state, which at points even outshone the exalted

description of early Christianity that the theological stu-

dent set down. We find that a political interest time and

again broke into the discussion of religious problems in

Hegel's early theological fragments. Hegel ardently strove

3* THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

to recapture the power that had produced and maintained,

in the ancient republics, the living unity of all spheres of

culture and that had generated the free development of

all national forces. He spoke of this hidden power as the

Volksgeist: 'The spirit of a nation, its history, religion

and the degree of political freedom it has reached cannot

be separated one from the other, neither as regards their

influence nor as regards their quality; they are interwoven

in one bond . . .' 2

Hegel's use of the Volksgeist is closely related to Mon-

tesquieu's use of the esprit ge'ne'ral of a nation as the basis

for its social and political laws. The 'national spirit' is not

conceived as a mystical or metaphysical entity, but repre-

sents the whole of the natural, technical, economic, moral,

and intellectual conditions that determine the nation's

historical development. Montesquieu's emphasis on this

historical basis was directed against the unjustifiable re-

tention of outmoded political forms. Hegel's concept of

the Volksgeist kept these critical implications. Instead of

following the various influences of Montesquieu, Rous-

seau, Herder, and Kant on Hegel's theological studies, we

shall limit ourselves to the elaboration of Hegel's main

interest.

Hegel's theological discussion repeatedly asks what the

true relation is between the individual and a state that

no -longer satisfies his capacities but exists rather as an

'estranged' institution from which the active political in-

terest of the citizens has disappeared. Hegel defined this

state with almost the same categories as those of eight-

eenth century liberalism: the state rests on the consent

of individuals, it circumscribes their rights and duties and

protects its members from those internal and external dan-

gers that might threaten the perpetuation of the whole.

The individual, as opposed to the state, possesses the in-

Thcologische Jugcndschriften, p. 17.

HEGEL'S EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 33

alienable rights of man, and with these the state power can

under no circumstances interfere, not even if such inter-

ference may be in the individual's own interest. 'No man

can relinquish his right to give unto himself the law and

to be solely responsible for its execution. If this right is

renounced, man ceases to be man. It is not the state's busi-

ness, however, to prevent him from renouncing it, for this

would mean to compel man to be man, and would be

force.' 8 Here is nothing of that moral and metaphysical

exaltation of the state which we encounter in Hegel's later

works.

The tone slowly changed, however, within the very

same period of Hegel's life and even within the same body

of his writings, and he came to consider it as man's his-

torical 'fate,' a cross to be borne, that he accept social

and political relations that restrict his full development.

Hegel's enlightened optimism and his tragic praise of

a lost paradise were replaced by an emphasis on histori-

cal necessity. Historical necessity had brought about a gulf

between the individual and the state. In die early period

they were in a 'natural' harmony, but one attained at the

expense of the individual, for man did not possess con-

scious freedom and was not master of the social process.

And the more 'natural' this early harmony was, the more

easily could it be dissolved by the uncontrolled forces

that then ruled the social world. 'In Athens and Rome,

successful wars, increasing wealth, and an acquaintance

with luxury and greater convenience of life produced an

aristocracy of war and wealth' that destroyed the repub-

lic and caused the complete loss of political liberty. 4 State

power fell into the hands of certain privileged individuals

and groups, with the vast mass of the citizens pursuing

only their private interest without regard for the common

ft Ibid., p. tis. 4 Ibid., p. 288.

34 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

good; 'the right to security of property* now became their

whole world. 8

Hegel's efforts to comprehend the universal laws gov-

erning this process led him inevitably to an analysis of the

role of the social institutions in the progress of history.

One of his historical fragments, written after 1797, opens

with the sweeping declaration that 'security of property is

the pivot on which the whole of modern legislation

turns/ and in the first draft to his pamphlet on Die Ver-

fassung Deutschlands (1798-9), he states that the his-

torical form of 'bourgeois property* (burgerliches Eigen-

tum) is responsible for the prevailing political disintegra-

tion. 1 Moreover, Hegel maintained that the social institu-

tions had distorted even the most private and personal re-

lations between men. There is a significant fragment in

the Theologische Jugendschriften, called Die Liebe, in

which Hegel states that ultimate harmony and union be-

tween individuals in love is prevented because of the 'ac-

quisition and possession of property as well as rights/ The

lover, he explains, 'who must look upon his or her be-

loved as the owner of property must also come to feel

his or her particularity* militating against the community

of their lifea particularity that consists in his or her

being bound up with 'dead things' that do not belong to

the other and remain of necessity outside of their unity. 8

The institution of property Hegel here related to the

fact that man had come to live in a world that, though

molded by his own knowledge and labor, was no longer

his, but rather stood opposed to his inner needs a strange

world governed by inexorable laws, a 'dead' world in

which human life is frustrated. The Theologische Jugend-

schriften present in these terms the earliest formulation

Ibid., p. 2x3.

*Dokumentc zu Hegcls Entwicklung, p. 268.

T Ibid., p. x86.

Theologische Jugcndschriftcn, pp. 381-2.

HEGEL'S EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 35

of the concept of 'alienation' (Entfremdung), which was

destined to play a decisive part in the future development

of the Hegelian philosophy.

Hegel's first discussion of religious and political prob-

lems strikes the pervasive note that the loss of unity and

liberty a historical fact is the general mark of the mod-

ern era and the factor that characterizes all conditions of

privatq and societal life. This loss of freedom and unity,

Hegel says, is patent in the numerous conflicts that abound

in human living, especially in the conflict between man

and nature. This conflict, which turned nature into a hos-

tile power that had to be mastered by man, has led to an

antagonism between idea and reality, between thought

and the real, between consciousness and existence. 9 Man

constantly finds himself set off from a world that is ad-

verse and alien to his impulses and desires. How, then, is

this world to be restored to harmony with man's poten-

tialities?

At first, Hegel's answer was that of the student of theol-

ogy. He interpreted Christianity as having a basic func-

tion in world history, that of giving a new 'absolute* cen-

ter to man and a final goal to life. Hegel could also see,

however, that the revealed truth of the Gospel could not

fit in with the expanding social and political realities of

the world, for the Gospel appealed essentially to the indi-

vidual as an individual detached from his social and politi-

cal nexus; its essential aim was to save the individual and

not society or the state. It was therefore not religion that

could solve the problem, or theology that could set forth

principles to restore freedom and unity. As a result,

Hegel's interest slowly shifted from theological to philo-

sophical questions and concepts.

Hegel always viewed philosophy not as a special science

but as the ultimate form of human knowledge. The need

9 Ibid., p. 844.

36 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

for philosophy he derived from the need to remedy the

general loss of freedom and unity. He explicitly stated

this in his first philosophical article. 'The need for philos-

ophy arises when the unifying power [die Macht der Ver-

einigung] has disappeared from the life of men, when the

contradictions have lost their living interrelation and in-

terdependence and assumed an independent 'form/ 10 The

unifying force he speaks of refers to the vital harmony of

the individual and common interest, which prevailed in

the ancient republics and which assured the liberty of the

whole and integrated all conflicts into the living unity of

the Volksgeist. When this harmony was lost, man's life be-

came overwhelmed by pervasive conflicts that could no

longer be controlled by the whole. We have already -men-

tioned the terms in which Hegel characterized these con-

flicts: nature was set against man, reality was. estranged

from 'the idea* and consciousness opposed to existence.

He next summarized all these oppositions as having the

general form of a conflict between subject and object, 11

and in this way he connected his historical problem to the

philosophical one that had dominated European thought

since Descartes. Man's knowledge and will had been

pushed into a 'subjective* world, whose self-certainty and

freedom confronted an objective world of uncertainty and

physical necessity. The more Hegel saw that the contra-

dictions were the universal form of reality, the more philo-

sophical his discussion became only the most universal

concepts could now grasp the contradictions, and only the

ultimate principles of knowledge could yield the prin-

ciples to resolve them.

At the same time, even the most abstract of Hegel's con-

cepts retained the concrete denotation of his questions.

lo'Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems/ in Erste

Druckschriften, ed. Georg Lasson, Leipzig 1913, p. 14.

11 Ibid., p. 13.

HEGEL'S EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 37

Philosophy was charged with a historical mission to give

an exhaustive analysis of the contradictions prevailing in

reality and to demonstrate their possible unification. The

dialectic developed out of Hegel's view that reality was a

structure of contradictions. The Theologische Jugend-

schriften still covered the dialectic over with a theological

framework, but even there the philosophical beginnings

of the dialectical analysis can already be traced.

The first concept Hegel introduces as the unification of

contradictions is the concept of life.

We might better understand the peculiar role Hegel

attributed to the idea of life if we recognize that for him

all contradictions are resolved and yet preserved in 'rea-

son.' Hegel conceived life as mind, that is to say, as a being

able to comprehend and master the all-embracing antag-

onisms of existence. In other words, Hegel's concept of

life points to the life of a rational being and to man's

unique quality among all other beings. Ever since Hegel,

the idea of life has been the starting point for many

efforts to reconstruct philosophy in terms of man's con-

crete historical circumstance and to overcome thereby the

abstract and remdte character of rationalist philosophy. 12

Life is distinguished from all other modes of being by

its unique relation to its determinations and to the world

as a whole. Each inanimate object is, by virtue of its par-

ticularity and its limited and determinate form, different

from and opposed to the genus; the particular contradicts

the universal, so that the latter does not fulfill itself in

the former. The living, however, differs from the non-

living in this respect, for life designates a being whose

different parts and states (Zustdnde) are integrated into

a complete unity, that of a 'subject.' In life, 'the particular

... is at the same time a branch of the infinite tree of

12 See Wilhelm Dilthey, Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels, in Gesammelte

Schiiften, Leipzig 1921, vol. iv, pp.

38 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

Life; every part outside the whole is at the same time the

whole, Life/ 18 Each living individual is also a manifesta-

tion of the whole of life, in other words, possesses the full

essence or potentialities of life. Furthermore, though every

living being is determinate and limited, it can supersede

its limitations by virtue of the power it possesses as a living

subject. Life is at first a sequence of determinate 'objec-

tive* conditions objective, because the living subject finds

them outside of its self, limiting its free self-realization.

The process of life, however, consists in continuously

drawing these external conditions into the enduring unity

of the subject. The living being maintains itself as a self

by mastering and annexing the manifold of determinate

conditions it finds, and by bringing all that is opposed to

itself into harmony with itself. The unity of life, therefore,

is not an immediate and 'natural* one, but the result of

a constant active overcoming of everything that stands

against it. It is a unity that prevails only as the result of

a process of 'mediation* (Vermittlung) between the living

subject as it is and its objective conditions. The mediation

is the proper function of the living self as an actual sub-

ject, and at the same time it makes the living self an actual

subject. Life is the first form in which the substance is

conceived as subject and is thus the first embodiment of

freedom. It is the first model of a real unification of op-

posites and hence the first embodiment of the dialectic.

Not all forms of life, however, represent such a complete

unity. Only man, by virtue of his knowledge, can achieve

'the idea of Life.* We have already indicated that for

Hegel a perfect union of subject and object is a prerequi-

site to freedom. The union presupposes a knowledge of

the truth, meaning thereby a knowledge of the potentiali-

ties of both subject and object. Man alone is able to trans-

form objective conditions so that they become a medium

is Theologische Jugcndschriften, p. 307.

HEGEL'S EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 39

for his subjective development. And the truth he holds

frees not only his own potencies, but those of nature as

well. He brings the truth into the world, and with it is

able to organize the world in conformity with reason.

Hegel illustrates this point in the mission of John the

Baptist, and for the first time advances the view that the

world is in its very essence the product of man's historical

activity. The world and all 'its relations and determina-

tions are the work of the dvOQcfwiov qxi)t6c;, of man's self-

development/ 14 The conception of the world as a product

of human activity and knowledge henceforth persists as

the driving force of Hegel's system. At this very early stage,

we can already discover the features of the later dialectical

theory of society.

'Life' is not the most advanced philosophic concept that

Hegel attained in his first period. The System fragment,

in which he gives a more precise elaboration of the philo-

sophic import of the antagonism between subject and

object and between man and nature, uses the term mind

(Geist) to designate the unification of these disparate do-

mains. Mind is essentially the same unifying agency as

life 'Infinite Life <may be called a Mind because Mind

connotes the living unity amid the diversity . . . Mind

is the living law that unifies the diversity so that the latter

becomes living.' 15 But although it means no more than

life, the concept mind lays emphasis on the fact that the

unity of life is, in the last analysis, the work of the sub-

ject's free comprehension and activity, and not of some

blind natural force.

The Theologische Jugendschriften yield yet another

concept that points far into Hegel's later logic. In a frag-

ment entitled Glauben und Wissen, Hegel declares, 'Uni-

fication and Being [Sein] are equivalent; the copula "is"

i* Ibid., p. 307. 15 P. 347.

40 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

in every proposition expresses a unification of subject and

predicate, in other words, a Being.' 16 An adequate inter-

pretation of this statement would require a thorough dis-

cussion of the basic developments in European philosophy

since Aristotle. We can here only intimate some of the

background and content of the formulation.

Hegel's statement implies that there is a distinction be-

tween 'to be' (Sein) and being (Seiendes), or, between de-

terminate being and being-as-such. The history of Western

philosophy opened with the same distinction, made in

answer to the question, What is Being? which animated

Greek philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle. Every

being around us is a determinate one: a stone, a tool, a

house, an animal, an event, and so on. But we predicate

of every such being that it is thus and so; that is, we at-

tribute being to it. And this being that we attribute to it

is not any particular thing in the world, but is common

to all the particular beings to which it can be attributed.

This points to the fact that there must be a being-as-such

that is different from every determinate being and yet at-

tributable to every being whatsoever, so that it can be

called the real 'one' in all the diversity of determinate be-

ings. Being-as-such is what all particular beings have in

common and is, as it were, their substratum. From this

point, it was comparatively easy to take this most univer-

sal being as 'the essence of all being,' 'divine substance,'

'the most real,' and thus to combine ontology with theol-

ogy. This tradition is operative in Hegel's Logic.

Aristotle was the first to regard this being-as-such that

is attributed alike to every determinate being not as a

separate metaphysical entity but as the process or move-

ment through which every particular being molds itself

into what it really is. According to Aristotle, there is a

distinction that runs through the whole realm of being

"P. 383.

HEGEL'S EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 41

between the essence (ovota) and its diverse accidental states

and modifications (TCI ovjipsp^ta). Real being, in the strict

sense, is the essence, by which is meant the concrete indi-

vidual thing, organic as well as inorganic. The individual

thing is the subject or substance enduring throughout a

movement in which it unifies and holds together the vari-

ous states and phases of its existence. The different modes

of being represent various modes of unifying antagonistic

relations; they refer to different modes of persisting

through change, of originating and perishing, of having

properties and limitations, and so on. And Hegel incor-

porates the basic Aristotelian conception into his philos-

ophy: 'The different modes of being are rriore or less com-

plete unifications.' ir Being means unifying, and unifying

means movement. Movement, in turn, Aristotle defines in

terms of potentiality and actuality. The various types of

movement denote various ways of realizing the potentiali-

ties inherent in the essence or moving thing. Aristotle

evaluates the types of movement so that the highest type

is that in which each and every potentiality is fully re-

alized. A being that moves or develops according to the

highest type would be pure iviQ^ia. It would have no

material of realization outside of or alien to itself, but

would be entirely itself at every moment of its existence.

If such a being were to exist, its whole existence would

consist in thinking. A subject whose self-activity is thought

has no estranged and external object; thinking 'grasps' and

holds the object as thought, and reason apprehends reason.

The veritable being is veritable movement, and the latter

is the activity of perfect unification of the subject with its

object. The true Being is therefore thought and reason.

Hegel concludes his presentation in the Encyclopaedia

of the Philosophical Sciences with the paragraph from

Aristotle's Metaphysics in which the veritable being is

IT p. 384.

42 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

explained to be reason. This is significant as more than a

mere illustration. For, Hegel's philosophy is in a large

sense a re-interpretation of Aristotle's ontology, rescued

from the distortion of metaphysical dogma and linked to

the pervasive demand of modern rationalism that the

world be transformed into a medium for the freely devel-

oping subject, that the world become, in short, the reality

of reason. Hegel was the first to rediscover the extremely

dynamic character of the Aristotelian metaphysic, which

treats all being as process and movement a dynamic that

had got entirely lost in the formalistic tradition of Aris-

totelianism.

Aristotle's conception that reason is the veritable being

is carried through by sundering this being from the rest

of the world. The vov-fte6s is neither the cause nor creator

of the world, and is its prime mover only through a com-

plicated system of intermediaries. Human reason is but a

weak copy of this vov<;-fo6<;. Nevertheless, the life of reason

is the highest life and highest good on earth.

The conception is intimately connected with a reality

offering no adequate fulfillment of the proper potentiali-

ties of men and things, so that the fulfillment was located

in an activity that was most independent of the prevailing

incongruencies of reality. The elevation of the realm of

mind to the position of the sole domain of freedom and

reason was conditioned by a world of anarchy and bond-

age. The historical conditions still prevailed in Hegel's

time; the visible potentialities were actualized in neither

society nor nature, and men were not free subjects of their

lives. And since ontology is the doctrine of the most gen-

eral forms of being and as such reflects human insight into

the most general structure of reality, there can be little

wonder that the basic concepts of Aristotelian and He-

gelian ontology were the same.

II

Towards the System of Philosophy

(1800-1802)

i. THE FIRST PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS

IN 1801, Hegel began his academic career in Jena, then

the philosophic center of Germany. Fichte had taught

there until 1799, and Schelling was appointed professor

in 1798. Kant's social and legal philosophy, his Meta-

physik der Sitten, had been published in 1799, and his

revolutionizing of philosophy in his three Critiques of

Reason still exerted a prime influence on intellectual life.

Quite naturally, therefore, Hegel's first philosophical ar-

ticles centered about the doctrines of Kant, Fichte, and

Schelling, and he formulated his problems in terms of the

currents of discussion among the German idealists.

As we have seen, Hegel took the view that philosophy

arises from the all-embracing contradictions into which

human existence has been plunged. These have shaped

the history of philosophy as the history of basic contradic-

tions, those between 'mind and matter, soul and body, be-

lief and understanding, freedom and necessity,' contradic-

tions that had more recently appeared as those between

'reason and sense' (Sinnlichkeit), 'intelligence and nature,'

and, in the most general form, 'subjectivity and objectiv-

ity.' x These were the very concepts that lay at the root

of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and the ones Hegel

now dissolved in his dialectical analysis.

The first concept Hegel subjected to dialectical re-inter-

pretation was that of reason. Kant had made the basic

i Erste Druckschriften, p. 13.

43

44 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL*S PHILOSOPHY

distinction between reason (Vernunft) and understanding

(Verstand). Hegel gave both concepts new meaning and

made them the starting point of his method. For him,

the distinction between understanding and reason is the

same as that between common sensp and speculative think-

ing, between undialectical reflection and dialectical knowl-

edge. The operations of the understanding yield the usual

type of thinking that prevails in everyday life as well as

in science. The world is taken as a multitude of determi-

nate things, each of which is demarcated from the other.

Each thing is a distinct delimited entity related as such to

other likewise delimited entities. The concepts that are

developed from these beginnings, and the judgments com-

posed of these concepts, denote and deal with isolated

things and the fixed relations between such things. The

individual determinations exclude one another as if they

were atoms or monads. The one is not the other and can

never become the other. To be sure, things change, and

so do their properties, but when they do so, one property

or determination disappears and another takes its place.

An entity that is isolated and delimited in this way Hegel

calls 'finite' (das Endliche).

Understanding, then, conceives a world of finite entities,

governed by the principle of identity and opposition.

Everything is identical with itself and with nothing else;

it is, by virtue of its self-identity, opposed to all other

things. It can be connected and combined with them in

many ways, but it never loses its own identity and never

becomes something other than itself. When red litmus

paper turns blue or day changes to night, a here and now

existent ceases to be here and now, and some other thing

takes its place. jWhen a child becomes a man one set of

properties, those of childhood, is replaced by another,

those of manhood. Red and blue, light and dark, child-

hood and manhood, eternally remain irreconcilable oppo-

TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 45

sitions. The operations of understanding thus divide the

world into numberless polarities, and Hegel uses the ex-

pression 'isolated reflection' (isolierte Reflection) to char-

acterize the manner in which understanding forms and

connects its polar concepts.

The rise and spread of this kind of thinking Hegel con-

nects with the origin and prevalence of certain relation-

ships in human life. 2 The antagonisms of 'isolated reflec-

tion' express real antagonisms. Thinking could come to

understand the world as a fixed system of isolated things

and indissoluble oppositions only when the world had

become a reality removed from the true wants and needs

of mankind.

Isolation and opposition are not, however, the final state

of affairs. The world must not remain a complex of fixed

disparates. The unity that underlies the antagonisms must

be grasped and realized by reason, which has the task of

reconciling the opposites and 'sublating* them in a true

unity. The fulfillment of reason's task would at the same

time involve restoring the lost unity in the social relations

of men.

As distinguished from the understanding, reason is mo-

tivated by the need 'to restore the totality.' 8 How can this

be done? First, says Hegel, by undermining the false se-

curity that the perceptions and manipulations of the un-

derstanding provide. The common-sense view is one of

'indifference' and 'security/ 'the indifference of security.' 4

Satisfaction with the given state of reality and acceptance

of its fixed and stable relations make men indifferent to

the as yet unrealized potentialities that are not 'given' with

the same certainty and stability as the objects of sense.

Common sense mistakes the accidental appearance of

things for their essence, and persists in believing that there

is an immediate identity of essence and existence. 5

Ibid., pp. 14-15. 8 p. 16. 4 P. 22. 8 Pp. 22-3.

46 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

The identity of essence and existence, per contra, can

only result from the enduring effort of reason to create it.

It comes about only through a conscious putting into ac-

tion of knowledge, the primary condition for which is the

abandonment of common sense and mere understanding

for 'speculative thinking.' Hegel insists that only this kind

of thinking can get beyond the distorting mechanisms of

the prevailing state of being. Speculative thinking com-

pares the apparent or given form of things to the poten-

tialities of those same things, and in so doing distinguishes

their essence from their accidental state of existence. This

result is achieved nbt through some process of mystical

intuition, but by a method of conceptual cognition, which

examines the process whereby each form has become what

it is. Speculative thinking conceives 'the intellectual and

material world* not as a totality of fixed and stable rela-

tions, but 'as a becoming, and its being as a product and

a producing.' 6

What Hegel calls speculative thinking is in effect his

earliest presentation of dialectical method. The relation

between dialectical thinking (reason) and isolating reflec-

tion (understanding) is clearly defined. The former criti-

cizes and supersedes the fixed oppositions created by the

latter. It undermines the 'security* of common sense and

demonstrates that 'what common sense regards as imme-

diately certain does not have any reality for philosophy/ 7

The first criterion of reason, then, is a distrust of matter-

of-fact authority. Such distrust is the real skepticism that

Hegel designates as 'the free portion* of every true phi-

losophy. 8

The form of reality that is immediately given is, then,

no final reality. The system of isolated things in opposi-

tion, produced by the operations of the understanding,

P. 14. T ibid., p. s*.

a 'VerMltnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophic,' in op. tit., p. 175.

TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 47

must be recognized for what it is: a 'bad* form of reality, a

realm of limitation and bondage. The 'realm of freedom,' 9

which is the inherent goal of reason, cannot be achieved,

as Kant and Fichte thought, by playing off the subject

against the objective world, attributing to the autonomous

person all the freedom that is lacking in the external

world, and leaving the latter a domain of blind necessity.

(Hegel is here striking against the important mechanism

of 'internalizing* or introversion, by which philosophy

and literature generally have made liberty into an inner

value to be realized within the soul alone.) In the final

reality there can be no isolation of the free subject from

the objective world; that antagonism must be resolved, to-

gether with all the others created by the understanding.

The final reality in which the antagonisms are resolved

Hegel terms 'the Absolute.' At this stage of his philosoph-

ical development he can describe this absolute only nega-

tively. Thus, it is quite the reverse of the reality appre-

hended by common sense and understanding; it 'negates'

common-sense reality in every detail, so that the absolute re-

ality has no single point of resemblance to the finite world.

Whereas common sense and the understanding had per-

ceived isolated entities that stood opposed one to the

other, reason apprehends 'the identity of the opposites.'

It does not produce the identity by a process of connecting

and combining the opposites, but transforms them so that

they cease to exist as opposites, although their content is

preserved in a higher and more 'real' form of being. The

process of unifying opposites touches every part of reality

and comes to an end only when reason has 'organized' the

whole so that 'every part exists only in relation to the

whole,' and 'every individual entity has meaning and sig-

nificance only in its relation to the totality.' 10

9'Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems,' p. 18.

10 Ibid., p. 21.

48 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

The totality of the concepts and cognitions of reason

alone represents the absolute. Reason, therefore, is fully

before us only in the form of an all-embracing 'organiza-

tion of propositions and intuitions/ that is, as a 'system/ "

We shall explain the concrete import of these ideas in the

next chapter. Here, in his first philosophical writings,

Hegel intentionally emphasizes the negative function of

reason: its destruction of the fixed and secure world of

common sense and understanding. The absolute is re-

ferred to as 'Night* and 'nothing/ 12 to contrast it to the

clearly defined objects of everyday life. Reason signifies

the 'absolute annihilation* of the common-sense world. 18

For, as we have already said, the struggle against common

sense is the beginning of speculative thinking, and the loss

of everyday security is the origin of philosophy.

Hegel gives further clarification to his position in the

article 'Glauben und Wissen/ in which he contrasts his

conclusions to those of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

The empirical principle that Kant retained by making rea-

son dependent on 'given* objects of experience is here re-

jected completely. In Kant, Hegel declares, reason is lim-

ited to an inner realm of the mind and is made powerless

over 'things-in-themselves/ In other words, it is not really

reason but the understanding that holds sway in the

Kantian philosophy.

On the other hand, Hegel makes special mention of the

fact that Kant did overcome this limitation at many points.

For example, the notion of an 'original synthetic unity of

apperception* recognizes Hegel's own principles of the

original identity of opposites, 1 * for the 'synthetic unity* is

properly an activity by which the antagonism between sub-

ject and object is produced and simultaneously overcome.

11 Pp. 25, 34-5. n P. 16. " p. 17.

i 'Glauben und Wissen/ in op. cit., p. 840.

TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 49

Kant's philosophy therefore 'contains the true form of

thought* as far as this concept is concerned, namely, the

triad of subject, object, and their synthesis. 15

This is the first point at which Hegel makes the claim

that the triad (Triplizitdt) is the true form of thought. He

does not state it as an empty schema of thesis, antithesis,

and synthesis, but as the dynamic unity of opposites. It is

the proper form of thought because it is the proper form

of a reality in which every being is the synthetic unity of

antagonistic conditions.

Traditional logic has recognized this fact in setting

forth the form of the judgment as S is P. We have already

hinted at Hegel's interpretation of this form. To know

what a thing really is, we have to get beyond its immedi-

ately given state (S is S) and follow out the process in

which it turns into something other than itself (P). In the

process of becoming P, however, S still remains S. Its real-

ity is the entire dynamic of its turning into something else

and unifying itself with its 'other.' The dialectical pattern

represents, and is thus 'the truth of,' a world permeated

by negativity, a world in which everything is something

other than it really is, and in which opposition and con-

tradiction constitute the laws of progress.

2. THE FIRST POLITICAL WRITINGS

The critical interests of dialectical philosophy are

clearly illustrated by Hegel's important political pam-

phlets of this period. These show that the condition in

which the German Reich found itself after its unsuccess-

ful war with the French Republic had a place at the root

of Hegel's early works.

The universal contradictions that, according to Hegel,

IB Ibid., p. 247.

5O THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

animate philosophy concretely exist in the antagonisms

and disunity among the numerous German states and

estates and between each of these and the Reich. The

'isolation' that Hegel had demonstrated in his philosophi-

cal articles is manifest in the stubborn way in which not

only each estate but practically each individual pursues

his own particular interest without any consideration for

the whole. The consequent 'loss of unity' has reduced the

Imperial power to complete impotence and left the Reich

an easy prey to any aggressor.

Germany is no longer a state ... If Germany were still to

be called a state, its present condition of decay could only be

called anarchy, were it not for the fact that her component

parts have constituted themselves as states. It is only the re-

membrance of a past tie and not any actual union that gives

them the appearance of unity ... In her war with the French

Republic Germany has come to realize that she is no longer a

state . . . The obvious results of this war are the loss of some

of the most beautiful of the German lands, and of some mil-

lions of her population, a public debt (even larger in the south

than in the north) which carries the agonies of the war into

peace-time, and the result that besides those who have fallen

under the power of conquerors and foreign laws and morals,

many states will lose their highest good in the bargain, that

is, their independence. 16

Hegel goes on to examine the basis for the disintegra-

tion. The German constitution, he finds, no longer cor-

responds to the actual social and economic state of the na-

tion. The constitution is a vestige of an old feudal order

that has long since been replaced by a different order, that

of individualistic society. 17 The retention of the old form

of constitution in the face of the radical change that has

taken place in all social relations is tantamount to main-

taining a given condition simply because it is given. Such

i'Die Verfassung Deutschlands/ in Schriftcn zur Politik und Rechts-

philosophie, pp. 3-4.

if Ibid., p. 7, note.

TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 51

a practice is opposed to every standard and dictate of rea-

son. The prevailing ordering of life is in sharp conflict

with the desires and needs of society; it has lost 'all its

power and all its dignity' and has become 'purely nega-

tive/ 18

And, Hegel continues, that which persists in this 'merely

empirical manner,' without being 'adapted to the idea of

reason/ cannot be regarded as 'real/ 19 The political sys-

tem has to be destroyed and transformed into a new ra-

tional order. Such a transformation cannot be made with-

out violence.

The extreme realism of Hegel's position shows through

the idealistic framework and terminology. 'The notion of

and insight into necessity are much too weak to effect

action. The notion and the insight are accompanied by

so much distrust that they have to be justified by violence;

only then does man submit to them/ 20 The notion can

be justified by violence only in so far as it expresses an

actual historical force that has ripened in the lap of the

existing order. The notion contradicts reality when the

latter has become self-contradictory. Hegel says that a pre-

vailing social form can be successfully attacked by thought

only if this form has come into open contradiction with

its own 'truth/ 21 in other words, if it can no longer fulfill

the demands of its own contents. This is the case with

Germany, Hegel holds. There, the champions of the new

order represent historical forces that have outgrown the

old system. The state, which should perpetuate the com-

mon interest of its members *in an appropriate rational

form for such alone would be its 'truth' does not do

this. For this reason, the rulers of the state speak falsely

when they defend their position in the name of the com-

mon interest. 22 Their foes, not they, represent the common

18 P. 139. 10 P. 3. 20 p. 13 6. 21 P. 140. 22 Ibid.

52 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

interest, and their notion, the idea of the new order

they uphold, is not merely an ideal but the expression of

a reality that no longer endures in the prevailing order.

Hegel's point is that the old order has to be replaced

by a 'true community* (Allgemeinheit). Allgemeinheit

means at one and the same time, first, a society in which

all particular and individual interests are integrated into

the whole, so that the actual social organism that results

accords with the common interest (community), and, sec-

ond, a totality in which all the different isolated concepts

of knowledge are fused and integrated so that they receive

their significance in their relation to the whole (univer-

sality). The second meaning is obviously the counterpart

of the first. Just as the conception of disintegration in

the sphere of knowledge expresses the existing disintegra-

tion of human relations in society, so the philosophical

integration corresponds to a social and political integra-

tion. The universality of reason, represented by the abso-

lute, is the philosophical counterpart of the social com-

munity in which all particular interests are unified into

the whole.

A real state, Hegel holds, institutionalizes the common

interest and defends it in all external and internal con-

flicts. 28 The German Reich, Hegel declares, does not have

this character.

Political powers and rights are not public offices set up to

accord with the organization of the whole, nor are the acts

and duties of the individual determined by the needs of the

whole. Each particular part of the political hierachy, each

princely house, each estate, town, corporation, and so on, in

short, everyone who has rights in or duties toward the state

has acquired them through his own power. The state, in view

of the encroachment on its own power, can do no more than

confirm that it has been deprived of its power . . . 2 *

*3 Pp. 13, 17-18. 14 p. 10 .

TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 53

Hegel explains the breakdown of the German state by

contrasting the feudal system with the new order of indi-

vidualist society that succeeded it. The rise of the latter

social order is explained in terms of the development of

private property. The feudal system proper integrated the

particular interests of the different estates into a true com-

munity. The freedom of the group or of the individual

was not essentially opposed to the freedom of the whole.

In modern times, however, 'exclusive property has com-

pletely isolated the particular needs from each other.' 25

People speak of the universality of private property as if it

were common to all of society and therefore, perhaps, an

integrating unity. But this universality, says Hegel, is only

an abstract legal fiction; in reality, private property re-

mains 'something isolated* that has no relation to the

whole. 26 The only unity that can be achieved among

property owners is the artificial one of a universally ap-

plied legal system. Laws, however, stabilize and codify

only the existing anarchic conditions of private owner-

ship and thus transform the state or the community into

an institution that exists for the sake of particular inter-

ests. 'Possession existed prior to law and did not originate

from law. That which had already been privately appro-

priated was made a legal right . . . German constitu-

tional law is therefore in the proper sense private law, and

political rights are legalized forms of possession, property

rights.' 27 A state wherein the antagonistic private inter-

ests are thus made pre-eminent in all fields may not be

called a true community. Moreover, Hegel declares, 'The

struggle to make the state power into private property dis-

solves the state and brings about the destruction of its

power.' 28

The state, taken over by private interests, must never-

theless at least assume the appearance of a true community

* P. 9, note. 20 p. 11, note. *t Ibid. "P. 13.

54 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

in order to put down general warfare and to defend

equally the property rights of all its members. The com-

munity thus becomes an independent power, elevated

above the individuals. 'Each individual wishes to live,

through the state's power, with his property secure. The

power of the state appears to him ... as something alien

that exists outside of him.' 29

Hegel in this period carried his criticism of the struc-

ture of modern society so far that he obtained an insight

into the mechanism by which the state becomes an inde-

pendent entity over and above the individuals. He re-

worked the pamphlet on the German Constitution several

times, and its final form shows a distinct weakening of his

critical attitude. Gradually, the 'higher' form of state that

is to replace the outmoded one (exemplified by Germany)

takes form as an absolute or power state. The reforms

Hegel demands are the creation of an effective Reich army,

wrested from the control of the estates and placed under

the unified command of the Empire, and the centraliza-

tion of all bureaus, finance, and law. The idea of a strong-

centralized state, we must note, was at that time a pro-

gressive one, which aimed to set free the available pro-

ductive forces that were being hampered by the existing

feudal forms. Four decades later, Marx emphasized in

his critical history of the modern state that the centralized

absolutistic state was a material advance over the feudal

and semi-feudal state forms. Consequently, the proposal

that such an absolute state be set up is not itself a sign

that Hegel's critical attitude was weakening. We note the

weakening, rather, in the consequences Hegel draws from

his conception of the absolute state. We shall develop

these briefly.

In the article on the German Constitution, there ap-

pears, for the first time in Hegel's formulations, a distinct

29 p. 18, note.

TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 55

subordination of right to might. Hegel was eager to free

his centralized state from any and all limitations that

might hinder its efficiency, and he therefore made the state

interest superior to the validity of right. The fact is clearly

shown in Hegel's remarks on the foreign policy of his

ideal state:

Right, he says, pertains to 'the state's interest/ laid down

for and granted to the state by contracts with other states. 80

In the continuously changing constellations of power, one

state's interest must sooner or later clash with that of an-

other. Right then confronts right. War, 'or whatever it

might be,' must then decide not which right is true and

just, 'for both sides have a true right, but which right

shall yield to the other.' 81 We shall find the same thesis,

greatly elaborated, in the Philosophy of Right.

A further consequence drawn from the conception of

the power state is a new interpretation of freedom. The

basic idea is retained, that the ultimate freedom of the

individual will not contradict the ultimate freedom of

the whole, but will be fulfilled only within and through

the whole. Hegel had placed great stress on this point in

his article on the difference between Fichte's and Schel-

ling's systems, in which he said that the community that

conforms to reason's standard must be conceived 'not as a

limitation on the individual's true freedom but as an ex-

pansion of it. The highest community is the highest free-

dom, in its power and in its exercise of it.' 82 Now, how-

ever, in the study of the German Constitution, he states:

'The stubbornness of the German character has not per-

mitted the individuals to sacrifice their special interests to

the society, or to unite in a common interest and find their

freedom in fully submitting to the higher power of the

state.' 88

so p. 100. 32 Erste Druckschriften, p. 65.

sip. 101. **Schriften zur Politik, pp. 7f.

56 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

The new element of sacrifice and submission now over-

shadows the earlier idea that the individual's interest is

fully to be preserved in the whole. And, as we shall see,

Hegel has here in effect taken the first step that leads to

his identifying freedom with necessity, or submission to

necessity, in his final system.

3. THE SYSTEM OF MORALITY

At about the same time, Hegel wrote the first draft of

that part of his system known as the Philosophy of Mind.

This draft, the so-called System of Morality (System der

Sittlichkeit), is one of the most difficult in German philos-

ophy. We shall sketch its general structure and limit the

interpretation to those parts that disclose the material

tendencies of Hegel's philosophy.

The system of morality, like all the other drafts of the

Philosophy of Mind, deals with the development of 'cul-

ture,' by which is meant the totality of man's conscious,

purposive activities in society. Culture is a realm of mind.

A social or political institution, a work of art, a religion,

and a philosophical system exist and operate as part and

parcel of man's own being, products of a rational subject

that continues to live in them. As products they consti-

tute an objective realm; at the same time, they are sub-

jective, created by human beings. They represent the pos-

sible unity of subject and object.

The development of culture shows distinct stages that

denote different levels of relation between man and his

world, that is, different ways of apprehending and master-

ing the world and of adapting it to human needs and

potentialities. The process itself is conceived as ontolog-

ical as well as historical; it is an actual historical develop-

ment as well as a progression to higher and truer modes

of being. In the gradual working out of Hegel's philoso-

TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 57

phy, however, the ontological process gains greater and

greater predominance over the historical, and to a large

extent is eventually detached from its original historical

roots.

The general scheme ^ as follows. The first stage is an

immediate rapport between the isolated individual and

given objects. The individual apprehends the objects of

his environment as things he needs or desires; he uses

them to fulfill his wants, consuming and 'annihilating*

them as food, beverages, and so on. 84 A higher level is

reached in the cultural process when human labor molds

and organizes the objective world, no longer simply anni-

hilating things but preserving them as enduring means for

the perpetuation of life. This stage presupposes a con-

scious association of individuals who have organized their

activity on some plane of division of labor so that there

is a constant production to replace what is used up. This

is the first step towards a community in societal life and

towards universality in the sphere of knowledge. To the

extent that the individuals associate themselves as having

a common interest, their conceptions and volitions become

influenced and are glided by the notions they hold in

common, and hence approach the universality of reason.

The forms of association differ according to the differ-

ent degrees of integration that are achieved in them.

The integrating agency is first the family, then the social

institutions of labor, property, and law, and finally the

state.

We shall not deal with the concrete social and economic

concepts with which Hegel fills this scheme, since we shall

encounter them again in the Jenenser drafts of the Philos-

ophy of Mind. We only wish to emphasize here that Hegel

describes the various social institutions and relations as a

system of contradicting forces, originating from the mode

**Schriften zur Politik, pp. 430 ff.

58 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

of social labor. That mode of labor transforms the par-

ticular work of the individual, pursued for the gratifica-

tion of his personal wants, into 'general labor,' which oper-

ates to produce commodities for the market. 35 Hegel calls

this last 'abstract and quantitative* labor and makes it

responsible for the increasing inequality of men and

wealth. Society is incapable of overcoming the antagonisms

growing out of this inequality; consequently, the 'system

of government* has to concentrate on the task. Hegel out-

lines three different systems of government, in fact, each

of which constitutes an advance on the other in fulfilling

the task. They are intrinsically related to the structure of

the society over which they rule.

The general picture of society is one in which 'the sys-

tem of wants' is a 'system of mutual physical dependence/

The individual's labor fails to guarantee that his wants

will be attended to. 'A force alien to the individual and

over which he remains powerless' determines whether or

not his needs will be fulfilled. The value of the product

of labor is 'independent of the individual and is subject

to constant change.' 86 The system of government is itself

of this anarchic kind. What governs is nothing but 'the

unconscious blind totality of needs and the modes of their

fulfillment.' 8T

Society must master its 'unconscious and blind fate.'

Such mastery, however, remains incomplete so long as the

general anarchy of interests prevails. Excessive wealth goes

hand in hand with excessive poverty, and purely quanti-

tative labor pushes man 'into a state of utmost barbarism,'

especially that part of the population that 'is subjected to

mechanical labor in the factories/ 88

The next stage in government, represented as a 'system

of justice,' balances the existing antagonisms, but does so

only in terms of the prevailing property relations. Govern-

Pp. 428-38. M P- 49*- 8T P- 493- " P. 496.

TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 59

ment here rests upon the administration of justice, but it

administers the law with 'complete indifference to the re-

lation in which a thing stands to any particular individ-

ual's needs/ 39 The principle of freedom, namely, that 'the

governed are identical with the governing,' cannot be

fully realized because the government cannot do away with

conflicts among particular interests. Liberty therefore ap-

pears only in 'the law courts, and in the discussion and

adjudication of litigations.' *

Hegel barely sketched the third system of government

in this series. It is, however, most significant that the main

concept in its discussion is 'discipline' (Zucht). 'The great

discipline is expressed in the general morals . . . and in

the training for war, and in the trial of the true value of

the individual in war.' 41

The quest for the true community thus terminates in a

society governed by utmost discipline and military prepa-

ration. The true unity between the individual and com-

mon interest, which Hegel demanded as the sole aim of

the state, has led to an authoritarian state that is to sup-

press the increasing antagonisms of individualistic society.

Hegel's discussion of the various stages of government is a

concrete description of the development from a liberal to

an authoritarian political system. This description con-

tains an immanent critique of liberalist society, for the

gist of Hegel's analysis is that liberalist society necessarily

gives birth to an authoritarian state. Hegel's article on

Natural Law, 42 probably written shortly after the outline

of the System of Morality, applies this critique to the

field of political economy.

Hegel examines the traditional system of political econ-

omy and finds it to be an apologetic formulation of the

89 P. 499- 40 p - 501- 41 P. 502.

'Ueber die wisscnschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts,' in

op. cit., pp. 3x9 ff.

6o ' THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL/S PHILOSOPHY

principles that govern the existing social system. The char-

acter of that system, Hegel again says, is essentially nega-

tive, for the very nature of the economic structure pre-

vents the establishment of a true common interest. The

task of the state, or of any adequate political organization,

is to see to it that the contradictions inherent in the eco-

nomic structure do not destroy the whole system. The state

must assume the function of bridling the anarchic social

and economic process.

Hegel attacks the doctrine of natural law because, he

says, it justifies all the dangerous tendencies that aim to

subordinate the state to the antagonistic interests of in-

dividualist society. The theory of the social contract, for

example, fails to note that the common interest can never

be derived from the will of competing and conflicting in-

dividuals. Moreover, natural law works with a purely

metaphysical conception of man. As he appears in the

natural-law doctrine, man is an abstract being who is later

equipped with an arbitrary set of attributes. The selection

of these attributes changes according to the changing apol-

ogetic interest of the particular doctrine. It is, moreover,

in line with the apologetic function of natural law that

most qualities that characterize man's existence in modern

society are disregarded (for example, the concrete relations

of private property, the prevailing modes of labor, and

so on).

The first draft of Hegel's social philosophy, then, al-

ready enunciated the conception underlying his entire

system: the given social order, based upon the system of

abstract and quantitative labor and upon the integration

of wants through the exchange of commodities, is incapa-

ble of asserting and establishing a rational community.

This order remains essentially one of anarchy and irra-

tionality, governed by blind economic mechanisms it re-

mains an order of ever repeated antagonisms in which all

TOWARDS THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 6l

progress is but a temporary unification of opposites.

Hegel's demand for a strong and independent state derives

from his insight into the irreconcilable contradictions of

modern society. Hegel was the first to attain this insight

in Germany. His justification of the strong state was made

on the ground that it was a necessary supplement to the

antagonistic structure of the individualist society he ana-

lyzed.

Ill

Hegel's First System

(1802-1806)

THE Jencnscr system, as it is called, is Hegel's first com-

plete system, consisting of a logic, a metaphysic, philoso-

phy of nature, and philosophy of mind. Hegel formulated

it in his lectures at the University of Jena from 1802 to

1806. These lectures have only recently been edited from

Hegel's original manuscripts and published in three vol-

umes, each of them representing a different stage of elabo-

ration. The Logic and the Metaphysics exist in but one

draft each, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy

of Mind in two. 1 The considerable variations between

these will be neglected here, since they have no bearing

on the structure of the whole.

We have chosen to deal only with the general trend and

organization of the whole, and with the principles that

guide the development of the concepts. The content of

the particular concepts will be discussed when we reach

the different sections of the final system.

i. THE LOGIC

Hegel's Logic expounds the structure of being-as-such,

that is, the most general forms of being. The philosophical

tradition since Aristotle designated as categories the con-

cepts that embrace these most general forms: substance,

i Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Natur philosophic (1802), ed. G. Las-

son, Leipzig 1923. Cited here as Jenenser Logik. Jenenser Realphilosophie

i (1803-4), c d. J- Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1932. Jenenser Realphilosophie n

(1805-6), ed. J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1931.

62

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 63

affirmation, negation, limitation; quantity, quality; unity,

plurality, and so on. Hegel's Logic is an ontology in so far

as it deals with such categories. But his Logic also deals

with the general forms of thought, with the notion, the

judgment, and the syllogism, and is in this respect 'formal

logic/

We can understand the reason for this seeming hetero-

geneity of content when we remember that Kant, too,

treated ontology as well as formal logic in his Transcen-

dental Logic, taking up the categories of substantiality,

causality, community (reciprocity), together with the

theory of judgment. The traditional distinction between

formal logic and general metaphysics (ontology) is mean-

ingless to transcendental idealism, which conceives the

forms of being as the results of the activity of human un-

derstanding. The principles of thought thus also become

principles of the objects of thought (of the phenomena).

Hegel, too, believed in a unity of thought and being,

but, as we have already seen, his conception of the unity

differed from Kant's. He rejected Kant's idealism on the

ground that it assumed the existence of 'things-in-them-

selves' apart from 'phenomena/ and left these 'things' un-

touched by the human mind and therefore untouched by

reason. The Kantian philosophy left a gulf between

thought and being, or between subject and object, which

the Hegelian philosophy sought to bridge. The bridge was

to be made by positing one universal structure of all be-

ing. Being was to be a process wherein a thing 'compre-

hends' or 'grasps' the various states of its existence and

draws them into the more or less enduring unity of its

'self/ thus actively constituting itself as 'the same* through-

out all change. Everything, in other words, exists more or

less as a 'subject.' The identical structure of movement

that thus runs through the entire realm of being unites

the objective and subjective worlds.

64 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

With this point in mind, we can readily see why logic

and metaphysics are one in the Hegelian system. The

Logic, it has often been said, presupposes an identity of

thought and existence. The statement has meaning only

in so far as it declares that the movement of thought re-

produces the movement of being and brings it to its true

form. It has also been maintained that Hegel's philosophy

puts notions in an independent realm, as if they were real

things, and makes them move around and turn into each

other. It must be said in reply that Hegel's Logic deals

primarily with the forms and types of being as compre-

hended by thought. When, for example, Hegel discusses

the passage of quantity into quality, or of 'being* into

'essence' he intends to show how, when actually compre-

hended, quantitative entities turn into qualitative ones,

and how a contingent existence turns into an essential one.

He means to be dealing with real things. The interplay

and motility of the notions reproduces the concrete process

of reality.

There is, however, yet another intrinsic relation be-

tween the notion and the object it comprehends. The cor-

rect notion makes the nature of an object clear to us. It

tells us what the thing is in itself. But while the truth

becomes evident to us, it also becomes evident that the

things 'do not exist in' their truth. Their potentialities

are limited by the determinate conditions in which the

things exist. Things attain their truth only if they negate

their determinate conditions. The negation is again a

determination, produced by the unfolding of previous

conditions. For example, the bud of the plant is the

determinate negation of the seed, and the blossom the

determinate negation of the bud. In its growth, the plant,

the 'subject' of this process, does not act on knowledge

and fulfill its potentialities on the basis of its own compre-

hending power. It rather endures the process of fulfillment

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 65

passively. Our notion of the plant, on the other hand, com-

prehends that the plant's existence is an intrinsic process

of development; our notion sees the seed as potentially

the bud and the bud as potentially the blossom. The no-

tion thus represents, in Hegel's view, the real form of the

object, for the notion gives us the truth about the process,

which, in the objective world, is blind and contingent. In

the inorganic, plant, and animal worlds, beings differ es-

sentially from their notions. The difference is overcome

only in the case of the thinking subject, which is capa-

ble of realizing its notion in its existence. The various

modes of being may thus be ordered according to their es-

sential difference from their notions.

This conclusion is the source of the basic divisions of

Hegel's Logic. It starts with the concepts that grasp reality

as a multitude of objective things, simply 'being,' free

from any subjectivity. They are qualitatively and quanti-

tatively connected with each other, and the analysis of

these connections hits upon relations that can no longer

be interpreted in terms of objective qualities and quanti-

ties but requires principles and forms of thought that

negate the tradititmal concepts of being and reveal the

subject to be the very substance of reality. The whole con-

struction can be understood only in the mature form

Hegel gave it in the Science of Logic; we shall limit our-

selves here to a brief description of the basic scheme.

Every particular existent. is_jessentiajjy_ different from

what it could be if its potentialities were realized. The

jx^ntialities are given in its^jnotion. The existent would

havejrue being if its potentialities were fulfilled and if

there were, therefore, an identity between its existence

and its notion. The difference between the reality and the

potentiality is the starting point of the dialectical process

that applies to every concept in Hegel's JLogtc. Finite

IHings are 'negative' and this is a defining characteristic

66 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

of them; they never are what they can and ought to be.

They always exist in a state that does not fully express

their potentialities as realized. The finite thing has as its

essence 'this absolute unrest, 1 this striving 'not to be what

it is/ a

Even in the abstract formulations of the Logic we can

see the concrete critical impulses that underlie this con-

ception. Hegel's dialectic is permeated with the profound

conviction that all immediate forms of existence in na-

ture and historyare 'bad/ because they do not permit

things to be what they can be. True existence begins only

when the immediate state is recognized as negative, when

beings become 'subjects' and strive to adapt their outward

state to their potentialities.

The full significance of the conception just outlined lies

in its assertion that negativity is constitutive of all finite

things and is the 'genuine dialectical* moment 8 of them

all. It is 'the innermost source of all activity, of living

and spiritual self-movement/ 4 The negativity everything

possesses is the necessary prelude to its reality. It is a state

of privation that forces the subject to seek remedy. As

such, it has a positive character.

The dialectical process receives its motive power from

the pressure to overcome the negativity. Dialectics is a

process in a world where the mode of existence of men

and things is made up of contradictory relations, so that

any particular content can be unfolded only through pass-

ing into its opposite. The latter is an integral part of the

former, and the whole content is the totality of all con-

tradictory relations implied in it. Logically, the dialectic

has its beginning when human unHerstandmg finds itself

unable to grasp something adequately from its given quali-

zjenenser Logik, p. 31.

* Science of Logic, trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, The

Macmillan Company, New York 1959, vol. I, p. 66.

Ibid., vol. H, p. 477.

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 67

tative or quantitative forms. The given quality or quantity

seems to be a 'negation' of the thing that possesses" this

quality or quantity. We shall have to follow Hegel's ex-

planation of this point in some detail.

He begins with the world as common sense views it.

It consists of an innumerable multitude of things Hegel

calls them 'somethings' (Etwas), each of them with its spe-

cific qualities. The qualities the thing has distinguish it

from other things, so that if we want to separate it off

from other things we simply enumerate its qualities. The

table here in this room is being used as a desk; it is fin-

ished in walnut, heavy, wooden, and so on. Being a desk,

brown, wooden, heavy, and so on, is not the same as just

being a table. The table is not any of these qualities,

nor is it the sum total of them. The particular qualities

are, according to Hegel, at the same time the 'negation*

of the table-as-such. The propositions in which the table's

qualities are predicated of it would indicate this fact. They

have the formal logical structure A is B (that is, not A).

'The table is brown* expresses also that the* table is other

than itself. This is the first abstract form in which the

negativity of all finite things is expressed. The very being

of something appears as other than itself. It exists, as Hegel

puts it, in its 'otherness* (Andersseiri).

The attempt to define something by its qualities, how-

ever, does not end in negativity, but is pushed a step

further. A thing cannot be understood through its quali-

ties without reference to other qualities that are actually

excluded by the ones it possesses. 'Wooden,' for example,

is meaningful only through the relation to some other,

non-wooden material. The meaning of 'brown* requires

that the meaning of other colors that are contraries of

brown be known, and so on. 'The quality i&Hrekrted-to

what it excludes; for it does nof exist as an absolute, for

itself, but exists in such a way that it is for itself only in

68 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

sgjatr as some other [quality! does not exist.' /* We are at

every point led beyond the qualities that should delimit

the thing and differentiate it from some other thing. Its

seeming stability and clarity thus dissolve into an endless

chain of 'relations' (Beziehungeri).

The opening chapters of Hegel's Logic thus show that

when human understanding ventures to follow out its

conceptions, it encounters the dissolution of its clearly de-

limited objects. First, it finds it completely impossible to

identify any thing with the state in which it actually ex-

ists. The effort to uncover a concept that truly identifies

the thing for what it is plunges the mind into an infinite

sea of relations. Every thing has. to be understood in rela-

tion to other tilings, so that these relations become the

very being of that thing. This infinitude of relations,

which seems to portend the failure of any attempt to cap-

ture the thing's character, becomes for Hegel, quite to the

contrary, the first step in true knowledge of the thing.

That is, it is the first step if properly taken.

The process is discussed by Hegel through an analysis

of 'infinity.' This is differentiated into two kinds, 'bad*

and 'real' infinity. The bad or spurious infinite is, so to

speak, the wrong road to the truth. It is the activity of

trying to overcome the inadequacy of a definition by going

to more and more of the related qualities entailed, in the

hope of reaching an end. The understanding simply fol-

lows out the relations, as each is entailed, adding one to

the next in the vain effort to exhaust and delimit the ob-

ject. The procedure has a rational core, but only inasmuch

as it presupposes that the essence of the object is made

up of its relations to other objects. The relations cannot,

however, be grasped by the 'spurious infinity' of mere

'added connections' (Und-Beziehungeri) by which common

sense links one object with another.

Jenenser Logfk, p. 4.

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 69

The relations must be apprehended in another way.

They must be seen as created by the object's own move-

ment. The object must be understood as one that itself

establishes and 'itself puts forth the necessary relation of

itself to its opposite/ 6 This would presuppose that the

object has a definite power over its own development so

that it can remain itself in spite of the fact that every con-/

crete stage of its existence is a 'negation* of itself, an/

'otherness/ The object, in other words, must be compre/

hended as a 'subject' in its relations to its 'otherness/ '

As an ontological category, the 'subject' is the power of

an entity to 'be itself in its otherness' (Bei-sich-selbst-sein

im Anderssein). Only such a mode of existence can incor-

porate the negative into the positive. Negative and posi-

tive cease to be opposed to each other when the driving

power of the subject makes negativity a part of the sub-

ject's own unity. Hegel says the subject 'mediates' (ver-

mittelt) and 'sublates' (aufhebt) the negativity. In the proc-

ess the object does not dissolve into its various qualitative

or quantitative determinations, but is substantially held

together throughout its relations with other objects.

This is the mode* of being or existence that Hegel de-

jscribes as 'real infinity/ 7 Infinity is not something behind

^r beyond finite things, but is their true reality. TJiejn-

finite is the mode of existence in which all potentialities

are realized and in which all being reaches its ultimate

The goal of the Logic is herewith set. It consists on

the one hand in demonstrating the true form of such a

final reality and, on. the other, in showing how the con-

cepts that try to grasp that reality are led to the con-

clusion that it is the absolute truth. Hegel announced in

his criticism of the Kantian philosophy that the task of

logic was 'to develop* the categories and not merely 'to

Ibid., p. 38. T Ibid., pp. 50-54.

7O THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

assemble' them. Such an endeavor would be possible of

fruition only if the objects of thought have a systematic

order. That order, Hegel says, is derived from the fact

that all modes of being attain their truth through the free

subject that comprehends them in relation to its own ra-

tionality. The arrangement of the Logic reflects this sys-

tematic comprehension. It starts with the categories of im-

mediate experience, which apprehend only the most ab-

stract forms of objective being (of material things, that is),

namely, Quantity, Quality, and Measure. These are the

most abstract, since they view every object as externally

determined by other objects. Simple connection prevails

in this case because the various modes of being are here

externally connected with each other, and no being is com-

prehended as having an intrinsic relation to itself and to

the other things with which it interacts. For example, an

object is taken as constituting itself in the processes of

attraction and repulsion. According to Hegel, this is an

abstract and external interpretation of objectivity since

the dynamic unity of a being is here conceived as the

product of some blind natural forces over which it exer-

cises no power. The categories of simple connection are

thus farthest from any recognition of the substance as

'subject/

The categories Hegel treats in the second section of the

Logic under the general title of Relation (Verhdltnis)

come one step closer to the goal. Substantiality, Causality,

and Reciprocity do not denote abstract and incomplete en-

tities (as did the categories of the first section), but real

relations. A substance is what it is only in relation to its

accidents. Likewise, a cause exists only in relation to its

effects, and two interdependent substances only in their

relation to each other. The connection is intrinsic. The

substance-the all-embracing category of this group-de-

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 71

notes a movement much more intrinsic than the blind

force of attraction and repulsion. It possesses a definite

power over its accidents and effects, and through its own

power it establishes its relation to other things, thus hav-

ing the ability to unfold its own potentialities. It does not,

however, possess knowledge of these potentialities and

therefore does not possess the freedom of self-realization.

Substantiality still denotes a relation of objects, of ma-

terial things, or, as Hegel says, a relation of being. To

grasp the world in its veritable being we must grasp it

with the categories of freedom, which are to be found only

in the realm of the thinking subject. A transition is neces-

sary from the relation of being to the relation of thought.

The latter relation refers to that between the particular

and the universal in the notion, the judgment, and the

syllogism. To Hegel, it is not a relation of formal logic,

but an ontological relation, and the true relation of all

reality. The substance of nature as well as history is a

universal that unfolds itself through the particular. The

universal is the natural process of the genus, realizing it-

self through the species and individuals. In history* the

universal is the substance of all development. The Greek

city-state, modern industry, a social class all these univer-

salities are actual historical forces that cannot be dissolved

into their components. On the contrary, the individual

facts and factors obtain their meaning only through the

universal to which they belong. The individual is deter-

mined not by his particular but by his universal quali-

ties, for instance, by his being a Greek citizen, or a mod-

ern factory worker, or a bourgeois.

Universality, on the other hand, is no 'relation of be-

ing 1 since all being as we have seen is determinate and

particular. It can be understood only as a 'relation of

thought/ that is, as the self-development of a comprehen-

sive and comprehending subject.

72 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

In traditional philosophy, the category of universality

has been treated as a part of logic, dealt with in the doc-

trine of the notion, the judgment and the syllogism. To

Hegel, however, these logical forms and processes reflect

and comprise the actual forms and processes of reality.

We have already hinted at Hegel's ontological interpre-

tation of the notion and the judgment. Fundamental in

this context is his treatment of the definition. Within the

logical tradition, the definition is the relation of thought

that grasps the universal nature of an object in its essen-

tial distinction from other objects. According to Hegel,

the definition can do this only because it reproduces (mir-

rors) the actual process in which the object differentiates

itself from other objects to which it is related. The defini-

tion must express, then, the movement in which a being

maintains its identity through the negation of its condi-

tions. In short, a real definition cannot be given in one

isolated proposition, but must elaborate the real history

of the object, for its history alone explains its reality. 8

The real definition of a plant, for instance, must show the

plant constituting itself through the destruction of the

seed by the bud and of the bud by the blossom. It must

tell how the plant perpetuates itself in its interaction and

struggle with its environment. Hegel calls the definition

'the self-preservation* and explains this usage: 'In defining

living things their characteristics must be derived from

the weapons of attack and defense with which these things

preserve themselves from other particular things/

In all these cases, thought seizes the real relations of

the objective world and presents us with the knowledge

of what the things are 'in themselves/ These real rela-

tions thought has to ferret out because they are hidden

Cf. Science of Logic, vol. i, p. 61.

tjenenser Logik, p. 109.

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 73

by the appearance of things. For this reason, thought is

more 'real' than its objects. Moreover, thought is the ex-

istential attribute of a being that 'comprehends' all ob-

jects, in the twofold sense that it understands and com-

prises them. The objective world comes to its true form

in the world of the free subject, and the objective logic

terminates in the subjective logic. In the Jenenser system,

the latter is treated in the section on Metaphysics. It ex-

pounds the categories and principles that comprehend all

objectivity as the arena of the developing subject, that is,

as the arena of reason.

The rough outlines we have provided of Hegel's main

ideas will be more clearly elaborated when we discuss the

final system of logic. Hegel's first logic already manifests

the endeavor to break through the false fixity of our con-

cepts and to show the driving contradictions that lurk in

all modes of existence and call for a higher mode of

thought. The Logic presents only the general form of the

dialectic, in its application to the general forms of being.

The more concrete applications appear in Hegel's Real-

philosophic, particularly in his social philosophy. We shall

not dwell now on trie difficult transition from the Logic

and Metaphysics to the Philosophy of Nature (which will

be discussed with the final logic), but shall pass directly

to the Jenenser Philosophy of Mind, which deals with the

historical realization of the free subject, man.

2. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

The history of the human world does not begin with

the struggle between the individual and nature, since the

individual is really a later product in human history. The

community (Allgemeinheit) comes first, although in a

ready-made, 'immediate' form. It is as yet not a rational

74 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

community and does not have freedom as its quality.

Consequently, it soon splits up into numerous antag-

onisms. Hegel calls this original unity in the historical

world 'consciousness/ thus re-emphasizing that we have

entered a realm in which everything has the character of

the subject.

The first form consciousness assumes in history is not

that of an individual but of a universal consciousness, per-

haps best represented as the consciousness of a primitive

group with all individuality submerged in the community.

Feelings, sensations, and concepts are not properly the

individual's but are shared among all, so that the com-

mon and not the particular determines the consciousness.

But even this unity contains opposition; consciousness is

what it is only through its opposition to its objects. To be

ssure, these, as objects of consciousness, are 'comprehended

objects' (begriffene Objekte), or objects that cannot be

divorced from the subject. Their 'being Comprehended*

is part of their character as objects. Either side of the op-

position, consciousness or its objects, thus has the form

of subjectivity, as do all the other types of opposition in

the realm of mind. The integration of the opposing ele-

ments can only be an integration within subjectivity.

The world of man develops, Hegel says, in a series of

integrations of opposites. In the first stage, the subject and

its object take the form of consciousness and its concepts;

in the second stage, they appear as the individual in con-

flict with other individuals; and in the final stage they ap^

pear as the nation. The last stage alone represents the at^

tainment of a lasting integration between subject and ob-

ject; the nation has its object in itself; its effort is directed

solely towards reproducing itself. Corresponding to the

three stages are three different 'media* of integration: lan-

guage, labor, and property.

HEGEL S FIRST SYSTEM

75

SUBJECT

MEDIUM

OBJECT

1

Consciousness

Language

Concepts

2

Individuals or

Groups of

Individuals

Labor

Nature

3

Nation

Community of

Individuals

Property

Nation

Community of

Individuals

Language is the medium in which the first integration

between subject and object takes place. 10 It is also the

first actual community (Allgemeinheit), in the sense that

it is objective and shared by all individuals. On the other

hand, language is the first medium of individuation, for

through it the individual obtains mastery over the ob-

jects he knows and names. A man is able to stake out his

sphere of influence and keep others from it only when he

knows his world, is conscious of his needs and powers,

and communicates this knowledge to others. Language is

thus also the first lever of appropriation.

Language, then, makes it possible for an individual to

take a conscious position against his fellows and to assert

his needs and desires against those of the other individ-

uals. The resulting antagonisms are integrated through the

process of labor, which also becomes the decisive force for

the development of culture. The labor process is respon-

sible for various types of integration, conditioning all the

subsequent forms of community that correspond to these

types: the family, civil society, and the state (the latter

two terms appear only later in Hegel's philosophy). Labor

first unites individuals into the family, which appropriates

as 'family property' n the objects that provide for its

Realphilosophie, i, pp. su ff.

n Ibid., pp. ss if.

76 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

subsistence. The family, however, finds itself and its prop-

erty among other property-owning families. The conflict

that develops here is not between the individual and the

objects of his desire, but between one group of individ-

uals (a family) and other similar groups. The objects are

already 'appropriated'; they are the (actual or potential)

property of individuals. The institutionalization of pri-

vate property signifies, to Hegel, that the 'objects' have

finally been incorporated into the subjective world: the

objects are no longer 'dead things/ but belong, in their

totality, to the sphere of the self-realization of the subject.

Man has toiled and organized them, and has thus made

them part and parcel of his personality. Nature thus takes

its place in the history of man, and history becomes essen-

tially human history. All historical struggles become strug-

gles between groups of property-owning individuals. This

far-reaching conception completely influences the subse-

quent construction of the realm of mind.

With the advent of the various property-owning family

units there begins a 'struggle for mutual recognition* of

their rights. Since property is looked upon as an essential

and constitutive element of individuality, the individual

has to preserve and defend his property in order to main-

tain himself as an individual. The consequent life-and

death struggle, Hegel says, can come to an end only~iFthe

opposed individuals are integrated into the community

of the nation (Volk).

This transition from family to nation correspond*

roughly to the transition from 'a state of nature* to a state

of civil society, as the political theories of the eighteenth

century conceived it. Hegel's interpretation of the 'strug

gle for mutual recognition' will be explained in our dis

cussion of the Phenomenology of Mind, in which it be

comes the entering wedge for freedom. The consequence

of the struggle for mutual recognition is a first real inte

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 77

gration that gives the groups or individuals in conflict

an objective common interest. The consciousness that

achieves this integration is again a universal (the Volks-

geist), but its unity is no longer a primitive and 'immedi-

ate* one. It is rather a product of self-conscious efforts to

make the existing antagonisms work in the interest of

the whole. Hegel calls it a mediated (vermittelte) unity.

The term mediation here manifests its concrete signifi-

cance. The activity of mediation is no other than jhe ac-

tivity of labor. Through his labor, man overcomes the

estrangement between the objective world and the sub j

jective world; he transforms nature into an appropriate

medium for his self-development. When objects are taken

and shaped by labor, they become part of the subject who

is able to recognize his needs and desires in them. Through

labor, moreover, man loses that atomic existence wherein

he is, as an individual, opposed to all other individuals;

he becomes a member of a community. The individual,

by virtue of his labor, turns into a universal; for labor is

of its very nature a universal activity: its product is ex-

changeable among all individuals.

In his further remarks on the concept of labor, Hegel

actually describes the mode of labor characteristic of mod-

ern commodity production. Indeed, he comes close to the

Marxian doctrine of abstract and universal labor. We en-

counter the first illustration of the fact that Hegel's onto-

logical notions are saturated with a social content expres-

sive of a particular order of society.

Hegel states, 'the individual satisfies his needs by his

labor, but not by the particular product of his labor; the

latter, to fill his needs, has to become something other

than it is.' " The particular object becomes a universal

one in the process of labor it becomes a commodity. The

universality also transforms the subject of labor, the la-

ii Ibid., p, *j8

78 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

borer, and his individual activity. He is forced to set aside

his particular faculties and desires. Nothing counts in the

distribution of the product of labor but 'abstract and uni-

versal labor/ 'The labor of each is, with regard to its con-

tent, universal for the needs of all.' Labor has 'value* only

as such a 'universal activity' (allgemeine Tdtigkeit): its

value is determined by 'whatjabor is for all, and not what

it is for the individual/ 1S

This abstract and universal labor is connected with con-

crete individual need through the 'exchange relation-

ships' of the market. 14 By virtue of the exchange, the prod-

ucts of labor are distributed among individuals according

to the value of abstract labor. Hegel, therefore, calls ex-

change 'the return to concreteness'; 15 through it the con-

crete needs of men in society are fulfilled.

Hegel is obviously striving for an exact understanding

of the function of labor in integrating the various indi-

vidual activities into a totality of exchange relationships.

He touches the sphere in which Marx later resumed the

analysis of modern society. The concept ofjlabor is not

peripheral in Hegel's system, but is the central notion

through which he conceives the develogment__of^society.

Driven by the insight that opened this dimension to him,

Hegel describes the mode of integration prevailing in a

commodity-producing society in terms that clearly fore-

shadow Marx's critical approach.

He emphasizes two points: the complete subordination

of the individual to the demon of abstract labor, and the

blind and anarchic character of a society perpetuated by

exchange relationships. Abstractjajbor cannot develop the

individual's true faculties. MechanizatumTthe very means

that should liberate man from toil, makes him a slave of

i Ibid.

Realphilosophic, n, p. 215.

i Ibid.

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 79

his labor. 4 The more he subjugates his labor, the more

powerless he himself becomes.' The machine reduces the

necessity of toil only for the whole, not for the individual.

'The more mechanized labor becomes, the less value it has,

and the more the individual must toil.' 16 'The value of

labor decreases in the same proportion as the productivity

of labor increases . . . The faculties of the individual are

infinitely restricted, and the consciousness of the factory

worker is degraded to the lowest level of dullness.' 17 While

labor thus changes from the self-realization of the indi-

vidual into his self -negation, the relation between the par-

ticular needs and labor, and between the needs and the.

labor of the whole, takes the form of 'an incalculable,

blind interdependence.' The integration of conflicting in-

dividuals through abstract labor and exchange thus estab-

lishes 'a vast system of communality and mutual interde-

pendence, a moving life of the dead. This system moves

hither and yon in a blind and elementary way, and like

a wild animal calls for strong permanent control and

curbing.' 18

The tone and pathos of the descriptions point strikingly

to Marx's Capital. It is not surprising to note that Hegel's

manuscript breaks off with this picture, as if he was terri-

fied by what his analysis of the commodity-producing so-

ciety disclosed. The last sentence, however, finds him for-

mulating a possible way out. He elaborates this in the

Realphilosophie of 1804-5. The^wi]d_ animal must be

curbed, and such a process requires the organization of a

strong state.

Hegel's early political philosophy is reminiscent of the

origins of political theory in modern society. Hobbes also

founded his Leviathan State upon the otherwise uncon-

querable chaos, the helium omnium contra omnes, of

ujenenser Realphilosophie, I, p. 837.

IT Ibid., p. 839. Ibid., p. 840.

8o THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL*S PHILOSOPHY

individualistic society. Between Hobbes and Hegel, how-

ever, lies the period in which the absolutist state had un-

leashed the economic forces of capitalism, and in which

political economy had uncovered some of the mechanisms

of the capitalist labor process. Hegel had indulged in a

study of political economy. His analysis of civil society

got to the root structure of modern society and presented

elaborate critical analysis, whereas Hobbes got and used

intuitive insight. And even more, Hegel discovered in

the upsurge of the French Revolution principles that

pointed beyond the given framework of individualist so-

ciety. The ideas of reason and freedom, of a unity between

the common and the particular interest, denoted, for him,

values that could not be sacrificed to the state. He strug-

gled all his life to render them consonant with the neces-

sity of 'controlling and curbing/ His attempts to solve

the problem are manifold, and the final triumph goes not

to the Leviathan, but to the rational state under the rule

of law.

The second Jenenser Realphilosophie goes on to discuss

the manner in which civil society is integrated with the

state. Hegel discusses the political form of this society

under the heading of 'Constitution.' Law (Gesetz) changes

the blind totality of exchaligereTaTiorirmto the consciously

regulated apparatus of the state. The picture of the an-

archy and confusion of civil society is painted in even

darker colors than before.

[The individual] is subject to the complete confusion and

hazard of the whole. A mass of the population is condemned

to the stupefying, unhealthy and insecure labor of factories,

manufactories, mines, and so on. Whole branches of industry

which supported a large bulk of the population suddenly fold

up because the mode changes or because the values of their

products fall on account of new inventions in other countries,

or for other reasons. Whole masses are thus abandoned to help-

less poverty. The conflict between vast wealth and vast pov-

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 81

erty steps forth, a poverty unable to improve its condition.

Wealth becomes ... a predominant power. Its accumulation

takes place partly by chance, partly through the general mode

of distribution . . . Acquisition develops into a many-sided

system which ramifies into fields from which smaller business

cannot profit. The utmost abstractness of labor reaches into

the most individual types of work and continues to widen its

sphere. This inequality of wealth and poverty, this need and

necessity turn into the utmost dismemberment of will, inner

rebellion and hatred. 19

But Hegel now stresses the positive aspect of this de-

grading reality. 'This necessity which means complete haz-

ard for the individual existence is at the . same time the

preservative. The State power intervenes; it must see to

it that every particular sphere [of life] is sustained, it

must search out new outlets, must open channels of trade

in foreign lands, and so on . . .' 20 The 'hazardLthat^ pre-

vails in .society is not mere chance, but the very process

by which the whole reproduces its own existence and that

of each of its members. The exchange relations of the mar-

ket provide the necessary integration without which iso-

lated individuals would perish in the competitive conflict.

The terrible struggles within the commodity-producing

society are 'better* than those between wholly unrestricted

individuals and groups 'better,' because they take place

on a higher level of historical development and imply a

'mutual recognition' of individual rights.

(Vertrag) expresses this recognition as a Asocial reality.

Hegel views the contract as one of the foundations, of mod-

ern society; the society is actually a f ramework^f contracts

between individuals. 81 (We shall see, however, that he

later taEeTgreat pains to restrict the validity of contracts

to the sphere of civil society that is, to the economic and

social relations and to exclude them as having a function

ujenenser Realphilosophie, n, pp. 83*-$*

20 ibid. "Pp. 8i8f.

82 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

between states.) The assurance that__a_ relation or a per-

formance is secured by a contract and that the contract

will be kept under all circumstances alone makes the rela-

tions and performances in a commodity-producing society

calculable and rational. 'My word must be good not for

moral reasons/ but because society presupposes that there

are mutual obligations on the part of its members. I do

my work under the condition that another does likewise. 22

If I break my word, I break the very contract of society

and not only hurt a particular person but the community;

I place myself outside of the whole which can alone fulfill

my right as an individual. Therefore, says Hegel, 'the uni-

versal is the substance of the contract/ 28 Contracts not

only regulate individual performance, but the operation

of the wholerThe contract treatsTndividuals as free and

equal; at the same time it considers each not in his con-

tingent particularity but in his 'universality/ as a homo-

geneous part of the whole. This identity of the particular

and the universal is, of course, not yet realized. The

proper potentialities of individuals are, as Hegel has

pointed out before, far from preserved in civil society.

Consequently, forcg_jrnust stand behind every contract.

The threatened application of force, and not his own vol-

untary recognition, binds the individual to his contract.

The contract thus involves the possibility of breach of the

contract and the revolt of the individual against the

whole. 24 Crime signifies the act of revolt, and punishment is

the mechanism through which the whole restores its right

over the rebellious individual. The recognition of the rule

of law represents that stage of integration in which the

individual reconciles himself with the whole. The rule of

law differs from the rule of contracts in so far as it takes

into^atcourlt the self of the individual in his existence as

well as in his knowledge/ 25 The individual knows that he

Pp. SI940. 28 p. 826. " P. 221. 25 p. 225.

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 83

can exist only by force of the law, not only because it pro-

tects him, but because he sees it to represent the common

interest, which, in the last analysis, is the sole guarantee

of his self-development. Individuals perfectly free and in-

dependent, yet united in a common interestthis is the

proper notion of die lawT The individual is 'confident*

that he finds 'himself, his essence* in the law and that the

law preserves and sustains his essential potentialities. 26

Such a conception presupposes a state whose laws really

manifest the free will of associated individuals, as if they

had assembled and decided upon the best legislation for

their common interest. The law could not otherwise ex-

press the will of each and at the same time 'the general

will.' Given that common decision, the law would be a

true identity between the individual and the whole.

Hegel's conception of law envisages such a society; he is

describing a goal to be attained and not a prevailing con-

The gap between ideal and reality, however, narrows

slowly. The more realistic Hegel's attitude towards his-

tory becomes, the more he endows the present with the

greatness of the futbre ideal. But whatever the outcome

of Hegel's struggle between philosophical idealism and po-

litical realism, his philosophy will not accept any state

that does not operate by the rule of law. He can accept a

'power state,' but only in so far as the freedom of the

individuals prevails therein and the state's power enhances

their proper power. 27

The individual can be free only as a political being.

Hegel thus resumes the classical Greek conception that the

Polis represents the true reality of human existence. Ac-

cordingly, the final unification of the social antagonisms

is achieved not by the reign of law, but by the political in-

stitutions that embody the law: by the state proper. What

a P. 248. *i See below, pp. soo ff.

84 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

is the form of government that best safeguards this em-

bodiment and is therefore the highest form of unity be-

tween the part and the whole?

Preliminary to his answer of this question, Hegel

sketches the origin of the state and the historical roles

of tyranny, democracy, and monarchy. He repudiates the

theory of the social contract 28 on the ground that it as-

sumes that 'the general will' is operative in the isolated

individuals prior lo iheir entry into the state. As against

the social contract theory he stresses that 'the general will'

can arise only out of a long process, which culminates in

the final regulation of the social antagonisms. The general

will is the result and not the origin of the state; the state

originates through an 'outside force' that impels the indi-

viduals against their will. Thus, 'all states are founded

through the illustrious power of great men.' * 9 And Hegel

adds, 'not by physical force.' The gj^eatjkuuidersof the

state had^in their personality something of the historic

power that coerces mankind to follow out its own course

and to progress thereby; these personalities reflect and

bear the higieijfcuiowledge and theUigKer morality of his-

toryeven if"they asmcRviduals are not conscious of it, or

even if they are driven by quite other motives. The idea

which Hegel is here introducing appears later to be the

Weltgeist.

The earliest state is of necessity a tyranny. The state

forms Hegel now describes have both a historical and a

normative order: tyranny is the earliest and the lowest,

hereditarymonarch^ highest form. 80 Again,

the standard by which the state is evaluated is the success

it has in producing a proper integration of individuals

into the whole. Tyranny integrates individuals by negating

them. But it does have one poutive-xesult: it disciplines

28 Jenenser Realphitosophic, 11, pp. 245-6.

29 Ibid., p. 846. to Pp. 846-53.

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 85

them, teacliesthemto_obey. Obeying the person of the

ruler is preparatory to obeying the law. 'The people over-

throw tyranny because it is abject, detestable, and so on;

in reality, however, because it has become superfluous/ 81

Tyranny ceases to be historically necessary once tHedisci-

pline has been accomplished. It is then succeeded by the

rule of law, that is, by democracy. '

Democracy represents a real identity between thejndi-

vidual and the whole; the government is one with all the

indiv1HuaTs7~ancl their will Expresses the interest of the

whole. The individua\_ursues his own particular inter-

est, hence he is the 'bourgeois'; but he also occupies him-

self with the needs and tasks of the whole, hence he is the

citoyen.* 2

Hegel illustrates democracy by reference to the Greek

city-state. There, the unity between the individual and

the general will was still fortuitous; the individi^al had to

yield to the majority, which was accide'ntaTin its turn.

Such 'a democracy therefore could not represent the ulti-

mate unity between the individual and the whole. 'The

beautiful and happy freedom of the Greeks' integrated

individuals into an 'immediate' unity only, founded on

nature and feeling rather than on the conscious intel-

lectual and moral organization of society. Mankind had to

advance to a higher form of the state beyond this one, to

a form in which the individual unites himself freely and

consciously with others into a community that in turn

preserves his real essence.

The best guardian of such a unity, in Hegel's opinion,

is hereditary monarchy. The person of the monarch repre-

sents the whole elevated above all special interests; mon-

arch by birth, he rules, as it were, 'by nature,' untouched

by the antagonisms of society. He is, therefore, the most

stable and enduring 'point* in the movement of the

a* Pp. 47-8. * P. 149.

86 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL*S PHILOSOPHY

whole. 88 'Public opinion' is the tie that binds the spheres

of life and controls their course. The state is neither an

enforced nor a natural unity, but a rational organization

of society through its various 'estates.' In each estate the

individual indulges his own specific activity and yet serves

the community. Each estate has its particular place, its

consciousness, and its morality, but the estates terminate

in the 'universal' estate, that is, in the state functionaries

who attend to nothing except the general interest. The

functionaries are elected and each 'sphere [town, guild,

and so on] administers its own affairs.' 8 *

More important than these details are the questions,

What qualities does hereditary monarchy possess that jus-

tify its place of honor in the philosophy of mind? How

does this state form fulfill the principles that guided the

construction of that philosophy? Hegel looked upon hered-

itary monarchy as the Christian state par excellence, or,

more strictly, as the Christian state that came into being

with the German Reformation. To him this state was the

embodiment of the principle of Christian liberty, which

proclaimed the freedom of man's inner conscience and his

equality before God. Hegel thought that without this

inner freedom the outer freedom democracy was supposed

to institute and protect was of no avail. The German

Reformation represented to his mind the great turning

point in history that came with the pronouncement that

the individual was really free only when he had become

self-conscious of his inalienable autonomy. 85 Protestantism

had established this self-consciousness, and shown that

Christian liberty implied, in the sphere of the social real-

ity, submission and obedience to the divine hierarchy of

the state. We shall deal further with this matter when we

reach the Philosophy of Right.

One question still to be answered affects the whole struc-

P. aso. M p. *5i. se p. S5 ,.

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 87

ture of Hegel's system. The historical world, in so far as it

is built, organized, and shaped by the conscious activity of

thinking subjects, is a realm of mind. But the mind is fully

realized and exists in its true form only when it indulges in

its proper activity, namely, in art, religion, and philosophy.

These domains of culture are, then, the final reality, the

province of ultimate truth. And this is precisely Hegel's

conviction: the absolute mind lives only in art, religion,

and philosophy. All three have the same content in a

different form: Art apprehends the truth by mere intui-

tion (Anschauung), in a tangible and therefore limited

form; Religion perceives it free of such limitation, but

only as mere 'assertion* and belief; Philosophy compre-

hends it through knowledge and possesses it as its inalien-

able property. On the other hand, these spheres of cul-

ture exist only in the historical development of mankind,

and the state is the final stage of this development. What,

then, is the relation between the state and the realm of ab-

solute mind? Does the rule of the state extend over art,

religion, and philosophy, or is it rather limited by them?

The problem has been frequently discussed. It has been

pointed out that Hegel's attitude underwent several

changes, that he was first inclined to elevate the state above

the cultural spheres, that he then co-ordinated it with or

even subordinated it to them, and that he then returned

to the original position, the predominance of the state.

There are apparent contradictions in Hegel's statements

on this point even within the same philosophical period.

In the second Jenenser Realphilosophie he declares that

the absolute mind 'is at first the life of a nation in general;

however, the Mind has to free itself from this life/ 86 and

he says, moreover, that with art, religion, and philosophy,

'the absolute free Mind . . . produces a different world,

one in which it has its proper form, where its work is

"P. 5S-

88 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

accomplished, and where the Mind attains the intuition of

its own as its own/ 8T Contrary to these statements, Hegel

says in his discussion of the relation between religion and

the state that 'the government stands above all; it is the

Mind which knows itself as the universal essence and real-

ity . . .' 88 Furthermore, he calls the state 'the reality of

the kingdom of heaven . . . The State is the spirit of

reality, whatever appears within the State must conform

to it.' 89 The meaning of these contradictions and their

possible solution can be made clear only through an un-

derstanding of the constitutive role of history in Hegel's

system. Here, we shall attempt but a preliminary explana-

tion.

Hegel's first system already reveals the outstanding traits

of his philosophy, especially its emphasis on the universal

as the true being. We indicated in our introduction the

socio-historical roots of this 'universalism,' showing that

its base was the lack of a 'community* in individualist

society. Hegel remained faithful to the heritage of the

eighteenth century and incorporated its ideals into the

very structure of his philosophy. He insisted that the 'truly

universal* was a community that preserved and fulfilled

the demands of the individual. One might interpret his

dialectic as the philosophic attempt to reconcile his ideals

with an antagonistic social reality. Hegel recognized the

great forward surges that must be generated by the pre-

vailing order of society the development of material as

well as cultural productivity; the destruction of obsolete

power relations that hampered the advance of mankind;

and the emancipation of the individual so that he might

be the free subject of his life. When he stated that every

'immediate unity* (which does not imply an opposition

between its component parts) is, with regard to the possi-

bilities of human development, inferior to a unity pro-

P. 6j. P. *6y. 8 p. a 7 o.

HEGEL'S FIRST SYSTEM 89

duced by integrating real antagonisms, he was thinking

of the society of his own time. The reconciliation of the

individual and the universal seemed impossible without

the full unfolding of those antagonisms which push the

prevailing forms of life to a point where they openly con-

tradict their content. Hegel has described this process in

his picture of modern society.

The actual conditions of modern society are the strong-

est instance of dialectic in history. There is no doubt that

these conditions, however they might be justified on the

ground of economic necessity, contradict the ideal of free-

dom. The highest potentialities^fjnank 1 ^^ IT* in tf^ ra-

tional union of free indiyidualsTthat is, in the universal

and not in tlxed particularities. The individual can hope

to fulfill himself only if he is a free member of a real

community.

The enduring quest for such a community amidst the

haunting terror of an anarchic society is at the back of

Hegel's insistence upon the intrinsic connection between

truth and universality. He was thinking of the fulfillment

of that quest when he designated the true universality as

the end of the dialectical process and as the final reality.

Time and again, the concrete social implications of the

concept of universality break through his philosophic for-

mulations, and the picture of an association of free indi-

viduals united in a common interest comes clearly to light.

We quote the famous passage in the Aesthetics:

True independence consists alone in the unity and in the

interpenetration of both the individuality and the universality

with each other. The universal acquires through the individ-

ual its concrete existence, and the subjectivity of the individ-

ual and particular discovers in the universal the unassailable

basis and the most genuine form of its reality , . .

In the Ideal [state], it is precisely the particular individ-

uality which ought to persist in inseparable harmony with the

substantive totality, and to the full extent that freedom and

9O THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

independence of the subjectivity may attach to the Ideal the

world-environment of conditions and relations should possess

no essential objectivity apart from the subject and the indi-

vidual. 40

The Philosophy of Mind, and in fact the whole of the

Hegelian system, is a portrayal of the process whereby

'the individual becomes universal' and whereby 'the con-

struction of universality* takes place.

*o The Philosophy of Fine Arts, trans. F. P. R. Osmaston, George Bell

and Sons, London 1920, vol. i, pp. 243 f.

IV

MM9MCMCC-

The Phenomenology of Mind

(1807)

HEGEL wrote the Phenomenology of Mind in 1806 in Jena

while the Napoleonic armies were approaching that city.

He finished it as the battle of Jena sealed the fate of

Prussia and enthroned the heir of the French Revolution

over the powerless remnants of the old German Reich.

The feeling that a new epoch in world history had just

begun pervades Hegel's book. It marks his first philosoph-

ical judgment on history arid draws its final conclusions

from the French Revolution, which now becomes the

turning point of the historical as well as the philosophical

way to truth.

Hegel saw that the result of the French Revolution was

not the realization of freedom, but the establishment of a

new despotism. He interpreted its course and its issue not

as a historical accident, but as a necessary development.

The process of emancipating the individual necessarily re-

sults in terror and destruction as long as it is carried out

by individuals against the state, and not by the state it-

self. The state alone can provide emancipation, though it

cannot provide perfect truth and perfect freedom. These

last are to be found only in the proper realm of mind, in

morality, religion, and philosophy. We have already en

countered this sphere as the realization of truth and free

dom in Hegel's first Philosophy of Mind. There, however

they were founded on an adequate state order and re

mained in an intrinsic connection with it. This connec

tion is all but lost in the Phenomenology of Mind. The

91

Q2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

state ceases now to have an all-embracing significance.

Freedom and reason are made activities of the pure mind

and do not require a definite social and political order as

a pre-condition, but are compatible with the already exist-

ing state.

We may assume that his experience of the breakdown

of liberal ideas in the histoty of his own time drove Hegel

to take refuge in the pure mind, Und that for philosophy's

sake he preferred reconciliation with the prevailing sys-

tem to the terrible contingencies of a new upheaval. The

reconciliation that now takes place between philosophical

idealism and the given society announces itself not so

much as a change in the Hegelian system as such, but as

a change in the treatment and function of the dialectic.

In the preceding periods the dialectic was oriented to the

actual process of history rather than to the end-product of

this process. The sketchy form of the Jenenser Philosophy

of Mind strengthened the impression that something new

could yet happen to the mind, and that its development

was far from concluded. Furthermore, the Jenenser system

elaborated the dialectic in the concrete process of labor

and of social integration. In the Phenomenology of Mind

the antagonisms of this concrete dimension are leveled

and harmonized. 'The world becomes Mind* takes on the

meaning not only that the world in its totality becomes the

adequate arena in which the plans of mankind are to be

fulfilled, but also means that the world itself reveals a

steady progress towards the absolute truth, that nothing

new can happen to mind, or, that everything that does

happen to it eventually contributes to its advancement.

There are, of course, failures and repulses; progress by no

means takes place in a straight line, but is produced by

the interplay of ceaseless conflicts. The negativity, as we

shall see, remains the source and the motive power of the

movement. Every failure and every setback, however, pos-

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 93

sesses its proper good and its proper truth. Every conflict

implies its own solution. The change in Hegel's point of

view becomes manifest in the unshakable certainty with

which he determines the end of the process. The mind,

despite all deviations and defeats, despite misery and de-

terioration, will attain its goal, or, rather, has attained

it, in the prevailing social system. The negativity seems to

be a secure stage in the growth of mind rather than the

force that goads it beyond; the opposition in the dialectic

appears as a wilful play rather than a struggle of life and

death.

Hegel conceived the Phenomenology of Mind as an in-

troduction to his philosophical system. During the execu-

tion of the work he altered his original plan, however.

Knowing that he would not be able to publish the rest of

his system in the near future, he incorporated large parts

of it into his introduction. The extreme difficulties that

the book offers are, to a great extent, due to this procedure.

As an introductory volume, the work intends to lead

human understanding from the realm of daily experience

to that of real philosophical knowledge, to absolute truth.

This truth is the sime that Hegel had already demon-

strated in the Jenenser system, namely, the knowledge and

process of the world as mind.

The world in reality is not as it appears, but as it is

comprehended by philosophy. Hegel begins with the ex-

perience of the ordinary consciousness in everyday life.

He shows that this mode of experience, like any other,

contains elements that undermine its confidence in its

ability to perceive 'the real/ and force the search to pro-

ceed to ever higher modes of understanding. The advance

to these higher modes is thus an internal process of ex-

perience and is not produced from without. If man pays

strict attention to the results of his experience, he will

abandon one type of knowledge and proceed to another;

94 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

he will go from sense-certainty to perception, from percep-

tion to understanding, from understanding to self-cer-

tainty, until he reaches the truth of reason.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind thus presents the im-

manent history of human experience. This is not, to be

sure, the experience of common sense, but one already

shaken in its security, overlaid with the feeling that it

does not possess the whole truth. It is an experience al-

ready en route to real knowledge. The reader who is to

understand the various parts of the work must already

dwell in the 'element of philosophy.' The 'We* that ap-

pears so often denotes not everyday men but philosophers.

The factor that determines the course of this experi-

ence is the changing relation between consciousness and

its objects. If the philosophizing subject adheres to its ob-

jects and lets itself be guided by their meaning, it will

find that the objects undergo a change by which their form

as well as their relation to the subject alters. When experi-

ence begins, the object seems a stable entity, independent

of consciousness; subject and object appear to be alien

to one another. The progress of knowledge, however, re-

veals that the two do not subsist in isolation. It becomes

clear that the object gets its objectivity from the subject.

'The real,' which consciousness actually holds in the end-

less flux of sensations and perceptions, is a universal that

cannot be reduced to objective elements free of the subject

(for example, quality, thing, force, laws). In other words,

the real object is constituted by the (intellectual) activity

of the subject; somehow, it essentially 'pertains' to the

subject. The latter discovers that it itself stands 'behind'

the objects, that the world becomes real only by force of

the comprehending power of consciousness.

This is, however, at first nothing but a re-statement of

the case of transcendental idealism, or, as Hegel says, it

is a truth only 'for us/ the philosophizing subjects, and

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND Q5

not yet a truth manifested in the objective world. Hegel

goes further. He says, self-consciousnesi has yet to demon-

strate that it is the true~reality; it must actually make the

world its free realization. Referring to this task, Hegel de-

clares the subject to be 'absolute negativity/ signifying

that it has the power to negate every given condition and

to make it its own conscious work. This is not an epistemo-

logical activity and cannot be carried out solely within the

process of knowledge, for that process cannot be severed

from the historical struggle between man and his world, a

struggle that is itself a constitutive part of the way to truth

and of the truth itself. The subject must make- the world

its own doing if it is to recognize itself as the only reality.

The process of knowledge becomes the process of history.

We have already reached this conclusion in the Jenenser

Philosophy of Mind. Self-consciousness carries itself into

the life-and-death struggle among individuals. From here

on, Hegel links the epistemological process of self-con-

sciousness (from sense-certainty to reason) with the his-

torical process of mankind from bondage to freedom. The

'modes or forms [Gestalteri] of consciousness* * appear si-

multaneously as objective historical realities, 'states of the

world* (Weltzustande). The constant transition from phil-

osophical to historical analysis which has often been criti-

cized as a confusion, or an arbitrary metaphysical interpre-

tation of history is intended to verify and demonstrate

the historical character of the basic philosophical con-

cepts. All of them comprehend and retain actual historical

stages in the development of mankind. Each form of con-

sciousness that appears in the immanent progress of knowl-

edge crystallizes as the life of a given historical epoch.

The process leads from the Greek city-state to the French

Revolution.

i Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, London (The Macmillan

Company, New York), 1910, vol. I, p. 34.

g6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

Hegel describes the French Revolution as the unloosing

of a 'self-destructive* freedom, self-destructive because the

consciousness that strove here to change the world in ac-

cordance with its subjective interests had not yet found its

truth. In other words, man did not discover his real in-

terest, he did not freely place himself under laws that se-

cure his own freedom and that of the whole. The new state

created by the Revolution, Hegel says, only altered the

external form of the objective world, making it a medium

for the subject, but it did not achieve the subject's essen-

tial freedom.

The achievement of the latter takes place in the transi-

tion from the French revolutionary era to that of Ger-

man idealist culture. The realization of true freedom is

thus transferred from the plane of history to the inner

realm of the mind. Hegel says: 'absolute freedom leaves

its self-destructive sphere of reality [that is, the historical

epoch of the French Revolution] and passes over into an-

other realm, that of the self-conscious mind. Here, free-

dom is held to be true in so far as it is unreal . . .' a This

new realm had been a discovery of Kant's ethical idealism.

Within it, the autonomous individual gives himself the

unconditional duty to obey universal laws that he im-

poses .upon himself of his own free will. Hegel did not,

however, regard this 'realm' as the final abode of reason.

The conflict that developed from Kant's reconciliation of

the individual with the universal, a conflict between the

dictate of duty and the desire for happiness, forced the

individual to seek the truth in other solutions. He looks

for it in art and religion and finally finds it in the 'abso-

lute knowledge' of dialectical philosophy. There, all oppo-

sition between consciousness and its object is overcome;

the subject possesses and knows the world as its own real-

ity, as reason.

* Ibid., p. 604.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 97

The Phenomenology of Mind in this way leads up to

the Logic. The latter unfolds the structure of the uni-

verse, not in the changing forms that it has for knowledge

that is not yet absolute, but in its true essence. It pre-

sents 'the truth in its true form. 1 * Just as the experience

with which the Phenomenology began was not everyday

experience, the knowledge with which it ends is not tra-

ditional philosophy, but a philosophy that has absorbed

the truth of all previous philosophies and with it all the

experience mankind has accumulated during its long trek

to freedom. It is a philosophy of a self-conscious humanity

that lays claim to a mastery of men and things and to its

right to shape the world accordingly, a philosophy that

enunciates the highest ideals of modern individualist so-

ciety.

After this brief preliminary survey of the broad per-

spective of the Phenomenology of Mind, we now turn to

a discussion of its principal conceptions in greater detail.

The Preface to the Phenomenology is one of the great-

est philosophical undertakings of all times, constituting

no less an attempt than to reinstate philosophy as the

highest form of human knowledge, as 'the Science.' We

shall here limit ourselves to its main points.

Hegel starts with a critical analysis of the philosophic

currents of the turn of the eighteenth century, and pro-

ceeds to develop his concept of philosophy and philo-

sophic truth. Knowledge has its source in the vision that

essence and existence are distinct in the various cognitive

processes. The objects it gets in immediate experience

fail to satisfy knowledge, because they are accidental and

incomplete, and it turns to seek the truth in the notion of

objects, convinced that the right notion is not a mere sub-

jective intellectual form, but the essence of things. This,

P. 55-

98 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

however, is but the first step of knowledge. Its major ef

fort is to demonstrate and expound the relation between

essence and existence, between the truth preserved in the

notion and the actual state in which things exist.

The various sciences differ from each other by the way

in which the objects they deal with are related to their

truth. This is confusing unless one bears in mind that

for Hegel truth signifies a form of existence as well as oi

knowledge, and that, consequently, the relation between

a being and its truth is an objective relation of things

themselves. Hegel illustrates this conception by contrast

ing mathematical and philosophical knowledge. The es-

sence or 'nature* of the right-angle triangle is that its sides

are related just as the Pythagorean proposition has it; but

this truth is 'outside* the triangle. The proof of the propo

sition consists in a process carried on solely by the know-

ing subject. '. . . the triangle ... . is taken to pieces, and

its parts made into other figures to which the construction

gives rise in the triangle.' 4 The necessity for the con-

struction does not arise from the nature or notion of the

triangle. 'The process of mathematical proof does not be-

long to the object; it is a function that takes place outside

of the matter in hand. The nature of a right-angled tri-

angle does not break itself up into factors in the manner

set forth in the mathematical construction which is re-

quired to prove the proposition expressing the relation

of its parts. The entire process of producing the result is

an affair of knowledge which takes its own way of going

about it.' 5 In other words, the truth about mathematical

objects exists outside of themselves, in the knowing sub-

ject. These objects, therefore, are in a strict sense untrue

and unessential 'external' entities.

The objects of philosophy, on the other hand, bear an

intrinsic relation to their truth. For example, the princi-

4 p. 40. 5 P. 39-

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND QQ

pie that 'the nature of man requires freedom and that

freedom is a form of reason* is not a truth imposed upon

man by an arbitrary philosophical theory, but can be

proved to be the inherent aim of man, his very reality. Its

proof is not advanced by the external process of knowl-

edge but by the history of man. In philosophy, the rela-

tion of an object to its truth is an actual happening

(Gescheheri). To come back to the example, man finds

that he is not free, that he is separated from his truth, lead-

ing a fortuitous, untrue existence. Freedom is something

he must acquire by overcoming his bondage, and he ac-

quires it when he eventually knows his true potentialities.

Freedom presupposes conditions that render freedom pos-

sible, namely, conscious and rational mastery of the world.

The known history of mankind verifies the truth of this

conclusion. The notion of man is his history, as appre-

hended by philosophy. Thus, essence and existence are

actually interrelated in philosophy, and the process of

proving the truth there has to do with the existing object

itself. The essence arises in the process of existence, and

conversely, the prpcess of existence is a 'return' to the es-

sence. 8

Philosophical knowledge aims only at the 'essentials'

that have a constitutive bearing upon man's destiny and

that of his world. The sole object of philosophy is the

world in its true form, the world as reason. Reason, again,

comes into its own only with the development of man-

kind. Philosophic truth, therefore, is quite definitely con-

cerned with man's existence; it is his innermost prod and

goal. This, in the last analysis, is the meaning of the state-

ment that truth is immanent in the object of philosophy.

The truth fashions the very existence of the object and is

not, as in mathematics, indifferent to it. Existing in truth

is a matter of life (and death), and the way to truth is

6 P. S9-

100 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

not only an epistemological but also a historical process.

This relation between truth and existence distinguishes

the philosophic method. A mathematical truth may be ar-

rested in one proposition; the proposition is true and its

contradictory is false. In philosophy, the truth is a real

process that cannot be put into a proposition. 'The ab-

stract or unreal is not its element and content, but the

real, what is self-establishing, has life within itself, exist-

ence in its very notion. It is the process that creates its

own moments in its course, and goes through them all;

and the whole of this movement constitutes its positive

content, and its truth.' T No single proposition can grasp

this process. For instance, the proposition, 'The nature

of man is freedom in reason/ is, if taken by itself, untrue.

It omits all the facts that make up the meaning of free-

dom and of reason, and that are assembled in the whole

historical drive towards freedom and reason. Furthermore,

the proposition is false in so far as freedom and reason

can only appear as the result of the historical process. The

conquest of bondage and irrationality, and hence bondage

and irrationality themselves, are essential parts of the

truth. Falsehood here is as necessary and real as truth.

The falsehood must be conceived as the 'mistaken form'

or untruth of the real object this object in its untrue

existence; the false is the 'otherness, the negative aspect

of the substance/ 8 but none the less a part of it and hence

constitutive in its truth.

The dialectical method conforms to this structure that

the philosophic object has, and attempts to reconstruct

and follow its real movement. A philosophic system is true

only if it includes the negative state and the positive, and

reproduces the process of becoming false and then return-

ing to truth. As a system of this kind, the dialectic is the

true method of philosophy. It shows that the object with

T Pp. 43-4- P-3&

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 1O1

which it deals exists in a state of 'negativity/ which the

object, through the pressures of its own existence, throws

off in the process of regaining its truth.

If, then, in philosophy, no single proposition is true

apart from the whole, in what sense is the whole system

true? The dialectical system alters the structure and mean-

ing of the proposition and makes it something quite differ-

ent from the proposition of traditional logic. The latter

logic, to which Hegel alludes as 'the logic of common

sense/ meaning the logic of traditional scientific method

as well, treats propositions as consisting of a subject, which

serves as a fixed and stable base, and a predicate attached

to it. The predicates are the accidental properties, or, in

Hegel's language, 'determinations' of a more or less fixed

substance.

As a contrast to this view of the proposition, Hegel sets

the 'speculative judgment* in philosophy. 9 The specula-

tive judgment does not have a stable and passive subject.

Its subject is active and develops itself into its predicates.

The predicates are various forms of the subject's exist-

ence. Or, to state it somewhat differently, what happens is

that the subject 'g9es under' (geht zu Grunde) and turns

into the predicate. The speculative judgment thus shakes

'the solid base' of the traditional proposition 'to its foun-

dations, and the only object is this very movement of the

subject.' 10 For example, the proposition God is Being,

taken as a speculative judgment, does not mean that the

subject, God, 'possesses' or 'supports' the predicate 'Being*

among many other predicates) but that die subject, God,

'passes' into Being. 'Being' here is 'not predicate but the

essential nature* of God. The subject God 'seems to cease

to be what He was when the proposition was put forward,

viz. a fixed subject/ and to become the predicate. 11

Whereas the traditional judgment and proposition imply

P. 61. 10 P. 59 . "P. 61.

102 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

a clear distinction of subject from predicate, the specu-

lative judgment subverts and destroys 'the nature of judg-

ment or of the proposition in general/ It strikes the de-

cisive blow against traditional formal logic. The subject

becomes the predicate without at the same time becoming

identical with it. The process cannot be adequately ex-

pressed in a single proposition; 'the proposition as it ap-

pears is a mere empty form/ 12 The locus of truth is not

the proposition, but the dynamic system of speculative

judgments in which every single judgment must be 'sub-

lated' by another, so that only the whole process repre-

sents the truth.

The traditional logic and the traditional concept of

truth are 'shaken to their foundations' not by philosophic

fiat but by insight into the dynamic of reality. The specu-

lative judgment has for its content the objective process

of reality in its essential, 'comprehended form/ not in its

appearance. In this very basic sense, Hegel's change from

traditional to material logic marked the first step in the

direction of unifying theory and practice. His protest

against the fixed and formal 'truth' of traditional logic

was in effect a protest against divorcing truth and its

forms from concrete processes; a protest against severing

truth from any direct guiding influence on reality.

In Germany, idealistic philosophy championed the right

of theory to guide practice. For idealistic philosophy rep-

resented the most advanced form of consciousness that

then prevailed, and the idea of a world permeated with

freedom and reason had no securer refuge than was of-

fered by this remote sphere of culture. The subsequent

development of European thought cannot be understood

apart from its idealist origins.

A thorough analysis of the Phenomenology of Mind

n P. 65.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 10$

would require more than a volume. We may forego that

analysis, since the latter parts of the work deal with prob-

lems we have already outlined in the discussion of the

Jenenser system. We shall confine our interpretation to

the opening sections, which elaborate the dialectical

method in great detail and set the pattern for the entire

work. 18

Knowledge begins when philosophy destroys the ex-

perience of daily life. Analysis of this experience is the

starting point of the search for truth. The object of experi-

ence is first given through the senses and takes the form

of sense-knowledge or sense-certainty (sinnliche Gewiss-

heit). Characteristic of this kind of experience is the fact

that its subject as well as its object appears as an 'individ-

ual this/ here and now. I see this house, here at this par-

ticular place and at this particular moment. The house is

taken as 'real' and seems to exist per se. The T that sees

it seems to be unessential, 'can as well be as not be,' and

'only knows the object because the object exists/ 14

If we analyze a bit, we see that what is known in this

experience, what sense-certainty holds as its invariant own

amid the flux of jmpressions, is not the object, the house,

but the Here and the Now. If I turn my head, the house

disappears and some other object appears, which, with an-

other turn of my head, will likewise disappear. To keep

hold of and to define the actual content of sense-certainty

I must refer to the Here and Now as the only elements

that remain permanent in the continuous change of ob-

jective data. What is the Here and Now? Here is a house,

but it is likewise not a house but a tree, a street, a man, and

so on. Now is daytime, but somewhat later now is night,

then morning, and so on. The Now remains identical

is Compare J. Loewenberg's excellent analysis in his two articles on

the Phenomenology of Mind, in Mind, vol. XLHI and XLIV, 1934-5.

" P. 9.

104 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL*S PHILOSOPHY

throughout the differences of day, night, or morning.

Moreover, it is Now just because it is neither day, nor

night, nor any other moment of time. It preserves itself

through the negation of all other moments of time. In

other words, the Now exists as something negative; its

being is a non-being. The same holds true for Here. Here

is neither the house nor the tree nor the street, but what

'is and remains in the disappearance of the house, tree,

and so on, and is indifferently house, tree/ 15 That is to

say, the Now and the Here are something Universal. Hegel

says an entity 'which is by and through negation, which

is neither this nor that, which is a not-this, and with equal

indifference this as well as that a thing of this kind we

call a Universal.' The analysis of sense-certainty thus

demonstrates the reality of the universal and develops at

the same time the philosophic notion of universality. The

reality of the universal is proved by the very content of

the observable facts; it exists in their process and can be

grasped only in and through the particulars.

This is the first result we obtain from philosophical

analysis of sense-certainty: it is not the particular, indi-

vidual object, but the universal that is 'the truth of sense-

certainty, the true content of sense-experience/ ie The

result implies something more astonishing. Sense-experi-

ence holds it self-evident that the object is the essential,

'the real/ while the subject is unessential and its knowl-

edge dependent upon the object. The true relation is now

found to be 'just the reverse of what first appeared/ ir The

universal has turned out to be the true content of experi-

ence. And the locus of the universal is the subject and not

the object; the universal exists 'in knowledge, which for-

merly was the non-essential factor/ 18 The object is not per

te; it is 'because I know it/ The certainty of sense experi-

i P. 94. i Ibid. i* p. 95. ia ibid.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 1O5

ence is thus grounded in the subject; it is, as Hegel says,

banished from the object, and forced back into the 'I.'

Further analysis of sense-experience reveals that the T

goes through the same dialectical process as the object,

showing itself to be something universal. At first, the indi-

vidual I, my ego, seems the sole stable point in the flux

of sense data. 'The disappearance of the particular Now

and Here that we mean is prevented by the fact that I

keep hold of them.' I assert that it is daytime and that I

see a house. I record this truth, and someone else reading

it later may assert that it is night and that he sees a tree.

'Both truths have the same authenticity* and both become

false with a change of time and place. The truth, therefore,

cannot attach to a particular individual I. If I say I see a

house here and now, I imply that everyone could take my

place as subject of this perception. I assume 'the I qua uni-

versal, whose seeing is neither the seeing of this tree nor

of this house, but just seeing/ Just as the Here and Now

are universal as against their individual content, so the I

is universal as against all individual I's.

The idea of a universal I is an abomination to common

sense, though everyday language makes constant use of it.

When I say 'I* see, hear, and so on, I put everybody in

my place, substitute any other I for my individual I.

'When I say "I," "this individual," I say quite generally

"all I's," everyone is what I say, everyone is "I," this indi-

vidual I.'

Sense-experience thus discovers that truth lies neither

with its particular object ner with the individual I. The

truth is the result of a double process of negation, namely,

(1) the negation of the 'per se* existence of the object, and

(2) the negation of the individual I with the shifting of

the truth to the universal I. Objectivity is thus twice

'mediated' or constructed by consciousness and hencefor-

ward remains tied to consciousness. The development of

106 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

the objective world is throughout interwoven in the de-

velopment of consciousness.

Common sense resents such a destruction of its truth

and claims that it can indicate the exact particular Here

and Now it means. Hegel accepts the challenge. 'Let us,

then, see how that immediate Here and Now which is

shown to us is constituted.' 19 When I point to a particular

Now, 'it has already ceased to be by the time it is pointed

out. The Now that is, is other than the one indicated, and

we see that the Now is just this to be when it no longer

is.' Pointing to the Now is thus a process involving the

following stages: (i) I point to the Now and assert that it

is thus and so. 'I point it out, however, as something that

has been.' In so doing, I cancel the first truth and assert

(2) that the Now has been, and that such is the truth. But

what has been, is not. Thus, (3) I cancel the second truth,

negate the negation of the Now, and assert it again as true.

This Now, however, which results from the whole process,

is not the Now that common sense first meant. It is in-

different to present or past. It is the Now that is past,

the one that is present, and so on, and is in all this one

and the same Now. In other words, it is something uni-

versal.

Sense-experience has thus itself demonstrated that its

real content is not the particular but the universal. 'The

dialectic process involved in sense-certainty is nothing

else than the mere history of its process of its experi-

ence; and sense-certainty itself is nothing else than simply

this history.' 20 Experience itself passes to a higher mode

of knowledge, which aims at the universal. Sense-certainty

turns into perception.

Perception (Wahrnehmung) is distinguished from sense-

certainty by the fact that its 'principle* is universality. 21

The objects of perception are things (Dinge), and things

1 P. 98. P. 100. 21 p. 104.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 1O7

remain identical in the changes of Here and Now. For ex-

ample, I call this thing I perceive here and now 'salt/ I

refer not to the particular heres and nows in which it is

present to me but to a specific unity in the diversity of

its 'properties' (Eigenschaften). I refer to the 'thinghood'

of the thing. The salt is white, cubical in shape, and so

on. These properties in themselves are universal, common

to many things. The thing itself seems to be nothing but

the 'simple togetherness* of such properties, their general

'medium/ But it is more than such simple togetherness.

Its properties are not arbitrary and exchangeable, but

rather 'exclude and negate* other properties. If the salt

is white and pungent, it cannot be black- and sweet. The

exclusion is not an arbitrary matter of definition; on the

contrary, the definition is dependent on the data offered

by the thing itself. It is the salt that excludes and negates

certain properties that contradict its 'being salt/ The

thing is thus not a 'unity indifferent to what it is, but . . .

an excluding, repelling unity/ 2a

So far, the object seems to be a definite one, which per-

ception merely has to accept and to 'take unto itself pas-

sively. Perception, like sense-experience, first gathers the

truth from the* object. But, like sense-experience also, it

discovers that the subject itself constitutes the objectivity

of the thing. For when perception attempts to determine

what the thing really is, it plunges into a seridfc of con-

tradictions. The thing is a unity and at the same time a

multiplicity. The contradiction cannot be avoided by as-

signing the two aspects to each of the two factors of per-

ception, so that unity is attached to the consciousness of

the subject and the multiplicity to the object. Hegel shows

that this would only lead to new contradictions. Nor does

it help to assume that the thing is really a unity and that

the multiplicity is produced by its relation to other

22 p. 108.

1O8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL*S PHILOSOPHY

things. 88 All such attempts to escape the contradiction

only serve to demonstrate that it is inescapable and con-

stitutes the very content of perception. The thing is in

itself unity and difference, unity in difference. Hegel's

further analysis of this relationship leads to a new de-

termination of universality. The real universal contains

diversity and at the same time maintains itself as an 'ex-

cluding and repelling' unity in all particular conditions.

In this way, the analysis of perception goes beyond the

point reached in the analysis of sense-experience. The uni-

versal now denoted as the true content of knowledge bears

a different character. The unity of the thing is not only

determined but constituted by its relation to other things,

and its thinghood consists in this very relation. The salt,

for example, is what it is only in relation to our taste, to

the food to which it is added, to sugar, and so on. The

thing salt, to be sure, is more than the mere 'together-

ness* of such relations; it is a unity in and for itself, but

this unity exists only in these relations and is nothing

'behind* or outside them. The thing becomes itself through

its opposition to other things; it is, as Hegel says, the

unity of itself with its opposite, or, of being-for-itself with

being-for-another. 24 In other words, the very 'substance*

of the thing must be gleaned from its self-established rela-

tion to other things. This, however, is not within the

power of perception to accomplish; it is the work of (con-

ceptual) understanding.

The analysis of perception produced 'unity in differ-

ence* or the 'unconditioned universal* as the true form of

the object of knowledge, unconditioned because the unity

of the thing asserts itself despite and through all delimit-

ing conditions. When perception attempted to grasp the

real content of its object, the 'thing' turned out to be a

self-constituting unity in a diversity of relations to other

*p. 117. 2 *P. 119.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 1OQ

things. Hegel now introduces the concept of force to ex-

plain how the thing is held together as a self-determining

unity in this process. The substance of the thing, he says,

can only be understood as force.

The concept of force takes in all the elements that

philosophic analysis has so far found to be characteristic

of the real object of knowledge. Force is itself a relation,

the elements of which are distinct and yet not separate

from each other; it is in all conditions not contingent but

necessarily determined by itself. 25 We shall not follow the

details of Hegel's discussion of this concept, but shall limit

ourselves to its conclusions.

If we take the substance of things to be force, we

actually split reality into two dimensions. We transcend

the perceptible properties of things and reach something

beyond and behind them, which we define as 'the real.'

For, force is not an entity in the world of perception; it

is not a thing or quality we can point to, such as white or

cubical. We can only perceive the effect or expression of

it, and for us its existence consists in this expression of

itself. Force is npthing apart from its effect; its being con-

sists entirely in this coming to be and passing away. If the

substance of things is force, their mode of existing turns

out to be appearance. For, a being that exists only as

'vanishing/ one that 'is per se straightway non-being, we

call ... a semblance (Schein).' 29 The term appearance

or semblance has for Hegel a twofold meaning. It means

first that a thing exists in such a way that its existence is

different from its essence; secondly, it means that that

which appears is not mere seeming (blosser Scheiri), but is

the expression of an essence that exists only as appearing.

Sec the Jenenscr Logik, p. 50. Force 'combines in itself the two sides

of the relation, the identity and the difference . . . Conceived as Force,

the substance is Cause in itself . . . Force is the very determinateness that

makes the substance this determinate substance and at the same time

posits it as relating itself to its opposite.'

Phenomenology of Mind, p. 136.

HO THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL S PHILOSOPHY

In other words, the appearance is not a non-being but is

the appearance of the essence.

The discovery that force is the substance of things gives

the process of knowledge insight into the realm of essence.

The world of sense-experience and perception is the realm

of appearance. The realm of essence is a 'supersensible'

world beyond this changing and evanescent realm of ap-

pearance. Hegel calls this early vision of the essence 'the

first and therefore imperfect manifestation of Reason'

imperfect because consciousness still finds its truth, 'in the

form of an object,' that is, as something opposed to the

subject. The realm of essence comes forth as the 'inner*

world of things. It remains 'for consciousness a bare and

simple beyond, because consciousness does not as yet find

itself in it.'

But truth cannot remain eternally out of reach of the

subject if man is to escape from an untrue existence in

an untrue world. The ensuing analysis therefore buckles

down to the task of showing that behind the appearance

of things is the subject itself, who constitutes their very

essence. Tiegel's insistence that the subject be recognized

behind the appearance of things is an expression of the

basic desire of idealism that man transform the estranged

world into a world of his own. The Phenomenology of

Mind accordingly follows through by merging the sphere

of epistemology with the world of history, passing from

the discovery of the subject to the task of mastering reality

through self-conscious practice5

**4The concept of force leads to the transition from con-

sciousness to self -consciousness/ If the essence of things is

conceived as force, the stability of the objective world dis-

solves into an interplay of movement. The concept, how-

ever, means more than a mere play.\A force wields a defi-

nite power over its effects and remains itself amid its vari-

ous manifestations. In other words, it acts according to

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 1 1 1

an inherent 'law/ so that, as Hegel puts it, the truth of

force is 'the law of Force' (<fcw Gesetz der Kraft). 27 The

realm of essence is not, as it first seemed, a blind play of

forces, but a domain of permanent laws determining the

form of the perceptible world.V While the multiplicity of

these forms seems at first to require a corresponding mul-

titude of laws, further analysis discloses that the diversity

is but a deficient aspect of the truth, and knowledge, in

setting out to unify the many laws into an over-arching

single law, succeeds in this early phase in gleaning the

general form of such. Knowledge finds that things exist

under a law if they have 'gathered and preserved all the

moments of their appearance* into their inner essence and

are capable of preserving their essential identity in their

relations to all things. This identity of the 'substance/ as

we have already indicated, must be understood as the spe-

cific work of a 'subject' that is essentially a constant proc-

ess of 'unification of opposites.' 28

The previous analysis has disclosed that the essence of

things is force, and the essence of force, law. Force under

law is what characterizes the self-conscious subject. The es-

sence of the objective world thus points to the existence

of the self-conscious subject. Understanding finds nothing

but itself when it seeks thet essence behind the appearance

of things. Jit is manifest that behind the so-called curtain,

which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be

seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order

that we may thereby see, as that there may be something

behind there which can be seen/ 29 (The truth of under-

standing is self-consciousness.^ The first chapter of the Phe-

nomenology has come to a close and the history of self-

consciousness begins.

Before we follow this history, we must evaluate the

general significance of the first chapter. The reader learns

T ibid., p. 149. 28 See above, p. 69. s Ibid., p. 162.

112 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

that behind the curtain of appearance is not an unknown

thing-in-itself, but the knowing subject. Self-consciousnesj

is the essence of things. We usually say this is the step

from Kant to Hegel, that is, from critical to absolute

idealism. But to say only that is to omit the purpose that

drove Hegel to make this transition.

\ The first three sections of the Phenomenology are <

critique of positivism 80 and, even more, of 'reification.

To begin with the latter, Hegel attempts to show that mar

can know the truth only if he breaks through his 'reified

world. \We borrow the term 'reification' from the Marxisi

theory, where it denotes the facftKat all relations betweer

men inthejworld of J^pitelisip, appeaF^TTelatloris be

tween things, or, that what in the social world seem to b<

the relations of things and 'natural* laws that regulate

their movement are in reality relations of men and his

torical forces. The commodity, for instance, embodies ir

all its qualities the social relations of labor; capital ii

the power of disposing over men; and so on. By virtue o

the inversion, the world has become an alienated

estranged world, in which man does not recognize or ful

fill himself, but is overpowered by dead things and laws

Hegel hit upon the same fact within the dimension ol

philosophy. Common serjse and traditional scientific

thought take the world as a totality of things, more 01

less existing per se, and seek the truth in objects that ar<

taken to be independent of the knowing subject. This i

more than an epistemological attitude; it is as pervasiv<

as the practice of men and leads them to accept the feel

ing that they are secure only in knowing and handling

objective facts. The more remote an idea is from the im

pulses, interests, and wants of the living subject, the mor<

true it becomes. And this, according to Hegel, is the ut

* Positivism is used as a general term for the philosophy of 'commoi

sense' experience.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 11J

most defamation of truth. For there is, in the last analysis,

no truth that does not essentially concern the living sub-

ject and that is not the subject's truth. The world is an

estranged and untrue world so long as man does not de-

stroy its dead objectivity and recognize himself and his

own life 'behind' the fixed form of things and laws. When

he finally wins this self-consciousness, he is on his way not

only to the truth of himself but also of his world. And

with the recognition goes the doing. He will try to put

this truth into action and make the world what it essen-

tially is, namely, the fulfillment of man's self-consciousness.

This is the impulse animating the opening sections of

the Phenomenology.^ True practice presupposes true

knowledge and the latter is endangered above all by the

positivist cfaim. Positivism, the philosophy of common

sense, appeals to the certainty of facts, but, as Hegel shows,

in a world where facts do not at all present what reality

can and ought to be, positivism amounts to giving up

the real potentialities of mankind for a false and alien

world. The positivist attack on universal concepts, on

the ground tfyey cannot be reduced to observable facts,

cancels from the domain of knowledge everything that

may not yet be a fact. In demonstrating that sense-experi-

ence and perception, to which positivism appeals, in them-

selves imply and mean not the particular observed fact

but something universal, Hegel is giving a final imma-

nent refutation of positivism. When he emphasizes time

and again that the universal is pre-eminent over the par-

ticular, he is struggling against limiting truth to the

particular 'given.' The universal is more than the par-

ticular. This signifies in the concrete that the potenti-

alities of men and things are not exhausted in the~gTven

forms and relations in which they may actually appear;

it means that men and things are all they have been and

actually are, and yet more than all this. Setting the truth

114 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

in the universal expressed Hegel's conviction that no given

particular form, whether in nature or society, embodies

the whole truth. Moreover, it was a way of denouncing

the isolation of men from things and of recognizing that

their potentialities could not be preserved except in their

redintegration.

In the treatment of self-consciousness, Hegel resumes

the analysis begun in the System der Sittlichkeit and the

Jenenser Philosophy of Mind* 1 of the^ relation between

and his world. Man has learned that "his

own seU-consciousnesslies behind the appearance of

things. He now sets out to realize this expcrience7Tojpr6ve

himselfnaster of hjIj^rj^Selfoonsdc^^ thus find?

itself in a 'state of desire* (Begierde): man, awakened to

seffconsciousness, desires the objects around him, appro-

priates and uses them. But in the process he comes to feel

that the objects are not the true end of his desire, but

that his needs can be fulfilled only through association

with other individuals. Hegel says, 'self-consciousness at-

tains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.' 82

The meaning of this rather strange statement is explained

in the discussion of lordship and bondage that follows it.

The concept of labor plays a central role in this discussion

in which Hegel shows that the objects of labor are not

dead things but living embodiments of the subject's es-

sence, so that in dealing with these objects, man is actually

dealing with man.

The individual can become what he is only through an-

other individual; his very existence consists in his 'being-!

for-another.' The relation, however, is by no means one

of harmonious co-operation between equally free individ-

uals who promote the common interest in the pursuit of

their own advantage. It is rather a 'life-and-death struggle'

i Sec above, pp. 57, 77. , M Phenomenology of Mind, p. 173.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 115

between essentially unequal individuals, the one a 'master'

and the other a 'servant/ Fighting out the battle is the

only way man can come to self-consciousness, that is, to

the knowledge of his potentialities and to the freedom

of their realization. The truth of self-consciousness is not

the T but the 'We/ 'the ego that is We and the We that

is ego/ 88

In 1844 Marx sharpened the basic concepts of his own

theory through a critical analysis of Hegel's Phenomenol-

ogy of Mind. He described the 'alienation* of labor in the

terms of Hegel's discussion of master and servant. Marx

was not familiar with the stages of Hegel's philosophy

prior to the Phenomenology, but he nevertheless caught

the critical impact of Hegel's analysis, even in the attenu-

ated form in which social problems were permitted to

enter the Phenomenology of Mind. The greatness of that

work he saw in the fact that Hegel conceived the 'self-

creation' of man (that is, the creation of a reasonable so-

cial order through man's own free action) as the process

of 'reification' and its 'negation/ in short, that he grasped

the 'nature of labor* and saw man to be 'the result of his

labor/ 8 * Marx makes reference to Hegel's definitive in-

sight, which disclosed to him that lordship and bondage

result of necessity from certain relationships of labor,

which are, in turn, relationships in a 'reified* world. The

relation of lord to servant is thus neither an eternal nor

a natural one, but is rooted in a definite mode of labor

and in man's relation to the products of his labor.

Hegel's analysis actually begins with the 'experience'

that the world in which self-consciousness must prove it-

self is split into two conflicting domains, the one in which

man is bound to his labor so that it determines his whole

sa Ibid., p. 174.

84 Marx-Engcls Gesamtausgabe, Erste Abteilung, Band 3. Berlin 1938,

p. 150-

1 16 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

existence, and the other in which man appropriates and

possesses another man's labor and becomes master by the

very fact of this appropriation and possession. Hegel de-

notes the latter as the lord and the former as the bonds-

man." The bondsman is not a human being who happens

to labor, but is essentially a laborer; his labor is his being.

He works on objects that do not belong to him but to an-

other. He cannot detach his existence from these objects;

they constitute 'the chain from which he cannot get

away.' M He is entirely at the mercy of him who owns

these objects. It must be noted that according to this ex-

position, dependence of man on man is neither a personal

condition nor grounded in personal or natural conditions

(viz. inferiority, weakness, and so on), but is 'mediated*

by things. In other words, it is the outcome of man's rela-

tion to the products of his labor. Labor so shackles the

laborer to the objects that his consciousness itself does not

exist except 'in the form and shape of thinghood.' He be-

comes a thing whose very existence consists in its being

used. The being of the laborer is a 'being-for-another.' **

Labor is, however, at the same time the vehicle that

transforms this relationship. The laborer's action does not

disappear when the products of his labor appear, but is pre-

served in them. The things labor shapes and fashions fill

the social world of man, and function there as objects of

labor. The laborer learns that his labor perpetuates this

world; he sees and recognizes himself in the things about

him. His consciousness is now 'externalized' in his work

and has 'passed into the condition of permanence.' The

man who 'toils and serves' thus comes to view the inde-

pendent being as himself. 84 The objects of his labor are

no longer dead things that shackle him to other men, but

products of his work, and, as such, pan and parcel of his

Phenomenology of Mind, p. i8t. "Ibid., p. 181.

"Ibid. "P. 186.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 117

own being. The fact that the product of his labor is ob-

jectified does not make it 'something other than the con-

sciousness moulding the thing through work; for just that

form is his pure self-existence, which therein becomes

truly realized/ M

The process of labor creates self-consciousness not only

in the laborer but in the master as well. Lordship is de-

fined chiefly by the fact that the lord commands objects

he desires without working on them. 40 He satisfies his type

of need through having someone, not himself, work. His

enjoyment depends upon his own freedom from labor.

The laborer he controls delivers to him the objects he

wants in an advanced form, ready to be enjoyed. The la-

borer thus preserves the lord from having to encounter

the 'negative side* of things, that on which they become

fetters on man. The lord receives all things as products

of labor, not as dead objects, but as things that bear the

hallmark of the subject who worked on them. When he

handles these things as his property, the lord is really han-

dling another self-consciousness, that of the laborer, the

being through whom he attains his satisfaction. The lord

in this wise finds that he is not an independent 'being-for-

himself,' but is essentially dependent on another being,

upon the action of him who labors for him.

Hegel has so far developed the relation of lordship and

bondage as a relation each side of which recognizes that

it has its essence in the other and comes to its truth only

through the other. The opposition between subject and

object that determined the *forms of mind hitherto de-

scribed has now disappeared. The object, shaped and culti-

vated by human labor, is in reality the objectification of a

self-conscious subject. 'Thinghood, which received its

shape and form through labor, is no other substance than

consciousness. In this way, we have a new mode [Gestalt]

P. 187. o P. i8.

11 8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

of self-consciousness brought about. We have now a con-

sciousness which . . . thinks or is free self-conscious-

ness/ 41 Why this rather sudden identification of the free

self-consciousness with the 'consciousness which thinks?

Hegel goes on to a definition of thinking that answers

this question in the basic terms of his philosophy. He says,

the subject of thinking is not the 'abstract ego* but the

consciousness that knows that it is the 'substance* of the

world. Or, thinking consists in knowing that the ob-

jective world is in reality a subjective world, that it is the

objectification of the subject. The subject that really

thinks comprehends the world as 'his' world. Everything

in it has its true form only as a 'comprehended* (begrif-

fenes) object, namely, as part and parcel of the develop-

ment of a free self-consciousness. The totality of objects

that make up man's world have to be freed from their

'opposition' to consciousness and must be taken up in such

a way as to assist its development.

Hegel describes thinking in terms of a definite kind of

existence. 'In thinking, I am free, because I am not in

an other, but remain simply and solely in touch with my-

self; and the object ... is in undivided unity my being-

for-myself ; and my procedure in comprehending is a pro-

cedure within myself.' 42 This explanation of freedom

shows that Hegel is connecting this basic concept with the

principle of a particular form of society. He says that he

is free who, in his existence with others, remains solely

with himself, he who holds his existence, as it were, as

his own undisputed property. Freedom is self-sufficiency

and independence of all 'externals,' a state wherein all

externality has been appropriated by the subject. The

fears and anxieties of competitive society, seem to motivate

this idea of freedom, the individual's fear of losing him-

i P. 190. < P. 191.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 11Q

self and his anxiety to preserve and secure his own. It

leads Hegel to give the predominant position to the 'ele-

ment of thought/

Indeed, if freedom consists in nothing but complete

self-sufficiency, if everything that is not entirely mine or

myself restricts my freedom, then freedom can only be

realized in thinking. We must therefore expect Hegel to

treat stoicism as the first historical form of self-conscious

freedom. The stoic mode of existence seems to have over-

come all the restrictions that apply in nature and so-

ciety. 'The essence of this consciousness is to be free, on

the throne as well as in fetters, throughout all the depend-

ence that attaches to its individual existence . . .' 43 Man

is thus free because he 'persistently withdraws from the

movement of existence, from activity as well as endurance,

into the mere essentiality of thought.'

Hegel goes on to say, however, that this is not real free-

dom. It is only the counterpart of 'a time of universal

fear and bondage.' He thus repudiates this false form of

freedom and corrects his statement quoted above. 'Free-

dom in thought takes only pure thought as its truth, but

this lacks the concrete filling of life. It is, therefore, merely

the notion of freedom, not living freedom itself.' 44 The

sections on stoicism 'in which these statements appear show

the play of conflicting elements in his philosophy. He has

demonstrated that freedom rests in the element of

thought; he now insists on an advance from freedom in

thought to 'living freedom.' He states that the freedom

and independence of self-consciousness is therefore but a

transitory stage in the development of mind towards real

freedom. The latter dimension is reached when man aban-

dons the abstract freedom of thought and enters into the

world in full consciousness that it is 'his own' world. The

'hitherto negative attitude 1 of self-consciousness towards

P. 193. " P. 193.

ISO THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

reality 'turns into a positive attitude. So far it has been

concerned merely with its own independence and free-

dom: jfc h^ sought to keep itself "for itself' at the~expense

r itswn actuaTrtrTTT 45 NowPit discov-

ers the world as its own new and real world, which in its

permanence possesses an interest for it/ The subject con-

ceives the world as its own 'presence* and truth; it is cer-

tain of finding only itself there. 4 *

Thisjyocess is thfi^ process^ o^historyitself. "The self-

consciojussubject attains his freedogPnot mthe form oi

the_T buTof theWe, the associated We that first appeared

as^he outcome of the struggle between lordlmd bonds-

ma^ The histoncaljreality of that We Jfinds its actual

fulfillment in th^life of a nation.' 4T .\

We have indicated the subsequent course of the mind in

the first pages of this chapter. At the end of the road, pure

thought again seems to swallow up living freedom: the

realm of 'absolute knowledge' is enthroned above the his-

torical struggle that closed when the French Revolution

was liquidated. The self-certainty of philosophy compre-

hending the world triumphs over the practice that changes

it. We shall see whether this solution was Hegel's last

word.

The foundations of the absolute knowledge that the

Phenomenology of Mind presents as the truth of the world

are given in Hegel's Science of Logic, to which we now

turn.

P. 2*3. * ibid. T p. W i.

V

<*><&<&

The Science of Logic

(1812-16)

THE striking difference between Hegel's Logic and the

traditional logic has often been emphasized in the state-

ment that Hegel replaced the formal by a material logic,

repudiating the usual separation of the categories and

forms of thought from their content. Traditional logic

treated these categories and forms as valid if they were

correctly formed and if their use was in conformity with

the ultimate laws of thought and the rules of the syllogism

no matter what the content to which they were applied.

Contrary to this procedure, Hegel maintained that the

content determines the form of the categories as well as

their validity. 'But it is the nature of the content, and

that alone, which lives and progresses in philosophic cog-

nition, and at the same time it is the inner reflection of

the content which posits and originates its determina-

tions/ * The categories and modes of thought derive from

the process of reality to which they pertain. Their form is

determined by the structure of this process.

It is in this connection that the claim is often made

that Hegel's logic was new. Novelty is supposed to consist

in his use of the categories to express the dynamic of real-

ity. In point of fact, however, this dynamic conception

was not a Hegelian innovation; it occurs in Aristotle's

philosophy where all forms of being are interpreted as

forms and types of movement. Aristotle attempted exact

i Science of Logic, trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, The Mac-

roillan Company, New York 1929, vol. i, p. 36.

lai

122 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL S PHILOSOPHY

philosophical formulation in dynamic terms. Hegel sim-

ply reinterpreted the basic categories of Aristotle's Meta-

physics and did not invent new ones.

We must note in addition that a dynamic philosophy

was enunciated in German philosophy prior to Hegel.

Kant dissolved the static forms of the given reality into a

complex of syntheses of 'transcendental consciousness/

while Fichte endeavored to reduce 'the given* to a spon-

taneous act of the ego. Hegel did not discover the dynamic

of reality, nor was he the first to adapt philosophical cate-

gories to this process. What he did discover and use was a

definite form of dynamic, and the novelty of his logic and

its ultimate significance rest upon this fact. The philosoph-

ical method he elaborated was intended to reflect the

actual process of reality and to construe it in an adequate

form.

With the Science of Logic, we reach the final level of

Hegel's philosophic effort. Henceforward, the basic struc-

ture of his system and its ground concepts remain un-

altered. It might therefore be appropriate briefly to re-

view this structure and these concepts along the lines of

Hegel's exposition of them in the prefaces and the intro-

duction to the Science of Logic.

Sufficient notice has not been given to the fact that

Hegel himself introduces his logic as primarily a critical

instrument. It is, first of all, critical of the view that 'the

material of knowledge exists in and for itself in the shape

of a finished world apart from Thinking/ that it exists as

'something in itself finished and complete, something

which, as far as its reality is concerned, could entirely dis-

pense with thought/ Hegel's first writings have already

shown that his attack on the traditional separation of

thought from reality involves much more than an episte-

mological critique. Such dualism, he thinks, is tantamount

a Ibid., vol. i, p. 54.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 123

to a compliance with the world as it is and a withdrawal

of thought from its high task of bringing the existing

order of reality into harmony with the truth. The separa-

tion of thought from being implies that thought has with-

drawn before the onslaught of 'common sense/ If, then,

truth is to be attained, the influence of common sense must

be swept away and with it the categories of traditional

logic, which are, after all, the philosophical categories of

common sense that stabilize and perpetuate a false reality.

And the task of breaking the hold of common sense be-

longs to the dialectical logic. Hegel repeats over and over

that dialectics has this 'negative' character. The negative

'constitutes the quality of dialectical Reason,' 8 and the

first step 'towards the true concept of Reason' is a 'nega-

tive step'; * the negative 'constitutes the genuine dialectical

procedure.' 5 In all these uses 'negative* has a twofold ref-

erence: it indicates, first, the negation of the fixed and

static categories of common sense and, secondly, the nega-

tive and therefore untrue character of the world designated

by these categories. As we have already seen, negativity is

manifest in the v^ry process of reality, so that nothing that

exists is true in its given form. Every single thing has to

evolve new conditions and forms if it is to fulfill its poten-

tialities.

The existence of things is, then, basically negative; all

exist apart from and in want of their truth, and their

actual movement, guided by their latent potentialities, is

their progress towards this truth. The course of progress,

however, is not direct and unswerving. The negation that

every thing contains determines its very being. The ma-

terial part of a thing's reality is made up of what that

thing is not, of what it excludes and repels as its opposite.

'The one and only thing for securing scientific progress

P. 36. * P. 56. 5 p. 66.

124 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

... is knowledge of the logical precept that Negation is

just as much Affirmation as Negation, or that what is self-

contradictory resolves itself not into nullity, into abstract

Nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its

particular content . . .' 6

Contradiction, or the concrete form of it we are discuss-

ing, the opposition, does not displace the actual identity

of the thing, but produces this identity in the form of a

process in which the potentialities of things unfold. The

law of identity by which traditional logic is guided im-

plies the so-called law of contradiction. A equals A only

in so far as it is opposed to non-4, or, the identity of A

results from and contains the contradiction. A does not

contradict an external non-4, Hegel holds, but a non-4

that belongs to the very identity of A; in other words, A

is ^//-contradictory.

By virtue of the negativity that belongs to its nature

each thing is linked with its opposite. To be what it

really is it must become what it is not. To say, then, that

everything contradicts itself is to say that its essence con-

tradicts its given state of existence. Its proper nature,

which is, in the last analysis, its essence, impels it to 'trans-

gress' the state of existence in which it finds itself and

pass over to another. And not only that, but it must even

transgress the bounds of its own particularity and put it-

self into universal relation with other things. The human

being, to take an instance, finds his proper identity only

in those relations that are in effect the negation of his

isolated particularityin his membership in a group or

social class whose institutions, organization, and values de-

termine his very individuality. The truth of the individ-

ual transcends his particularity and finds a totality of con-

flicting relations in which his individuality fulfills itself.

Pp. 64-5.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 125

We are thus led once more to the universal as the true

form of reality.

The logical form of the universal is the notion. Hegel

says that the truth and essence of things lives in their

notion. The statement is as old as philosophy itself, and

has even seeped into popular language. We say that we

know and hold the truth of things in our ideas about

them. The notion is the idea that expresses their essence,

as distinguished from the diversity of their phenomenal

existence. Hegel draws the consequence of this view.

'When we mean to speak of things, we call the Nature or

essence of them their Concept/ but at the same time we

maintain that the concept 'exists only for thought/ 7 For,

it is claimed, the concept is a universal, whereas all that

exists is a particular. The concept is thus 'merely' a con-

cept and its truth merely a thought. In opposition to this

view, Hegel shows that the universal not only exists, but

that it is even more actually a reality than is the particu-

lar. There is such a universal reality as man or animal,

and this universal in fact makes for the existence of every

individual man or animal. 'Every human individual,

though infinitel^ unique, is so only because he belongs

to the class of man, every animal only because it belongs

to the class of animal. Being-man, or being-animal, is the

Prius of their individuality.' 8 The biological and psycho-

logical processes of the human and animal individual are,

in a strict sense, not its own but those of its species or

kind. When Hegel says that every human individual is

first man, he means that his highest potentialities and his

true existence center in his being-man. Accordingly, the

actions, values, and aims of every particular individual

or group have to be measured up against what man can

and ought to be.

T p. 44. a p. 45 .

126 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

The concrete importance of the conception becomes ob-

vious when contrasted with modern authoritarian ide-

ology in which the reality of the universal is denied, the

better to subjugate the individual to the particular in-

terests of certain groups that arrogate to themselves the

function of the universal. If the individual were nothing

but the individual, there would be no justifiable appeal

from the blind material and social forces that overpower

his life, no appeal to a higher and more reasonable social

ordering. If he were nothing but a member of a particu-

lar class, race, or nation, his claims could not reach beyond

his particular group, and he would simply have to accept

its standards. According to Hegel, however, there is no

particularity whatsoever that may legislate for the indi-

vidual man. The universal itself reserves that ultimate

right.

The content of the universal is preserved in the notion.

If the universal is not just an abstraction but a reality,

then the notion denotes that reality. The formation of the

notion, too, is not an arbitrary act of thinking, but some-

thing that follows the very movement of reality. The for-

mation of the universal, in the last analysis, is a historical

process and the universal a historical factor. We shall see,

in Hegel's Philosophy of History, that the historical de-

velopment from the Oriental to the modern world is con-

ceived as one in which man makes himself the actual sub-

ject of the historical process. Through the negation of

every historical form of existence that becomes a fetter on

his potentialities, man finally gets for himself the self-

consciousness of freedom. The dialectical notion of man

comprehends and includes this material process. This no-

tion therefore cannot be put in a single proposition or a

series of propositions that claims to define the essence of

man in accordance with the traditional law of identity.

The definition requires a whole system of propositions that

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 127

mirror the actual development of mankind. In the differ-

ent parts of the system the essence of man will appear in

different and even contradictory forms. The truth will be

no one of these, but the totality, the concrete develop-

ment of man.

We have outlined the negative aspect of the dialectic.

Its positive aspect consists in its shaping of the universal

through the negation of the particular, in its construction

of the notion. The notion of a thing is 'the Universal im-

manent in it,' 9 immanent because the universal contains

and holds up the proper potentialities of the thing. Dia-

lectical thinking is 'positive because it is the source of the

Universal in which the Particular is comprehended/ 10

The process of dissolving and destroying the common-

sense stability of the world thus results in constructing

'the Universal which is in itself concrete/ concrete, for

it does not exist outside the particular but realizes itself

only in and through the particular, or, rather, in the total-

ity of particulars.

We have taken man as an example of the dialectical

construction of the universal. Hegel, however, demon-

strates the same process for all entities of the objective

and subjective world. The Science of Logic deals with the

general ontological structure these entities have, and not

with their individual concrete existence. For this reason,

the dialectical process in the Logic assumes a most gen-

eral and abstract form. We have already discussed it in

the chapter on the Jenenser Logic. The process of

thought begins with the attempt to grasp the objective

structure of being. In the course of the analysis, this struc-

ture dissolves into a multitude of interdependent 'some-

things/ qualities and quantities. On further analysis

thought discovers that these constitute a totality of an-

P. 45. 10 P. 36. 11 See above, pp. 62 ft.

128 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

tagonistic relations, governed by the creative power of con-

tradiction. These relations appear as the essence of being.

The essence, therefore, emerges as the process that negates

all stable and delimited forms of being and negates as well

the concepts of traditional logic which express these forms.

The categories Hegel uses to unfold this essence compre-

hend the actual structure of being as a unification of op-

posites which requires that reality be interpreted in terms

of the 'subject/ The logic of objectivity thus turns into the

logic of subjectivity which is the true 'notion' of reality.

There are several meanings of the term notion that ap-

pear in the exposition..

1. Notion is the 'essence* and 'nature* of things, 'that

which by thinking is known in and of things' and 'what

is really true in them/ 12 This meaning implies a multi-

tude of notions to correspond to the multitude of things

they denote.

2. Notion designates the rational structure of being,

the world as Logos, reason. In this sense, the notion is

'one, and is the essential basis' and the actual content of

the Logic. 18

3. Notion in its true form of existence is 'the free, inde-

pendent and self-determining Subjective, or rather the

Subject itself/ " It is this sense of the term that Hegel

means when he says, 'TJie character of Subject must be

expressly reserved for the Notion/ "

The Science of Logic opens with the well-known inter-

play of Being and Nothing. Unlike the Phenomenology

of Mind, the Logic does not begin with the data of com-

mon sense, but with the same philosophical concept that

brought the Phenomenology to a close. Thinking, in its

quest for the truth behind the facts, seeks a stable base

for orientation, a universal and necessary law amid the

endless flux and diversity of things. Such a universal, if

P. 55. " P. 48. " P. 75. i P. 7.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 12Q

it is really to be the beginning and the basis for all sub-

sequent determinations, must not itself be determinate,

for otherwise it would be neither first nor the beginning.

The reason it could not be determinate if it is to be a be-

ginning lies in the fact that everything determinate is de-

pendent on that which determines it, and hence is not

prior.

The first and indeterminate universal that Hegel posits

is being. It. is common to all things (for all things are

being), therefore, the most universal entity in the world.

It has no determination whatsoever; it is pure being and

nothing else.

The Logic thus begins, as the whole of Western philos-

ophy began, with the concept of being. The question,

What is Being? sought that which holds all things in ex-

istence and makes them what they are. The concept of

being presupposes a distinction between determinate be-

ing (something; Seiendes) and being-as-such (Seiri), with-

out determinations. 16 Daily language distinguishes being

from determinate being in all the forms of judgment. We

say a rose is a plant; he is jealous; a judgment is true;

God is. The copula 'is* denotes being, but being that is

quite different from a determinate being. The 'is* does

not point to any actual thing that could be made the

subject of a determinate proposition, for in determining

being as such and such a thing, we would have to use

the selfsame 'is* which we are attempting to define, a

patent impossibility. We cannot define being as some

thing since being is the predicate of every thing. In other

words, every thing is, but being is not some thing. And

what is not some thing is nothing. Thus, being is 'pure

indeterminateness and vacuity'; it is no thing, hence

nothing. 17

In the attempt to grasp being we encounter nothing.

* Sec above, pp. 40 1 1T Science of Logic, vol. i, p. 94.

1JO THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

Hegel uses this fact as an instrumentality to demonstrate

the negative character of reality. In the foregoing anal-

ysis of the concept ef being, being did not 'turn into'

nothing, but both were revealed as identical, so that it

is true to say every determinate being contains the being

as well as the nothing. According to Hegel, there is not a

single thing in the world that does not have in it the to-

getherness of being and nothing. Everything is only in so

far as, at every moment of its being, something that as

yet is not comes into being and something that is now

passes into not-being. Things are only in so far as they

arise and pass away, or, being must be conceived as be-

coming (Werderi). " The togetherness of being and noth-

ing is thus manifest in the structure of all existents and

must be retained in every logical category: 'This unity

of Being and Nothing, as being the primary truth, is, once

and for all, the basis and the element of all that follows:

therefore, besides Becoming itself, all further logical de-

terminations . . . and in short all philosophic concepts,

are examples of this unity/

If this is the case, logic has a task hitherto unheard of

in philosophy. It ceases to be the source of rules and forms

for correct thinking. In fact, it takes rules, forms, and all

the categories of traditional logic to be false because they

disregard the negative and contradictory nature of reality.

In Hegel's logic the content of the traditional categories is

completely reversed. Moreover, since the traditional cate-

gories are the gospel of everyday thinking (including ordi-

nary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice, Hegel's

logic in effect presents rules and forms of false thinking

and action false, that is, from the standpoint of common

sense. The dialectical categories construct a topsy-turvy

world, opening with the identity of being and nothing

and closing with the notion as the true reality. Hegel

uibid., p. 118.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 1J1

plays up the absurd and paradoxical character of this

world, but he who follows the dialectical process to the

end discovers that the paradox is the receptacle of the

hidden truth and that the absurdity is rather a quality

possessed by the correct schema of common sense, which,

cleansed of their dross, contains the latent truth. For the

dialectic shows latent in common sense the dangerous im-

plication that the form in which the world is given and

organized may contradict its true content, that is to say,

that the potentialities inherent in men and things may

require the dissolution of the given forms. Formal logic

accepts the world-form as it is and gives some general

rules for theoretical orientation to it. Dialectical logic,

on the other hand, rejects any claim of sanctity for the

given, and shatters the complacency of those living under

its rubric. It holds that 'external existence' is never the

sole criterion of the truth of a content, 19 but that every

form of existence must justify before a higher tribunal

whether it is adequate to its content or not.

Hegel said the negativity of being is 'the basis and the

element* of all that ensues. Progress from one logical cate-

gory to another* is stimulated by an inherent tendency in

every type of being to overcome its negative conditions

of existence and pass into a new mode of being where it

attains its true form and content. We have already noted

that the movement of categories in Hegel's logic is but a

reflection of the movement of being. Moreover, it is not

quite correct to say that one category 'passes into' an-

other. The dialectical analysis rather reveals one category

as another, so that the other represents its unfolded con-

tentunfolded by the contradictions inherent in it.

The first category that participates in this process is

quality. We have seen that all being in the world is de-

terminate; the first task of the logic is to investigate this

i P. 184.

13* THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

determinacy. Something is determinate when it is quali-

tatively distinct from any other being. 'By virtue of its

quality Something is opposed to an Other: it is variable

and finite, and determined as negative, not only in con-

trast with an Other, but simply in itself/ f Every qualita-

tive determination is in itself a limitation and therefore

a negation. Hegel gives this old philosophic statement a

new content in linking it with his negative conception of

reality. 21 A thing exists with a certain quality this means

that it excludes other qualities and finds itself limited by

the ones it has. Moreover, every quality is what it is only

in relation to other qualities, and these relations deter-

mine the very nature of a quality. Thus, the qualitative

determinates of a thing are reduced to relations that dis-

solve the thing into a totality of other things, so that it

exists in a dimension of 'otherness.' For instance, the

table here in this room is, if analyzed for its qualities,

not the table but a certain color, material, size, tool, and

so on. It is, Hegel says, in respect of qualities, not being-

for-itself, but 'being-for-other' (Anderssein, Sein-fur-

Anderes). As against this otherness stands what the thing

is in itself (its being a table), or, as Hegel calls it, its

'Being-in-itself (Ansichseiri). These are the two concep-

tual elements with which Hegel constructs every being.

It must be noted that for Hegel these two elements can-

not be detached from one another. A thing in itself is

what it is only in its relations with others, and, conversely,

its relations with others determine its very existence. The

traditional idea of a thing-in-itself behind phenomena, an

outer world separated from the inner, an essence perma-

nently removed from reality, is rendered absurd by this

conception, and philosophy emerges as definitely joined

to the concrete reality.

We return to our analysis of quality. Determinate being

to P. in. " Sec above, pp. 1*3 f.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 1JJ

is more than the flux of changing qualities. Something pre-

serves itself throughout this flux, something that passes

into other things, but also stands against them as a being

for itself. This something can exist only as the product

of a process through which it integrates its otherness with

its own proper being. Hegel says that its existence comes

about through 'the negation of the negation.' 22 The first

negation is the otherness in which it turns, and the sec-

ond is the incorporation of this other into its own self.

Such a process presupposes that things possess a certain

power over their movement, that they exist in a certain

self-relation that enables them to 'mediate* their existen-

tial conditions. 28 Hegel adds that this concept of mediation

is 'of the utmost importance* because it alone overcomes

the old metaphysical abstractions of Substance, Entelechy,

Form, and so on, and, by conceiving the objective world

as the development of the subject, paves the way for a

philosophical interpretation of concrete reality.

Hegel attributes to the thing a permanent relation to

itself. 'Something is in itself in so far as it has returned

to itself from Being-for-Other.' 24 It is then an 'intro-

reflected' being. Intro-reflection is a characteristic of the

subject, however, and in this sense the objective 'some-

thing* is already 'the beginning of the subject/ 28 though

only the beginning. For, the process by which the some-

thing sustains itself is blind and not free; the thing can-

not manoeuver the forces that shape its existence. The

'something' is hence a low level of development in the

process that culminates in a free and conscious subject.

'Something determines itself as Being-for-Self and so on,

till finally, as Notion, it receives the concrete intensity

of the subject.' M

M Science of Logic, vol. i, p. ia8. "P. 128.

2> Pp. 1x7-8. 2 Ibid.

* P. 13*.

134 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

Hegel continues by pointing out that the thing's unity

with itself, which is the basis for its determinate states,

is really something negative, because it results from the

'negation of the negation.' The objective thing is deter-

mined; it passes into a new mode of being by suffering

the action of manifold natural forces; hence, the 'negative

unity' that it has is not a conscious or active unity, but a

mechanical one. Owing to its lack of real power, the thing

simply 'collapses into that simple unity which is Being,' 2T

a unity that is not the result of a self-directed process of

its own. The thing, engaged though it is in continuous

transitions into other things and states, is subject to change

and not the subject of change.

The sections that follow outline the manner in which

the unity of a thing may develop. They are difficult to un-

derstand because Hegel applies to the objective world

categories that find their verification only in the life of

the subject. Concepts like determination, mediation, self-

relation, ought, and so on, anticipate categories of sub-

jective existence. Hegel nevertheless uses them to charac-

terize the world of objective things, analyzing the existence

of things in terms of the existence of the subject. The

net result is that objective reality is interpreted as the field

in which the subject is to be realized.

Negativity appears as the differ ence between being-for-

other and being-for-self within the unity of the thing. The

thing as it is 'in itself is different from the conditions in

which it actually exists. The actual conditions of the

thing 'oppose' or stand in the way of its working out its

proper nature. This opposition Hegel denotes as that be-

tween determination (Bestimmung), which now takes on

the meaning of the 'proper nature' of the thing, and

talification (Beschaffenheit), which refers to the actual

state or condition of the thing. The determination of a

" P. 1*8.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 1J5

thing comprises its inherent potentialities 'as against the

external conditions which are not yet incorporated in the

thing itself/ 28

When, for instance, we speak of the determination of

man, and say that that determination is reason, we imply

that the external conditions in which man lives do not

agree with what man properly is, that his state of exist-

ence is not reasonable and that it is man's task to make

it so. Until the task is successfully completed, man ex-

ists as a being-for-other rather than a being-for-self. His

talification contradicts his determination. The presence

of the contradiction makes man restive; he struggles to

overcome his given external state. The contradiction thus

has the force of an 'Ought* (Solleri) that impels him to

realize that which does not as yet exist.

As we have said, the objective world, too, is now treated

as a participant in the same kind of process. The thing's

transition from one talification to another, and even its

passage into another thing, are interpreted as motivated

by the thing's own potentialities. Its transformation does

not occur, as first appeared, 'according to its Being-for-

other,' but according to its proper self. 29 Within the proc-

ess of change, every external condition is taken into the

thing's proper being, and its other is 'posited in the thing

as its own moment.' 80 The concept of negation, too, un-

dergoes revision in Hegel's exposition at this point. We

have seen that the various states of a thing were inter-

preted as various 'negations' of its true being. Now, since

the thing is conceived as a kind of subject that determines

itself through its relations to other things, its existent

qualities or talifications are barriers or limits (Grenzen)

through which its potentialities must break. The process

of existence is simply the contradiction between talifica-

tions and potentialities; hence, to exist and to be limited

38 P. 136. 2 P. 137. 80 p. jjS.

136 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

are identical. 'Something has its Determinate Being only

in Limit* 31 and the 'Limits are the principle of that

which they limit.'

Hegel summarizes the result of this new interpretation

by saying that the existence of things is 'the unrest of

Something in its Limit; it is immanent in the Limit to be

the contradiction which sends Something on beyond it-

self/ 82 We have herewith reached Hegel's concept of fini-

tude. Being is continuous becoming. Every state of exist-

ence has to be surpassed; it is something negative, which

things, driven by their inner potentialities, desert for an-

other state, which again reveals itself as negative, as limit.

When we say of things that they are finite, we mean thereby

. . . that Not-Being constitutes their nature and their Being.

Finite things are; but their relation to themselves is that they

are related to themselves as something negative, and in this

self-relation send themselves on beyond themselves and their

Being. They are, but the truth of this Being is their end. The

finite does not only change, ... it perishes; and its perishing

is not merely contingent, so that it could be without perish-

ing. It is rather the very being of finite things that they con-

tain the seeds of perishing as their own Being-in-Self [Insich-

seiri], and the hour of their birth is the hour of their death. 88

These sentences are a preliminary enunciation of the

decisive passages in which Marx later revolutionized West-

ern thought. Hegel's concept of finitude freed philosophic

approaches to reality from the powerful religious and

theological influences that were operative even upon secu-

lar forms of eighteenth-century thought. The current

idealistic interpretation of reality in that day still held

the view that the world was a finite one because it was a

created world and that its negativity referred to its sinful-

ness. The struggle against this interpretation of 'negative'

was therefore in large measure a conflict with religion

" P. 140. *a Pp. 140-41. ss p. 142.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 137

and the church. Hegel's idea of negativity was not moral

or religious, but purely philosophical, and the concept of

finitude that expressed it became a critical and almost

materialistic principle with him. The world, he said, is

finite not because it is created by God but because finitude

is its inherent quality. Correspondingly, finitude is not an

aspersion on reality, requiring the transfer of its truth to

some exalted Beyond. Things are finite in so far as they

are, and their finitude is the realm of their truth. They

cannot develop their potentialities except by perishing.

Marx later laid down the historical law that a social

system can set free its productive forces only by perishing

and passing into another form of social organization.

Hegel saw this law of history operative in all being. 'The

highest maturity or stage which any Something can reach

is that in which it begins to perish/ 84 It is clear enough

from the preceding discussion that when Hegel turned

from the concept of finitude to that of infinity he could

not have had reference to an infinity that would annul

the results of his previous analysis, that is, he could not

have meant an infinity apart from or beyond finitude.

The concept of thte infinite, rather, had to result from a

stricter interpretation of finitude.

As a matter of fact, we find that the analysis of ob-

jective things has already taken us from the finite to the

infinite. For the process in which a finite thing perishes

and, in perishing, becomes another finite thing, which

repeats the same, is in itself a process ad infinitum, and

not only in the superficial sense that the progression can-

not be broken. When a finite thing 'perishes into* another

thing, it has changed itself, inasmuch as perishing is its

way of consummating its true potentialities. The inces-

sant perishing of things is thus an equally continuous ne-

gation of their finitude. It is infinity. 'The finite in perish-

* Vol. ii, p. 246.

138 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

ing, in this negation of its self, has reached its Being-in-

Self [Ansichsein], and therefore has gained its proper self

. . . Thus it passes beyond itself only to find itself again.

This self-identity, or negation of negation, is affirmative

Being, is the other of the Finite, ... is the Infinite/ 85

The infinite, then, is precisely the inner dynamic of

the finite, comprehended in its real meaning. It is noth-

ing else but the fact that fmitude 'exists only as a passing

beyond' itself. 86

In an addendum to his exposition Hegel shows that the

concept of finitude yields the basic principle of idealism.

If the being of things consists in their transformation

rather than in their state of existence, the manifold states

they have, whatever their form and content may be, are

but moments of a comprehensive process and exist only

within the totality of this process. Thus, they are of an

'ideal' nature and their philosophical interpretation must

be idealism. 87 'The proposition that the finite is of ideal

nature constitutes Idealism, In philosophy idealism con-

sists of nothing else than the recognition that the finite

has no veritable being. Essentially every philosophy is an

idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle . . .' 88

For, philosophy starts when the truth of the given state

of things is questioned and when it is recognized that

that state has no final truth in itself. To say 'that the finite

has no veritable being' does not mean that the true being

must be sought in a transmundane Beyond or in the in-

most soul of man. Hegel rejects such flight from reality

as 'bad idealism.' His idealistic proposition implies that the

current forms of thought, just because they stop short at

the given forms of things, must be changed into other

88 Vol. I, p. 149. 88 P. ^9.

37 Hegel employs the original historical sense of 'ideal.' An existent is

'of an ideal nature' if it exists not through itself, but through something

else.

P. 1 68.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 1$9

forms until the truth is reached. Hegel embodies this es-

sentially critical attitude in his concept of ought. The

'ought* is not a province of morality or religion, but of

actual practice. Reason and law inhere in finitude, they

not only ought to, but must be realized on this earth.

'In actual fact, Reason and Law are at no such sorry pass

as that they merely "ought" to be; . . .nor yet is Ought

in itself perpetual, nor finitude (which would be the

same) absolute/ 89 The negation of finitude is at the same

time the negation of the infinite Beyond; it involves the

demand that the 'ought* be fulfilled in this world.

Accordingly, Hegel contrasts his concept of infinity with

the theological idea of it. There is no reality other than

or above the finite; if finite things are to find their true

being, they must find it through their finite existence and

through it alone. Hegel calls his concept of infinity, there-

fore, the very 'negation of that beyond which is in itself

negative/ His infinite is but the 'other' of the finite and

therefore dependent on finitude; it is in itself a finite

infinity. There are not two worlds, the finite and the in-

finite. There is only one world, in which finite things at-

tain their self-determination through perishing. Their in-

finity is in this world and nowhere else.

Conceived as the 'infinite* process of transformation,

the finite is the process of being-for-self (Fursichseiri). A

thing is for itself, we say, when it can take all its external

conditions and integrate them with its proper being. It is

'for itself if it 'has passed beyond the Barrier and its

Otherness in such a manner that, thus negating them, it

is infinite return upon itself/ 40 Being-for-itself is not a

state but a process, for every external condition must con-

tinuously be transformed into a phase of self-realization,

and each new external condition that arises must be sub-

jected to this treatment. Self-consciousness, Hegel says, is

99 P. 149. 40 P. iyi.

140 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

the 'nearest example of the presence of infinity/ On the

other hand, 'natural things never attain a free Being-for-

self; they remain being-for-other. 41

This essential difference between the object's mode of

existence and that of a conscious being results in limiting

the term 'finite* to things that do not exist for themselves

and do not have the power, therefore, to fulfill their po-

tentialities through their own free, conscious acts. Owing

to their lack of freedom and consciousness, their manifold

qualities are 'indifferent* to them, 42 and their unity is a

quantitative unit rather than a qualitative unity. 4 '

We shall omit the discussion of the category of quantity

and turn directly to the transition from being to essence,

which brings the First Book of the Science of Logic to a

close. The analysis of quantity discloses that quantity is

not external to the nature of a thing but is itself a qual-

ity, namely, measure (Mass). The qualitative character of

quantity finds expression in Hegel's famous law that quan-

tity passes into quality. Something might change in quan-

tity without the slightest change in quality, so that its na-

ture or properties remain one and the same, while it in-

creases or diminishes in a given direction. Everything 'has

some play within which it remains indifferent to this

change . . .' 4 * There comes a point, however, at which

the nature of a thing alters with a mere quantitative

change. The well-known examples of a heap of grain

which ceases to be a heap if one grain after the other is

removed, or of water which becomes ice when a gradual

decrease of temperature has reached a certain point, or

of a nation which, in the course of its expansion, suddenly

breaks down and disintegrates: all these examples do not

*i Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 96, Addition (The Logic

of Hegel, trans. W. Wallace, Oxford 1892, p. 179).

Science of Logic, vol. I, p. 192.

"P. 199-

"P. 387-

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 141

cover the full meaning of Hegel's proposition. We must

understand also that he aimed it against the ordinary view

that the process of 'arising and passing away' was a grad-

ual (allmdhlich) one, he aimed it at the view that natura

non facit saltum. 46

A given form of existence cannot unfold its content

without perishing. The new must be the actual negation

of the old and not a mere correction or revision. To be

sure, the truth does not drop full-blown from heaven,

and the new must somehow have existed in the lap of

the old. But it existed there only as potentiality, and its

material realization was excluded by the prevailing form

of being. The prevailing form has to be broken through.

'The changes of Being' are 'a process of becoming other

which breaks off graduality and is qualitatively other as

against the preceding state of existence.' 46 There is no

even progress in the world: The appearance of every new

condition involves a leap; the birth of the new is the

death of the old.

The Science of Logic opened with the question, What

is Being? It set afoot the quest for categories that could

enable us to gra$p the truly real. In the course of the

analysis, the stability of being was dissolved into the

process of becoming and the enduring unity of things

was seen to be a 'negative unity,' which could not be

known from quantitative or qualitative aspects but rather

involved the negation of all qualitative and quantitative

determinates. For, every determinate property was seen

to contradict what things are 'for themselves.' Whatever

the enduring unity of being 'for itself may be, we know

that it is not a qualitative or quantitative entity that ex-

ists anywhere in the world, but is rather the negation of

all determinates. Its essential character is therefore nega-

tivity; Hegel calls it also 'universal contradiction/ existing

"P.389-

142 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL*S PHILOSOPHY

as it does 'by the negation of every existing determinate-

ness/ 4T It is 'absolute negativity' or 'negative totality.' 48

This unity, it appears, is such by virtue of a process wherein

things negate all mere externality and otherness and relate

these to a dynamic self. A thing is for itself only when it

has posited (gesetzt) all its determinates and made them

moments of its self-realization, and is thus, in all changing

conditions, always 'returning to itself.' * Hegel calls this

negative unity and process of self-relation the essence of

things.

The question What is Being? is answered in the state-

ment that 'the truth of Being is Essence.' 50 And to learn

what essence is, we have merely to collect the results of

the preceding analysis:

1. The essence has 'no determinate Being.' 51 All the

traditional proposals about a realm of ideas or substances

have to be discarded. The essence is neither something in

nor something above the world, but rather the negation

of all being.

2. This negation of all being is not nothing, but the

'infinite movement of Being' beyond every determinate

state.

3. The movement is not a contingent and external

process, but one held together by the power of self-relation

through which a subject posits its determinates as mo-

ments of its own self-realization.

4. Such a power presupposes a definite being-in-self, a

capacity for knowing and reflecting upon the determinate

states. The process of the essence is the process of reflec-

tion.

5. The subject that the essence reveals itself to be is

not outside the process nor is it its unchangeable sub-

stratum; it is the very process itself, and all its characters

4T * 394- 48 P- 4<>5- 49 P. 404- co Vol. ii, p. 16. i P. 17.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 143

are dynamic. Its unity is the totality of a movement that

the Doctrine of Essence describes as the movement of re-

flection.

It is of the utmost importance to know that for Hegel

reflection, like all the characters of essence, denotes an

objective as well as subjective movement. Reflection is

not primarily the process of thinking but the process

of being itself. 52 Correspondingly, the transition from

being to essence is not primarily a procedure of philo-

sophical cognition, but a process in reality. Being's 'own

nature* 'causes it to internalize itself/ and being, thus 'en-

tering into itself becomes Essence/ This means that ob-

jective being, if comprehended in its true form, is to be

understood as, and actually is, subjective being. The sub-

ject now appears as the substance of being, or being per-

tains to the existence of a more or less conscious subject,

which is capable of facing and comprehending its determi-

nate states and thus has the power to reflect upon them and

shape itself. The categories of the essence cover the whole

realm of being, which now manifests itself in its true,

comprehended form. The categories of the Doctrine of

Being reappear; determinate being is now conceived as

existence and later as actuality; the 'something 1 as thing

and later as substance, and so on.

Reflection is the process in which an existent consti-

tutes itself as the unity of a subject. It has an essential

unity that contrasts with the passive and changeable unity

of the something; it is not determinate but determining

being. All determination is here 'posited by the Essence

itself and stands under its determining power.

If we examine what Hegel attributes to the process of

essence and what he discusses under the heading of Deter-

minations of Reflection, we find the traditional ultimate

laws of thought, the laws of identity, variety, and contra-

M Vol. II, p. l6.

144 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

diction. Added under a separate head is the law of ground.

The original meaning of these laws and their actual ob-

jective content was a discovery made by the Hegelian

logic. Formal logic cannot even touch their sense; the

separation of the subject matter of thought from its form

cuts the very ground from under truth. Thought is true

only in so far as it remains adapted to the concrete move-

ment of things and closely follows its various turns. As

soon as it detaches itself from the objective process and,

for the sake of some spurious precision and stability, tries

to simulate mathematical rigor, thought becomes untrue.

Within the Science of Logic, it is the Doctrine of Essence

that provides the basic concepts that emancipate dialec-

tical logic from the mathematical method. Hegel under-

takes a philosophic critique of mathematical method be-

fore he introduces the Doctrine of Essencein his discus-

sion of quantity. Quantity is only a very external charac-

teristic of being, a realm in which the real content of

things gets lost. The mathematical sciences that operate

with quantity operate with a content-less form that can be

measured and counted and expressed by indifferent num-

bers and symbols. But the process of reality cannot be so

treated. It defies formalization and stabilization, because

it is the very negation of every stable form. The facts and

relations that appear in this process change their nature at

every phase of the development. 'Our knowledge would be

in a very awkward predicament if such objects as freedom,

law, morality, or even God himself, because they cannot

be measured and calculated, or expressed in a mathe-

matical formula, were to be reckoned beyond the reach

of exact knowledge, and we had to put up with a vague

generalized image of them . . .' M Since it is not only

philosophy but every other true field of inquiry that aims

68 Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 99, Addition (The Logic

of Hegel, trans. W. Wallace, p. 187).

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 145

at knowledge of such contents, the reduction of science to

mathematics means the final surrender of truth:

When mathematical categories are used to determine some-

thing bearing upon the method or content of philosophic sci-

ence, such a procedure proves its preposterous nature chiefly

herein, that, in so far as mathematical formulae mean thoughts

and conceptual distinctions, such meaning must first report,

determine and justify itself in philosophy. In its concrete sci-

ences, philosophy must take the logical element from logic

and not from mathematics; it must be a mere refuge of philo-

sophic impotence when it flies to the formations which logic

takes in other sciences, of which many are only dim presenti-

ments and others stunted forms of it, in order to get logic for

philosophy. The mere employment of such borrowed forms is

in any case an external and superficial procedure: a knowl-

edge of their worth and of their meaning should precede their

use; but such knowledge results only from conceptual contem-

plation, and not from the authority which mathematics gives

them. 54

The Doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate knowledge

from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the scien-

tific common sense that imposes this worship. Mathemati-

cal formalism abandons and prevents any critical under-

standing and use of facts. Hegel recognized an intrinsic

connection between mathematical logic and a wholesale

acquiescence in facts, and to this extent anticipated more

than a hundred years of the development of positivism.

The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about

things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them

as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowl-

edge deals with appearances in order to get beyond them.

'Everything, it is said, has an Essence, that is, things really

are not what they immediately show themselves. There is

therefore something more to be done than merely rove

from one quality to another and merely to advance from

** Science of Logic, op. tit., vol. i, p. 331.

146 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

qualitative to quantitative, and vice versa; there is a per-

manent in things, and that permanent is in the first in-

stance their Essence/ 55 The knowledge that appearance

and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The

mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish

the essential from the apparent process of reality and to

grasp their relation. The laws of reflection that Hegel

elaborates are the fundamental laws of the dialectic. We

pass now to a brief summary of these.

Essence denotes the unity of being, its identity through-

out change. Precisely what is this unity or identity? It is

not a permanent and fixed substratum, but a process

wherein everything copes with its inherent contradictions

and unfolds itself as a result. Conceived in this way, iden-

tity contains its opposite, difference, and involves a self-

differentiation and an ensuing unification. Every existence

precipitates itself into negativity and remains what it is

only by negating this negativity. It splits up into a diver-

sity of states and relations to other things, which are

originally foreign to it, but which become part of its

proper self when they are brought under the working

influence of its essence. Identity is thus the same as the

'negative totality/ which was shown to be the structure

of reality; it is 'the same as Essence/ 86

Thus conceived, the essence describes the actual process

of reality. 'The contemplation of everything that is shows,

in itself, that in its self-identity it is self-contradictory and

self-different, and in its variety or contradiction, self*iden-

tical; it is in itself this movement of transition of one of

these determinations into the other, just because each in

itself is its own opposite/ "

Hegel's position involves complete reversal of the tra-

** Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 112, Addition (The

Logic of Hegel, trans. W. Wallace, p. ao8).

w Science of Logic, vol. 11, p. 38.

BT ibid.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 147

ditional laws of thought and of the kind of thinking de-

rived from them. We cannot express this identity of things

in a proposition that distinguishes a permanent substratum

and its attributes from its opposite or contrary. The va-

riety and the opposites are for Hegel part of the thing's

essential identity, and, to grasp the identity, thought has

to reconstruct the process by which the thing becomes its

own opposite and then negates and incorporates its oppo-

site into its own being.

Hegel returns time and again to accent the importance

of this conception. By virtue of the inherent negativity

in them, all things become self-contradictory, opposed

to themselves, and their being consists in that 'force which

can both comprehend and endure Contradiction.' 58 'All

things are contradictory in themselves' this proposition,

which so sharply differs from the traditional laws of iden-

tity and contradiction, expresses for Hegel 'the truth and

essence of things.' 59 'Contradiction is the root of all move-

ment and life,' all reality is self-contradictory. Motion es-

pecially, external movement as well as self-movement, is

nothing but 'existing contradiction.' 60

Hegel's analysis of the Determinations of Reflection

marks the point at which dialectical thinking can be seen

to shatter the framework of the idealist philosophy that

uses it. So far, we note that the dialectic has-yielded the

conclusion that reality is contradictory in character and a

'negative totality.' As far as we have penetrated into the

Hegelian logic, dialectic has appeared as a universal onto-

logical law, which asserts that every existence runs its

course by turning into the opposite of itself and produc-

ing the identity of its being by working through the op-

position. But a closer study of the law reveals historical

implications that bring forth its fundamentally critical

motivations. If the essence of things is the result of such

8i Vol. ii. p. 68. P. 66. eo p. 67.

148 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

process, the essence itself is the product of a concrete de-

velopment, 'something which has become [ein Gewor-

denes]. 9 61 And the impact of this historical interpretation

shakes the foundations of idealism.

It may very well be that the developed antagonisms of

modern society impelled philosophy to proclaim contra-

diction to be the 'definite fundamental basis of all activ-

ity and self-movement.' Such an interpretation is fully

supported by the treatment accorded decisive social rela-

tionships in Hegel's earlier system (for example, in the

analysis of the labor process, the description of the con-

flict between the particular and the common interest, the

tension between state and society). There, the recognition

of the contradictory nature of social reality was prior to

the elaboration of the general theory of the dialectic.

But in any case, when we do apply the Determinations

of Reflection to historical realities, we are driven almost

of necessity to the critical theory that historical material-

ism developed. For, what does the unity of identity and

contradiction mean in the context of social forms and

forces? In its ontological terms, it means that the state of

negativity is not a distortion of a thing's true essence, but

its very essence itself. In socio-historic terms, it means that

as a rule crisis and collapse are not accidents and external

disturbances, but manifest the very nature of things and

hence provide the basis on which the essence of the exist-

ing social system can be understood. It means, moreover,

that the inherent potentialities of men and things cannot

unfold in society except through the death of the social

order in which they are first gleaned. When something

turns into its opposite, Hegel says, when it contradicts it-

self, it expresses its essence. When, as Marx says, the cur-

rent idea and practice of justice and equality lead to in-

justice and inequality, when the free exchange of equiva-

ip. fit.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 149

lents produces exploitation on the one hand and accumu-

lation of wealth on the other, such contradictions, too, are

of the essence of current social relations. The contradic-

tion is the actual motor of the process.

The Doctrine of Essence thus establishes the general

laws of thought as laws of destruction destruction for the

sake of the truth. Thought is herewith installed as the

tribunal that contradicts the apparent forms of reality in

the name of their true content. The essence, 'the truth

of Being/ is held by thought, which, in turn, is contra-

diction.

According to Hegel, however, the contradiction is not

the end. The essence, which is the locus of the contradic-

tion, must perish and 'the contradiction resolve itself/ fl2

It is resolved in so far as the essence becomes the ground

of existence. The essence, in becoming the ground of

things, passes into existence. 68 The ground of a thing, for

Hegel, is nothing other than the totality of its essence,

materialized in the concrete conditions and circumstances

of existence. The essence is thus as much historical as

ontological. The essential potentialities of things realize

themselves in the lame comprehensive process that estab-

lishes their existence. The'essence can 'achieve* its existence

when the potentialities of things have ripened in and

through the conditions of reality. Hegel describes this

process as the transition to actuality.

Whereas the preceding analysis was guided by the fact

that the proper potentialities of things cannot be realized

2 Vol. II. p. 60.

Ibid., pp. 70-73: Hegel explains this relation in his analysis of the

Law of Ground. His discussion has a twofold aim: (i) It shows the Es-

sence operative in the actual existence of things; and (*) it cancels the

traditional conception of the Ground as a particular entity or form among

others. Hegel acknowledges that the 'principle of sufficient reason Tor

Ground]' implies the critical view that Being 'in its immediacy is de-

clared to be invalid and essentially to be something posited.' He holds,

however, that the reason or Ground for a particular being cannot be

sought in another likewise particular being.

150 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

within the prevailing forms of existence, the analysis of

actuality discloses that form of reality in which these po-

tentialities have come into existence. Essential determina-

tions do not here remain outside of things, in the shape of

something that ought to be but is not, but are now ma-

terialized in their entirety. Despite this general advance

embodied in the concept of actuality, Hegel describes ac-

tuality as a process totally permeated by conflict between

possibility and reality. The conflict, however, is no longer

an opposition between existent and as yet non-existent

forces, but between two antagonistic forms of reality that

co-exist.

A close study of actuality reveals that it is first con-

tingency (Zufalligkeit). That which is is not what it is of

necessity; it might exist in some other form as well. Hegel

does not refer to some empty logical possibility. The mul-

titude of possible forms is not arbitrary. There is a defi-

nite relation between the given and the possible. Possible

is only that which can be derived from the very content

of the real. We are here reminded of the analysis previ-

ously made in connection with the concept of reality. The

real shows itself to be antagonistic, split into its being and

its ought. The real contains the negation of what it im-

mediately is as its very nature and thus 'contains . . . Pos-

sibility/ M The form in which the real immediately exists

is but a stage of the process in which it unfolds its content,

or the given reality is 'equivalent to possibility/ 65

The concept of reality has thus turned into the con-

cept of possibility. The real is not yet 'actual/ but is at

first only the possibility of an actual. Mere possibility

belongs to the very character of reality; it is not imposed

by an arbitrary speculative act. The possible and the

real are in a dialectical relation that requires a special

condition in order to be operative, and that condition

* Science of Logic, vol. n, p. 175. Ibid., p. 177.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 151

must be one in fact. For instance, if the existing rela-

tions within a given social system are unjust and in-

human, they are not offset by other realizable possibili-

ties unless these other possibilities are also manifested

as having their roots within that system. They must be

present there, for example, in the form of an obvious

wealth of productive forces, a development of the ma-

terial wants and desires of men, their advanced culture,

their social and political maturity, and so on. In such a

case, the possibilities are not only real ones, but repre-

sent the true content of the social system as against its

immediate form of existence. They are thus an even more

real reality than the given. We may say in such a case

that 'the possibility is reality/ and that the concept of the

possible has turned back into the concept of the real. 66

How can possibility be reality? The possible must be

real in the strict sense that it must exist. As a matter of

fact, the mode of its existence has already been shown.

It exists as the given reality itself taken as something that

has to be negated and transformed. In other words, the

possible is the given reality conceived as the 'condition*

of another reality.* 7 The totality of the given forms of

existence are valid only as conditions for other forms of

existence. 68 This is Hegel's concept of real possibility, set

forth as a concrete historical tendency and force, so as defi-

nitely to preclude its use as an idealistic refuge from real-

ity. Hegel's famous proposition that 'the fact [die Sache]

is before it exists 9 69 can now be given its strict meaning.

Before it exists, the fact 'is* in the form of a condition

within the constellation of existing data. The existing

state of affairs is a mere condition for another constella-

tion of facts, which bring to fruition the inherent poten-

"Ibid.

T Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 146.

Science of Logic, vol. n, p. 179.

P. 105.

152 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

tialities of the given. 'When all the conditions of a fact are

present, it enters into existence/ 70 And at such a time,

also, the given reality is a real possibility for transforma-

tion into another reality. 'The Real Possibility of a case

[einer Sache] is the existing multiplicity of circumstances

which are related to it.' 71 Let us revert to our case of a

social system as yet unrealized. Such a new system is really

possible if the conditions for it are present in the old,

that is, if the prior social form actually possesses a content

that tends towards the new system as to its realization.

The circumstances that exist in the old form are thus

conceived not as true and independent in themselves, but

as mere conditions for another state of affairs that implies

the negation of the former. 'Thus Real Possibility consti-

tutes the totality of conditions; an Actuality . . . which is

the Being-in-Self of some Other . . .' 72 The concept of

real possibility thus develops its criticism of the positivist

position out of the nature of facts themselves. Facts are

facts only if related to that which is not yet fact and yet

manifests itself in the given facts as a real possibility. Or,

facts are what they are only as moments in a process that

leads beyond them to that which is not yet fulfilled in

fact.

The process of 'leading beyond* is an objective tendency

immanent in the facts as given. It is an activity not in

thought but in reality, the proper activity of self-realiza-

tion. For, the given reality holds the real possibilities as

its content, 'contains a duality in itself/ and is in itself

'reality and possibility.' In its totality as well as in its every

single aspect and relation, its content is enveloped in an

inadequacy such that only its destruction can convert its

possibilities into actualities. 'The manifold forms of exist-

To Ibid. up. 179. 72 p. !8o.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 153

ence are in themselves self-transcendence and destruction,

and thus are determined in themselves to be a mere possi-

bility.' 78 The process of destroying existing forms and re-

placing them by new ones liberates their content and per-

mits them to win their actual state. The process in which

a given order of reality perishes and issues into another is,

therefore, nothing but the self-becoming of tfce old real-

ity. 74 It is the 'return 1 of reality to itself, that is, to its

true form. 75

The content of a given reality bears the seed of its

transformation into a new form, and its transformation is

a 'process of necessity/ in the sense that it 'is the sole way

in which a contingent real becomes actual. The dialectical

interpretation of actuality does away with the traditional

opposition between contingency, possibility, and necessity,

and integrates them all as moments of one comprehensive

process. Necessity presupposes a reality that is contingent,

that is, one which in its prevailing form holds possibilities

that are not realized. Necessity is the process in which that

contingent reality attains its adequate form. Hegel calls

this the process of actuality.

Without a grasp of the distinction between reality and

actuality, Hegel's philosophy is meaningless in its decisive

principles. We have mentioned that Hegel did not declare

that reality is rational (or reasonable), but reserved this

attribute for a definite form of reality, namely, actuality.

And the reality that is actual is the one wherein the dis-

crepancy between the possible and the real has been over-

come. Its fruition occurs through a process of change, with

the given reality advancing in accordance with the possi-

bilities manifest in it. Since the new is therefore the freed

truth of the old, actuality is the 'simple positive unity*

of those elements that had existed in disunity within the

T* p. 180. w p. 183. T P. 184.

154 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

old; it is the unity of the possible and the real, which in

the process of transformation 'returns only to itself/ 76

Any purported difference between various forms of the

actual is but an apparent one, because actuality develops

itself in all the forms. A reality is actual if it is preserved

and perpetuated through the absolute negation of all con-

tingencies, in other words, if all its various forms and

stages are but the lucid manifestation of its true content.

In such a reality, the opposition between contingency and

necessity has been overcome. Its process is of necessity,

because it follows the inherent law of its own nature and

remains in all conditions the same. 77 At the same time,

this necessity is freedom because the process is not deter-

mined from outside, by external forces, but, in a strict

sense, is a self-development; all conditions are grasped

and 'posited* by the developing real itself. Actuality thus

is the title for the final unity of being that is no longer

subject to change, because it exercises autonomous power

over all change not simple identity but 'self-identity/ 78

Such a self-identity can be attained only through the

medium of self-consciousness and cognition. For only a

being that has the faculty of knowing its own possibilities

and those of its world can transform every given state of

existence into a condition for its free self-realization. True

reality presupposes freedom, and freedom presupposes

knowledge of the truth. The true reality, therefore, must

be understood as the realization of a knowing subject.

Hegel's analysis of actuality thus leads to the idea of the

subject as the truly actual in all reality.

We have reached the point where the Objective Logic

turns into the Subjective Logic, or, where subjectivity

emerges as the true form of objectivity. We may sum up

Hegel's analysis in the following schema:

w P. 184. f T P. 184. rt P. 186.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 155

The true form of reality requires freedom.

Freedom requires self-consciousness and knowledge of

the truth.

Self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth are the

essentials of the subject.

The true form of reality must be conceived as subject.

We must note that the logical category 'subject* does

not designate any particular form of subjectivity (such as

man) but a general structure that might best be charac-

terized by the concept 'mind/ Subject denotes a universal

that individualizes itself, and if we wish to think of a con-

crete example, we might point to the 'spirit* of a histori-

cal epoch. If we have comprehended such an epoch, if we

have grasped its notion, we shall see a universal principle

that develops, through the self-conscious action of indi-

viduals, in all prevailing institutions, facts, and relations.

The concept of the subject, however, is not the last

step of Hegel's analysis. He now proceeds to demonstrate

that the subject is notion. He has shown that the sub-

ject's freedom consists of its faculty to comprehend what

is. In other words, freedom derives its content from the

knowledge of the truth. But the form in which the

truth is held is the notion. Freedom is, in the last anal-

ysis, not an attribute of the thinking subject as such, but

of the truth that this subject holds and wields. Freedom is

thus an attribute of the notion, and the true form of real-

ity in which the essence of being is realized is the notion.

The notion 'exists/ however, only in the thinking subject.

'The Notion, in so far as it has advanced into such an

existence as is free in itself, is just the Ego, or pure self-

consciousness/ w

Hegel's strange identification of the notion and the ego

"P. 117.

156 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

or subject can be understood only if we bear in mind that

he considers the notion to be the activity of comprehend-

ing (Begreifen) rather than its abstract logical form or re-

sult (Begriff). We are reminded of Kant's transcendental

logic in which the highest concepts of thought are treated

as creative acts of the ego that are ever renewed in the

process of knowledge. 80 Instead of dwelling on Hegel's

elaboration of this point, 81 we shall attempt to develop

some of the implications of his concept of the notion.

According to Hegel, the notion is the subject's activity

and, as such, the true form of reality. On the other hand,

the subject is characterized by freedom, so that Hegel's

Doctrine of the Notion really develops the categories of

freedom. These comprehend the world as it appears when

thought has liberated itself from the power of a 'reified'

reality, when the subject has emerged as the 'substance'

of being. Such liberated thought has eventually overcome

the traditional separation of the logical forms from their

content. Hegel's idea of the notion reverses the ordinary

relation between thought and reality, and becomes the

cornerstone of philosophy as a critical theory. According

to common-sense thinking, knowledge becomes the more

unreal the more it abstracts from reality. For Hegel, the

opposite is true. The abstraction from reality, which the

formation of the notion requires, makes the notion not

poorer but richer than reality, because it leads from the

facts to their essential content. The truth cannot be

gleaned from the facts as long as the subject does not yet

live in them but rather stands against them. The world

of facts is not rational but has to be brought to reason,

that is, to a form in which the reality actually corresponds

to the truth. As long as this has not been accomplished,

the truth rests with the abstract notion and not with the

BO See above, pp. 21 ff.

i Science of Logic, vol. n, pp. 280 ff.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 157

concrete reality. The task of abstraction consists in the

'transcendence and reduction of reality [as from mere ap-

pearance] to the essential, which manifests itself in the

Notion only.* M With the formation of the notion, abstrac-

tion does not desert, but leads into actuality. What nature

and history actually are will not be found in the prevail-

ing facts; the world is not that harmonious. Philosophical

knowledge is thus set against reality, and this opposition

is expressed in the abstract character of the philosophical

notions. 'Philosophy is not meant to be a narrative of

what happens, but a cognition of what is true in happen-

ings, and out of the body of truth it has to comprehend

that which in the narrative appears as mere happening/ 8t

Philosophical cognition is superior to experience and

science, however, only in so far as its notions contain that

relation to truth which Hegel grants only to dialectical

notions. Mere transpassing of the facts does not distinguish

dialectical knowledge from positivistic science. The latter,

too, goes beyond the facts; it obtains laws, makes predic-

tions, and so forth. With all the apparatus of its procedure,

however, positivistjc science stays within the given reali-

ties; the future it predicts, even the changes of form to

which it leads never depart from the given. The form and

content of scientific concepts remain bound up with the

prevailing order of things; they are static in character even

when they express motion and change. Positivist science

also works with abstract concepts. But they originate by

abstraction from the particular and changing forms of

things and fix their common and enduring characters.

The process of abstraction that results in the dialectical

notion is quite different. Here, abstraction is the reduc-

tion of the diverse forms and relations of reality to the

actual process in which they are constituted. The chang-

> P. **. * P. 823.

158 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

ing and the particular are here as important as the com-

mon and enduring. The universality of the dialectical no-

tion is not the fixed and stable sum-total of abstract char-

acters, but a concrete totality that itself evolves the par-

ticular differences of all the facts that belong to this

totality. The notion not only contains all the facts of

which reality is composed, but also the processes in which

these facts develop and dissolve themselves. The notion

thus establishes 'the principle of its distinctions'; 84 the

diverse facts that the notion comprehends are to be shown

as 'inner distinctions' of the notion itself. 88

The dialectical method derives all concrete determina-

tions from one comprehensive principle, which is the prin-

ciple of the actual development of the subject-matter it-

self. The various states, qualities, and conditions of the

subject-matter must appear as its own positive unfolded

content. Nothing can be added from outside (any given

fact, for instance). Dialectical development is not 'the ex-

ternal activity of subjective thought/ but the objective

history of the real itself. 86 Hegel is consequently able to

say that in dialectical philosophy it is 'not we who frame

the notions/ 8T but that their formation is rather an ob-

jective development that we only reproduce.

There is no more adequate example of the formation

of the dialectical notion than Marx's concept of capital-

ism. Just as Hegel, in accordance with the doctrine that

the notion is an antagonistic totality, declares it 'impos-

sible and absurd to frame the truth in such forms as posi-

tive judgment or judgment in general/ 88 Marx, too, re-

pudiates any definitions that fix the truth in a final body

of propositions. The concept of capitalism is no less than

P. 44. SP. 4Q. ** Philosophy of Right, 31.

7 Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 163, Addition a (The

Logic of Hegel, trans. W. Wallace, p. 893).

Science of Logic, vol. 11, p. 829.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 159

the totality of the capitalist process, comprehended in the

'principle* by which it progresses. The notion of capital-

ism starts with the separation of the actual producers from

the means of production, resulting in the establishment of

free labor and the appropriation of surplus value, which,

with the development of technology, brings about the ac-

cumulation and centralization of capital, the progressive

decline of the rate of profit, and the breakdown of the

entire system. The notion of capitalism is no less than the

three volumes of Capital, just as Hegel's notion of the

notion comprises all three books of his Science of Logic.

Moreover, the notion constitutes a 'negative totality/

which evolves only by virtue of its contradictory forces.

The negative aspects of reality are thus not 'disturbances'

or weak spots within a harmonious whole, but the very

conditions that expose the structure and tendencies of

reality. The extraordinary importance of this method be-

comes quite clear when we consider the way Marx con-

ceived the crisis as a material moment of the capitalist

system, so that this 'negative* moment is the fulfillment of

the principle of that system. Crises are necessary stages in

the 'self-differentiation' of capitalism, and the system re-

veals its true content through the negative act of break-

down.

The notion presents an objective totality in which every

particular moment appears as the 'self-differentiation* of

the universal (the principle that governs the totality) and

is therefore itself universal. That is to say, every particular

moment contains, as its very content, the whole, and must

be interpreted as the whole. For explanation, let us again

refer to the field in which dialectical logic has come to

fruition, the theory of society.

Dialectical logic holds that every particular content is

formed by the universal principle that determines the

160 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

movement of the whole. A single human relation, for ex-

ample, that between a father and his child, is constituted

by the fundamental relations that govern the social system.

The father's authority is buttressed by the fact that he is

the provider of the family; the egoistic instincts of com-

petitive society enter his love. The image of his father ac-

companies the adult and guides his submission to the

powers that rule over his social existence. The privacy of

the family relation thus opens and leads into the prevail-

ing social relations, so that the private relation itself un-

folds its own social content. This development proceeds

according to the principle of the 'determinate negation.'

That is to say, the family relation produces its contradic-

tion that destroys its original content, and this contradic-

tion, though dissolving the family, fulfills its actual func-

tion. The particular is the universal, so that the specific

content directly turns into the universal content through

the process of its concrete existence. Here again, dialec-

tical logic reproduces the structure of a historical form

of reality in which the social process dissolves every de-

limited and stable sphere of life into the economic dy-

namic.

Owing to its intrinsic relation to every other particular

moment of the whole, the content and function of every

given aspect changes with every change of the whole. To

isolate and fix the particular moments is therefore impos-

sible. The unbridgeable gulf asserted to exist between

mathematics and dialectical theory rests on this point; this

is why every attempt to frame the truth in mathematical

forms inevitably destroys it. For, mathematical objects

'have the peculiar distinction . . . that they are external

to one another and have a fixed determination. Now if

Notions are taken in this manner, so that they correspond

to such [mathematical] symbols, then they cease to be

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC l6l

Notions. Their determinations are not such dead matters

as numbers and lines, . . . they are living movements;

the different determinateness of one side is also immedi-

ately internal to the other; and what would be a complete

contradiction with numbers and lines is essential to the

nature of the Notion.' 89 The notion, the only adequate

form of the truth, 'can essentially be apprehended only by

Mind ... It is in vain that an attempt is made to fix it

by means of spatial figures and algebraic symbols for the

purpose of the external eye and of a notionless mechanical

treatment or calculus.' 90

The entire doctrine of the notion is perfectly 'realistic'

if it is understood and executed as a historical theory. But,

as we have already hinted, Hegel tends to dissolve the ele-

ment of historical practice and replace it with the inde-

pendent reality of thought. The multitude of particular

notions eventually converge in the notion, which becomes

the one content of the entire Logic. 91 This tendency might

still be reconciled with a historical interpretation if we

regard the notion as representing the final penetration of

the world by reason. Realization of the notion would then

mean the universal mastery, exercised by men having a

rational social organization, over nature a world that

might indeed be imagined as the realization of the notion

of all things. Such a historical conception is kept alive in

Hegel's philosophy, but it is constantly overwhelmed by

the ontological conceptions of absolute idealism. It is ulti-

mately the latter in which the Science of Logic terminates.

We cannot follow the Doctrine of the Notion beyond

the point we have reached. Instead of a brief and neces-

sarily inadequate outline of the Subjective Logic, we have

chosen to attempt a rough interpretation of its closing

paragraphs. They furnish the famous transition from the

P. 251. P. 252. " See below, p. 165 f.

l62 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

Logic to the Philosophy of Nature and Mind, and thus

close the entire range of the system.

THE notion designates the general form of all being, and,

at the same time, the true being which adequately repre-

sents this form, namely, the free subject. The subject ex-

ists, again, in a movement from lower to higher modes of

self-realization. Hegel calls the highest form of this self-

realization the idea. Ever since Plato the idea has meant

the image of the true potentialities of things as against

the apparent reality. It was originally a critical concept,

like the concept of essence, denouncing the security of

common sense in a world too readily content with the

form in which things immediately appeared. The propo-

sition that the true being is the idea and not the reality

thus contains an intended paradox.

For Hegel, who knew of no realm of truth beyond the

world, the idea is actual and man's task is to live in its

actuality. The idea exists as cognition and life. The terms

will offer no more difficulties; since Hegel's earliest writ-

ings, life has stood for the actual form of true being. 92 It

represents the mode of existence that a subject, through

the conscious negation of all otherness, has made its own

free work. Furthermore, life can be such a free work only

by virtue of cognition, since the subject requires the

power of conceptual thinking to dispose over the poten-

tialities of things.

The element of practice is still retained in the conclud-

ing sections of the Logic. The adequate form of the idea

is termed the unity of cognition and action, or 'the iden-

tity of the Theoretical and the Practical Idea.' 98 Hegel

expressly declares that the practical idea, the realization

of 'the Good* that alters the external reality, is 'higher

a Sec above, pp. 57 f . Science of Logic, vol. 11, p. 466.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC l6g

than the Idea of Cognition, ... for it has not only the

dignity of the universal but also of the simply actual.' M

The manner in which Hegel demonstrates this unity

shows, however, that he has made a final transformation

of history into ontology. The true being is conceived as a

perfectly free being. Perfect freedom, according to Hegel,

requires that the subject comprehend all objects, so that

their independent objectivity is overcome. The objective

world then becomes the medium for the self-realization

of the subject, which knows all reality as its own and has

no object but itself. As long as cognition and action still

have an external object that is not yet mastered and is

therefore foreign and hostile to the subject, the subject

is not free. Action is always directed against a hostile world

and, since it implies the existence of such a hostile world,

action essentially restricts the freedom of the subject. Only

thought, pure thought, fulfills the requirements of perfect

freedom, for thought 'thinking* itself is entirely for itself

in its otherness; it has no object but itself. 95

We recall Hegel's statement that 'every philosophy is

an idealism/ We can now understand the critical side of

idealism, which justifies this statement. There is, however,

another aspect of idealism that ties it up with the reality

its critical tendencies strive to overcome. From their ori-

gin, the basic concepts of idealism reflect a social separa-

tion of the intellectual sphere from the sphere of material

production. Their content and their validity had to do

with the power and the faculties of a 'leisure class,' which

became the guardian of the idea by virtue of the fact that

it was not compelled to work for the material reproduc-

tion of society. For, its exceptional status freed this class

from the inhumane relations that the material reproduc-

tion created, and made it capable of transcending them.

M p. 460.

See Philosophy of Right, 4, Addition.

164 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

The truth of philosophy thus became a function of its

remoteness from material practice.

We have seen that Hegel protested this trend in philos-

ophy, considering it the complete abdication of reason.

He spoke for the actual power of reason and for the con-

crete materialization of freedom. But he was frightened

by the social forces that had undertaken this task. The

French Revolution had again shown that modern society

was a system of irreconcilable antagonisms. Hegel recog-

nized that the relations of civil society could, owing to

the particular mode of labor on which they were based,

never provide for perfect freedom and perfect reason. In

this society, man remained subject to the laws of an un-

mastered economy, and had to be tamed by a strong state,

capable of coping with the social contradictions. The final

truth had therefore to be sought in another sphere of real-

ity. Hegel's political philosophy was governed throughout

by this conviction. The Logic also bears the mark of

resignation.

If reason and freedom are the criteria of true being,

and the reality in which they are materialized is marred

by irrationality and bondage, they must again come to

rest in the idea. Cognition thus becomes more than ac-

tion, and knowledge, the knowledge of philosophy, draws

closer to the truth than does the social and political prac-

tice. Although Hegel says that the stage of historical de-

velopment attained at his time reveals that the idea has

become real, it 'exists' as the comprehended world, pres-

ent in thought, as the 'system of science/ This knowledge

is no longer individual, but has the 'dignity* of the 'uni-

versal/ Mankind has become conscious of the world as

reason, of the true forms of all that it is capable of realiz-

ing. Purified as it is of the dross of existence, this system

of science is the flawless truth, the absolute idea.

The absolute idea is not added to the results of the

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC / 165

preceding analysis as a separate supreme entity. It is in

its content, the totality of the concepts that the Logic has

unfolded, and in its form the 'method* that develops this

totality. 'To speak of the absolute idea may suggest the

conception that we are at length reaching the right thing

and the sum of the whole matter. It is certainly possible

to indulge in a vast amount of senseless declamation about

the absolute idea. But its true content is only the whole

system of which we have been hitherto studying the de-

velopment/ 9e Consequently Hegel's chapter on the Abso-

lute Idea gives us a final comprehensive demonstration

of dialectical method. 97 Here, again, it is presented as the

objective process of being, which preserves itself only

through the different modes of the 'negation of the nega-

tion/ It is this dynamic that eventually moves the abso-

lute idea and makes the transition from the Logic to the

Philosophy of Nature and of Mind. The absolute idea is

the true notion of reality and, as such, the highest form

of cognition. It is, as it were, dialectical thought, unfolded

in its totality. However, it is dialectical thought and thus

contains its nega^n; it is not a harmonious and stable

form but a process of unification of opposites, It is not

complete except in its otherness.

The absolute idea is the subject in its final form,

thought. Its otherness and negation is the object, being.

The absolute idea now has to be interpreted as objective

being. Hegel's Logic thus ends where it began, with the

category of being. This, however, is a different being that

can no longer be explained through the concepts applied

in the analysis that opened the Logic. For being now is

understood in its notion, that is, as a concrete totality

wherein all particular forms subsist as the essential dis-

M Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 837. Addition (The

Logic of Hegel, trans. W. Wallace, pp. 374 f.).

f Science of Logic, vol. 11, pp. 468-84.

l66 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

tinctions and relations of one comprehensive principle.

Thus comprehended, being is nature, and dialectical

thought passes on to the Philosophy of Nature.

This exposition covers but one aspect of the transition.

The advance beyond the Logic is not only the methodo-

logical transition from one science (Logic) to another

(Philosophy of Nature), but also the objective transition

from one form of being (the Idea) to another (Nature).

Hegel says that 'the idea freely releases itself into nature,

or, freely 'determines itself as nature. 98 It is this statement,

putting the transition forward as an actual process in

reality, that offers great difficulties in the understanding of

Hegel's system.

We have stressed that dialectical logic links the form

of thought with its content. The notion as a logical form

is at the same time the notion as existing reality; it is a

thinking subject. The absolute idea, the adequate form

of this existence, must therefore contain in itself that dy-

namic which drives it into its opposite, and, through the

negation of this opposite, to its return upon itself. But

how can this free transformation of the absolute idea into

objective being (Nature) and from there into mind be

demonstrated as an actual happening?

At this point, Hegel's Logic resumes the metaphysical

tradition of Western philosophy, a tradition that it had

abandoned in so many of its aspects. Since Aristotle, the

quest for being (as such) had been coupled with the quest

for the veritable being, for that determinate being that

most adequately expresses the characters of being-as-such.

This veritable being was called God. The Aristotelian

ontology culminated in theology," but a theology that had

nothing to do with religion, since it treated the being of

God in exactly the same way that it treated the being of

08 Ibid., p. 486.

9 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book A, 7.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 167

material things. The Aristotelian God is neither the cre-

ator nor judge of the world; his function is purely an onto-

logical, one might even say, mechanical one; he repre-

sents a definite type of movement.

In line with this tradition, Hegel too links his Logic

with theology. He says that the Logic 'shows forth God as

he is in his eternal essence before the creation of Nature

and of a finite Mind/ 10 God in this formula means the

totality of the pure forms of all being, or, the true essence

of being that the Logic unfolds. This essence is realized in

the free subject whose perfect freedom is thought. Up to

this point Hegel's logic follows the pattern of the Aristo-

telian metaphysic. But now, the Christian tradition, in

which Hegel's philosophy was deeply rooted, asserts its

right and prevents the maintenance of a purely ontolog-

ical concept of God. The absolute idea has to be con-

ceived as the actual creator of the world; it has to prove

its freedom by freely releasing itself into its otherness,

that is, nature.

Hegel's view does, however, hold to the rationalistic

tendencies of his philosophy. The true being does not re-

side beyond this world, but exists only in the dialectical

process that perpetuates it. No final goal exists outside

this process that might mark a salvation of the world. As

the Logic depicts it, the world is 'totality in itself, and

contains the pure idea of truth itself.' 1C1 The process of

reality is a 'circle/ showing the same absolute form in all

its moments, namely, the return of being to itself through

the negation of its otherness. Hegel's system thus even

cancels the idea of creation; all negativity is overcome by

the inherent dynamic of reality. Nature achieves its truth

when it enters the domain of history. The subject's devel-

opment frees being from its blind necessity, and nature

100 Science of Logic, vol. i, p. 60. 101 ibid., vol. 11, p. 2*7,

l68 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

becomes a part of human history and thus a part of mind.

History, in its turn, is the long road of mankind to con-

ceptual and practical domination of nature and society,

which comes to pass when man has been brought to rea-

son and to a possession of the world as reason. The index

that such a state has been achieved is, Hegel says, the fact

that the true 'system of science' has been elaborated, mean-

ing his own philosophical system. It embraces the whole

world as a comprehended totality in which all things and

relations appear in their actual form and content, that is,

in their notion. The identity of subject and object,

thought and reality, is there attained.

VI

The Political Philosophy

(1816-1821)

THE first volume of the Science of Logic had appeared

in 1812, the last in 1816. During the four year interim

had come the Prussian 'War of Liberation/ the Holy Al-

liance against Napoleon, the battles of Leipzig and Water-

loo, and the victorious entry of the Allies into Paris. In

1816, Hegel, then principal of a high school in Nurem-

berg, was appointed to a professorship of philosophy at

the University of Heidelberg. The next year, he pub-

lished the first edition of the Encyclopedia of the Philo-

sophical Sciences and was chosen Fichte's successor at the

University of Berlin. This final goal of his academic career

coincides with the end of his philosophical development.

He became the so-called official philosopher of the Prus-

sian state and the philosophical dictator of Germany.

We shall not enter further on an account of Hegel's bi-

ography, since we are not here dealing with his personal

character and motives. The social and political function of

his philosophy, and the affinity between his philosophy

and the Restoration must be accounted for in terms of

the particular situation that modern society found itself

in at the end of the Napoleonic era.

Hegel saw Napoleon as the historical hero fulfilling the

destiny of the French Revolution; he was, thought Hegel,

the one man able to transform the achievements of 1789

into a state order and to connect individual freedom with

the universal reason of a stable social system. It was not

an abstract greatness he admired in Napoleon, but the

169

17O THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL/S PHILOSOPHY

quality of expressing the historical need of the time. Na-

poleon was 'the soul of the world/ in whom the universal

task of the time was embodied. That task was to consoli-

date and preserve the new form of society that stood for

the principle of reason. We know that the principle of

reason in society meant for Hegel a social order built on

the rational autonomy of the individual. Individual free-

dom, however, had assumed the form of brute individ-

ualism; the freedom of each individual was pitted in

life-and-death competitive struggle against that of every

other. The Terror of 1793 exemplified this individualism

and was its necessary outcome. The conflict among feudal

estates had once attested that feudalism was no longer

capable of uniting the individual and the general inter-

est; the pervasive competitive freedom of individuals now

witnessed that middle-class society also was not. Hegel

saw in the sovereignty of the state the one principle that

would bring unity.

Napoleon had to a large extent crushed the vestiges of

feudalism in Germany. The Civil Code was introduced in

many parts of the former German Reich. 'Civil equality,

religious liberty, the abolition of the tithe and of feudal

rights, the sale of ecclesiastic holdings, the suppression

of the guilds, the multiplication of the bureaucracy, and

a "wise and liberal" administration, a constitution that

brought with it the voting of taxes and of laws by the

notables, all these were to weave a network of interest

closely bound with the maintenance of French domina-

tion.' l The absurdly impotent Reich had been replaced

by a number of sovereign states, especially in southern

Germany. These states, to be sure, were only caricature

forms of a modern sovereign state as we know it, but they

nevertheless were a marked advance over the former terri-

i Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon, Paris 1955, p. 4*8.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 171

torial subdivisions of the Reich, which had vainly sought

to accommodate the development of capitalism to the old

order of society. The new states were at least larger eco-

nomic units; they had a centralized bureaucracy, a simpler

system for administering justice, and a more rational

method of taxation under some kind of public control.

These innovations seemed to be in line with Hegel's de-

mand for a more rational ordering of political forms to

permit the development of the new intellectual and ma-

terial forces unleashed by the French Revolution, and it

is no wonder, therefore, that he at first viewed the struggle

against Napoleon as a reactionary opposition. His refer-

ence to the 'War of Liberation* is, therefore, contemptu-

ous and ironical. He went so far, in fact, that he could

not acknowledge the defeat of Napoleon as final even

after the Allies had triumphantly entered Paris.

Typical of Hegel's attitude to the political events of

these years are the utterances in his lectures (1816) in

which he defiantly emphasizes the purely intellectual val-

ues as against the actual political interests:

We may hope that* in addition to the State, which has swal-

lowed up all other interests in its own, the Church may now

resume her high position that in addition to the kingdom of

the world to which all thoughts and efforts have hitherto been

directed, the Kingdom of God may also be considered. In

other words, along with the business of politics and the other

interests of every-day life, we may trust that Science, the free

rational world of mind, may again flourish. 2

Truly, this was a strange attitude. The political philoso-

pher who but one year later became the official ideologi-

cal spokesman for the Prussian state and then declared

the state's right to be the right of reason itself, now de-

nounces political activity and interprets national libera-

a Lectures on the History of Philosophy t trans. E. S. Haldane, London

1898, pp. xi f.

If* THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

tion to mean freedom for philosophical scholarship. Truth

and reason he now sets far beyond the social and political

whirl, in the realm of pure science.

We shall note that Hegel's new position stayed with

him. As for his shift from a rather anti-nationalist to a

nationalist position, we may recall a similar 'inconsistency*

in the early days of modern philosophical writing. Hobbes,

who may be called the most characteristic philosopher of

the rising bourgeoisie, found his political philosophy

compatible first with the monarchy of Charles I, then

with Cromwell's revolutionary state, and finally with the

Stuart reaction. It was irrelevant to Hobbes whether the

sovereign state assumed the form of a democracy, oli-

garchy, or limited monarchy, as long as it asserted sover-

eignty in its relations with other states and maintained

its own authority in relation to its citizens. So, too, for

Hegel, differences in political form between nations did

not matter so long as the underlying identity of social

and economic relations was uniformly maintained as that

of middle-class society. Modern constitutional monarchy

seemed to him to serve quite well in preserving this eco-

nomic structure. Upon the downfall of the Napoleonic

system in Germany, he consequently was quite willing to

hail the ensuing sovereign monarchy as the genuine heir

of the Napoleonic system.

To Hegel, state sovereignty was a necessary instrument

for preserving middle-class society. For, the sovereign state

would remove the destructive competitive element from

the individuals and make competition a positive interest

of the universal; it would be capable of dominating the

conflicting interests of its members. The point that is

here implied is that where the social system requires the

individual's existence to depend on competition with

others, the only guarantee of at least a limited realiza-

tion of the common interest would be the restriction of

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 173

his freedom within the universal order of the state. Sov-

ereignty of the state thus presupposes international com-

petition among antagonistic political units, the power of

each of which resides essentially in its undisputed author-

ity over its members.

In his published report of 1817 on the debates of the

Estates of Wurttemberg, Hegel's views are entirely dic-

tated by this attitude. Wurttemberg had become a sover-

eign kingdom by act of Napoleon. A new constitution was

necessary to replace the obsolescent semi-feudal system,

and newly acquired territories had to be combined with

the original state so as to form a centralized social and

political whole. The king had drafted such a constitution

and had submitted it to the assembled estates in 1815. The

latter refused to accept it. Hegel, in his strong defense of

the royal draft against the estates' opposition, interpreted

the conflict between the two parties as a struggle between

the old and new social principle, between feudal privilege

and modern sovereignty.

His report shows throughout the guiding thread of the

principle of sovereignty. Napoleon, he says, established

the external sovereignty of the state the historical task

now is to establish its internal sovereignty, an undisputed

authority of the government over its citizens. And this

Fngenders a new conception of the relation of the state

to its members. The idea of the social contract must be

displaced by the idea of the state as an objective whole.

The Jenenser system 8 had repudiated any application of

the social contract to the state. Now, the main theme that

shapes Hegel's philosophy is tLat the state is separate from

socigty^

Out of the irreconcilable conflict of particular inter-

ests, which are the basis of modern society's relations,

a See above, p. 84.

174 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

the inherent mechanisms of this society can produce

no common interest. The universal must be imposed upon

the particulars, as it were, against their will, and the re-

sulting relation between the individuals on the one hand

and the state on the other cannot be the same as that

between individuals. The contract might apply to the lat-

ter, but it cannot hold for the former. For, a contract im-

plies that the contracting parties are 'equally independent

of each other/ Their agreement is but a 'contingent rela-

tion* that originates from their subjective wants. 4 The

state, on the other hand, is an 'objective, necessary rela-

tion/ essentially independent of subjective wants^

/According to Hegel, civil society must finally generate

an authoritarian system, a change that springs from the

economic foundations of that society itself, and serves to

perpetuate its framework. The change in form is sup-

posed to save the threatened content. Hegel, we may re-

call, outlined an authoritarian system when he spoke of

a 'government of discipline* at the conclusion of the

Jenenser system of morality. That government form did

not amount to a new order, but simply imposed a method

on the prevailing system of individualism. Here, again,

in elevating the state above society, Hegel follows the

same pattern. He gives the state the supreme position be-

cause he sees the inevitable effects of the antagonisms

within modern society. The competing individual inter-

ests are incapable of generating a system that would guar-

antee the continuance of the whole, hence an uncontro-

vertible authority must be imposed on them. The gov-

ernment's relation to the people is removed from the

sphere of contract and made 'an original substantial

unity/ 5 The individual bears primarily the relation of

* 'Verhandlungen in der Versammlung der LandsUnde des Kdnigreichs

Wiirttemberg im Jahre 1815 und i8i6/ in Schriften zur Politik und

Rcchtsphilosophie, p. 197.

Ibid., p. 197.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 175

duty to the state and his right is subordinate to this. The

sovereign state takes shape as a disciplinary state./

Its sovereignty, however, must differ from that of the

absolutistic statethe people must become a material pan

of the state power. 6 Since modern economy is founded on

the individual's emancipated activity, his social maturity

must be asserted and encouraged. It is notable in this

connection that Hegel gave special criticism to one point

in the royal constitution, that dealing with the restriction

of suffrage. The king had provided, first, that officials ol

the state as well as members of the army, clergy, and med

ical profession were not to be elected and, secondly, that

a net income of at least 200 florins from realties should

be a prerequisite to suffrage. Hegel declared, on the first

that the consequent exclusion of state officials from the

popular Chamber was extremely dangerous. For it was pre

cisely those who were statesmen by profession and train

ing who would be the ablest defenders of the common

as against the particular interests. Every private business

in this society, he declared, by its very nature sets the

individual against the community.

'Realty owners a$ well as tradesmen and others whc

find themselves in possession of property or of a craft arc

interested in preserving the bourgeois order, but theii

direct aim therein is to preserve their private property/ '

They are prepared and determined to do as little ai

possible for the universal. He adds that this attitude it

not a matter of ethics or of the personal character of some

individuals, but is rooted 'in the nature of the case,' 8 ir

the nature of this social class. It can be counteractec

by a stable bureaucracy as far removed as possible fron

the sphere of economic competition and thus capable oi

serving the state without any interference from privat*

business.

p. 161. *p. 169. p. 170.

176 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

This essential function of bureaucracy in the state is

a material element of Hegel's political thought. Historical

developments have borne out his conclusions, though in

a form quite different from his expectations.

Hegel also repudiates the second restriction of the fran-

chise, that by property qualifications. For property is the

very factor that makes the individual oppose the universal

and follow the ties of his private interest instead. In

Hegel's terminology, property is an 'abstract' qualifica-

tion that has nothing to do with human attributes. The

political influence of the mere quantity of holdings, he

declares, is a negative heritage of the French Revolution;

as a criterion of privileges it must eventually be overcome,

or, at least, must no longer constitute 'the sole condition

for one of the most important political functions/ 9 The

abolition of property qualifications as prerequisites for

political rights would strengthen rather than weaken the

state. For, the strong bureaucracy that would be made

possible would set this state on much firmer ground than

the interests of relatively small proprietors can provide.

Describing the struggle between the king and the

estates in Wurttemberg, Hegel depicts it as that between

'rational State law' (vernunftiges Staatsrecht) and the tra-

ditional code of positive law. 10 Positive law comes down

to an outmoded code of old privileges held to be eternally

valid only because valid for hundreds of years. 'Positive

law/ he argues, 'must rightly perish when it loses that

basis which is the condition of its existence/ lx The old

privileges of the estates have about as much basis in mod-

ern society as have 'sacrificial murder, slavery, feudal des-

potism, and countless other infamies/ M These have been

done with as 'rights/ reason has been a historical reality

ever since the French Revolution. The recognition of the

P. 177. 10 P. 198. 11 P. 199. n Ibid.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 177

rights of man has overthrown old privilege and has laid

down 'the everlasting principles of established legislation,

government, and administration/ 18 At the same time,

the rational order that Hegel is here discussing is grad-

ually stripped of its revolutionary implications and

adapted to the requirements of the society of his time.

It now indicates for him the furthest limits within which

this society can be reasonable without being negated in

principle. He holds up the revolutionary terror of 1793

as brutal warning that the existing order must be pro-

tected with all available means. The princes ought to

know 'as a result of the experiences of the past twenty-five

years, the dangers and horrors connected with the estab-

lishment of new constitutions, and with the criterion of

a reality that conforms to thought.' 14

Hegel generally praised the endeavor to fashion reality

in accordance with thought. This was man's highest privi-

lege and the sole way to materialize the truth. But when

such an attempt threatened the very society that originally

hailed this as man's privilege, Hegel preferred to main-

tain the prevailing order under all circumstances. We may

again cite Hobbes to show how anxiety for the existing

order unites even the most disparate philosophies: 'The

state of man can never be without some incommo'dity or

other,' but 'the greatest, that in any form of government

can possibly happen to the people in general, is scarce

sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calami-

ties, that accompany a civil war . . .' 'The present ought

always to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best;

because it is against both the law of nature, and the di-

vine positive law, to do anything tending to the subver-

sion thereof .' 15

p. 185. Kpp. 161-9.

IB Hobbes, Leviathan, in Works, edited by Molesworth, vol. in, pp. 170,

548.

178 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

It is not an inconsistency in Hegel's system that indi-

vidual freedom is thus overshadowed by the authority

vested in the universal, and that the rational finally comes

forward in the guise of the given social order. The ap-

parent inconsistency reflects the historical truth and

mirrors the course of the antagonisms of individualist so-

ciety, which turn freedom into necessity and reason into

authority. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, to a considerable

extent, owes its relevance to the fact that its basic con-

cepts absorb and consciously retain the contradictions of

this society and follow them to the bitter end. The work

is reactionary in so far as the social order it reflects is

so, and progressive in so far as it is progressive.

Some of the gravest misunderstandings that obscure the

Philosophy of Right can* be removed simply by consider-

ing the place of the work in Hegel's system. It does not

treat with the whole cultural world, for the realm of

right is but a part of the realm of mind, namely, that

part which Hegel denotes as objective mind. It does not,

in short, expound or deal with the cultural realities of

art, religion, and philosophy, which embody the ultimate

truth for Hegel. The place that the Philosophy of Right

occupies in the Hegelian system makes it impossible to

regard the state, the highest reality within -the realm of

right, as the highest reality within the whole system. Even

Hegel's most emphatic deification of the state cannot can-

cel his definite subordination of the objective to the abso-

lute mind, of the political to the philosophical truth.

The content to come is announced in the Preface, often

attacked as a document of utmost servility to the Restora-

tion and of uncompromising hostility to all the liberal

and progressive tendencies of the time. Hegel's denuncia-

tion of J. F. Fries, one of the leaders of the insurgent Ger-

man youth movement, his defense of the Karlsbader Be-

schlusse (1819), with their wholesale persecutions of every

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IfQ

liberal act or utterance (arbitrarily labeled with the then

current term of abuse, 'demagogic'), his apologia for strong

censorship, for the suppression of academic freedom, and

for restricting all trends towards some form of truly repre-

sentative government have all been quoted in confirma-

tion of the charge. There is, of course, no justification for

Hegel's personal attitude at the time. In the light of the

historical situation, however, and especially of the later

social and political development, his position and the

whole Preface assume quite another significance. We must

briefly examine the nature of the democratic opposition

that Hegel criticizes.

The movement sprang from the disappointment and

disillusionment of the petty bourgeoisie after the war of

1813-15. The liberation of the German states from French

rule was accompanied by an absolutist reaction. The prom-

ise of political recognition for popular rights and the

dream of an adequate constitution remained unfulfilled.

The response was a surge of propaganda for the political

unification of the German nation, a propaganda that did

contain in large measure a truly liberalist hostility to the

newly established Despotism. Since, however, the upper

classes were capable of holding their own within the ab-

solutist framework, and since no organized working class

existed, the democratic movement was, to a large extent,

made up of resentment on the part of the powerless petty

bourgeoisie. This resentment received striking expression

in the program of the academic Burschenschaften and of

their precursors, the Turnvereine. There was much talk

of freedom and of equality, but it was a freedom that

would be the vested privilege of the Teutonic race alone,

and an equality that meant general poverty and privation.

Culture was looked upon as the holding of the rich and

of the alien, made to corrupt and soften the people.

Hatred of the French went along with hatred of Jews,

l8o THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

Catholics, and 'nobles/ The movement cried for a truly

'German war/ so that Germany might unfold 'the abun-

dant wealth of her nationality/ It demanded a 'savior*

to achieve German unity, one to whom 'the people will

forgive all sins/ It burned books and yelled woe to the

Jews. It believed itself above the law and the constitution

because 'there is no law to the just cause/ 16 The state was

to be built from 'below/ through the sheer enthusiasm

of the masses, and the 'natural* unity of the Volk was to

supersede the stratified order of state and society.

It is not difficult to recognize in these 'democratic* slo-

gans the ideology of the Fascist Volksgemeinschaft. There

is, in point of fact, a much closer relation between the

historical role of the Burschenschaften, with their racism

and anti-rationalism, and National Socialism, than there

is between Hegel*s position and the latter. Hegel wrote

his Philosophy of Right as a defense of the state against

this pseudo-democratic ideology, in which he saw a more

serious threat to freedom than in the continued rule of

the vested authorities. There can be no doubt that his

work strengthened the power of these authorities and

thus assisted an already victorious reaction, but, only a

relatively short time later, it turned out to be a weapon

against reaction. For, the state Hegel had in mind was

one governed by the standards of critical reason and by

universally valid laws. The rationality of law, he says,

is the life element of the modern state. 'The law is ...

the Shibboleth, by means of which are detected the false

brethren and friends of the so-called people/ 1T We shall

see that Hegel wove the theme through his mature polit-

ical philosophy. There is no concept less compatible with

"See Heinrich von Trietschke, Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten

Jahrhundert, yd edition, 1886, vol. 11, pp. 383-443, especially pp. 385.

391* 427, 439.

" Philosophy of Right, trans. S. W. Dyde, George Bell and Sons, London

1896, p. xxiii.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY l8l

Fascist ideology than that which founds the state on a

universal and rational law that safeguards the interests of

every individual, whatever the contingencies of his natu-

ral and social status.

Hegel's attack on the democratic opponents of the Res-

toration is, moreover, inseparable from his even sharper

criticism of the reactionary representatives of the organic

theory of the state. His criticism of the Volksbewegung

is linked with his polemic against K. L. von Haller's

Restauration der Staatwissenschaft (first published in

1816), a work that exerted great influence on political ro-

manticism in Germany. Haller there had considered the

state to be a natural fact and at the same time a divine

product. As such, he had accepted without justification

the rule of the strong over the weak, which every state

implies, and had rejected any interpretation of the state

as representing the institutionalized rights of free individ-

uals or as subject to the demands of human reason. Hegel

characterized Haller's position as nothing short of fanati-

cism, mental imbecility, and hypocrisy. 1 18 If supposedly

natural values and not those of reason are fundamental

principles of the state, then hazard, injustice, and the

brute in man replace the rational standards of human

organization.

Both the democratic and feudal opponents of the state

agreed in repudiating the rule of law. Hegel held, against

both of them, that the rule of law is the only adequate

political form of modern society Modern society, he said,

is not a natural community or an order of divinely be-

stowed privileges. It is based on the general competition

of free owners of property who get and hold their posi-

tion in the social process through their self-reliant activ-

ity. It is a society in which the common interest, the per-

is Ibid M 858, p. 844, note.

l82 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

petuation of the whole, is asserted only through blind

chance. Conscious regulation of the social antagonisms,

therefore, by a force standing above the clash of particu-

lar interests, and yet safeguarding each of them, could

alone transform the anarchic sum-total of individuals into

a rational society. The rule of law was to be the lever of

that transformation.

At the same time, Hegel rejected political theory as

such, and denied that it had any use in political life. The

rule of law was at hand; it was embodied in the state and

constituted the adequate historical realization of reason.

Once the given order was thus accepted and acquiesced

in, political theory was rendered superfluous, for 'theories

now set themselves in opposition to the existing order and

make as though they were absolutely true and neces-

sary/ 19 Hegel was impelled to renounce theory because

he maintained that theory was necessarily critical, espe-

cially in the form it had taken in Western history. Ever

since Descartes, it was claimed that theory could plumb

the rational structure of the universe and that reason

could through its efforts become the standard of human

life. Theoretical and rational knowledge of the truth thus

implied recognition of the 'untruth 1 of a reality not yet

up to standard. The inadequate nature of the given reality

forced theory to transcend it, to become idealistic. But,

Hegel now says, history has not stood still; mankind has

reached the stage where all the means are at hand for

realizing reason. The modern state is the reality of that

realization. Hence, any further application of theory to

politics would now make theory Utopian. When the given

order is taken as rational, idealism has reached its end.

Political philosophy must henceforth refrain from teach-

ing what the state ought to be. The state is, is rational,

and there's the finale. Hegel adds that his philosophy will

i Ibid., p. xx, note.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 183

instead counsel that the state must be recognized as a

moral universe. The task of philosophy becomes that of

'reconciling men to the actual.'

A strange reconciliation, indeed. There is hardly an-

other philosophical work that reveals more unsparingly

the irreconcilable contradictions of modern society, or

that seems more perversely to acquiesce in them. The

very Preface in which Hegel renounces critical theory

seems to be calling for it by stressing 'the conflict between

what is and what ought to be.'

The content to which reason pointed was within reach,

Hegel said. The realization of reason could no longer be

philosophy's task, nor could it be allowed to dissipate it-

self in Utopian speculations. Society as actually consti-

tuted had brought to fruition the material conditions for

its change, so that the truth that philosophy contained at

its core might once for all be brought into being. Free-

dom and reason could now be seen as more than inner

values. The given condition of the present was a 'cross*

to be borne, a world of misery and injustice, but within

it blossomed the potencies of free reason. The recog-

nition of these potencies had been the function of philoso-

phy, the attainment of the true order of society was now

the function of practice. Hegel knew that 'one form of

life has become old' and that it could never be rejuvenated

by philosophy. 20 The concluding passages of the Preface

set the tone for the entire Philosophy of Right. They

mark the resignation of a man, who knows that the truth

he represents has drawn to its close and that it can no

longer invigorate the world.

Nor can it invigorate the social forces he understood and

represented. The Philosophy of Right is the philosophy

of middle-class society come to full self-consciousness.

20 Ibid., p. xxx.

184 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

It holds up the positive and the negative elements of

a society that has grown mature and that sees full well

its insurmountable limitations. All the fundamental con-

cepts of modern philosophy are reapplied in the Philoso-

phy of Right to the social reality from which they

sprang, and all reassume their concrete form. Their ab-

stract and metaphysical character disappears; their ac-

tual historical content shows forth. The notion of the sub-

ject (the ego) now discloses that it has an intrinsic connec-

tion with the isolated economic man, the notion of free-

dom with property, the notion of reason with the lack of

real universality or community in the competitive sphere;

natural law now becomes the law of competitive society

and all this social content is not the product of a forced

interpretation, or of an external application of these con-

cepts, but the final unfolding of their original meaning.

At its roots, the Philosophy of Right is materialist in ap-

proach. Hegel exposes in paragraph after paragraph the

social and economic under-structure of his philosophic

concepts. True, he derives all the social and economic

realities from the idea, but the idea is conceived in terms

of them and bears their marks in all its moments.

The Philosophy of Right does not expound a specific

theory of the state. It is not only a philosophic deduction

of right, state, and society, or an expression of Hegel's per-

sonal opinions on their reality. What is essential in the

work is the self-dissolution and self-negation of the basic

concepts of modern philosophy. They share the fate of

the society they explain. They lose their progressive char-

acter, their promising tone, their critical impact, and as-

sume the form of defeat and frustration. It is this inner

happening in the work rather than its systematic con-

struction that we shall strive to develop.

In the Introduction, the general framework is set for

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 185

an elaboration of right, civil society, and state. The realm

of right is the realm of freedom. 21 The thinking subject

is the free being; freedom is an attribute of his will. It is

the will that is free, so that freedom is its substance and

essence. 22 This assertion should not be taken to contradict

the conclusion in the Logic that thought is the sole realm

of freedom. For, the will is 'a special way of thinking/

namely, it is 'thought translating itself into reality' and

becoming practice. Through his will, the individual can

determine his acts in accord with his free reason.(The en-

tire sphere of right, the right of the individual, of the

family, of society and of the state, derive from and must

conform to the free will of the individual. To this extent,

then, we are restating the conclusions of Hegel's earlier

writings, that state and society are to be constructed by

the critical reason of the emancipated individual. But that

point is soon brought into question. The emancipated in-

dividual of modern society is not capable of such a con-

struction. His will, expressive of particular interests, does

not contain that 'universality* which would give common

ground to both the particular and the general interest.

The individual will is not of itself part and parcel of the

'general will/ The philosophical basis for social contract

must be denied for this reason.*^

The will is a unity of two different aspects or moments:

first, the individual's ability to abstract from every spe-

cific condition and, by negating it, to return to the abso-

lute liberty of the pure ego; 28 secondly, the individual's

act of freely adopting a concrete condition, freely affirm-

ing his existence as a particular, limited ego. 24 The first

of these Hegel calls the universal aspect of will, because

through constant abstraction^ from and negation of every

determinate condition the ego asserts its identity as against

11 1 1. Addition. "4. *s 5 . 24 6.

l86 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

the diversity of its particular states. That is, the individ-

ual ego is a true universal in the sense that it can abstract

from and transcend every particular condition and remain

at one with itself in the process. The second sense recog-

nizes that the individual cannot in fact negate every par-

ticular condition, but must choose some one in which he

carries on his life. He is in this respect a particular ego.

The fixation on either mode of will results in a nega-

tive liberty. If the individual abstracts from every particu-

lar condition and retreats into the pure will of his ego,

he will constantly be rejecting all established social and

political forms and will get to something like the abstract

liberty and equality exalted in the French Revolution.

The same was done in Rousseau's theory of the state and

society, which predicated an original state of man where

the living unit was the abstract individual possessing cer-

tain arbitrarily selected qualities such as good and evil,

private owner or member of a community without private

property, and so on. Rousseau, Hegel says, made 'the will

and the spirit of the particular individual in his peculiar

caprice . . . the substantive and primary basis' in so-

ciety. 25

Hegel's notion of the will aims to demonstrate that the

will is of a dual character, consisting of a- fundamental

polarity between particular and universal elements. It

aims, moreover, to show that this will is not adequate to

give rise to a social and political order, but that the latter

requires other factors that can be made harmonious with

the will only through the long process of history. The

individual's free will of necessity asserts his private inter-

est; it can therefore never of itself will the general or

common interest. Hegel shows, for example, that the free

man becomes the property owner who, as such, stands

25 *9. P-35-

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 187

against other property owners. His will is 'by nature* de-

termined by his immediate 'impulses, appetites, and in-

clinations/ and is directed to satisfying these. 26 Satisfac-

tion means that he has made the object of his will his

own. He cannot fulfill his wants except by appropriating

the objects he wants, thus excluding other individuals

from the use and enjoyment of the same. His will neces-

sarily takes 'the form of individuality [Einzelheit].' 27 The

object is to the ego something 'which may or may not

be mine.' 28 And the individual will has nothing in its

nature that would overpass this mutual exclusion of 'mine'

and 'thine 1 and unify the two in some common third. In

its natural dimension, then, the free will is license, for-

ever bound up with the arbitrary processes of appropria-

tion. 29

We have here a first example of Hegel's identifying a

law of nature with the law of competitive society. The

'nature' of free will is conceived in such a way that it

refers to a particular historical form of the will, that of

the individual as private owner, with private property

serving as the first realization of freedom. 80

How, then, can the individual will, expressing the di-

vided claims of 'mine' and 'thine,' with no common

ground between, ever become the will of 'our* and thus

express a common interest? The social-contract hypothesis

cannot serve, for no contract between individuals tran-

scends the sphere of private law. The contractual basis

that is presumed for the state and society would make

the whole subject to the same arbitrariness that governs

private interests. At the same time, the state cannot base

itself on any principle that implies an annulment of the

rights of the individual. Hegel stands firmly by this thesis,

which was enunciated in all the political philosophy of

2 11. 27 12. "14, p. 84. 29 15- 04l**?.

l88 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

the rising middle class. The time had passed when the

absolutist state described in the Leviathan could be said

best to preserve the interests of the new middle class. A

long process of discipline had since borne fruit the indi-

vidual had become the decisive unit of the economic order

and, what is more, now demanded his rights in the politi-

cal scheme. Hegel sets forth that demand and is true to

it in all his political theory.

We have stated that Hegel represented the 'universality'

of the will as a universality of the ego, meaning thereby

that the universality consists in the fact that the ego in-

tegrates all existential conditions into its self-identity.

The result is paradoxical: the universal is set in the most

individual element in man, in his ego. Socially, the proc-

ess is quite understandable. Modern society does not unite

individuals so that they can carry on autonomous yet con-

certed activities for the good of all. They do not reproduce

their society consciously, by collective activity, that is.

Given such a situation as prevails, the abstract equality

of the individual ego becomes the sole refuge for free-

dom. The freedom it wills is negative, a constant nega-

tion of the whole. The attainment of a positive freedom

requires that the individual leave the monadic sphere of

his private interest and settle himself in the essence of

the will, which aims not at some particular end but at

freedom as such. The will of the individual must become

a will to general freedom. It can become such, however,

only if he has actually become free. Only the will of the

man who is himself free aims at positive freedom. Hegel

puts this conclusion into the cryptic formula that 'free-

dom wills freedom/ or, 'the free will . . . wills the free

will/

The formula contains concrete historical life in what

i ai, Addition, p. 30, and 27, p. 54.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY l8g

seems to be an abstract philosophical pattern. It is not any

individual, but the free individual who 'wishes freedom.'

Freedom in its true form can be recognized and willed

only by an individual who is free. Man cannot know free-

dom without possessing it; he must be free in order to

become free. Freedom is not simply a status he has, but

an action he undertakes as a self-conscious subject. So

long as he knows no freedom, he cannot attain it by him-

self; his lack of freedom is such that he might even volun-

tarily choose or acquiesce in his cwn bondage. In that

case, he has no interest in freedom, and his liberation

must come about against his will. In other words, the

act of liberating is taken out of the hands of individuals

who themselves, because of their fettered status, cannot

choose it as their own course.

The notion of freedom in the Philosophy of Right re-

fers back to the essential relation between freedom and

thought set forth in the Logic. The root of that relation

is now laid bare in the social structure, and with it the

connection is revealed between idealism and the principle

of ownership. In the working out of the analysis, Hegel's

conception loses its critical content and comes to serve as

a metaphysical justification of private property. We shall

attempt to follow out this turn of the discussion.

The process whereby the will 'purifies* itself to a point

where it desires freedom is the laborious one of education

through history. The education is an activity and product

of thought. 'The self-consciousness, which purifies its ob-

ject, content or end, and exalts it to universality, is

thought carrying itself through into will. It is at this point

that it becomes clear that the will is true and free only

as thinking intelligence.' 8a Freedom of the will depends

on thought, upon knowledge of truth. Man can be free

M. pp.

1QO THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

only when he knows his potentialities. The slave is not

free for two reasons: first, because he is actually in bond-

age; secondly, because he has no experience or knowledge

of freedom. Knowledge, or, in Hegel's language, the self-

consciousness of freedom, is 'the principle of right, moral-

ity, and all forms of social ethics.' 8S The Logic had

founded freedom on thought; the Philosophy of Right, re-

capitulating, gets at the socio-historical conditions for this

conclusion. The will is free if it is 'wholly by itself, be-

cause it refers to nothing but itself, and all dependence

upon any other thing falls away.' 84

Of its very nature, the will aims at appropriating its

object, making the latter part of its own being. This is a

prerequisite for perfect freedom. But material objects

offer a definite limit to such appropriation. Essentially,

they are external to the appropriating subject, and their

appropriation is hence necessarily imperfect. The only

object that can become my property in toto is the mental

object, for it has no autonomous reality apart from the

thinking subject. 'It is the Mind I can appropriate in the

most complete manner.' ss Mental appropriation is differ-

ent from property in material objects because the compre-

hended object does not remain external to the subject.

Property is thus consummated by the free will, which rep-

resents the fulfillment of freedom as well as of appro-

priation.

The Logic had concluded that freedom consists in the

subject's having complete power over its 'other.' The con-

crete form of such freedom is perfect and perennial own-

ership. The union of the principle of idealism with the

principle of ownership is thus consummated. Hegel goes

on to make the identification thoroughgoing for his phi-

losophy. He states that 'only the will is the unlimited and

ss !, p . S o. 84 3 P-S 1 - "5*-

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1Q1

absolute, while all other things in contrast with the will

are merely relative. To appropriate is at bottom only to

manifest the majesty of my will towards things, by dem-

onstrating that they are not self-complete and have no

purpose of their own. This is brought about by my instill-

ing into the object another end than that which it pri-

marily had. When the living thing [Hegel is referring to

the example of an animal as a potential object of will] be-

comes my property it gets another soul than it had. I give

it my will.' 8e And, he concludes, 'free will is thus the ideal-

ism which refuses to hold that things as they are can be

self-complete/

The principle of idealism, that objective being depends

upon thought, is now interpreted as the basis for the po-

tential property-character of things. At the same time, it

is the most veritable being, mind, that idealism conceives

as fulfilling the idea of ownership.

Hegel's analysis of free will gives property a place in

the very make-up of the individual, in his free will. The

free will comes into existence as the pure will to freedom.

This is 'the idea of right' and is identical with freedom

as such. But it is ohly the idea of right and of freedom.

The materialization of the idea begins when the emanci-

pated individual asserts his will as a freedom to appro-

priate. 'This first phase of freedom we shall know as

property.' 87

The deduction of property from the essence of the free

will is an analytical process in Hegel's discussion; what he

does is draw the consequences of his former conclusions

about the will. At first, the free will is 'the single will of

a subject/ replete with aims that are directed to the va-

riety of objects of a world to which the subject is related

as an exclusive individual. He becomes actually free

86 44. Addition, pp. 51-2. 87 83> Addition, p. 41.

tgg THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

in a process of testing his freedom by excluding others

from the objects of his will and making the latter ex-

clusively his. By virtue of his exclusive will, the subject is

'a person.' That is, personality begins when there is a self-

conscious power to make the objects of one's will one's

own. 88

Hegel has stressed that the individual is free only when

he is recognized as free, and that such recognition is ac-

corded him when he has proved his freedom. Such proof

he can furnish by showing his power over the objects of

his will, through appropriating them. The act of appro-

priation is completed when other individuals have as-

sented to or 'recognized' it. 89

We have also seen that for Hegel the subject's substance

rests in an 'absolute negativity' in so far as the ego

negates the independent existence of objects and turns

them into media for its own fulfillment. The activity

of the property owner is now the driving power of this

negation. 'A person has the right to direct his will upon

any object, as his real and positive end. The object thus

becomes his. As it has no end in itself, it receives its mean-

ing and soul from his will. Man has the absolute right to

appropriate all that is a thing.' 40 Mere appropriation, how-

ever, results in mere possession (Besitz). But possession is

property only if made objective for other individuals as

well as for the owner. 'The form of mere subjectivity must

be removed from the objects'; they must be held and used

88 39- 8 *44.P-5 1

40 Hegel's concept of 'mutual recognition' of persons has three distinct

elements in it:

a. the positivistic element the mere acceptance of the fact of appro-

priation.

b. the dialectical element-the proprietor recognizes that the labor of

those expropriated is the condition for the perpetuation and enjoy-

ment of his property.

c. the historical element the fact of ownership has to be confirmed by

society.

The Jenenser system and the Phenomenology of Mind emphasized the

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 193

as the generally recognized property of a definite person. 41

That person must in turn recognize himself in the things

he possesses, must know and handle them as the fulfill-

ment of his free will. Then and then only does possession

become an actual right. 48 Free will is of necessity the

'single will' of a definite person, and property has 'the

quality of being private property/ 48

The institution of private property has rarely been so

consistently developed from and founded in the isolated

individual's nature. Thus far, no universal order has en-

tered Hegel's deduction, nothing that bestows the sanction

of a universal right upon individual appropriation. No

God has been invoked to ordain and justify it, nor have

men's needs been cited as responsible for producing it.

Property exists solely by virtue of the free subject's power.

It is derived from the free person's essence. Hegel has re-

moved the institution of property from any contingent

connection and has hypostatized it as an ontological rela-

tion. He emphasizes over and over that it may not be

justified as a means of satisfying human wants. 'The ra-

tionale of property does not consist in its satisfaction of

needs but rather in the fact that the institution overcomes

the mere subjectivity of the person, and, at the same time,

fulfills the determination of the latter. The person exists

as Reason only in property.' " Property is prior to the con-

tingent needs of society. It is 'the first embodiment of

freedom and therefore a substantial end in itself.' 'In

first two elements; the Philosophy of Right is mainly constructed upon

the first and third. The deduction of "private property in the latter work

gives distinct indication of all the factors peculiar to modern philoso-

phy, notably its respect for the prime authority of facts together with

its demand that the basis for those facts be rationally justified.

The withdrawal of the dialectical element in this discussion shows an

increasing influence of reification that sets in among Hegel's concepts.

The Jenenser system and the Phenomenology had treated property as a

relationship among men; the Philosophy of Right treats it as a relation-

ship between subject and the objects.

"51, Addition. "46.

g 45. 44 41, Addition (our translation).

194 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

man's relation to external objects, the rational element

consists in the possession of property.' What and how

much a person possesses, however, is a matter of chance

and, from the standpoint of right, entirely contingent. 45

Hegel explicitly admits that the prevailing distribution

of property is the product of accidental circumstances,

quite at odds with rational requirements. On the other

hand, he absolves reason from the task of passing judg-

ment on this distribution.^He makes no effort to apply the

philosophical principle of the equality of men to the in-

equalities of property, and iiKfact rejects this step. The

only equality that might be derived from reason is 'that

everybody should possess property,' 48 but reason is en-

tirely indifferent to the quality and quantity of ownership.

It is in this connection that Hegel presents his striking

definition, 'Right is unconcerned about differences in in-

dividuals.' 47 1

The definition combines the progressive and regressive

features of his philosophy of right. Unconcern about in-

dividual differences, as we shall see, is characteristic of the

abstract universality of law, which sets a minimum of

equality and rationality upon an order of irrationality and

injustice. On the other hand, that same unconcern typi-

fies a social practice wherein the preservation of the whole

is reached only by disregarding the human essence of the

individual. The object of the law is not the concrete indi-

vidual, but the abstract subject of rights.

The process of transforming the relations between men

into relations of things operates in Hegel's formulation.

The person is submerged in his property and is a person

only by virtue of his property. Consequently, Hegel de-

notes all Law of Persons as Law of Property. 'Clearly it is

only personality that gives us a right to things, and there-

45 49. 46 ibid. Addition. "ibid.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 195

fore personal right is in essence real right [Sachen-

recht]: 48

The process of reification continues to permeate Hegel's

analysis. He derives the entire Law of Contracts and Obli-

gations from the Law of Property. Since the freedom of

the person is exercised in the external sphere of things,

the person can 'externalize' himself, that is, deal with him-

self as an external object. He can of his own free will

'alienate' himself and sell his performances and services.

'Mental endowments, science, art, even such matters of

religion as sermons, masses, prayers, blessings, also inven-

tions and so forth become objects of a contract; they are

recognized and treated in the same way as the objects for

purchase, sale, and so on.' 49 The alienation of the person,

however, must have a limit in time, so that something re-

mains of the 'totality and universality* of the person. If I

were to sell 'the entire time of my concrete labor, and

the totality of my produce, my personality would become

the property of someone else; I would no longer be a per-

son and would place myself outside of the realm of

right.' 50 The principle of freedom, which was to demon-

strate the absolute supremacy of the person over all things,

has not only turned this person into a thing, but has also

made him a function of time. Hegel struck upon the same

fact that impelled Marx later to stipulate 'the shortening

of the labor day' as the condition for man's passing into

'the realm of freedom.' Hegel's conceptions carry far

enough, also, to touch upon the hidden force of labor-

time and to reveal that the difference between the an-

cient slave and the 'free' worker can be expressed in terms

of the quantity of time belonging to the 'lord.' 5l

The institution of private property has been derived

from the free will of the person. This will, however, has

48 40, note. 43. o 67. 6i Ibid. Addition.

ig6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL/S PHILOSOPHY

a definite limit, the private property of other persons. I

am and I remain proprietor only in so far as I willingly

renounce my right to appropriate other people's property.

Private property thus leads beyond the isolated individual

to his relations with other likewise isolated individuals.

The instrument that makes the institution of property se-

cure in this dimension is the Contract** Here again, the

ontological idea of reason is adjusted to the commodity-

producing society and given its concrete embodiment

there. 'It is just as much a necessity of reason that men

make contracts, exchange, trade, as that they have prop-

erty.' Contracts constitute that 'mutual recognition* which

is required to transform possession into private property.

Hegel's originally dialectical concept of 'recognition* now

describes the state of affairs in the acquisitive society. 58

Contracts, however, merely regulate the particular inter-

ests of proprietors and nowhere transcend the domain of

private law. Hegel once more repudiates the doctrine of a

social contract, because, he holds, it is false to say that

men have an arbitrary choice to secede from the state or

not to do so; 'rather is it absolutely necessary for everyone

to be in a State.* The 'great progress* of the modern state

over the feudal one is due to the fact that the former is

'an end in itself* and no man may make private arrange-

ments with regard to it. 84

The implications of private property drive Hegel ever

deeper into the dark paths of the foundations of right.

The Introduction had already announced that crime and

punishment essentially pertain to the institution of private

property, 85 and therefore also to the institution of right.

The rights of property owners must of necessity clash since

each stands against the other, the subject of his own par-

ticular will. Each depends in his acts upon 'the caprice

7. " 75. Addition.

t See note 40, above. 33, Addition.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1Q7

and erratic choice' dictated by his knowledge and voli-

tion, 56 and the agreement of his private will with the gen-

eral will is only an accident that bears the germs of new

conflict. Private right is thus necessarily wrong, for the

isolated individual must offend against the general right.

Hegel declares that 'fraud and crime' are an 'unpremedi-

tated or civil wrong [unbefangenes oder burgerliches Un-

recht],' denoting that they are a material part of civil so-

ciety. The right in civil society originates from the fact

that there is an abstract generalization of particular inter-

ests. If the individual, in pursuit of his interest, collides

with the right, he can claim for himself the. same authority

that the others claim against him, namely, that he acts to

preserve his own interest. The right, however, holds the

higher authority because it also represents though in an

inadequate form the interest of the whole.

The right of the whole and that of the individual do

not have the same validity. The former codifies the de-

mands of the society on which depend the maintenance

and welfare of the individuals as well. If the latter do not

recognize this right, they not only offend against the uni-

versal but also against themselves. They are wrong, and

the punishment of their crime restores their actual right.

This formulation, which guides Hegel's theory of pun-

ishment, entirely detaches the idea of wrong from all

moral considerations. The Philosophy of Right does not

place wrong in any moral category, but introduces it under

the head of Abstract Right. Wrong is a necessary element

in the relationship of individual owners to one another.

Hegel's exposition contains this strong mechanistic ele-

ment, again a striking parallel with Hobbes's materialist

political philosophy. To be sure, Hegel holds that free

reason governs the will and act of individuals, but this

"8i.

198 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

reason seems to behave in the manner of a natural law

and not as an autonomous human activity. Reason rules

over man instead of operating through his conscious

power. When, therefore, Hegel identifies the Law of Rea-

son (Vernunftrecht) with the Law of Nature (Naturrecht),

this formula assumes a sinister significance, quite against

Hegel's intention. He meant it to emphasize that reason

is the very 'nature* of society, but the 'natural' character

of the Law of Reason comes much closer to being the

blind necessity of nature than the self-conscious freedom

of a rational society. We shall see that Hegel repeatedly

stresses the 'blind necessity' of reason in civil society. The

same blind necessity that Marx later denounced as the

anarchy of capitalism thus was placed in the center of the

Hegelian philosophy when it set out to demonstrate the

free rationality of the prevailing order.

The free will, the actual motor of reason in society,

necessarily creates wrong. The individual must clash with

the social order that claims to represent his own will in

its objective form. But the wrong and the 'avenging jus-

tice' that remedies it not only express a 'higher logical

necessity,' 6T but also prepare the transition to a higher

social form of freedom, the transition from abstract right

to morality. For, in committing a wrong, and in accepting

punishment for his deed, the individual becomes con-

scious of the 'infinite subjectivity' of his freedom. 58 He

learns that he is free only as a private person. When he

collides with the order of right, he finds that this mode

of freedom he has practiced has reached insurmountable

limits. Repelled in the external world, the will now turns

inward, to seek absolute freedom there. The free will

enters the second realm of its fulfillment: the subject who

appropriates becomes the moral subject.

8T 8i. "104, p. 103.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY ig(

The transition from the first to the second part o

Hegel's work thus traces a decisive trend in modern so

ciety, that in which freedom is internalized (verinner

licht). The dynamics of the will, which Hegel puts for

ward as an ontological process, correspond to a historica

process that began with the German Reformation. We in

dicated this in our Introduction. Hegel cites one of th<

most important documents that set this message forth

Luther's paper On Christian Liberty, wherein Luthe

maintained that 'the soul will not be touched nor affectec

if the body is maltreated, and the person subjected t<

another man's power/ Hegel terms this statement 'sense

less sophistic reasoning,' but at the same 'time agrees tha

such a condition is possible, that man can be 'free in fet

ters.' This, he holds, is true only if it is the result of th<

man's free will, and then only in regard to himself. Wit!

regard to an other, one is unfree if his body is enslavec

and free only if he actually and concretely exists as free. 5

Inner freedom, for Hegel, is only a transitory stage in th<

process of achieving outer freedom. The tendency t<

abolish the inner realm of freedom may be said to fore

shadow that stage of society in which the process of in

ternalizing values no longer proves efficient as a mean

of restraining the individual's demands. Inner freedon

does at least reserve to the individual a sphere of uncon

ditional privacy with which no authority may interfere

and morality does place him under some universally valic

obligations. But when society turns to totalitarian forms

in accordance with the needs of monopolist imperialism

the entirety of the person becomes a political object. Evei

his innermost morality is subjugated to the state and hi

privacy abolished. The same conditions that previously

called for the internalizing of values now demand tha

they be fully externalized.

48-

800 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

Hegel's Philosophy of Right still shows a balance be-

tween these two polar developments. Hegel maintains that

the subjectivity of the will 'remains the ground of the

existence of freedom/ eo and he lets freedom terminate in

an all-powerful state. Morality, the realm of inner free-

dom, however, loses all its splendor and glory in Hegel's

work and becomes a mere joint between Private and Con-

stitutional Law, between abstract right and societal life.

It has often been stressed that Hegel's system contains

no real ethics. His moral philosophy is absorbed in his

political philosophy. But the submersion of ethics in poli-

tics conforms to his interpretation and valuation of civil

society. It is not an accident that his section on Morality

is the most brief and the least significant of any in his

work.

We shall pass to the last portion of the Philosophy of

Right, that treating social and political ethics (Si it lie h-

keit). This part of the work deals with the family, civil

society, and the state, and we must first sketch the sys-

tematic connection that it has with the two preceding sec-

tions of the Philosophy of Right. The will here turns

outward to the external realm of social reality. An indi-

vidual who rejoices in the inner freedom and truth of

his morality, we find, has not reached freedom and truth.

The 'abstract good' is 'devoid of power'; it is compatible

with any given content. 61 The Science of Logic had dem-

onstrated that the idea is fulfilled only in actuality. Simi-

larly, the free will must overcome the diremption between

inner and outer world, between subjective and universal

right, and the individual must achieve his will in ob-

jective social and political institutions, which in turn must

accord with his will. The entire third part of the Philoso-

phy of Right presupposes that no objective institution ex-

o 106, p. 152. "141, p. 154*

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 3O1

ists that is not based upon the free will of the subject,

and no subjective freedom that is not visible in the ob-

jective social order.

The opening paragraphs state precisely this. Promise is

given, moreover, that the ideal will be shown as an actual

existent. Mankind has reached the stage of maturity and

possesses all the means that render the realization of rea-

son possible. But these very means have been developed

and employed by a society the organizing principle of

which is the free play of private interests, and which is

therefore unable to use them in the interest of the whole.

The Philosophy of Right claims that private property is

the material reality of the free subject arid the realization

of freedom. From his earliest writings, however, Hegel

had seen that private property relations militate against

a truly free social order. The anarchy of self-seeking prop-

erty owners could not produce from its mechanism an

integrated, rational, and universal social scheme. At the

same time, a proper social order, Hegel maintained, could

not be imposed with private property rights denied, for

the free individual would be annulled thereby. The task

of making the fiecessary integration devolved, therefore,

upon an institution that would stand above the individ-

ual interests and their competing relationships, and yet

would preserve their holdings and activities.

Hegel copes with the problem along the lines he fol-

lowed when he raised the problem of natural law. The

natural-law doctrine had struggled with the question of

how a state of anarchic appropriation (the state of nature)

could be transformed into one in which property is gen-

erally secure. Civil society was supposed to establish such

a state of general security. Hegel now puts the same ques-

tion, but takes one step beyond the traditional pattern in

answering it. The two stages of development, that of the

state of nature and that of civil society are overarched

202 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

by a third, the state. Hegel holds the doctrine of natural

law to be inadequate, because it makes civil society an

end in itself. Even in Hobbes's political philosophy, abso-

lute sovereignty was made subordinate to the need of an

adequate safeguard for the securities and properties of

civil society, and the fulfillment of this latter condition

was made the content of sovereignty. Hegel says that

civil society cannot be an end in itself because it cannot,

by virtue of its intrinsic contradictions, achieve true unity

and freedom. The independence of civil society is there-

fore repudiated by Hegel and made subordinate to the

autonomous state.

Hegel shifts the task of materializing the order of rea-

son from civil society to the state. The latter, however,

does not displace civil society, but simply keeps it mov-

ing, guarding its interests without changing its content.

The step beyond civil society thus leads to an authori-

tarian political system, which preserves intact the material

content of the society. The authoritarian trend that ap-

pears in Hegel's political philosophy is made necessary by

the antagonistic structure of civil society.

But it is not the only trend. The dialectic follows the

structural transformation of civil society to the point of

its final negation. The concepts that point to this negation

are at the very root of the Hegelian system: Reason and

freedom, conceived as genuine dialectical concepts, can-

not be fulfilled in the prevailing system of civil society.

Elements thus appear in Hegel's notion of the state that

are incompatible with the order of civil society and outline

the picture of a future social organization for mankind.

This applies particularly to Hegel's basic requirement for

a state, that it must preserve and satisfy the true interest

of the individual and cannot be conceived except in terms

of the perfect unity between the individual and the uni-

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 2OJ

versal. The abstract determinations of the Logic once

again show forth in their historical significance. The veri-

table being, the Logic had said, is the universal, which is

in itself individual and contains the particular in itself.

This veritable being, which the Logic called the notion,

now returns as the state embodying reason and freedom.

It is 'the Universal which has unfolded its actual ration-

ality/ 62 and represents 'the identity of the general and

particular will.' 88 The state is the 'embodiment of con-

crete freedom, in which the person and his particular in-

terests have their complete development, and receive ade-

quate recognition of their rights/ e * The particular inter-

ests of individuals are in no circumstances to be set aside

or suppressed; 'everything depends on the union of unij

versality and particularity in the State/ 65 I

The true dialectical content of reason and freedom re

peatedly shows through Hegel's authoritarian formula foi

saving the given social scheme. The urge to preserve the

prevailing system impels him to hypostatize the state as a

domain in itself, situated above and even opposed to the

rights of the individual. The state 'has an absolute author-

ity or force/ 66 l is a matter of indifference to the state

'whether the individual exists or not/ 8T On the other

hand, Hegel insists that the family, civil society, and state

'are not something foreign to the subject/ but part and

parcel 'of his own essence/ 68 He calls the relation of the

individual to these institutions a 'duty and obligation/

which necessarily restricts his liberty. But he maintains

that it restricts only his 'abstract freedom* and therefore

rather means the liberation of his 'substantial freedom/ 69

The same dynamic that tears Hegel's concepts from

their ties with the structure of middle-class society and

drives the dialectical analysis beyond this social system

62 i5. *&>. i46. 68 i47.

68 155- * B a6i, Addition. ? 145, Addition. 148-9.

304 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

recurs in every portion of the last section of the Philoso-

phy of Right. Family, civil society, and state are justified

by a method that implies their negation. The discussion

of the family that opens this section is entirely animated

by this paradox. The family is a 'natural' foundation for

the order of reason that culminates in the state, but at

the same time it is such only in so far as it dissolves. The

family has its 'external reality' in property, but property

also destroys the family. Children grow up and establish

property-holding families of their own. 70 The 'natural*

unit of the family thus breaks up into a multitude of

competing groups of proprietors, who essentially aim at

their particular egoistic advantage. These groups make

for the entry of civil society, which comes on the scene

when all ethics has been lost and negated. 71

(Hegel bases his analysis of civil society on the two ma-

terial principles of modern society: (i) The individual

aims only at his private interests, in the pursuit of which

he behaves as a 'mixture of physical necessity and caprice';

(2) Individual interests are so interrelated that the asser-

tion and satisfaction of the one depends upon the asser-

tion and satisfaction of the other. 72 This is so far simply

the traditional eighteenth-century description of modern

society as a 'system of mutual dependence' in which every

individual, in pursuit of his own advantage, 'naturally'

also promotes the interest of the whole. 78 Hegel, however,

follows the negative rather than the positive aspects of

this system. The civil community appears, only to disap-

pear at once in a 'spectacle of excess, misery, and physical

and social corruption.' 74 We know that from the begin-

ning Hegel maintained that a true society, which is the

free subject of its own progress and reproduction, can

only be conceived as one that materializes conscious free-

TO 177. TI !8i. 78 i8a. T* 184, Addition. T4 g 185.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

dom. The complete lack of such within civil society at

once denies to it the title of a final realization of reason.

Like Marx, Hegel emphasizes the fact that the integra-

tion of the private interests in this society is the product

of chance and not of free rational decision. The totality

appears, therefore, not as liberty 'but as necessity.' " In

Civil Society universality is nothing but necessity/ 7fl It

gives an order to a process of production in which the

individual finds his place not according to his needs and

abilities, but according to his 'capital/ The term 'capital'

here refers not only to the proper economic power of the

individual, but also to that part of his physical power that

he expends in the economic process, that is, to his labor-

power. 77 The specific wants of individuals are satisfied by

means of abstract labor, 78 which is the 'general and per-

manent property 1 of men. 79 Because the possibility of shar-

ing in the general wealth depends on capital, this system

produces increasing inequalities. 80 It is a short step from

this point to the famous paragraphs that set forth the in-

trinsic connection between the accumulation of wealth on

the one hand ahd the growing impoverishment of the

working class on the other:

By generalizing the relations of men by way of their wants,

and by generalizing the manner in which the means of meet-

ing these wants are prepared and procured, large fortunes are

amassed. On the other side, there occur a repartition and limi-

tation of the work of the individual labourer and, conse-

quently, dependence and distress in the artisan class . . .

When a large number of people sink below the standard

of living regarded as essential for the members of society, and

lose that sense of right, rectitude and honour which is de-

rived from self-support, a pauper class arises, and wealth ac-

cumulates disproportionately in the hands of a few. 81

78 186. rr 8199.200. "199. 81 *43-4-

" ftsg, Addition. " 196, 198. 80 200.

2O6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL/S PHILOSOPHY

Hegel envisages the rise of a vast industrial army and

sums up the irreconcilable contradictions of civil society

in the statement that 'this society, in the excess of its

wealth, is not wealthy enough ... to stem excess of pov-

erty and the creation of paupers/ 82 The system of estates

that Hegel outlines as the proper organization of civil so-

ciety is not of itself able to resolve the contradiction. The

external unity attempted among competing individuals

through the three estates the peasantry, the traders (in-

cluding craftsmen, manufacturers, and merchants), and

the bureaucracy merely repeats Hegel's earlier attempts

in this direction; the idea sounds less convincing here than

ever before. All the organizations and institutions of civil

society are for 'the protection of property/ 88 and the free-

dom of that society means only 'the right of property/

The estates must be regulated by external forces that are

more powerful than the economic mechanisms. These pre-

pare the transition to the political ordering of society.

This transition occurs in the sections on the Administra-

tion of Justice, the Police, and the Corporation.

The administration of justice makes abstract right into

law and introduces a conscious universal order into th^

blind and contingent processes of civil society. We have

said that the concept of law is central to the Philosophy

of Right, so much so in fact that the title of the work

might better be 'Philosophy of Law/ The entire discus-

sion in it assumes that right actually exists as law, an as-

sumption that follows from the ontological principles of

Hegel's philosophy. Right, as we have seen, is an attribute

of the free subject, of the person. The person, in turn, is

what he is only by virtue of thought, qua thinking sub-

ject. Thought establishes a true community for otherwise

isolated individuals, gives them a universality. Right ap-

"145. ao8.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 807

plies to individuals in so far as they are universal; it may

not be possessed because of any particular accidental quali-

ties. This means that he who possesses right does so as 'the

individual in the form of the universal, the ego qua uni-

versal person,' 84 and that the universality of right is es-

sentially an abstract one. The idealist principle that

thought is the true being is thus seen to imply that right

is universal in the form of universal law, for the law ab-

stracts from the individual and treats him as 'universal

person/ 'Man has his value in his being man, not in his

being a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, or Italian/ 88

The rule of law pertains to the 'universal person* and not

to the concrete individual, and it embodies freedom pre-

cisely in so far as it is universal.

Hegel's legal theory is definitely aligned with the pro-

gressive trends in modern society. Anticipating later de-

velopments in jurisprudence, he rejects all doctrines be-

stowing the right on judicial decision rather than on the

universality of the law, and he criticizes points of view

that make judges 'the permanent law-givers' or leave to

their discretion the ultimate decision as to right and

wrong. 86 In his fime the social forces in power had not

yet come to agree that the abstract universality of the law,

like the other phenomena of liberalism, interferes with

their designs, and that the need is for a more direct and

effective ruling instrument. Hegel's concept of law is

adapted to an earlier phase of civil society, characterized

by free competition among individuals more or less

equally endowed materially, so that 'everyone is an end

in himself . . / and 'to each particular person others are

a means to the attainment of his end/ 8T Within this sys-

tem, Hegel says, even the common interest, the universal,

'appears as a means/

as ibid. 91 1. T 182, Addition,

208 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

Such is the social scheme that produced civil society.

The scheme cannot perpetuate itself unless it harmonizes

the antagonistic interests, of which it is made up, into a

form that is more rational and calculable than the opera-

tions of the commodity market that governs it. Unre-

stricted competition requires a minimum of equal pro-

tection for the competitors and a reliable guarantee for

contracts and services. This minimum of harmony and

integration, however, cannot be had except by abstracting

from each one's concrete existence and its variations. 'The

right does not deal with man's specific determinations. Its

purpose is not to advance and protect him* in his 'neces-

sary wants and special aims and drives [such as his thirst

for knowledge or his desire to maintain life, health, and

so on]/ 88 Man enters into contracts, exchange relations,

and other obligations simply as the abstract subject of

capital or of labor-power or of some other socially neces-

sary possession or device. Accordingly, the law can be uni-

versal and treat individuals as equals only in so far as it

remains abstract. Right is hence a form rather than a con-

tent. The justice dispensed by law gets its cue from the

general form of transaction and interaction, while the con-

crete varieties of individual life enter only as a sum-total

of attenuating or aggravating circumstances. The law as a

universal thus has a negative aspect. It of necessity involves

an element of chance, and its application to a particular

case will engender imperfection and cause injustice and

hardship. These negative elements, however, cannot be

eliminated by extending the discretionary powers of the

judge. The law's abstract universality is a far better guar-

antee of right, despite all the shortcomings, than is the

individual's concrete and specific self. In civil society all

individuals have private interests by which they are set

Philosophised Propaedcutik, I, gss (Sdmtliche Werke, ed. Hermann

Glockner, Stuttgart 1987, vol. HI, p. 49).

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 800

against the whole, and none of them can claim to be a

source of right.

It is true at the same time that the abstract equality

of men before the law does not eliminate their material

inequalities or in any sense remove the general contin-

gency that surrounds the social and economic status they

possess. But by force of the fact that it disregards the con-

tingent elements, the law is more just than the concrete

social relations that produce inequalities, hazard, and

other injustices. Law is at least based on a few essential

factors common to all individuals. (We must bear in mind

that private ownership is one of these 'essential factors'

to Hegel, and that human equality means to him also

an equal right of all to property.) In standing by its prin-

ciple of fundamental equality, the law is able to rectify

certain flagrant injustices without upsetting the social or-

der that demands the continuance of injustice as a con-

stitutive element of its existence.

This, at least, is the philosophical construction, valid

only in so far as the rule of law gives greater security and

protection to the weak than does the system that has since

replaced it, the rule of authoritarian decree. Hegel's doc-

trine is the product of the liberalistic era and embodies its

traditional principles. For laws to be obeyed they must be

known to all, he says, citing the fact that tyranny would

'hang up the laws so high that no citizen could read them.'

By the same token, he excludes retroactive legislation. The

judge's power of decision, too, he states, must be restricted

as far as possible through the calculable terms of the law

itself. Public trial, for example, is essential as one such

restrictive device, and is justified by the fact that the law

requires the confidence of the citizenry and that the right,

as essentially universal, belongs to all. 89

SS4, Addition.

55 IO THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

Hegel's conception implies that the body of law is what

free men would themselves establish of their own reason.

He assumes, in line with the tradition of democratic po-

litical philosophy, that the free individual is the original

legislator who gave the law to himself, but the assumption

does not prevent Hegel from saying that law is material-

ized in the 'protection of property through the adminis-

tration of justice. 1 90

This insight into the material connection between the

rule of law and the rule of property compels Hegel, in

contrast to Locke and his successors, to go beyond the

liberalist doctrine. Because of this connection, the law

cannot be the final point of integration for civil society,

nor can it represent its real universality. The rule of law

merely embodies the 'abstract right* of property. 'The

function of judicial administration is only to actualize

into necessity the abstract side of personal liberty in Civil

Society . . . The blind necessity of the system of wants is

not yet lifted up to consciousness of the universal, and

worked from that point of view/ 91 The law must there-

fore be supplemented and even supplanted by a much

stronger and stricter force which will govern individuals

more directly and more visibly. The Police emerge.

Hegel's notion of the police adopts many features of

the doctrine with which absolutism used Co justify the

regulations it practised upon social and economic life.

The police not only interfered in the productive and dis-

tributive process, not only restricted freedom of trade and

profit and watched over prices, poverty, and vagrancy, but

also supervised the private life of the individual wherever

ogjjo8. See Locke, Of Civil Government, Book n, 134: Locke's con-

cept of property includes in its meaning the basic rights of the individuals,

that is 'their lives, liberties and estates'! This concept still operates in

Hegel's work. According to Hegel, everything that is other than and

separable from the 'free mind' may be made property.

'i Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 532 (Hegel's Philosophy

of Mind, trans. W. Wallace, London 1894, p. *6i).

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY * 1 1

the public welfare could be affected. There is, however,

an important difference between the police who did all

this during the rise of modern absolutism, and the police

of the Restoration. 92 To a considerable extent, Hegel's

Philosophy of Right expresses the official theory of the

latter. The police is supposed to represent the interest of

the whole against social forces that are not too weak but

too strong to guarantee an undisturbed functioning of the

social and economic process. The police does not any

longer have to organize the process of production for

want of private power and knowledge to achieve this. The

task of the police is a negative one, rather, to safeguard

'the security of person and property' in the contingent

sphere that is not covered by the universal stipulations

of the law. 98

Hegel's statements about the function of the police

show, however, that he goes beyond the doctrine held dur-

ing the Restoration, especially in his emphasis that the

growing antagonisms of civil society increasingly make the

social organism a blind chaos of selfish interests and ne-

cessitate the establishment of a powerful institution to

control the confusion. Significantly enough, it is in this

discussion of the police that Hegel makes some of his most

pointed and far-reaching remarks about the destructive

course that civil society is bound to take. And he concludes

with the statement that 'by means of its own dialectic the

civil society is driven beyond its own limits as a definite

and self-complete society.' It must seek to open new mar-

kets to absorb the products of an increasing over-produc-

tion, and must pursue a policy of economic expansion and

systematic colonization. 94

2 See Kurt Wolzendorff, Der Polizeigedanke des modcrnen Staates.

Breslau 1918, pp. 100-130.

w Philosophy of Right, 830-31.

M Ibid. 246-8.

81 2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

The difficulties in relating the police to the external

policy of the state disappear if we take into consideration

the fact that the police for Hegel is a product of the grow-

ing antagonisms of the civil order and is introduced to

cope with these contradictions. Accordingly, the line be-

tween the police and the state (which fulfills what the po-

lice begins) is not sharp. Hegel envisages a final situation

wherein 'the labor of all will be subject to administrative

regulation/ w This, he says, will 'shorten and alleviate

the dangerous upheavals' to which civil society is prone.

In other words, a totalitarian social organization will leave

less time 'for conflicts to adjust themselves merely by un-

conscious necessity/ M

The police, however, is not the only remedy. The un-

ruliness of civil society is to be bridled by yet another

institution, the Corporation, which Hegel conceives along

the lines of the old guild system, with some features added

of the modern corporate state. The corporation is an eco-

nomic as well as a political unit, with the following dual

function: (i) to bring unity to the competing economic in-

terests and activities within the estates, and (2) to cham-

pion the organized interests of civil society as against the

state. The corporation is supervised by the state, 91 but

it aims to safeguard the material concerns of trade and in-

dustry. Capital and labor, producer and consumer, profit

and general welfare meet in the corporation, where the

special interests of economic subjects are purified of mere

self-seeking so that they can fit into the universal order

of the state.

Hegel does not explain how all this is possible. It seems

that the corporation selects its members according to

their actual qualifications and that it guarantees their

business and their assets, but this appears to be all. The

s 136. " Ibid. * tss, Addition.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY gig

corporation remains an ideological agency above all, an

entity that exhorts the individual to work for an ideal

that doesn't exist, 'the unselfish end of the whole.' M

Moreover, the corporation is to bestow upon him appro-

bation as a recognized member of society. Actually, how-

ever, it is not the individual but the economic process

that does the recognizing. The individual, therefore, ob-

tains only an ideological good; his compensation is the

'honor* of belonging to the corporation."

The corporation leads from the section on civil so-

ciety to that on the state. The state is essentially separate

and distinct from society. The decisive feature of civil so-

ciety is 'the security and protection of property and per-

sonal freedom/ 'the interest of the individual' its ultimate

purpose. The state has a totally different function, and is

related to the individual in another way. 'Union as such

is itself the true content and end* for the State. The inte-

grating factor is the universal, not the particular. The in-

dividual may 'pass a universal life* in the state; his particu-

lar satisfactions, activities, and ways of life are here regu-

lated by the common interest. The state is a subject in

the strict sense o\ the word, namely, the actual carrier and

end of all individual actions that now stand under 'uni-

versal laws and principles/ 10

The laws and principles of the state guide the activities

of free-thinking subjects, so that their element is not na-

ture, but mind, the rational knowledge and will of asso-

ciated individuals. This is the meaning of Hegel's term-

ing the state 'Objective Mind/ The state creates an order

that does not depend, as civil society did, on the blind

interrelation of particular needs and performances for its

own perpetuation. The 'system of wants' becomes a con-

scious scheme of life controlled by man's autonomous

w 8 58 . 99 ibid. 100 958, note.

814 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

decisions in the common interest. The state therefore can

be denoted as the 'realization of freedom/ 101

We have mentioned that for Hegel the state's funda-

mental task is to make the specific and the general

interest coincide, so as to preserve the individual's

right and freedom. Yet such a demand presupposes

the identification of state and society, not their separa-

tion. For, the wants and interests of the individual exist

in society and, no matter how they may be modified by

the demands of the common welfare, they arise in and

remain bound up with the social processes governing in-

dividual life. The demand that freedom and happiness

be fulfilled thus eventually falls back upon society, and

not upon the state. According to Hegel, the state has no

aim other than 'association as such/ In other words, it

has no aim at all if the social and economic order con-

stitutes a 'true association/ The process of bringing the

individual into harmony with the universal would engen-

der the 'withering away* of the state, rather than the op-

posite.

Hegel, however, separated the rational order of the state

from the contingent interrelations of the society be-

cause he looked upon society as civil society, which is not

a 'true association/ The critical character of his dialec-

tic forced him to see society as he did. Dialectical method

understands the existent in terms of the negativity it con-

tains and views realities in the light of their change.

Change is a historical category. 102 The objective mind,

with which the Philosophy of Right deals, unfolds itself

in time, 108 and the dialectical analysis of its content has

to be guided by the forms that this content has taken in

101 8 5 8, Addition and 260.

102 Hegel, Philosophic der Wcltgeschichte, ed. Georg Lasson, 1920, vol.

I, p. 10.

los See below, p. 224.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 215

history. The truth thus appears as a historical achieve-

ment, so that the stage man has reached with civil society

fulfills all preceding historical efforts. Some other form of

association may come in the future, but philosophy, as

the science of the actual, does not enter into speculations

over it. The social reality, with its general competition,

selfishness, and exploitation, with its excessive wealth and

excessive poverty, is the foundation on which reason must

build. Philosophy cannot jump ahead of history, for it is a

son of its time, 'its time apprehended in thought/ 104

The times are those of a civil society wherein has been

prepared the material basis for realizing reason and free-

dom, but a reason distorted by the blind necessity of the

economic process and a freedom perverted through com-

petition of conflicting private interests. Yet this selfsame

society has much that makes for a truly free and rational

association: it upholds the inalienable right of the indi-

vidual, increases human wants and the means for their

satisfaction, organizes the division of labor, and advances

the rule of law. These elements must be freed from pri-

vate interests and submitted to a power that stands above

the competitive system of civil society, in a specially ex-

alted position. This power is the state. Hegel sees the

state as 'an independent and autonomous power' in which

'the individuals are mere moments,' as 'the march of God

in the world.' 105 He thought this to be the very essence of

the state, but, in reality, he was only describing the his-

torical type of state that corresponded to civil society.

We reach this interpretation of Hegel's state by placing

his concept in the socio-historical setting that he himself

implied in his description of civil society. Hegel's idea

of the state stems from a philosophy in which the liberal-

lo* Philosophy of Right, p. xxviii.

105 258, Addition.

*l6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

istic conception of state and society has all but collapsed.

We have seen that Hegel's analysis led to his denying any

'natural' harmony between the particular and the general

interest, between civil society and the state. The liberalise

idea of the state was thus demolished. In order that the

framework of the given social order may not be broken,

the common interest has to be vested in an autonomous

agency, and the authority of the state set above the battle-

ground of competing social groups.ulegel's 'deified' state,

however, by no means parallels the Fascist one. The latter

represents the very level of social development that Hegel's

state is supposed to avoid, namely, the direct totalitarian

rule of special interests over the whole. Civil society under

Fascism rules the state; Hegel's state rules civil society.

And in whose name does it rule? According to Hegel, in

the name of the free individual and in his true interest.

'The essence of the modern state is the union of the uni-

versal with the full freedom of the particular, and with

the welfare of individuals.' 106 The prime difference be-

tween the ancient and the modern world rests on the fact

that in the latter the great questions of human life are to

be decided not by some superior authority, but by the free

'I will* of man. 'This I will . . . must have its peculiar

niche in the great building of State.' 10T The basic prin-

ciple of this state is the full development of the individ-

ual. 108 Its constitution and all its political institutions are

to express 'the knowledge and the will of its individuals.''

At this point, however, the historical contradiction irv'

herent in Hegel's political philosophy determines its fate.

The individual who knows and wishes his true interest

in the common interest this individual simply doesn't

exist. Individuals exist only as private owners, subjects of

the fierce processes of civil society, cut off from the com-

" *6o, Addition. IOT g 179, Addition. " *6o and a6i.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 217

mon interest by selfishness and all it entails. As far as civil <

society reaches, none is free of its toils.

Outside of society, however, lies nature. If there could

be found someone who possesses his individuality by vir-

tue of his natural and not his social existence, and who is

what he is simply by nature and not by the social mecha-

nisms, he might be the stable point from which the state

could be ruled. Hegel finds such a man in the monarch, a

man chosen to his position 'by natural birth.' 109 Ultimate

freedom can rest with him, for he is outside a world of

false and negative freedom and is 'exalted above all that

is particular and conditional/ uo The ego-of everyone else

is corrupted by the social order that molds all; the mon-

arch alone is not so influenced and is hence able to origi-

nate and decide all his acts by reference to his pure ego.

He can cancel all particularity in the 'simple certainty of

his self.' m

We know what the 'self-certainty of the pure ego* means

to Hegel's system: it is the essential property of the 'sub-

stance as subject/ and thus characterizes the true being. 112

The use of thi^ principle historically to yield the mon-

arch's natural person again points up the frustration of

idealism. Freedom becomes identical with the inexorable

necessity of nature, and reason terminates in an accident

of birth. The philosophy of freedom again turns into a

philosophy of necessity.

Classical political economy described modern society as

a 'natural system' whose laws appeared to have the neces-

sity of physical laws. This point of view soon lost its magic.

Marx showed how the anarchic forces of capitalism assume

the quality of natural forces as long as they are not made

subject to human reason, that the natural element in so-

ciety is not a positive but a negative one. Hegel seems to

io 280. no 879. in Ibid. i See above, pp. 155 f.

8l8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

have had some inkling of this. He sometimes seems to be

smiling at his own idealization of the monarch, declaring

that the decisions of the monarch are only formalities. He

is 'a man who says yes and so puts the dot upon the i.' 118

He notes that monarchs are not remarkable for intellec-

tual or physical strength and that, despite this, millions

permit themselves to be ruled by them. 114 Nevertheless,

the intellectual weakness of the monarch is preferable to

the wisdom of civil society, Hegel feels.

The fault with Hegel lies much deeper than in his

glorification of the Prussian monarchy. He is guilty not

so much of being servile as of betraying his highest philo-

sophical ideas. His political doctrine surrenders society to

nature, freedom to necessity, reason to caprice. And in so

doing, it mirrors the destiny of the social order that falls,

while in pursuit of its freedom, into a state of nature far

below reason. The dialectical analysis of civil society had

concluded that society was not capable of establishing rea-

son and freedom of its own accord. Hegel therefore put

forward a strong state to achieve this end and tried to

reconcile that state with the idea of freedom by giving a

strong constitutional flavoring to monarchy.

The state exists only through the medium of law. 'Laws

express the content of objective freedom . . . They are

an absolute final end and a universal work.' ll5 Hence the

state is bound by laws that are the opposite of authori-

tarian decrees. The body of laws is 'a universal work* that

incorporates the reason and the will of associated men.

The constitution expresses the interests of all (now, of

course, their true, 'purified' interests), and the executive,

legislative and judiciary powers are but the organs of con-

stitutional law. Hegel repudiates the traditional division

us 280, Addition. n* *8i, Addition.

n Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (trans. W. Wallace, as

Hegel's Philosophy of Mind), p. *6j.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

of these powers, as detrimental to the state's unity; the

three functions of government are to work in permanent

actual collaboration. The emphasis on the state's unity is

so strong that it occasionally leads Hegel to formulations

that come close to the organicist theory of the state. He

declares, for instance, that the constitution, though 'be-

gotten in time, should not be contemplated as made* by

man, but rather as 'divine and perpetual.' 118 Such utter-

ances spring from the same motives that impelled the most

far-seeing philosophers to set the state above any danger

of criticism. They recognized that the tie that most ef-

fectively binds the conflicting groups of the ruling class

is the fear of any subversion of the existing order.

We shall not spend time upon Hegel's outline of the

constitution, since it hardly adds essentially to his earlier

writings on the same subject, although some important

features of his system are worthy of brief notice. The tra-

ditional trinity of political powers is altered to consist of

the monarchic, the administrative, and the legislative

power. These overlap so that the executive power belongs

to the first two and includes the judicial, while the legis-

lative power is ekercised by the government together with

the estates. The entire political system again converges to-

wards the idea of sovereignty, which, though now rooted

in the 'natural' person of the monarch, still pervades the

whole structure. Alongside the state's sovereignty over the

antagonisms of civil society, Hegel now stresses its sover-

eignty over the people (Volk). The people 'is that part of

the State which does not know what it wants,' and whose

'movement and action would be elemental, void of reason,

violent, and terrible' m if not regulated. Here again,

Hegel may have been thinking of the Volksbewegung of

his time; the Prussian monarchy may well have seemed a

n Philosophy of Right, 273, note.

117 301 and 303, note.

220 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

paragon of reason compared to that Teutonic movement

from 'below.' Yet, Hegel's advocacy of a strong hand over

the masses is part of a more general trend, which threatens

the whole constitutional structure of his state.

The state provides a unity for the particular and the

general interest. Hegel's view of this unity differs from the

liberalistic, inasmuch as his state is imposed upon the so-

cial and economic mechanisms of civil society and is vested

in independent political powers and institutions. 'The ob-

jective will is in itself rational in its very conception,

whether or not it be known by the individuals or willed

as an object of their caprice.' 118

Hegel's exaltation of the state's political power has,

however, some clearly critical traits. Discussing the re-

lation between religion and the state, he points out that

'religion is principally commended and resorted to in

times of public distress, disturbance, and oppression; it is

taught to furnish consolation against wrong and the hope

of compensation in the case of loss.' 110 He notes the dan-

gerous function of religion in its tendency to divert man

from his search for actual freedom and to pay him ficti-

tious damages for real wrongs. 'It would surely be regarded,

as a bitter jest if those who were oppressed by any des-

potism were referred to the consolations of religion; nor

is it to be forgotten that religion may assume the form

of a galling superstition, involving the most abject servi-

tude, and the degradation of man below the level of the

brute.' Some force has to interfere to rescue the indi-

vidual from religion in such a case. The state comes to

champion 'the rights of reason and self-consciousness.'

It is not strength, but weakness which has in our times

made religion a polemical kind of piety'; the struggle

for man's historical fulfillment is not a religious but a so-

"158. ii 170,

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 221

cial and political struggle, and its transplantation to an

inner sanctum of the soul, of belief and morality, means

regression to a stage long since past.

Nevertheless, these critical qualities are dwarfed by

the oppressive trends inherent in all authoritarianism,

which manifest their full force in Hegel's doctrine of ex-

ternal sovereignty. We have already shown how Hegel ele-

vated the national interests of the particular state to the

place of highest and most indubitable authority in inter-

national relations. The state puts forward and asserts the

interests of its members by welding them into a com-

munity, in this way fulfilling their freedom and their

rights and transforming the destructive force of competi-

tion into a unified whole. Undisputed internal authority

of the state is a prerequisite for successful competition,

and the latter necessarily terminates in external sover-

eignty. The life and death struggle of individuals in civil

society for mutual recognition has its counterpart among

sovereign states in the form of war. War is the inevitable

issue of any test of sovereignty. It is neither an absolute

evil nor an accident, but an 'ethical element/ for war

achieves that integration of interests that civil society can-

not establish by itself. 'Successful wars have prevented

civil broils and strengthened the internal power of the

State/ 12

Hegel was thus as cynical as Hobbes on the subject of

the bourgeois state, ending in a complete rejection of In-

ternational Law. The state, the final subject that perpetu-

ates competitive society, cannot be bound by a higher law,

for such a law would amount to an external restriction of

sovereignty and destroy the life-element of civil society. 111

120 3*4, note.

121 Fascist ideology has made this intrinsic connection between sov-

ereignty, war, and competition a decisive argument against liberal capi-

talism. 'An entire community can practice competition in an orderly way

only in war or in competition with an outside community. Thus, in war-

282 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

No contract is valid among states. Sovereignty cannot be

circumscribed by treaties that imply in their very nature

a mutual dependence of the parties involved. Sovereign

states stand outside the world of civil interdependence;

they exist in a 'state of nature/

We note again that blind nature enters and elbows

aside the self-conscious rationality of objective mind:

States find themselves in a natural more than a legal rela-

tion to each other. There is hence a continuous struggle be-

tween them. They conclude treaties and therewith establish a

legal relation between themselves. On the other hand, how-

ever, they are autonomous and independent. Right, therefore,

cannot be real as between them. They may break treaties arbi-

trarily, and they must constantly find themselves distrusting

one another. Since they are in a state of nature, they act ac-

cording to violence. They maintain and procure their rights

through their own power and must as a matter of necessity

plunge into war. 122

Hegel's idealism comes to the same conclusion as did

Hobbes's materialism. The rights of sovereign states 'have

reality not in a general will which is constituted as a su-

perior power, but in their particular wills.' 128 Accord-

ingly, disputes among them can be settled only by war.

International relations are an arena for 'the wild play of

particular passions, interests, aims, talents, virtues, force,

wrong, vice, and external contingency' the moral end it-

self, 'the State's autonomy, is exposed to chance.' 12i

time, each warring community operates internally on the basis of co-

operation and externally on the basis of competition. In this way there is

order within and anarchy without. It is obviously an inevitable condition

of any society of sovereign nations that it be characterized by anarchy.

Multiple sovereignties are merely a synonym for anarchy. International

anarchy is a corollary of national sovereignty.' This paragraph from Law-

rence Dennis's book The Dynamics of War and Revolution (1940, p. 122)

is an exact restatement of Hegel's doctrine of sovereignty.

w Philosophised Propadeutik, I, 31, in Sdmtliche Wcrke, op. cit.,

vol. HI, p, 74.

i" Philosophy of Right, 353.

124

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

But is this drama of chance and violence really final?

Does reason terminate in the state and in that play of

reckless natural forces in which the state must perforce

engage? Hegel has repudiated such conclusions through-

out the Philosophy of Right. The state right, though not

bound by international law, is still not the final right, but

must answer to 'the right of the World Mind which is

the unconditional absolute/ 125 The state has its real con-

tent in universal history (Weltgeschichte), the realm of

the world mind, which holds 'the supreme absolute

truth.' 128 Furthermore, Hegel emphasizes that any rela-

tion between autonomous states 'must be external. A third

must therefore stand above and unite them.' 'This third

is the Mind which materializes itself in world history, and

constitutes itself absolute judge over States.' 127 The state,

even laws and duties, are merely 'a determinate reality';

they pass up into and rest upon a higher sphere. 128

What, then, is this final sphere of state and society?

How are state and society related to the world mind?

These questions can only be answered if we turn to an

interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of History.

*

125 j . 126 33. 127 259, Addition. 128 270, note.

VII

M )<*(-

The Philosophy of History

BEING, for dialectical logic, is a process through contra-

dictions that determine the. content and development of

all reality. The Logic had elaborated the timeless struc-

ture of this process, but the intrinsic connection, between

the Logic and the other parts of the system, and, above

all, the implications of the dialectical method destroy the

very idea of timelessness. The Logic had shown that the

true being is the idea, but the idea unfolds itself 'in

space* (as nature) and 'in time* (as mind). 1 Mind is of

its very essence affected by time, for it exists only in the

temporal process of history. The forms of the mind mani-

fest themselves in time, and the history of the world is an

exposition of mind in time. 2 The dialectic thus gets to

view reality temporally, and the 'negativity* that, in the

Logic, determined the process of thought appears in the

Philosophy of History as the destructive power of time.

The Logic had demonstrated the structure of reason;

the Philosophy of History expounds the historical content

of reason. Or, we may say, the content of reason here is

the same as the content of history, although by content

we refer not to the miscellany of historical facts, but to

what makes history a rational whole, the laws and tenden-

cies to which the facts point and from which they receive

their meaning.

'Reason is the sovereign of the world/ f this, according

to Hegel, is a hypothesis, and the only hypothesis in the

i Philosophy of History, p. 7*.

* Philosophic der Wcltgcschichte, ed. G. Lasson, op. dt., p. 194.

Philosophy of History, p. 9.

3*4

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 885

philosophy of history. This hypothesis, which distinguishes

the philosophic method of treating history from any other

method, does not imply that history has a definite end.

The teleological character of history (if indeed history has

such) can only be a conclusion from an empirical study

of history and cannot be assumed a priori. Hegel states

emphatically that 'in history, thought must be subordinate

to what is given, to the realities of fact; this is its basis

and guide.' 4 Consequently, 'we have to take history as it

is. We must proceed historically empirically/ an odd ap-

proach for an idealistic philosophy of history.

The laws of history have to be demonstrated in and

from the facts thus far, Hegel's is the empirical method.

But these laws cannot be known unless the investigation

first has the guidance of proper theory. Facts of themselves

disclose nothing; they only answer adequate theoretical

questions. True scientific objectivity requires the appli-

cation of sound categories that organize data in their ac-

tual significance, and not a passive reception of given facts.

'Even the ordinary, the "impartial" historiographer, who

believes and prgfesses that he maintains a simply receptive

attitude, surrendering himself only to the data supplied

him is by no means passive as regards the exercise of his

thinking powers. He brings his categories with him, and

sees the phenomena . . . exclusively through these

media.' 5

But how does one recognize the sound categories and

the proper theory? Philosophy decides. It elaborates those

general categories that direct investigation in all special

fields. Their validity in these fields, however, must be veri-

fied by the facts, and the verification is had when the given

facts are comprehended by the theory in such a way that

they appear under definite laws and as moments of definite

4 Ibid, p. 8. Ibid., p. ii.

226 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

tendencies, which explain their sequence and interde-

pendence.

The dictum that philosophy should provide the general

categories for understanding history is not arbitrary, nor

did it originate with Hegel. The great theories of the

eighteenth century all took the philosophic view that his-

tory was progress. This concept of progress, soon to de-

generate into a shallow complacency, originally pointed

sharp condemnatory criticism on an obsolete social order.

The rising middle class used the concept of progress as a

means to interpret the past history of mankind as the pre-

history of its own reign, a reign that was destined to bring

the world to maturity. When, they said, the new middle

class would get to shape the world in accordance with its

interests, an unheard-of spurt in material and intellectual

forces would make man master of nature and would initi-

ate the true history of humanity. As long as all this had

not yet materialized, history was still in a state of struggle

for truth. The idea of progress, an integral element in the

philosophy of the French Enlightenment, interpreted his-

torical facts as signposts marking man's path to reason.

The truth still lay outside the realm of fact in a state to

come. Progress implied that the given state of affairs would

be negated and not continued.

This pattern still prevails in Hegel's Philosophy of His-

tory. Philosophy is the material as well as the logical

a priori of history, so long as history has not yet won the

level adequate to human potentialities. We know, how-

ever, that Hegel thought history had reached its goal and

that idea and reality had found common ground. Hegel's

work thus marks the apogee and end of the critical philo-

sophic historiography. He still looks to freedom's inter-

est in his dealing with historical facts, and still views the

struggle for freedom as the only content of history. But

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 227

this interest has lost its vigor and the struggle has come

to an end.

The concept of freedom, as the Philosophy of Right has

shown, follows the pattern of free ownership. As a result,

the history of the world that Hegel looks out upon exalts

and enshrines the history of the middle class, which based

itself on this pattern. There is a stark truth in Hegel's

strangely certain announcement that history has reached

its end. But it announces the funeral of a class, not of

history. At the close of the book, Hegel writes, after a de-

scription of the Restoration, 'This is the point which con-

sciousness has attained/ 6 This hardly sounds like an end.

Consciousness is historical consciousness, and when we

read in the Philosophy of Right that 'one form of life has

grown old/ it is one form, not all forms of life. The con-

sciousness and the aims of his class were open to Hegel.

He saw they contained no new principle to rejuvenate the

world. If this consciousness was to be mind's final form,

then history had entered a realm beyond which there was

no progress.

Philosophy gives historiography its general categories,

and these are identical with the basic concepts of the dia-

lectic. Hegel has summarized them in his introductory lec-

tures. 7 We shall get to them later. First, we must discuss

the concepts he calls specific historical categories.

The hypothesis on which the Philosophy of History

rests has already been verified by Hegel's Logic: the true

being is reason, manifest in nature and come to realiza-

tion in man. The realization takes place in history, and

since reason realized in history is mind, Hegel's thesis im-

plies that the actual subject or driving force of history is

mind.

6 P. 456.

TGeorg Lasson has published the various forms of this introduction

in his edition of Hegel's Philosophic der Weltgeschichtc, ig&o-8. See

particularly vol. i, p. 10 et seq. and p. 31 et seq.

2*8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

Of course, man is also part of nature and his natural

drives and impulses play a material role in history. Hegel's

Philosophy of History does more justice to this role than

do many empirical historiographies. Nature, in the form

of the sum-total of natural conditions for human life, re-

mains the primary basis of history throughout Hegel's

book.

As a natural being, man is confined to particular condi-

tionshe is born in this or that place or time, a member

of this or that nation, bound to share the fate of the par-

ticular whole to which he belongs. Yet, despite all this,

man is essentially a thinking subject, and thought, we

know, constitutes universality. Thought (i) lifts men be-

yond their particular determinations and (2) also makes

the multitude of external things the medium for the sub-

ject's development.

This double universality, subjective and objective, char-

acterizes the historical world wherein man unfolds his life.

History, as the history of the thinking subject, is of ne-

cessity universal history (Weltgeschichte) just because 'it

belongs to the realm of Mind.' We apprehend the content

of history through general concepts, such as nation, state;

agrarian, feudal, civil society; despotism, democracy,

monarchy; proletariat, middle class, nobility, and so on.

Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon are for us Roman, English,

French citizens; we understand them as members of their

nation, responding to the society and the state of their

time. The universal asserts itself in them. Our general

concepts grasp this universal to be the actual subject of

history, so that, for example, the history of mankind is

not the life and battles of Alexander the Great, Caesar, the

German emperors, the French kings, the Cromwells and

Napoleons, but the life and battles of that universal which

unfolds itself in different guises through the various cul-

tural wholes.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 2*Q

The essence of this universal is mind, and 'the essence

of Mind is freedom . . . Philosophy teaches that all the

qualities of Mind exist only through freedom; that all are

but means for attaining freedom; that all seek and pro-

duce this and this alone. 1 * We have discussed these quali-

ties, and we have seen that freedom terminates in the self-

assurance of complete appropriation; that the mind is free

if it possesses and knows the world as its property. It is

therefore quite understandable that the Philosophy of

History should end with the consolidation of middle-class

society and that the periods of history should appear as

necessary stages in the realization of its form of freedom.

The true subject of history is the universal, not the in-

dividual; the true content is the realization of the self-

consciousness of freedom, not the interests, needs, and ac-

tions of the individual. 'The history of the world is none

other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom/ 9

Yet, 'the first glance at history convinces us that the ac-

tions of men proceed from their needs, their passions,

their characters and talents; and impresses us with the be-

lief that such needs, passions and interests are the sole

springs of actiori the efficient agents in this scene of activ-

ity.' 10 To explain history thus means 'to depict the pas-

sions of mankind, its genius, its active powers/ 1X How

does Hegel resolve the apparent contradiction? There can

be no question that the needs and interests of individuals

are the levers of all historical action, and that in history

it is the individual's fulfillment that should come to pass.

Something else asserts itself, howeverhistorical reason.

As they follow out their own interests, individuals pro-

mote the progress of mind, that is, perform a universal

task that advances freedom. Hegel cites the example of

Caesar's struggle for power. In his overthrpw of the tra-

Philosophy of History, p. 17. *> P. *o.

P. 19. " P. 13.

23O THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

ditional form of Roman state, Caesar was certainly driven

by ambition; but, in satisfying his personal drives he ful-

filled 'a necessary destiny in the history of Rome and of

the world'; through his actions, he achieved a higher, more

rational form of political organization. 12

A universal principle is thus latent in the particular

aims of individualsuniversal because 'a necessary phase

in the development of truth.' " It is as if mind uses indi-

viduals for its unwitting tool. Let us take an example from

Marxian theory that may elucidate the connection be-

tween Hegel's Philosophy of History and the subsequent

evolution of the dialectic. Marx held that during a de-

veloped industrial capitalism individual capitalists are

compelled to adapt their enterprises to the rapid progress

of technology in order to assure their profits and outdo

their competitors. They thereby reduce the amount of

labor-power they employ and thus, since their surplus

value is produced only by labor-power, reduce the rate of

profit at the disposal of their class. In this way they ac-

celerate the disintegrating tendencies of the social system

they want to maintain.

The process of reason working itself out through indi-

viduals, however, does not occur with natural necessity,

nor does it have a continuous and unilinear course. 'There

are many considerable periods in history in which this de-

velopment seems to have been intermitted; in which, we

might rather say, the whole enormous gain of previous

culture appears to have been entirely lost; after which,

unhappily, a new commencement has been necessary.' 14

There are periods of 'retrocession' alternating with periods

of steady advance. Regress, when it occurs, is not an 'ex-

ternal contingency' but, as we shall see, is part of the

dialectic of historical change; an advance to a higher plane

p. 30. P. *g. " P. 56.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 2J1

of history first requires that the negative forces inherent

in all reality get the upper hand. The higher phase, how-

ever, is finally to be reached; every obstacle on the road

to freedom is surmountable, given the efforts of a self-

conscious mankind.

This is the universal principle of history. It is not a

'law/ in the scientific sense of the term, such, for exam-

ple, as governs matter. Matter in its structure and motion

has unchangeable laws that carry on and maintain it, but

matter is nowhere the subject of its processes, nor has it any

power over them. A being, on the other hand, that is the

active and conscious subject of its existence stands under

quite different laws. Self-conscious practice becomes part

of the very content of the laws, so that the latter operate

as laws only in so far as they are taken into the subject's

will and influence his acts. The universal law of history is,

in Hegel's formulation, not simply progress to freedom,

but progress 'in the self-consciousness of freedom.' A set

of historical tendencies becomes a law only if man com-

prehends and acts on them. Historical laws, in other words,

originate and are actual only in man's conscious practice,

so that if, for instance, there is a law of progress to ever

higher forms of freedom, it ceases to operate if man fails

to recognize and execute it. Hegel's philosophy of history

might amount to a deterministic theory, but the determin-

ing factor is at least freedom. Progress depends on man's

ability to grasp the universal interest of reason and on

his will and vigor in making it a reality.

But if the particular wants and interests of men are the

sole springs of their action, how can self-consciousness of

freedom ever motivate human practice? To answer this

question we must again ask, Who is the actual subject of

history? Whose practice is historical practice? Individuals,

it would seem, are merely agents of history. Their con-

sciousness is conditioned by their personal interest; they

8J2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

make business, not history. There are some individuals,

however, who rise above this level; their actions do not

repeat old patterns but create new forms of life. Such

men are men of history kat'exochen, welthistorische Indi-

viduen, like Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon. 15 Their acts,

too, spring from personal interests, but in their case these

become identical with the universal interest and the latter

far transcends the interest of any particular group: they

forge and administer the progress of history. Their inter-

est must necessarily clash with the particular interest of

the prevailing system of life. Historical individuals are

men of a time when 'momentous collisions' arise 'between

existing, acknowledged duties, laws, and rights, and those

potentialities which are adverse to this fixed system; which

assail and even destroy its foundations and existence/ "

These potentialities appear to the historical individual as

choices for his specific power, but they involve a 'univer-

sal principle* in so far as they are the choice of a higher

form of life that has ripened within the existing system.

Historical individuals thus anticipated 'the necessary . . .

sequent step in progress which their world was to take.' 1T

What they desired and struggled for was 'the very truth

for their age, for their world/ Conscious of 'the require-

ments of the time* and of 'what was ripe for development/

they acted.

Even these men of history, however, are not yet the

actual subjects of history. They are the executors of its

will, the 'agents of the World Mind/ no more. They are

victims of a higher necessity, which acts itself out in their

lives; they are still mere instruments for historical prog-

ress.

The final subject of history Hegel calls the world mind

(Wcltgeist). Its reality lies in those actions, tendencies, ef-

IB p. 29. i Ibid. IT p. 30.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 233

forts, and institutions that embody the interest of freedom

and reason. It does not exist separate from these realities,

and acts through these agents and agencies. The law of

history, which the world mind represents, thus operates be-

hind the backs and over the heads of individuals, in the

form of an irresistible anonymous power. The transition

from Oriental culture to that of the Greek world, the rise

of feudalism, the establishment of bourgeois societyall

these changes were not man's free work, but the necessary

results of objective historical forces. Hegel's conception

of the world mind emphasizes that in these previous peri-

ods of recorded history man was not the self-conscious

master of his existence. The divine power 'of the world

mind appeared then an objective force that rules over the

actions of men.

The sovereignty of the world mind, as Hegel portrays

it, exhibits the dark traits of a world that is controlled

by the forces of history instead of controlling them. While

these forces are as yet unknown in their true essence, they

bring misery and destruction in their wake. History then

appears as 'thq, slaughter-bench at which the happiness of

peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individ-

uals have been victimized.' 18 Hegel at the same time

extols the sacrifice of individual and general happi-

ness that results. He calls it 'the cunning of reason.' 19

Individuals lead unhappy lives, they toil and perish, but

though they actually never win their goal, their distress

and defeat are the very means by which truth and freedom

proceed. A man never reaps the fruits of his labor; they

always fall to future generations. His passions and inter-

ests, however, do not succumb; they are the devices that

keep him working in the service of a superior power and

a superior interest. 'This may be called the cunning of

i P. i. w P. 33.

234 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

reason that it sets the passions to work for itself, while

that which develops its existence through such impulsion

pays the penalty, and suffers loss.' 20 Individuals fail and

pass away; the idea triumphs and is eternal.

The idea triumphs precisely because individuals perish

in defeat. It is not the 'Idea that is implicated in opposi-

tion and combat, and that is exposed to danger. It remains

in the background, untouched and uninjured 1 while 'in-

dividuals are sacrificed and abandoned. The Idea pays the

penalty of existence and of transitoriness not from itself,

but from the passions of individuals/ 21 But can this idea

still be regarded as the incarnation of truth and freedom?

Kant had emphatically insisted that it would contradict

man's nature to use him as a mere means. Only a few

decades later Hegel declares himself in favor of 'the idea

that individuals, their desires and the gratification of them,

are . . . sacrificed, and their happiness given up to the

empire of chance, to which it belongs; and that as a gen-

eral rule, individuals come under the category of means.' 2a

He confesses that where man is simply an object of su-

perior historical processes he can be an end in himself

only in the domain of morality and religion.

The world mind is the hypostatic subject of history; it

is a metaphysical substitute for the real subject, the un-

fathomable God of a frustrated humanity, hidden and

awful, like the God of the Calvinists; the mover of a world

in which all that occurs does so despite the conscious ac-

tions of man and at the expense of his happiness. 'History

... is not the theater of happiness. Periods of happiness

are blank pages in it.' * 8

This metaphysical subject, however, assumes concrete

form as soon as Hegel raises the question of how the world

mind materializes itself. 'In what material is the idea of

so ibid. "ibid. "ibid. p. 6.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 2 35

Reason wrought out?' The world mind strives to realize

freedom and can materialize itself only in the real realm

of freedom, that is, in the state. Here, the world mind is,

as it were, institutionalized; here it finds the self-conscious-

ness through which the law of history operates.

The Philosophy of History does not discuss (as did the

Philosophy of Right) the idea of the state; it discusses its

various concrete historical forms. Hegel's well-known

schema distinguishes three main historical stages in the de-

velopment of freedom: the Oriental, the Greco-Roman,

and the German-Christian.

The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Mind

man as such is free; and because they do not know this,

they are not free. They only know that one is free. But on

this very account, the freedom of that one is only caprice . . .

That one is therefore only a Despot, not a free man. The con-

sciousness of freedom first arose among the Greeks, and there-

fore they were free; but they, and the Romans likewise, knew

only that some are free not man as such . . . The Greeks,

therefore, had slaves; and their whole life and the main-

tenance of their splendid liberty, was implicated with the in-

stitution of slavery . . . The German nations, under the in-

fluence of Christianity, were the first to attain the conscious-

ness, that man, as man, is free: that it is the freedom of Mind

which constitutes its essence. 24

Hegel distinguishes three typical state forms to corre-

spond to the three main phases in the development of

freedom: 'The East knew and to the present day knows

only that One is free; the Greek and Roman world, that

some are free; the German world knows that all are free.

The first political form, therefore, which we observe in

history, is despotism, the second democracy and aristoc-

racy, the third monarchy.' At first, this is no more than

the Aristotelian typology applied to universal history. The

monarchic holds first rank as the perfectly free state form,

a* P. 18; see also pp. 104-10.

836 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

by virtue of its rule of right and law under constitutional

guarantees. 'In monarchy, . . . there is one lord and no

serf, for servitude is abrogated by it; and in it Right and

Law are recognized; it is the source of real freedom. Thus

in monarchy, the caprice of individuals is kept under, and

a common gubernatorial interest established/ 25 Hegel's

judgment here is based on the fact that he regards the

modern absolutist state to be an advance over the feudal

system. He has reference to the strongly centralized

bourgeois state that overcame the revolutionary terror of

1793. Freedom, he has shown, begins with property, un-

folds itself in the universal rule of law that acknowledges

and secures the equal right to property, and terminates in

the state, which is able to cope with the antagonisms that

attend freedom of property. Consequently, the history of

freedom comes to an end with the advent of 'modern

monarchy, which, in Hegel's time, achieved this goal.

The Philosophy of Right had concluded with the state-

ment that the right of the state is subordinate to the right

of the world mind and to the judgment of universal his-

tory. Hegel now develops this point. He gives the various

state forms their place in the course of history, first co-

ordinating each with its representative historical period.

Hegel does not mean to say that the Oriental world knew

only despotism, the Greco-Roman only democracy, and the

German only monarchy. His scheme rather implies that

despotism is the political form most adequate to the ma-

terial and intellectual culture of the Orient, and the other

political forms respectively to the other historical periods.

He then proceeds to assert that the unity of the state is

conditioned by the prevailing national culture; that is, the

state depends on such factors as the geographical location

and the natural, racial, and social qualities of the nation.

25 P. 899-

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 237

This is the purport of his concept of national mind (Volks-

geist). 26 The latter is the manifestation of the world mind

at a given stage of historical development; it is the subject

of national history in the same sense as the world mind is

the subject of universal history. National history must be

understood in terms of universal history. 'Each particular

National genius is to be treated as only one individual in

the process of Universal History.' 2T The history of a na-

tion has to be judged according to its contribution to the

progress of all mankind towards the self-consciousness of

freedom. 28 The various nations do not contribute equally;

some are active promoters of this progress. These are the

world-historical nations (welthistorische Volksgeister). The

decisive jumps to new and higher forms of life occur in

their history, while other nations play more minor roles.

The question as to the relation of a particular state to

the world mind may now be answered. Every form of

state must be evaluated according to whether it is ade-

quate to the stage of historical consciousness that mankind

has reached. Freedom does not and cannot mean the same

thing in the different periods of history, for in each period

one type of freedom is the true one. The state must be

built on the acknowledgment of this freedom. The Ger-

man world, through the Reformation, produced in its

course that kind of freedom which recognized the essen-

tial equality of men. Constitutional monarchy expresses

and integrates this form of society. It is for Hegel the

consummation of the realization of freedom.

Let us now consider the general structure of the histori-

* Pp. 50-54; see also p. 64. T p. 53.

*a The decisive difference between Hegel's concept of the Volksgeist and

the use made of the same concept by the Historischc Schule consists in

this: that the latter school conceived of the Volksgeist in terms of a

natural rather than a rational development and set it against the higher

values posited in universal history. We shall see later that the Historischc

Schule's conception belongs to the positivist reaction against Hegelian

rationalism.

838 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

cal dialectic. Since Aristotle, historical change has been

contrasted with changes in nature. Hegel held to the same

distinction. He says historical change is 'an advance to

something better, more perfect/ whereas mutation in na-

ture 'exhibits only a perpetually self-repeating cycle.' 29 It

is only in historical changes that something new arises.

Historical change is therefore development. 'Everything

depends on apprehending the principle of this develop-

ment/ The principle implies first that there exists a latent

'destiny/ 'a potentiality striving to realize itself/ This is

obvious in the case of the living being whose life is the

unfolding of potentialities contained in the germ, and

their constant actualization, but the highest form of de-

velopment is reached only when self-consciousness exer-

cises mastery over the whole process. The life of the think-

ing subject is the only one that may be called a self-reali-

zation, in the strict sense. The thinking subject 'produces

itself, expands itself actually to what it always was poten-

tially. 9 80 And it achieves this result in so far as every par-

ticular existential condition is dissolved by the potentiali-

ties that are inherent in it and transformed into a new

condition, which fulfills these potentialities. How is this

process manifested in history?

The thinking subject lives in history, and the state fur-

nishes in large part the existential conditions of its his-

torical life. The state exists as the universal interest amid

individual actions and interests. Individuals experience

this universal in various forms, each of which is an essen-

tial phase in the history of every state. The state appears

first as an immediate, 'natural' unity. At this stage, social

antagonisms have not yet intensified and individuals find

satisfaction in the state without consciously opposing their

individualities to the commonwealth. This is the golden

Ibid., p. 54. 8 P-55-

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 239

youth of every nation, and the golden youth of universal

history. Unconscious freedom prevails, but because it is

unconscious, it is a stage of mere potential freedom; actual

freedom comes only with the self-consciousness of freedom.

The prevailing potentiality has to actualize itself; in doing

so it shatters the unconscious stage of human organi-

zation.

Thought is the vehicle of this process. The individuals

become conscious of their potentialities and organize their

relations in accordance with their reason. A nation com-

posed of such individuals has 'apprehended the principle

of its life and condition, the science of its laws, right and

morality, and has consciously organized the state.' 81

This state, also, is subject to thought, the element that

leads ultimately to its destruction, the same element that

has given this state its form. Social and political reality

cannot, for any length of time, conform to the demands

of reason, for the state seeks to maintain the interest of

that which is, and thus to fetter the forces that tend to a

higher historical form. Sooner or later, the free rational-

ity of thought n^ust come into conflict with the rationali-

zations of the given order of life.

Hegel saw in this process a general law of history, as

unalterable as time itself. No power whatsoever could, in

the long run, stop the march of thought. Thinking was

not a harmless activity but a dangerous one, which, as

soon as it would flow among citizens and determine their

practice, would drive them to question and even to sub-

vert the traditional forms of culture. Hegel illustrated this

destructive dynamics of thought by means of an ancient

myth.

The god Kronos first ruled over the lives of men, and

his rule signified a Golden Age during which men lived

w p. 76.

240 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

in immediate unity among themselves and with nature.

But Kronos was the god of time, and time devoured its

own children. Everything that man had accomplished was

destroyed; nothing remained. Then, Kronos himself was

devoured by Zeus, a power greater than time. Zeus was

the god who brought forth reason and promoted the arts;

he was the 'political god* who created the state and made

it the work of self-conscious and moral individuals. This

state was generated and maintained by reason and mo-

rality; it was something that could persist and endure,

reason's productive power seemed to bring time to a

standstill. This moral and rational community, however,

was dissolved by the same force that had created it. The

principle of thought, of reasoning and knowledge de-

stroyed the beautiful work of art that was the state, and

Zeus, who had put an end to the devouring force of time,

was himself swallowed up. The work of thought was de-

stroyed by thought. Thought is thus drawn into the proc-

ess of time, and the force that compelled knowledge in the

Logic to negate every particular content is disclosed, in

the Philosophy of History, as the negativity of time itself.

Hegel says: 'Time is the negative element in the sensuous

world. Thought is the same negativity, but it is the deep-

est, the infinite form of it . . .' 82

Hegel connected the destructive dynamics of thought

with historical progress towards 'universality/ The dissolu-

tion of a given form of the state is, at the same time, the

crossing to a higher form of state that is more 'universal'

than the preceding form. Man's self-conscious activity on

the one hand 'destroys the reality, the permanence of what

is, but at the same time it gains, on the other side, the

essence, the notion, the universal/ " According to Hegel,

historical progress is preceded and guided by a progress

P. 77. P.77.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 24!

of thought. As soon as thought is emancipated from its

attachment to the prevailing state of affairs, it goes beyond

the face value of things and tries for their notion. The

notion, however, comprehends the essence of things as

distinguished from their appearance the prevailing con-

ditions appear as limited particularities that do not ex-

haust the potentialities of things and men. Those who ad-

here to principles of reason, if they succeed in establishing

new social and political conditions, will endeavor, through

their higher conceptual knowledge, to incorporate more

of these potentialities into the order of life. Hegel saw

history progressing at least so much that the essential free-

dom and equality of men was being increasingly recog-

nized, and the particular limitations on this freedom and

equality were being increasingly removed.

When thought becomes the vehicle of practice it real-

izes the universal content of the given historical condi-

tions by shattering its particular form. Hegel viewed the

development of mankind as a process to real universality

in state and society. 'The history of the world is the disci-

pline [Zucht] of the uncontrolled natural will to univer-

sality and to subjective freedom.' * In the Logic, Hegel

had designated the notion as the unity of the universal

and the particular, and as the realm of subjectivity and

freedom. In the Philosophy of History, he applied these

selfsame categories to the final goal of historical develop-

ment, that is, to a state in which the freedom of the sub-

ject is in conscious union with the whole. The progress of

conceptual thinking, the comprehension of the notion,

was here linked to the progress of freedom. The Philoso-

phy of History thus gfcve a historical illustration of this

essential connection between freedom and the notion,

which had been explained in the Logic. Hegel elucidated

p. 104.

242 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

this connection by analyzing the work of Socrates. Instead

of surveying the content of Hegel's Philosophy of History,

we shall discuss his analysis of the Socratic contribution.

Hegel begins with a description of the early period of

the Greek city-state during which 'the subjectivity of will 1

was not yet awake within the natural unity of the polls.

Laws existed and the citizenry obeyed them, but they

looked upon them as having 'a necessity of nature/ M This

period was the one of the great constitutions (Thales, Bias,

Solon). The laws were held valid because they were laws;

freedom and right existed only in the form of custom

(Gewohnheit). The natural, continuous character of this

state made 'the democratic constitution . . . here the

only possible one; the citizens were still unconscious of

particular interests, and therefore of a corrupting ele-

ment . . .' M The absence of conscious subjectivity was

the condition for an undisturbed functioning of democracy.

The interest of the community could be 'intrusted to the

will and resolve of the citizens' because these citizens did

not yet have an autonomous will that could at any mo-

ment turn against the community. Hegel makes this point

general for all democracy. True democracy, he holds, ex-

presses an early phase in human development, a phase

prior to that in which the individual is emancipated, and

one incompatible with emancipation. His evaluation is ob-

viously based on the conviction that the progress of so-

ciety will necessarily engender a conflict between the in-

terest of the individual and that of the community. So-

ciety cannot free the individual without separating him

from the community and opposing his wish for subjective

liberty to the demands of the whole. The reason the Greek

city-state could be a democracy, Hegel implies, is that it

was made up of citizens who were not yet conscious of

w p. tss. 8 ibid.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 843

their essential individuality. Hegel held that a society of

emancipated individuals conflicted with democratic homo-

geneity.

Any recognition of individual freedom consequently

seemed to involve tearing down the ancient democracy.

'That very subjective freedom which constitutes the prin-

ciple and determines the peculiar form of freedom in our

world which forms the absolute basis of our political and

religious life, could not manifest itself in Greece other-

wise than as a destructive element/ 8T

This destructive element was brought into the Greek

city-state by Socrates, who taught precisely the 'subjec-

tivity* that Hegel calls the destructive element for the

ancient democracy. 'It was in Socrates that . . . the prin-

ciple of subjectivity [Innerlichkeit] of the absolute inde-

pendence of thought attained free expression.' 88 Socrates

taught that 'man has to discover and recognize in himself

that which is Right and Good, and that this Right and

Good is in its nature universal/ There are beautiful things

in the state, good and brave deeds, true judgments, just

judges but something exists that is the beautiful, the

good, the brave, etc.; it is more than all these particulars

and common to all of them. Man has an idea of the beau-

tiful, the good, etc., in his notion of beauty, goodness, etc.

The notion comprises what is truly beautiful and good,

and Socrates charged the thinking subject to discover this

truth and to maintain it against all external authority.

Socrates thus set the truth apart as a universal and attrib-

uted the knowledge of this universal to the autonomous

thought of the individual. By so doing he 'set the indi-

vidual up as the subject of all final decisions, against the

fatherland and customary morality/ w Socrates's principles

thus show 'a revolutionary opposition to the Athenian

87 Ibid. * P. 6g. 89 Pp. 969-70.

244 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

State.' * He was condemned to death. This act was justified

in so far as the Athenians were condemning their 'absolute

foe.' On the other hand, the death sentence contained the

'deeply tragical* element that the Athenians thereby also

condemned their society and their state. For, their sen-

tence recognized that 'what they reprobated in Socrates

had already struck firm root among themselves.' * l

A decisive historical turn thus followed upon a turn in

the development of thought. Philosophy began to elab-

orate universal concept, and this was the prelude of a

new phase in state history. Universal concepts, however, are

abstract concepts, and 'the construction of the State in the

abstract' struck at the very foundations of the existing state.

The homogeneity of the city-state was achieved through

the exclusion of slaves, other Greek citizens, and 'barbar-

ians.' Though Socrates himself may not have developed

this implication, abstract universal concepts of their very

nature imply a crossing beyond every particularity and

a championing of the free subject, of man as man.

The same process that made abstract thought into truth's

abode emancipated the individual as a real 'subject.' Soc-

rates could not teach men to think in the abstract without

making them free from the traditional standards of thought

and existence. The free subject as the Logic had main-

tainedis indeed intrinsically connected with the notion.

The free subject arises only when the individual no longer

accepts the given order of things but stands up to it be-

cause he has learned the notion of things and learned that

the truth does not lie in the current norms and opinions.

He cannot know this unless he has ventured into abstract

thought. It gives him the necessary 'detachment' from the

prevailing standards, and, in the form of critical, opposi-

tional thought, it constitutes the medium in which the

free subject moves.

p. 170. ibid.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 845

When the principle of subjectivity first appeared, with

Socrates, it could not be concretized and made the foun-

dation of the state and society. The principle made its

real debut with Christianity and thus 'arose first in reli-

gion.'

[Its introduction into] the various relations of the actual

world involves a more extensive problem than its simple im-

plantation; a problem whose solution and application require

a severe and lengthened process of culture. In proof of this,

we may note that slavery did not cease immediately on the

reception of Christianity. Still less did liberty predominate in

states; or governments and constitutions adopt a rational or-

ganization; or recognize freedom as their basis. That applica-

tion of the principle of Christianity to political relations; the

thorough moulding or interpenetration of society by it, is a

process identical with history itself. 42

The German Reformation marks the first successful at-

tempt to introduce the principle of subjectivity into

changing social and political relations. It placed the sole

responsibility for his deeds on the free subject and chal-

lenged the traditional system of authority and privilege

in the name of Christian freedom and human equality.

'While, then, the individual knows that he is filled with

the Divine Spirit, all [the hitherto prevailing external re-

lations] ... are ipso facto abrogated; there is no longer

a distinction between priests and laymen; we no longer

find one class in possession of the substance of the truth,

as of all spiritual and temporal treasures of the Church/

The inmost subjectivity of man was recognized 'as that

which can and ought to come into possession of the truth;

and this subjectivity is the common property of all man-

kind.'"

Hegel's picture of the Reformation is fully as erroneous

as his description of the subsequent social development,

4i p. 18. * P. 4i&

846 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEI/S PHILOSOPHY

confusing the ideas by which modern society glorified its

rise for the reality of this society. He was thus led to a

harmonistic interpretation of history, according to which

the crossing to a new historical form is at the same time

a progress to a higher historical form a preposterous in-

terpretation, because all the victims of oppression and in-

justice are witness against it, as are all the vain sufferings

and sacrifices of history. The interpretation is the more

preposterous because it denies the critical implications of

the dialectic and establishes a harmony between the prog-

ress of thought and the process of reality.

Hegel did not, however, consider the historical realiza-

tion of man to be an unswerving progress. The history of

man was to him at the same time the history of man's

alienation (Entfremdung).

'What Mind really strives for is the realization of its

notion; but in doing so, it hides that goal from its own

vision, and is proud and well satisfied in this alienation

from its own essence.' 44 The institutions man founds and

the culture he creates develop laws of their own, and man's

freedom has to comply with them. He is overpowered by

the expanding wealth of his economic, social, and political

surrounding and comes to forget that he himself, his free

development, is the final goal of all these works; instead

he surrenders to their sway. Men always strive to per-

petuate an established culture, and in doing so perpetuate

their own frustration. The history of man is the history

of his estrangement from his true interest and, by the

same token, the history of its realization. The conceal-

ment of man's true interest in his societal world is part

of the 'cunning of reason' and is one of those 'negative

elements' without which there is no progress to higher

forms. Marx was the first to explain the origin and sig-

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

nificance of this estrangement; Hegel had little more than

a general intuition of its meaning.

Hegel died in 1831. The preceding year had brought

the first revolutionary concussion to the political system

of the Restoration the same system that Hegel thought

signified the realization of reason in civil society. The

state began to totter. The Bourbons in France were over-

thrown by the July revolution. British political life was

rent with heated discussions of the Reform Bill, which

provided for far-reaching changes in the English electoral

system, changes that favored the city bourgeoisie, and for

the strengthening of Parliament at the expense of the

crown. The French and the English movements resulted

merely in an adjustment of the state to the prevailing

power relationships so that the process of democratization

that went on in political forms nowhere crossed beyond

the social system of civil society. Nevertheless, Hegel knew

full well the dangers of even the small transformations

that were going on. He knew that the dynamics inherent

in civil society, once loosed from the protective mecha-

nisms of the state, could, at any moment, release forces

to shake the whole system.

One of Hegel's latest writings, published the year of his

death, was an extended paper on the English Reform Bill.

It contained a severe criticism of the bill, claiming that

it weakened the sovereignty of the monarch by setting up

a Parliament that would place the 'abstract principles' of

the French Revolution in opposition to the concrete hier-

archy of the state. The strengthening of Parliament, he

warns, will eventually unleash the terrifying power of the

'people.' Reform, in the given social situation, might sud-

denly turn into revolution. Were the bill to succeed,

248 THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

... the struggle would threaten to become even more dan-

gerous. There would no longer exist any higher power medi-

ating between the interest of positive privilege and the de-

mand for more real freedom, a higher power that might re-

strict and reconcile these. For, in England, the monarchic ele-

ment does not have the power that other states have and

through which they could effect transition from legislation

based merely on positive rights to one based on the principles

of real freedom. Other states have been able to effect trans-

formations without upheaval, violence and robbery; in Eng-

land, the transformation would have to be carried through by

another force, by the people. An opposition building itself on

a program hitherto foreign to Parliament and feeling itself

unable to expand its influence among the other parties in

Parliament might be induced to seek its strength among the

people; then, instead of achieving a reform it would bring

forth a revolution. 45

Rudolf Haym, who interpreted Hegel according to Ger-

man liberalism, recognized that Hegel's article was a docu-

ment of fear and anxiety rather than of reactionary po-

litical philosophy, for 'Hegel did not disapprove % of the

tendency and content of the Reform Bill, but feared the

danger of reform as such.' 4fl Hegel's belief in the stability

of the Restoration state was seriously shaken. Reform

might be a good thing, but this state could not afford the

liberty of reform without endangering the system of

power on which it rested. Hegel's article on the Reform

Bill is not a document expressive of any faith or confi-

dence that the existing form of the state will eternally en-

dure, any more than is his Preface to the Philosophy of

Right. Here, too, Hegel's philosophy ends in doubt and

resignation. 41

"'Ueber die Englische Reformbill* in Schriften iw Politik und Rechts-

philosophie, p. 3*6.

* Hegel und seine Zeit, Berlin 1857, p. 456.

7 See Hegel's letters to Goschel (December 15, 1830) and to Schultz

(January 29, 1831); cf. F. Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Stoat, Mtinchen

19*0, vol. u, p. **o.

PART II

The Rise of Social Theory

Introduction

FROM PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIAL THEORY

THE transition from philosophy to the domain of state

and society had been an intrinsic part of Hegel's system.

His basic philosophic ideas had fulfilled themselves in the

specific historical form that state and society had assumed,

and the latter became central to a new -theoretical inter-

est. Philosophy had in this way devolved upon social

theory. To understand the impact of Hegel's philosophy

on subsequent social theory, we must deviate from the

usual explanation.

The traditional account of the post-history of Hegelian

philosophy begins by pointing to the fact that the Hegel-

ian school after Hegel's death split into a right and a left

wing. The right wing, consisting of Michelet, Goschel,

Johann Eduard Erdmann, Gabler, and Rosenkranz, to

name only the most representative thinkers of this group,

took up and elaborated the conservative trends in the

Hegelian system, particularly in the Logic, Metaphysic

and the Philosophies of Right and of Religion. The left

wing, made up of David Friedrich Strauss, Edgar and

Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, and Ciszkowski, among others,

developed the critical tendencies in Hegel, beginning this

with a historical interpretation of religion. This latter

group came into greater and greater social and political

conflict with the Restoration and ended either in out-and-

out socialism and anarchism, or in a liberalism of the

petty-bourgeois stamp.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the influence

251

858 THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY

of Hegelianism was almost dead. It got its rebirth in

the last decades of the century in British Hegelianism

(Green, Bradley, Bosanquet) and, later still, gained a new

political impetus in Italy, where the interpretation of

Hegel was used as a preparation for Fascism.

In a totally different form, the Hegelian dialectic also

became an integral part of Marxian theory and its Lenin-

ist interpretation. Apart from these main lines, certain of

Hegel's concepts found employment in sociology (in

Lorenz von Stein's work, for example), in jurisprudence

(the historical school; Lasalle) and in the field of history

(Droysen, Ranke).

Such an account as this, though formally accurate, is a

little too schematic, and obliterates certain important dis-

tinctions. The historical heritage of Hegel's philosophy,

for instance, did not pass to the 'Hegelians' (neither of the

right nor of the left) they were not the ones who kept

alive the true content of this philosophy. The critical

tendencies of the Hegelian philosophy, rather, were taken

over by, and continued in, the Marxian social theory,

while, in all other aspects, the history of Hegelianism be-

came the history of a struggle against Hegel in which he

was used as a symbol for all that the new intellectual (and

to a considerable extent even the practical political) efforts

opposed.

Hegel's system brings to a close the entire epoch in

modern philosophy that had begun with Descartes and

had embodied the basic ideas of modern society. Hegel

was the last to interpret the world as reason, subjecting

nature and history alike to the standards of thought and

freedom. At the same time, he recognized the social and

political order men had achieved as the basis on which

reason had to be realized. His system brought philosophy

to the threshold of its negation and thus constituted the

FROM PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIAL THEORY 253

sole link between the old and the new form of critical

theory, between philosophy and social theory.

Before we attempt to show how the inner workings of

Western philosophy necessitated the transition to the criti-

cal theory of society, we must indicate the way in which

the historical efforts that distinguish the modern era en-

tered into and shaped the philosophic interest. The social

forces at work in this historical surge used philosophy in

its predominantly rationalistic form, and the idea of reason

might well serve again as the starting point for our discus-

sion.

Beginning with the seventeenth century, philosophy had

quite definitely absorbed the principles of the rising mid-

dle class. Reason was the critical slogan of this class, with

which it fought all who hampered its political and eco-

nomic development. The term saw service in the war of

science and philosophy against the Church, in the attack

of the French Enlightenment on absolutism, and in the

debate between liberalism and mercantilism. No clear-cut

definition of reason, and no single meaning for it, ran

through these periods. Its meaning changed with the

changing position of the middle class. We shall try to

gather up its essential elements and evaluate its varying

historical impact.

The idea of reason is not necessarily anti-religious. Rea-

son allows the possibility that the world might be the

creature of God and that its order might be divine and

purposive, but this should not exclude man's right to mold

it in accordance with his needs and knowledge. The mean-

ing of the world as rational implied, first, that it could be

comprehended and changed by man's knowingful action.

Nature was regarded as rational in its very structure, with

subject and object meeting in the medium of reason.

Secondly, human reason, it was explained, is not once

and for all restricted to a pre-established order, whether

254 THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY

social or otherwise. The multitude of talents that man

possesses all originate and develop in history, and he may

employ them in many ways for the best possible satisfac-

tion of his desires. Satisfaction itself will depend on the

extent of his control over nature and society. The standard

of reason was ultimate in this wide range of control. That

is to say, nature and society alike were to be organized so

that existing subjective and objective endowments freely

unfolded. Bad organization in society was to a consider-

able extent held responsible for the harmful and iniqui-

tous forms that institutions had assumed. With the ad-

vance towards a rational social order, these, it was held,

would lose their vitiating character. Man would by educa-

tion become a rational being in a rational world. The

completion of the process would see the laws of his indi-

vidual and social life all derived from his own autonomous

judgment. The realization of reason thus implied an end

to all external authority such as set man's existence at odds

with the standards of free thought.

Thirdly, reason involves universality. For, the emphasis

on reason declares that man's acts are those of a thinking

subject guided by conceptual knowledge. With concepts

as his instruments, the thinking subject can penetrate the

contingencies and recondite devices of the world and reach

universal and necessary laws that govern and order the

infinitude of individual objects. He thus discovers poten-

tialities that are common to multitudes of particulars, po-

tentialities that will explain the changing forms of things

and dictate the range and direction of their course. Uni-

versal concepts will become the organon of a practice that

alters the world. They might arise only through this prac-

tice and their content might change with its progress, but

they will not depend on chance. Genuine abstraction is

not arbitrary, nor is it the product of free imagination; it

is strictly determined by the objective structure of reality.

FROM PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIAL THEORY 255

The universal is as real as the particular; it only exists in

a different form, namely, as force, dynamis, potentiality.

Fourthly, thought unites the manifold not only of the

natural but of the socio-historical world. The subject of

thought, the source of conceptual universality, is one and

the same in all men. The specific contents of universal

concepts and their connotations may vary, but the think-

ing ego that is their source is a totality of pure acts, uni-

form in all thinking subjects. To say, then, that the ra-

tionality of the thinking subject is the ultimate basis for

the rational organization of society is, in the last analysis,

to recognize the essential equality of all men. Moreover,

the thinking subject, as the creator of universal concepts,

is necessarily free, and its freedom is the very essence of

subjectivity. The mark of this essential freedom is the

fact that the thinking subject is not chained to the imme-

diately given forms of being, but is capable of transcend-

ing them and changing them in line with his concepts.

The freedom of the thinking subject, in turn, involves his

moral and practical freedom. For, the truth he envisions

is not an object for passive contemplation, but an objec-

tive potentiality calling for realization. The idea of reason

implies the freedom to act according to reason.

Fifthly, this freedom to act according to reason was re-

garded as exercised in the practice of natural science.

A mastery of nature and of its recently unearthed resources

and dimensions was a requisite of the new process of pro-

duction that strove to transform the world into a huge

commodity market. The idea of reason came under the

sway of technical progress, and the experimental method

was seen as the model of rational activity, that is, as a

procedure that alters the world so that its inherent poten-

cies become free and actual. Modern rationalism, as a re-

sult, had a tendency to pattern individual as well as social

life on the model of nature. We point, for instance, to

*5<> THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY

Descartes's mechanistic philosophy, Hobbes's materialist

political thought, Spinoza's mathematical ethics, and Leib-

niz's monadology. The human world was presented as

governed by objective laws, analogous or even identical

with the laws of nature, and society was set forth as an

objective entity more or less unyielding to subjective de-

sires and goals. Men believed their relations to each other

to result from objective laws that operate with the neces-

sity of physical laws, and their freedom to consist in

adapting their private existence to this necessity. A strik-

ingly conformist skepticism thus accompanied the develop-

ment of modern rationalism. The more reason triumphed

in technology and natural science, the more reluctantly

did it call for freedom in man's social life. Under the

pressure of this process, the critical and ideal elements

slowly vanished and took refuge in heretical and opposi-

tional doctrines (for example, in atheistic materialism dur-

ing the French Enlightenment). The representative phi-

losophers of the middle class (particularly Leibniz, Kant,

and Fichte) reconciled their philosophical rationalism

with the flagrant irrationality of the prevailing social rela-

tions, and inverted human reason and freedom so that

they became ramparts of the isolated soul or mind, in-

ternal phenomena quite compatible with external reali-

ties, even if these contradicted reason and freedom.

We have already indicated the motives that prompted

Hegel to break with the tendency of introversion and to

proclaim the realization of reason in and through given

social and political institutions. We have stressed the role

of the dialectic in the process that brought philosophy to

grips with social reality. It resulted in the dissolution of

the harmonious world of fixed objects posited by common

sense and in the recognition that the truth philosophy

sought was a totality of pervasive contradictions. Philo-

sophical concepts now came to reflect the actual move-

FROM PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIAL THEORY 257

ment of reality, but since they were themselves patterned

on its social content, they stopped where the content

stopped, that is, in the state that governed civil society,

while the ideas and values that pointed beyond this social

system were stowed away in the realm of the absolute

mind, in the system of dialectical philosophy.

The method, however, that operated in this system

reached farther than the concepts that brought it to a

conclusion. Through the dialectic, history had been made

part of the very content of reason. Hegel had demon-

strated that the material and intellectual powers of man-

kind had developed far enough to call upon man's social

and political practice to realize reason. Philosophy itself

thus made direct application to social theory and practice,

not as to some external force but as to its legitimate heir.

If there was to be any progress beyond this philosophy, it

had to be an advance beyond philosophy itself and, at the

same time, beyond the social and political order to which

philosophy had tied its fate.

This is the intrinsic connection that compels us to aban-

don chronological order and to discuss the foundations of

Marxian theory Jbefore dealing with the early French and

German sociology. The impact of the Hegelian philosophy

upon social theory, and the specific function of modern

social theory cannot be understood except from 'the fully

unfolded form of Hegel's philosophy and its critical tend-

encies, as they went over to Marxian theory.

I

) ->*-

The Foundations of the Dialectical Theory of

Society

i. THE NEGATION OF PHILOSOPHY

THE transition from Hegel to Marx is, in all respects, a

transition to an essentially different order of truth, not to

be interpreted in terms of philosophy. We shall see that

all the philosophical concepts of Marxian theory are social

and economic categories, whereas Hegel's social and eco-

nomic categories are all philosophical concepts. Even

Marx's early writings are not philosophical. They express

the negation of philosophy, though they still do so in

philosophical language. To be sure, several of Hegel's

fundamental concepts crop up in the development from

Hegel to Feuerbach to Marx, but the approach to Marx-

ian theory cannot be made by showing the metamorphosis

of old philosophical categories. Every single concept in the

Marxian theory has a materially different foundation, just

as the new theory has a new conceptual* structure and

framework that cannot be derived from preceding the-

ories.

As a first approach to the problem, we may say that in

Hegel's system all categories terminate in the existing or-

der, while in Marx's they refer to the negation of this

order. They aim at a new form of society even when de-

scribing its current form. Essentially they address them-

selves to a truth to be had only through the abolition of

civil society. Marx's theory is a 'critique' in the sense that

all concepts are an indictment of the totality of the exist-

ing order.

THE NEGATION OF PHILOSOPHY 2 59

Marx considered Hegel's philosophy to be the most ad-

vanced and comprehensive statement of bourgeois princi-

ples. The German middle class of Hegel's day had not yet

reached the level of economic and political power held by

the middle classes of the western European nations. He-

gel's system therefore unfolded and completed 'in thought'

all those bourgeois principles (completed 'in reality' in

other Western nations) that were not yet part of social re-

ality. It made reason the sole universal standard of so-

ciety; it recognized the role of abstract labor in integrating

divergent individual interests into a unified 'system of

wants'; it discovered the revolutionary implications of the

liberalise ideas of freedom and equality; 'it described the

history of civil society as the history of the irreconcilable

antagonisms inherent in this social order.

Marx lays particular stress on the decisive contributions

of Hegel's concept of labor. Hegel had said that the divi-

sion of labor and the general interdependence of individ-

ual labor in the system of wants alike determine the system

of state and society. Moreover, the process of labor like-

wise determines the development of consciousness. The

'life and death struggle' between master and servant opens

the path to self-conscious freedom.

Furthermore, we must recall that Hegel's philosophy

rests upon a specific interpretation of the subject-object

relation. The traditional epistemological antagonism be-

tween subject (consciousness) and object, Hegel makes

into a reflection of a definite historical antagonism. The

object first appears as an object of desire, something to be

worked up and appropriated in order to satisfy a human

want. In the course of the appropriation, the object be-

comes manifest as 'the otherness' of man. Man is not 'with

himself when he deals with the objects of his desire and

labor, but is dependent on an external power. He has

to cope with nature, chance, and the interests of other

860 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

proprietors. Development beyond this point of the rela-

tion between consciousness and the objective world is a

social process. It leads first to the total 'estrangement* of

consciousness; man is overpowered by things he has him-

self made. The realization of reason therefore implies the

overcoming of this estrangement, the establishment of

a condition in which the subject knows and possesses it-

self in all its objects.

This demonstration of the role of labor, and of the

process of reification and its abolition, is, Marx declares,

the greatest achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology of

Mind. But the weight of the demonstration is lost. For,

Hegel makes the claim that the unity of subject and object

has already been consummated and the process of reifica-

tion overcome. The antagonisms of civil society are set at

rest in his monarchic state, and all contradictions are

finally reconciled in the realm of thought or the absolute

mind.

Did 'the truth* actually coincide with the given social

and political order? Had history, then, discharged theory

from any need to transcend the given system of life in

society? Hegel's affirmative answer rested on the assump-

tion that social and political forms had become adequate

to the principles of reason, so that the highest potenti-

alities of man could be developed through a development

of existing social forms. His conclusion implied a decisive

change in the relation between reality and theory: reality

was held to coincide with theory. In the form Hegel finally

gave it, theory, the adequate repository of the truth,

seemed to give welcome to the facts as they were and

hailed them as conforming to reason.

The truth, Hegel maintained, is a whole that must be

present in every single element, so that if one material

element or feet cannot be connected with the process of

reason, the truth of the whole is destroyed. Marx said

THE NEGATION OF PHILOSOPHY *6l

there was such an elementthe proletariat. The existence

of the proletariat contradicts the alleged reality of reason,

for it sets before us an entire class that gives proof of the

very negation of reason. The lot of the proletariat is no

fulfillment of humari potentialities, but the reverse. If

property constitutes the first endowment of a free person,

the proletarian is neither free nor a person, for he pos-

sesses no property. If the exercises of the absolute mind,

art, religion, and philosophy, constitute man's essence, the

proletarian is forever severed from his essence, for his

existence permits him no time to indulge in these activi-

ties.

Furthermore, the existence of the proletariat vitiates

more than just the rational society of Hegel's Philosophy

of Right; it vitiates the whole of bourgeois society. The

proletariat originates in the labor process and is the ac-

tual performer or subject of labor in this society. Labor,

however, as Hegel himself showed, determines the essence

of man and the social form it takes. If the existence of the

proletariat, then, bears witness to 'the complete loss of

man/ and this loss results from the mode of labor on which

civil society is founded, the society is vicious in its en-

tirety and the proletariat expresses a total negativity: 'uni-

versal suffering* and 'universal injustice.' x The reality of

reason, right, and freedom then turns into the reality of

falsehood, injustice and bondage.

The existence of the proletariat thus gives living wit-

ness to the fact that the tr\ith has not been realized. His-

tory and social reality themselves thus 'negate* philosophy.

The critique of society cannot be carried through by philo-

sophical doctrine, but becomes the task of socio-historical

practice.

i Marx, 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rcchtsphilosophie/ in Marx-Engels

Gesamtausgabc, ed. Marx-Engels Institute, Moskou, vol. I, Frankfurt M.

19x7, p. 619.

86* THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

Before we outline the development of Marxian theory,

we have to distinguish it from the other contemporary

forms that were built on 'the negation of philosophy.' The

deep surge of conviction that philosophy had come to an

end colored the first decades after Hegel's death. The as-

surance spread that the history of thought had reached a

decisive turn and that there was only one medium left in

which 'the truth' could be found and put into operation,

namely, man's concrete material existence. Philosophical

structures had hitherto domiciled 'the truth,' setting it

apart from the historical struggle of men, in the form of

a complex of abstract, transcendental principles. Now,

however, man's emancipation could become man's own

work, the goal of his self-conscious practice. The true -be-

ing, reason, and the free subject could now be transformed

into historical realities. Hegel's successors accordingly ex-

alted the 'negation of philosophy' as 'the realization of

God* through the deification of man (Feuerbach), as 'the

realization of philosophy' (Feuerbach, Marx), and as the

fulfillment of the 'universal essence' of man (Feuerbach,

Marx).

2. KIERKEGAARD

Who and what will fulfill the essence of man? Who will

realize philosophy? The different answers to these ques-

tions exhaust the trends of post-Hegelian philosophy. Two

general types may be distinguished. The first, represented

by Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, seizes upon the isolated

individual; the second, represented by Marx, penetrates

to the origins of the individual in the process of social

labor and shows how the latter, process is the basis of

man's liberation.

Hegel had demonstrated that the fullest existence of the

individual is consummated in his social life. Critical em-

ployment of the dialectical method tended to disclose that

KIERKEGAARD 263

individual freedom presupposes a free society, and that

the true liberation of the individual therefore requires

the liberation of society. Fixation on the individual alone

would thus amount to adopting an abstract approach,

such as Hegel himself set aside. Feuerbach's materialism

and Kierkegaard's existentialism, though they embody

many traits of a deep-rooted social theory, do not get be-

yond earlier philosophical and religious approaches to

the problem. The Marxian theory, on the other hand,

focuses down as a critical theory of society and breaks with

the traditional formulations and trends.

Kierkegaard's individualistic interpretation of 'the nega-

tion of philosophy* inevitably developed a fierce opposi-

tion to Western rationalism. Rationalism was essentially

universalistic, as we have shown, with reason resident in

the thinking ego and in the objective mind. The truth

was lodged either in the universal 'pure reason/ which

was untouched by the circumstances of individual life, or

in the universal mind, which could flourish though indi-

viduals might suffer and die. Man's material happiness

was deserted in both cases, by the introversion of reason

as well as by its' premature adequation to the world as

it is.

Rationalist philosophy, the individualists contended,

was not concerned with man's actual needs and longings.

Though it claimed to respond to his true interests, it gave

no answer to his simple quest for happiness. It could not

help him in the concrete decisions he constantly had to

make. If, as the rationalists maintained, the real unique

existence of the individual (which could never be reduced

to a universal) was not the primary subject matter of phi-

losophy, and the truth could not be found in or related

to this unique existence, all philosophical efforts were

superfluous, nay, dangerous. For they served to divert man

from the only realm in which he seeks and needs the

864 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

truth. Only one criterion, therefore, held for a genuine

philosophy, its capacity to save the individual.

According to Kierkegaard, the individual is not the

knowing but only the 'ethically existing subjectivity.' The

sole reality that matters to him is his own 'ethical exist-

ence.' * Truth lies not in knowledge, for sense perception

and historical knowledge are mere semblance, and 'pure'

thought is nothing but a 'phantom.' Knowledge deals only

with the possible and is incapable of making anything

real or even of grasping reality. Truth lies only in ac-

tion and can be experienced only through action. The

individual's own existence is the sole reality that can ac-

tually be comprehended, and the existing individual him-

self the sole subject or performer of this comprehension.

His existence is a thinking existence, but his thought is

determined by his individual living, so that all his prob-

lems arise and are resolved in his individual activity.

Every individual, in his innermost individuality, is iso-

lated from all others; 8 he is essentially unique. There is

no union, no community, no 'universality' to contest his

dominion. Truth is forever the outcome of his own de-

cision (Entscheidung) and can be realized only in the free

acts that spring from this decision. The sole decision open

to the individual is that between eternal salvation and

eternal damnation.

Kierkegaard's individualism turns into the most em-

phatic absolutism. There is only one truth, eternal happi-

ness in Christ; and only one proper decision, to live a

Christian life. Kierkegaard's work is the last grjeat attempt

to restore religion as the ultimate organon for liberating

humanity from the destructive impact of an oppressive so-

cial order. His philosophy implies throughout a strong

'Kierkegaard, Abschliessendc unwissenschafliche Nachschrift, in his

Werke, Jena 1910, vol. vii, p. 15.

Ibid., p. ii.

KIERKEGAARD 265

critique of his society, denouncing it as one that distorts

and shatters human faculties. The remedy was to be found

in Christianity, and the fulfillment in the Christian way

of life. Kierkegaard knew that in this society such a way

of life involved incessant struggle and ultimate humilia-

tion and defeat, and that a Christian existence within cur-

rent social forms was ever an impossibility. The church

had to be separated from the state, for, any dependence

on the state would betray Christianity. The true role of

the church, freed of any restrictive force, was to denounce

prevailing injustice and bondage and to point up the in-

dividual's ultimate interest, his salvation.

Salvation could not rely upon external institutions and

authorities, nor could it ever be attained by pure thought.

Consequently, Kierkegaard now shifts the burden of

achieving a life in truth to the concrete individual, the

same individual who is the basic concern of Christianity.

The individual is 'the truth/ not reason or mankind or the

state for the individual is the only reality. 'That which

exists is always an individual; the abstract does not exist.' 4

Kierkegaard returns to the original function of religion,

its appeal to the destitute and tormented individual. He

thus restores to Christianity its combative and revolution-

ary force. The appearance of God again assumes the terri-

fying aspect of a historical event suddenly breaking in

upon a society in decay. Eternity takes on a temporal

aspect, while the realization of happiness becomes an im-

mediately vital matter of daily life.

Kierkegaard, however, was holding to a content that

could no longer take a religious form. Religion was

doomed to share the fate of philosophy. The salvation of

mankind could not any longer rest in the realm of faith,

especially since advancing historical forces were in motion,

* P. 8.

266 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

bearing forward the revolutionary core of religion in a

concrete struggle for social liberation. In these circum-

stances the religious protest was weak and impotent, and

religious individualism could even turn against the indi-

vidual it set out to save. If left to the inner world of the

individual, 'the truth' gets separated from the social and

political vortex in which it belongs.

Kierkegaard's attack on abstract thought led him to as-

sail certain universal concepts that uphold the essential

equality and dignity of man. He holds humanity (reine

Menschheit) to be a 'negativity/ a mere abstraction from

the individual and a leveling of all existential values. 8

The 'totality* of reason, in which Hegel saw the comple-

tion of the truth, is also a 'mere abstraction/ e We can

best see how far from a purely philosophical matter is

this focusing of philosophy on the uniqueness of the indi-

vidual and how much it entails his social and political iso-

lation, when we consider Kierkegaard's attitude to the

socialist movement. There is no doubt, he says, that 'the

idea of socialism and community (Gemeinschaft) cannot

save this age.' 7 Socialism is just one among many attempts

to degrade individuals by equalizing all so as to 'remove

all organic, concrete differentiations and distinctions/ 8 It

is a function of resentment on the part of the many against

the few who possess and exemplify the higher values; so-

cialism is thus part of the general revolt against extraor-

dinary individuals.

The anti-rationalist attack on universals becomes in-

creasingly important in the subsequent development of

European thought. The assault upon the universal reason

was easily swung to an attack on the positive social impli-

B Ztir Kritik der Gegenwart. Innsbruck igsa, p. 34.

eibid., p. 41. fP. 61. a P. 64.

FEUERBACH 267

cations of this universal. We have already indicated that

the concept of reason was connected with advanced ideas,

like the essential equality of men, the rule of law, the

standard of rationality in state and society, and that West-

ern rationalism was thus definitely linked with the funda-

mental institutions of liberalist society. In the ideological

field, the struggle against this liberalism began with the

attack on rationalism. The position called 'existentialism*

played an important part in this attack. First, it denied

the dignity and reality of the universal. This led to a re-

jection of any universally valid rational norms for state

and society. Later, it was claimed that no bond joins in-

dividuals, states, and nations into a whole of mankind,

that the particular existential conditions of each cannot

be submitted to the general judgment of reason. Laws, it

was held, are not based upon any universal qualities of

man in whom a reason resides; they rather express the

needs of individual people whose lives they regulate in

accordance with their existential requirements. This de-

motion of reason made it possible to exalt certain par-

ticularities (such as the race or the folk) to the rank of the

highest values.

3. FEUERBACH

Feuerbach starts with the fact Kierkegaard had failed

to recognize, namely, that in the present age the human

content of religion can be preserved only by abandoning

the religious, other-worldly form. The realization of reli-

gion requires its negation. The doctrine of God (theology)

must be changed into the doctrine of than (anthropology).

Everlasting happiness will, begin with the transformation

of the kingdom of heaven into a republic of earth.

Feuerbach agrees with Hegel that mankind has reached

maturity. The earth is ready to be transformed, through

the collective and conscious practice of men, into a do-

268 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

main of reason and freedom. He therefore sketches a 'Phi-

losophy of the Future/ which he regards as the logical and

historical fulfillment of Hegel's philosophy. 'The new phi-

losophy is the realization of the Hegelian, moreover, of

the entire preceding philosophy.' g The negation of reli-

gion had begun with Hegel's transformation of theology

into logic; it ends with Feuerbach's transformation of logic

into anthropology. 10 Anthropology, to Feuerbach, is a

philosophy aiming at the concrete emancipation of man,

outlining therefor the conditions and qualities of an ac-

tually free human existence. Such a philosophy cannot

be idealist, for the means are at hand for carrying through

a free human existence by liberation in fact. Hegel's great

error was that he stuck to idealism at a time when a ma-

terialistic solution of the problem was at hand. The new

philosophy, then, is a realization of Hegelian philosophy

only as its negation.

When he accepted the given state of the world as ade-

quate to the standard of reason, Hegel contradicted his

own principles and hitched philosophy to an external con-

tent, that given in his day. His critical distinctions are in

the end merely distinctions within that given, and his phi-

losophy has a 'critical, but not a genetico-critical signifi-

cance.' ll The latter type of philosophy would not simply

demonstrate and understand its object, but would investi-

gate its origin and thus question its right to exist. The

prevailing state of man is the result of a long historical

process in which all transcendental values have been 'secu-

larized* and made the aims of man's empirical life. The

happiness he sought in heaven and in pure thought can

now be satisfied on earth. Only a 'genetic' analysis will

Grunds&tze der Philosophic der Zukunft, in Sdmmtlichc Werke, Leip-

zig 1846, vol. ii, Sao; see also 31.

10 Vorl&ufige Thcscn zur Reform der Philosophic, op. cit., vol. 11, p.

247.

der Hegelschen Philosophic in op. dt., pp. *si-*:

FEUERBACH 269

enable philosophy to furnish the ideas that might help

man in his real liberation. Hegel, Feuerbach insists, un-

dertook no such analysis. His construction of history pre-

supposed throughout that the prevailing stage of develop-

ment reached in his time was the immanent end of all

preceding stages.

Moreover, genetic analysis is not only a matter of the

philosophy of history, but of logic and psychology as well.

Here, Hegel failed the more, for thought receives no

genetic analysis in his system. Being is conceived as

thought from the outset. It enters the system not as the

'fact* of the external world, which is at first simply 'given'

and other than thought, but as notion. And in the elabo-

ration of the system being becomes a derivative mode of

thought, or, as Feuerbach says, 'the predicate of thought.'

Consequently, nature is derived from the structure and

movement of thought a complete reversal of the true

state of affairs.

Feuerbach's genetic analysis of thought starts, per

contra, from the obvious fact that nature is the primary

and thought the secondary reality. 'The true relation of

thought to Being is this; Being is subject, thought is

predicate. Thought springs from Being, but Being does

not spring from thought.' ia

Philosophy must thus begin with being, not Hegel's ab-

stract being-as-such, but with being in the concrete, that

is, with nature. 'The essence of Being qua Being is the

essence of nature.' 18 The new philosophy is not, however,

to be a philosophy of nature in the traditional sense. Na-

ture becomes relevant only in so far as it conditions human

existence; man is to be the proper content and interest.

The liberation of man requires the liberation of nature,

of man's natural existence. 'All science must be founded

i* Vorl&ufige Thcsen zur Reform der Philosophic, p. 263.

is Ibid.

THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

on nature. Theory is a mere hypothesis as long as the

natural basis of theory has not been established. This

holds especially true for the theory of freedom. The new

philosophy will succeed in "naturalizing" freedom, the

same that was hitherto merely an anti-natural and supra-

natural hypothesis.' 14

Feuerbach joins the great tradition of materialist phi-

losophers who, taking as the point of departure for their

views man's actual state in nature and in society, could see

that the idealistic solutions were illusory. The hard fact

that man's natural drives were permitted no satisfactory

outlet showed freedom and reason to be a myth, as far as

social realities were concerned. Hegel had committed the

unpardonable offense against the individual of construct-

ing a realm of reason on the foundations of an enslaved

humanity. Despite all historical progress, Feuerbach cries

out, man is still in need, and the pervasive fact philosophy

encounters is 'suffering.' This, and not cognition, is pri-

mary in man's relation to the objective world. 'Thought

is preceded by suffering.' 1 And no realization of reason

is in the offing until that suffering has been eliminated.

We have mentioned that 'the universal suffering' that

Marx saw in the existence of the proletariat negated for

him the reality of reason. The 'principle of suffering,'

Marx held, was rooted in the historical form of society

and required social action for its abolition. Feuerbach,

per contra, introduces nature as the basis and medium

for liberating mankind. Philosophy is negated and ful-

filled by nature. Man's suffering is a 'natural' relation

of the living subject to its objective environment, for the

subject is opposed and overwhelmed by the object. Nature

shapes and determines the ego trom without, making it

essentially 'passive.' The process of liberation cannot elimi-

i Ibid., p. 167. IB P. 153.

FEUERBACH 271

nate this passivity, but can transform it from a source

of privation and pain to one of abundance and enjoyment.

Feuerbach's conception of the ego reverses the tradi-

tional conception of it, which motivated modern philoso-

phy since Descartes. The ego, according to Feuerbach,

is primarily receptive, not spontaneous; determined, not

self-determining; the passive subject of perception, not

the active subject of thought. "True objective thought,

true objective philosophy arises only out of the negation

of thought, out of being determined by the object, out of

passion, the source of all pleasure and need.' 16 Feuer-

bach's naturalism thus maintains that perception, sensu-

ousness (Sinnlichkeit), sensation (Empfindung) are the

proper organon of philosophy. 'The object, in its true

meaning, is given only by the senses'; 1T 'nothing is un-

questionably and immediately certain except the object of

the senses, of perception and sensation.' 18

This is the point at which Marx's critique of Feuerbach

begins. Marx upholds Hegel on this point, as against Feuer-

bach. Hegel had denied that sense-certainty is the final

criterion of the truth, on the ground that, first, the truth

is a universal ttiat cannot be won in an experience that

conveys particulars, and, second, that truth finds fulfill-

ment in a historical process carried forward by the col-

lective practice of men. The latter is basic, with sense-

certainty and nature alike drawn into the movement so

that they change their content in its course. 19

Hegel's point was that labor brings sense-certainty and

16 P. 5 8.

IT Grunds&tze der Philosophic der Zukunft, 32.

is Ibid., 57.

i Feuerbach discusses Hegel's critique of sense-certainty in his Kritih

der Hegelschen Philosophic, op. tit., pp. 211-15. He isolates the standpoint

of sense-certainty from the more comprehensive modes of understanding

with which sense-certainty is psychologically and historically linked. The

authority of common sense is upheld, as against a truth that is made

manifest only when there is freedom from this authority.

ft?* THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

nature into the historical process. Because he conceived

human existence in terms of sense, Feuerbach disregarded

this material function of labor altogether. 'Not satisfied

with abstract thought, Feuerbach appeals to sense-percep-

tion [Anschauung]; but he does not understand our sen-

suous nature as practical, human-sensuous activity.' *

Labor transforms the natural conditions of human ex-

istence into social ones. By omitting the labor process from

his philosophy of freedom, therefore, Feuerbach omitted

the decisive factor through which nature might become

the medium for freedom. His interpretation of man's free

development as a 'natural* development neglected the his-

torical conditions for liberation and made freedom into

an event within the framework of the given order. His

'perceptual materialism' perceives only 'separate individ-

uals in bourgeois society.' 21

Marx focused his theory on the labor process and by

so doing held to and consummated the principle of the

Hegelian dialectic that the structure of the content (real-

ity) determines the structure of the theory. He made the

foundations of civil society the foundations of the theory

of civil society. This society operates on the principle of

universal labor, with the labor process decisive for the

totality of human existence; labor determines the value

of all things. Since the society is perpetuated by the con-

tinued universal exchange of the products of labor, the

totality of human relations is governed by the immanent

laws of the economy. The development of the individual

and the range of his freedom depend on the extent to

which his labor satisfies a social need. All men are free,

but the mechanisms of the labor process govern the free-

so Man, "Theses on Feuerbach/ v; see The German Ideology, ed. R.

Pascal, International Publishers, New York 1939, p. 198, and Sidney Hook,

From Hegel to Marx, New York 1936, p. $.

**Manc, 'Theses on Feuerbach/ DC; see The German Ideology, op. dt.,

p. 199, and Sidney Hook, op. dt., p. tgg.

MARX: ALIENATED LABOR 273

dom of them all. The study of the labor process is, in the

last analysis, absolutely necessary in order to discover the

conditions for realizing reason and freedom in the real

sense. A critical analysis of that process thus yields the

final theme of philosophy.

4. MARX: ALIENATED LABOR

Marx's writings between 1844 an d 1846 treat the form

of labor in modern society as constituting the total 'alien-

ation* of man. The employment of this category links

Marx's economic analysis with a basic category of the

Hegelian philosophy. The social division of labor, Marx

declares, is not carried out with any consideration for the

talents of individuals and the interest of the whole, but

rather takes place entirely according to the laws of capi-

talist commodity production.. Under these laws, the prod-

uct of labor, the commodity, seems to determine the na-

ture and end of human activity. In other words, the ma-

terials that should serve life come to rule over its con-

tent and goal, and the consciousness of man is completely

made victim to tKe relationships ot material production.

The materialistic proposition that is the starting point

of Marx's theory thus states, first, a historical fact, ex-

posing the materialistic character of the prevailing social

order in which an uncontrolled economy legislates over

all human relations. At the same time, Marx's proposition

is a critical one, implying that the prevailing relation be-

tween consciousness and social existence is a false one

that must be overcome before the true relation can come

to light. The truth of the materialist thesis is thus to be

fulfilled in its negation.

Marx emphasizes time and again that his materialistic

starting point is forced upon him by the materialistic

874 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

quality of the society he analyzes. He states that he begins

with a 'fact/ an 'economic fact* recognized even by clas-

sical political economy." As modern society runs its course,

'the worker becomes the poorer the more wealth he pro-

duces and the more his production increases in power and

extent. The worker becomes a cheaper commodity the

more commodities he produces. Hand in hand with the

exploitation (Verwertung) of the objective world goes the

depreciation of the human world.' 28 Classical political

economy (Marx quotes Adam Smith and J. B. Say) admits

that even great social wealth means nothing but 'station-

ary poverty 1 for the worker. 24 These economists had shown

that poverty is not at all the result of adverse external

circumstance, but of the prevailing mode of labor itself.

'In the progressing condition of society the destruction

and impoverishment of the worker is the product of his

own labor and of the wealth he has himself produced.

Misery thus springs from the nature of the prevailing

mode of labor' and is rooted in the very essence of mod-

ern society. 25

What significance does this mode of labor have as far

as the development of man is concerned? With this ques-

tion, the Marxian theory leaves 'the plane of political

economy/ 26 The totality of economic relations, laws, and

institutions may not be treated simply as an isolated ob-

jective cluster of facts, but as making up a historical form

within which men carry on their lives. Freed from the

limitations of a specialized science, the economic cate-

gories are seen to be determining factors for human exist-

ence (Daseinsformen, Existenzbestimmungen), even if

they denote objective economic facts (as in the case of

'Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskriptc' (1844), in Marx-Engds

Gcsamtausgabe, edited by the Marx-Engels Institute, vol. HI, Berlin 1932,

pp. 80-81, 89-90.

* Ibid., p. 8a. * P. 43. P. 45. * P. 45.

MARX: ALIENATED LABOR 275

commodity, value, ground rent).* 7 Far from being a mere

economic activity (Erwerbstatigkeit), labor is the 'ex-

istential activity' of man, his 'free, conscious activity' not

a means for maintaining his life (Lebensmittet) but for

developing his 'universal nature.' 28 The new categories

will evaluate the economic reality with a view to what

it has made of man, of his faculties, powers, and needs.

Marx summarizes these human qualities when he speaks

of the 'universal essence' of man; his examination of the

economy is specifically carried on with the question in

mind whether that economy realizes man's Gattungswesen

(universelles Weseri).

These terms point back to Feuerbach and to Hegel.

Man's very nature lies in his universality. His intellectual

and physical faculties can be fulfilled only if all men exist

as men, in the developed wealth of their human resources.

"Man is free only if all men are free and exist as 'universal

beings.' When this condition is attained, life will be

shaped by the potentialities of the genus, Man, which em-

braces the potentialities of all the individuals that com-

prise it. The emphasis on this universality brings nature

as well into the self-development of mankind. Man is free

if 'nature is his work and his reality,' so that he 'recog-

nizes himself in a world he has himself made/ M

All this has an obvious resemblance to Hegel's idea of

reason. Marx even goes so far as to describe the self-

realization of man in terms of the unity between thought

and being. 80 The whole problem is, however, no longer

a philosophical 6he, for the self-realization of man now

requires the abolition of the prevailing mode of labor,

and philosophy cannot deliver this result. The critique

does begin in philosophic terms, because the enslavement

27 A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans, N. 1

Stone, Charles H. Kerr and Co., Chicago 1904, p. 302.

as 'Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte,' pp. 87-8.

t*P. 89. *P. "7-

876 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

of labor and its liberation are alike conditions that go

beyond the framework of traditional political economy

and affect the very foundations of human existence (which

are the proper domain of philosophy), but Marx departs

from the philosophical terminology as soon as he has

elaborated his own theory. The critical, transcendental

character of the economic categories, hitherto expressed

by philosophical concepts, later, in his Capital, is dem-

onstrated by the economic categories themselves.

Marx explains the alienation of labor as exemplified in,

first, the relation of the worker to the product of his

labor and, second, the relation of the worker to his own

activity. The worker in capitalist society produces com-

modities. Large-scale commodity production requires capi-

tal, large aggregations of wealth used exclusively to

promote commodity production. The commodities are

produced by independent private entrepreneurs for pur-

poses of profitable sale. The worker labors for the capi-

talist, to whom he surrenders, through the wage contract,

the product of his labor. Capital is power to dispose over

the products of labor. The more the worker produces, the

greater the power of capital becomes and the smaller the

worker's own means for appropriating his products. Labor

thus becomes the victim of a power it has itself created.

Marx summarizes this process as follows: 'The object

which labor produces, its product, is encountered as an

alien entity, a force that has become independent of its

producer. The realization of labor is its objectification.

Under the prevailing economic conditions, this realization

of labor appears as its opposite, the negation [Entwirk-

lichung] of the laborer. Objectification appears as loss of

and enslavement by the object, and appropriation as alien-

ation and expropriation.' " Once turned to the laws of

ip. 83.

MARX: ALIENATED LABOR 377

capitalist commodity production, labor is inevitably im-

poverished. For, 'the more the worker toils, the more

powerful becomes the alien world of objects he produces

to oppose him, and the poorer he himself becomes . . .' i

Marx shows this mechanism at work in the movement of

wages. The laws of commodity production, without any

external aids, maintain wages at the level of stationary

poverty. 88

[As a result,] the realization of labor appears as negation to

such an extent that the worker is negated to the point of

starvation. The objectification appears as a loss of the objects

to such an extent that the worker is deprived of the most

necessary objects of life and labor. Moreover, labor itself be-

comes an object of which he can make himself master only

by the greatest effort and with incalculable interruptions.

Appropriation of the object appears as alienation to such an

extent that the more objects the worker produces the less he

possesses and the more he comes under the sway of his

product, of capital. 84

The worker alienated from his product is at the same

time alienated from himself. His labor itself becomes no

longer his own, and the fact that it becomes the property

of another bespeaks an expropriation that touches the very

essence of man. Labor in its true form is a medium for

man's true self-fulfillment, for the full development of

his potentialities; the conscious utilization of the forces

of nature should take place for his satisfaction and en-

joyment. In its current form, however, it cripples all hu-

man faculties and enjoins satisfaction. The worker 'does

not affirm but contradicts his essence.' 'Instead of develop-

ing his free physical and mental energies, he mortifies his

body and ruins his mind. He therefore first feels he is

with himself when he is free from work and apart from

himself when he is at work. He is at home when he does

a* Ibid. " Pp. 59-44- * P- 83-

878 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

not wdrk and not at home when he does. His working is,

therefore, not done willingly but under compulsion. It is

forced labor. It is, therefore, not the satisfaction of a need,

but only a means for the satisfaction of wants outside of

it.' "

In consequence, 'Man [the worker] feels himself acting

freely only in his animal functions like eating, drinking

and begetting . . . whereas in his human functions he is

nothing but an animal. The animal becomes the human

and the human the animal/ 86 This holds alike for the

worker (the expropriated producer), and for him who buys

his labor. The process of alienation affects all strata of so-

ciety, distorting even the 'natural* functions of man. The

senses, the primary sources of freedom and happiness ac-

cording to Feuerbach, are reduced to one 'sense of pos-

sessing.' 87 They view their object only as something that

can or cannot be appropriated. Even pleasure and enjoy-

hient change from conditions under which men freely de-

velop their 'universal nature* into modes of 'egoistic* pos-

session and acquisition. 88

Marx's analysis of labor under capitalism is thus quite

deep seated, going further than the structure of economic

relationships to the actual human content. Relations such

as those between capital and labor, capital and commod-

ity, labor and commodity, and those between commodities

are understood as human relations, relations in man's so-

cial existence. Even the institution of private property ap-

pears as 'the product, result and inevitable consequence

of the alienated mode of labor,' and derives from the

mechanisms of the social mode of production. 89 The alien-

ation of labor leads to the division of labor so character-

istic of all forms of class society: 'Each man has a particu-

lar, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him

Pp. 85-6. P. 86. ST p. us. ts p. 1 19.

89 Pp. 90-91; see also The German Ideology, op. tit., p. 44.

MARX: ALIENATED LABOR 279

and from which he cannot escape* 40 a division that is not

overcome when the abstract freedom of the individual is

proclaimed in bourgeois society. Labor separated from its

object is, in the last analysis, an 'alienation of man from

man'; the individuals are isolated from and set against

each other. They are linked in the commodities they ex-

change rather than in their persons. Man's alienation from

himself is simultaneously an estrangement from his fellow

men. 41

Marx's early writings are the first explicit statement of

the process of reification (Verdinglichung) through which

capitalist society makes all personal relations between men

take the form of objective relations between things. Marx

expounds this process in his Capital as 'the Fetishism of

Commodities/ The system of capitalism relates men to

each other through the commodities they exchange. The

social status of individuals, their standard of living, the

satisfaction of their needs, their freedom, and their power

are all determined by the value of their commodities. The

capacities and needs of the individual have no part in the

evaluation. Even man's most human attributes become a

function of money/ the general substitute for commodities.

Individuals participate in the social process as owners of

commodities only. Their mutual relations are those of

their commodities. 42 Capitalist commodity production

has this mystifying result, that it transforms the social re-

lations of individuals into 'qualities of ... things them-

selves [commodities] and still more pronouncedly trans-

forms the interrelations of production themselves into a

thing [money].' 48 The mystifying result arises from the

specific mode of labor in commodity production, with its

40 The German Ideology, p. 22.

41 'Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte,' p. 89.

** A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 41.

** Capital, vol. m, trans. E. Untermann, Charles H. Kerr and Co.,

Chicago 1909, p. 962; cf. p. 966.

88O THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

separate individuals working independently of each other,

and fulfilling their own needs only through those of the

market:

The Fetishism of commodities h^s its origin ... in the pe-

culiar social character of the labor that produces them.

As a general rule, articles of utility become commodities,

only because they are products of the labor of private indi-

viduals or groups of individuals who carry on their work inde-

pendently of each other. The sum-total of the labor of all

these private individuals forms the aggregate labor of society

[gesellschaftliche Gesamtarbeit]. Since the producers do not

come into contact with each other until they exchange their

products, the specific social character of each producer's labor

does not show itself except in the act of exchange. In other

words, the labor of the individual asserts itself as a part of the

labor of society, only by means of the relations which the act

of exchange establishes directly between the products, and

indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the lat-

ter, therefore, the relations connecting the labor of one indi-

vidual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social rela-

tions between individuals at work, but as what they really

are, material relations between persons [sachliche Verhdltnisse

von Per s on en] and social relations between things. 44

What does this reification accomplish? It sets forth the

actual social relations among men as a totality of objective

relations, thereby concealing their origin, their mecha-

nisms of perpetuation, and the possibility of their trans*

formation. Above all, it conceals their human core and

content. If wages, as the reification process would indi-

cate, express the value of labor, Exploitation is at best a

subjective and personal judgment. If capital were nothing

other than an aggregate of wealth employed in commodity

production, then capital would appear to be the cumu-

lative result of productive skill and diligence. If the crea-

tion of profits were the peculiar quality of utilized capital,

Capitol, trans. S. Moore and . Aveling, vol. i, Chicago 1906, pp. 83-4.

MARX: ALIENATED LABOR 281

such profits might represent a reward for the work of the

entrepreneur. The relation between capital and labor on

this basis would involve neither iniquity nor oppression;

it would rather be a purely objective, material relation-

ship, and economic theory would be a specialized science

like any other. The laws of supply and demand, the fixing

of value and prices, the business cycles, and so on, would

be amenable to study as objective laws and facts, regard-

less of their eftect on human existence. The economic

process of society would be a natural process, and man,

with all his needs and desires, would play in it the role

of an objective mathematical quantum rather than that

of a conscious subject.

Marxian theory rejects such a science of economics and

sets in its place the interpretation that economic relations

are existential relations between men. It does this not by

virtue of any humanitarian feeling but by virtue of the

actual content of the economy itself. Economic relations

only seem to be objective because of the character of com-

modity production. As soon as one delves beneath this

mode of production, and analyzes its origin, one can see

that its natural < objectivity is mere semblance while in

reality it is a specific historical form of existence that man

has given himself. Moreover, once this content comes to

the lore, economic theory would turn into a critical theory.

'When one speaks of private property one thinks he is

dealing with something outside of man. When one speaks

of labor, one has to do immediately with man himself.

The new formulation of the question already involves

its solution/ " As soon as their mystifying character is

uncovered, economic conditions appear as the complete

negation of humanity.* 8 The mode of labor perverts all

'okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte/ p. 93.

"The fact that a particular form of social life is 'negative' does not

prevent its having progressive qualities. Marx frequently emphasized that

282 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

human faculties, accumulation of wealth intensifies pov-

erty, and technological progress leads to 'the rule of dead

matter over the human world. 1 * T Objective facts come

alive and enter an indictment of society. Economic reali-

ties exhibit their own inherent negativity.

We are here touching upon the origins of the Marxian

dialectic. For Marx, as for Hegel, the dialectic takes note

of the fact that the negation inherent in reality is 'the

moving and creative principle.' The dialectic is the 'dia-

lectic of negativity/ 48 Every fact is more than a mere

fact; it is a negation and restriction of real possibilities.

Wage labor is a fact, but at the same time it is a restraint

on free work that might satisfy human needs. Private

property is a fact, but at the same time it is a negation

of man's collective appropriation of nature.

Man's social practice embodies the negativity as well as

its overcoming. The negativity Q capitalist societyjies in

its alienation of labor; the negation of this negativity will

come with the abolition of alienated labor. Alienation has

taken its most universal form in the institution of private

property; amends will be made with the abolition of pri-

vate property. It is of the utmost importance to note that

Marx views the abolition of private property entirely as

a means for the abolition of alienated labor, and not as

an end in itself. The socialization of the means of produc-

tion is as such merely an economic fact, just like any other

the capitalist mode of labor has had a distinctly progressive character in

the sense that it has made possible the rational exploitation of all kinds

of material resources, it has constantly increased the productivity of labor,

and has emancipated a hitherto unknown multitude of human capacities.

But progress in class society does not imply increasing happiness and lib-

erty. Until the alienated form of labor is abolished, all progress will con-

tinue to be more or less technical, denoting more rational methods of

production and a more rational domination of men and nature. With all

these qualities, progress only aggravates the negativity of the social order,

which perverts and restricts the forces of technical progress. Here, again,

Hegel's philosophy was right: the progress of reason is no progress ol

happiness.

*T Ibid., p. 77. 4 p. 156.

MARX: ALIENATED LABOR 283

economic institution. Its claim to be the beginning of a

new social order depends on what man does with the so-

cialized means of production. If these are not utilized for

the development and gratification of the free individual,

they will amount simply to a new form for subjugating

individuals to a hypostatized universality. The abolition

of private property inaugurates an essentially new social

system only if free individuals, and not 'the society,' be-

come masters of the socialized means of production. Marx

expressly warns against such another 'reification' of so-

ciety: 'One must above all avoid setting "the society" up

again as an abstraction opposed to the individual. The in-

dividual is the social entity [das gesellschaftliche Wesen].

The expression of his life ... is therefore an expression

and verification of the life of society/ 49

The true history of mankind will be, in the strict sense,

the history of free individuals, so that the interest of the

whole will be woven into the individual existence of each.

In all prior forms of society, the interest of the whole lay

in separate social and political institutions, which repre-

sented the right of society as against the right of the indi-

vidual. The abolition of private property will do away

with all this once and for all, for it will mark 'man's re-

turn from family, religion, state, etc., to his human, that

is, social existence/ 80

It is, then, the free individuals, and not a new system

of production, that exemplify the fact that the particular

and the common interest have been merged. The individ-

ual is the goal. This 'individualistic' trend is fundamental

as an interest of the Marxian theory. We have shown the

role of the universal in the traditional theories, placing

stress on the fact that human fulfillment, what we have

called 'the truth' exemplified, could only be conceived in

p. 117. <> P. 115-

284 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

terms of the abstract universal concept so long as society

retained the form it had. Shot through with a conflict at

every hand among individual interests, the concrete con-

ditions of social life made a mockery of 'the universal

essence* of man and nature. And since the prevailing so-

cial realities contradicted that essence, and hence contra-

dicted 'the truth/ the latter had no refuge save the mind,

where it was hypostatized as an abstract universal.

Marx explains how this state of affairs came about,

snowing its origin in the division of labor of class society,

and particularly in the divorce that was entailed between

the intellectual and material forces of production.

The forces of production, the state of society, and conscious-

ness, can and must come into contradiction with one another,

because the division of labor implies the possibility, nay the

fact that intellectual and material activity enjoyment and

labor, production and consumption devolve on different indi-

viduals . . . The division of labor . . . manifests itself also in

the ruling class as the division of mental and material labor, so

that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the

class . . . while the others' attitude to these ideas and illu-

sions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality

the active members of this class and have less time to make up

illusions and ideas about themselves ... It is self-evident that

phantoms like 'the Higher Being/ 'Notion* ... are merely

the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently

of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters

and limitations, within which the mode of production of life,

and the form of intercourse coupled with it, move. 51

Just as materially the reproduction of the social whole

was the result of blind forces over which man's conscious

powers exercised no guidance, so mentally, the universal

came forth as a reality that was independent and creative.

The groups governing society were compelled to hide the

The German Ideology, pp. ti, $9-40, *i.

MARX: ALIENATED LABOR 285

fact that their interests were private by cloaking them in

the 'dignity of the universal.' 'Each new class which puts

itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled,

merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its

interest as the common interest of all the members of so-

ciety ... It will give its ideas the form of universality,

and represent them as the only rational, universally valid

ones/ 52 The claim of universality for the ideas of a ruling

class is thus part of the mechanisms of class rule, and the

critique of class society will also destroy its philosophical

claims.

The universal concepts employed are at first those hy-

postatizing desired forms of human existence concepts

like reason, freedom, justice, and virtue, and also state,

society, democracy. All of these envisage that man's uni-

versal essence is materialized either within the prevailing

social conditions or beyond them in a supra-historical

realm. Marx also points to the fact that such concepts be-

come increasingly universal in scope with the advance of

the society. The ideas of honor, loyalty, and so on, which

characterized medieval times and which were the domi-

nant ideas of the aristocracy, were far more restricted in

appeal and applied to fewer persons than the ideas of

freedom, equality, and justice, of the bourgeoisie, which

reflect the more far-reaching base of that class. The devel-

opment of dominant ideas thus keeps step with and mir-

rors an increasing social and economic integration. 'The

most general abstractions commonly arise only where

there is the highest concrete development, where one fea-

ture seems to be jointly possessed by many, and to be com-

mon to all. Then it cannot be thought of any longer in

one particular form.' 88 The more society advances, the

M Pp. 40-41.

t A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, pp. 198-9.

286 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

more do 'abstract ideas hold sway, that is, ideas which in-

creasingly take on the form of universality/ 5 *

This process, however, turns into its opposite as soon

as classes are abolished and the interest of the whole is

fulfilled in the existence of every individual, for then 'It

is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as

general or "the general interest" as ruling.' 55 The indi-

vidual becomes the actual subject of history, in such a

way that he is himself the universal and manifests the

'universal essence* of man.

Communism, with its 'positive abolition of private

property/ is thus of its very nature a new form of indi-

vidualism, and not only a new and different economic

system, but a different system of life. Communism is 'the

real appropriation [Aneignung] of the essence of man by

and for man, therefore it is man's complete conscious

. . . return to himself as a social, that is, human being/

It is the 'true solution of man's conflict with nature and

with man, of the strife between existence and essence, reifi-

cation and self-determination, liberty and necessity, indi-

vidual and genus/ M The contradictions that lay beneath

the philosophy of Hegel and all traditional philosophy

will dissolve in this new form of society. For these are

historical contradictions rooted in the antagonisms of class

society. Philosophical ideas express material historical

conditions, which cast off their philosophical form as soon

as they are subjected to the scrutiny of critical theory and

are seized by conscious social practice.

Hegel's philosophy revolved about the universality of

reason; it was a rational system with its every part (the

subjective as well as the objective spheres) integrated into

M The German Ideology, p. 40.

5 Ibid., p. 41.

5 'Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte,' p. 114.

MARX: THE ABOLITION OF LABOR 287

a comprehensive whole. Marx shows that capitalist society

first put such a universality into practice. Capitalism de-

veloped the productive forces for the totality of a uniform

social system. Universal commerce, universal competition,

and the universal interdependence of labor were made to

prevail and transformed men into 'world-historical, em-

pirically universal individuals.' 8T

This universality, however, as we have explained, is a

negative one, for the productive forces are used, as arc

the things man produces with them, in a way that makes

them seem the products of an uncontrolled alien power,

It is 'an empirical fact that separate individuals have, with

the broadening of their activity into world-historical ac-

tivity, become more and more enslaved under a powei

alien to them ... a power which has become more and

more enormous and, in the last instance, turns out to be

the world market.' M The distribution of supply under in-

ternational commodity production is a blind and anarchic

universal process, wherein the demand of the individual

is satisfied only if he can meet the requirements of ex-

change. Marx calls this anarchic relation of supply to de-

mand a 'natural' form of social integration, meaning thai

it seems to have the force of a natural law instead of oper-

ating, as it should, under the joint control of all men.

5. THE ABOLITION OF LABOR

The realization of freedom and reason requires a re-

versal of this state of affairs*. 'Universal dependence, this

natural form of the world-historical cooperation of indi-

viduals, will be transformed by this communist revolution

into the control and conscious mastery of these powers

which, born of the action of men on one another, have

T The German Ideology , p. 35. Ibid., p. 37.

288 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

till now overawed and governed men as powers com-

pletely alien to them/ w

Moreover, since the state of affairs that has prevailed

'till now* is a universal negativity, affecting all spheres

of life everywhere, its transformation requires a universal

revolution, that is to say, a revolution that would reverse,

first, the totality of prevailing conditions and, secondly,

would replace this with a new universal order. The ma-

terial elements of complete revolution must be present so

that the convulsion grips not specific conditions in the

existent society, but the very 'production of life* prevail-

ing in it, the 'total activity* on which it has been based. 60

This totalitarian character of the revolution is made nec-

essary by the totalitarian character of the capitalist rela-

tions of production. 'Modern universal intercourse can be

controlled by individuals . . . only when controlled by

all/

The revolutionary convulsion that ends the system of

capitalist society sets free all the potentialities for general

satisfaction that have developed in this system. Marx ac-

cordingly calls the communist revolution an act of 'ap-

propriation* [Aneignung], meaning that with the abolition

of private property men are to obtain true ownership

over all those things that have hitherto remained estranged

from them.

Appropriation is determined by the object to be appro-

priated, that is, by 'the productive forces, which have been

developed to a totality and which only exist within a uni-

versal intercourse. From this aspect alone, therefore, this

appropriation must have a universal character . . ,' 62

The universality that exists in the present state of society

will be transposed to the new social order, where, how-

ever, it will have a different character. The universal will

" Ibid., pp. 27-8. o p. ,9. ti p. 67. > P. 66.

MARX: THE ABOLITION OF LABOR 289

no longer operate as a blind natural force once men have

succeeded in subjecting the available productive forces

'to the power of individuals united/ Man will then for

the first time in history consciously treat 'all natural prem-

ises as the creatures of men/ M His struggle with nature

will pursue 'a general plan* formulated by 'freely com-

bined individuals/ e4

The appropriation is also determined by the persons

appropriating* The alienation of labor creates a society

split into opposing classes. Any social scheme that effects

a division of labor without taking account of the abilities

and needs of individuals in assigning them their roles

tends to shackle the activity of the individual to external

economic forces. The mode of social production (the way

in which the life of the whole is maintained) circum-

scribes the life of the individual and harnesses his entire

existence to relations prescribed by the economy, without

regard to his subjective abilities or wants. Commodity pro-

duction under a system of free competition has aggravated

this condition. The commodities allotted to the individ-

ual for the gratification of his needs were supposed to be

the equivalent of iiis work. Equality seemed to be guar-

anteed, at least in this respect. The individual could not,

however, choose his work. It was prescribed for him by

his position in the social process of production, which was

in turn forced upon him by the prevailing distribution of

power and wealth.

The fact of classes contradicts freedom, or, rather,

transforms it into an abstract idea. The class circum-

scribes the actual range of individual freedom within the

general anarchy, the arena of free play still open to the

individual. Each is free to the extent that his class is free,

and the development of his individuality is confined to

p. 70. * P. 7.

THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

the limits of his class: he unfolds himself as a 'class indi-

vidual/

The class is the actual social and economic unit, not

the individual. It 'achieves an independent existence over

against the individuals, so that the latter find their con-

ditions of existence predestined, and hence have their po-

sition in life and their personal development assigned to

them by their class, [and] become subsumed under it.' M

The existent form of society accomplishes a universal

order only by negating the individual. The 'personal in-

dividual* becomes a 'class individual/ 66 and his constitu-

ent properties become universal properties that he shares

with all other members of his class. His existence is not

his, but that of his class. We recall Hegel's statement

that the individual is the universal, that he acts histor-

ically not as a private person but as a citizen of his state.

Marx understands this negation of the individual to be

the historical product of class society, effectuated not by

the state but by the ordering of labor.

The subsumption of individuals under classes is the

same phenomenon as their subjection to the division of

labor. 67 By division of labor Marx here means the process

of separating various economic activities into specialized

and delimited fields: first, industry and commerce sep-

arated from agriculture; then industry separated from

-commerce; and finally the latter subdivided into different

branches. 68 This entire differentiation takes place under

the requirements of commodity production in its capi-

talistic form, accelerated by the progress of technology.

It is a blind and 'natural' process. The totality of labor

required to perpetuate society appears as an a priori given

body of work that is organized in a definite way. The spe-

cific division of labor that prevails seems an unalterable

P. 49. P. 77. T p. 49. 68 pp. g and 48.

MARX: THE ABOLITION OF LABOR 291

necessity that drags the individuals into its toils. Business

becomes an objective entity that gives men a certain

standard of living, a set of interests, and a range of possi-

bilities that mark them off from men engaged in other

businesses. The conditions of labor mold the individuals

into groups or classes, and are class conditions converging

upon the fundamental division into capital and wage

labor.

The two fundamental classes, however, are not classes

in the same sense. The proletariat is distinguished by the

fact that, as a class, it signifies the negation of all classes.

The interests of all other classes are essentially one-sided;

the proletariat's interest is essentially universal. The pro-

letariat has neither property nor profit to defend. Its one

concern, the abolition of the prevailing mode of labor, is

the concern of society as a whole. This is expressed in the

fact that the communist revolution, in contrast to all pre-

vious revolutions, can leave no social group in bondage

because there is no class below the proletariat.

The universality of the proletariat is, again, a negative

universality, indicating that the alienation of labor has

intensified to th^ point of total self-destruction. The labor

of the proletarian prevents any self-fulfillment; his work

negates his entire existence. This utmost negativity, how-

ever, takes a positive turn. The very fact that he is de-

prived of all assets of the prevailing system sets him be-

yond this system. He is a member of the class 'which is

really rid of all the old world and at the same time stands

pitted against it/ eo The 'universal character' of the pro-

letariat is the final basis for the universal character of the

communist revolution.

The proletariat is the negation not only of certain par-

ticular human potentialities, but also of man as such. All

w P. 57; see also p. 67.

*g* THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

specific distinguishing marks by which men are differen-

tiated lose their validity. Property, culture, religion, na-

tionality, and so on, all things that might set one man off

from another, make no such mark among proletarians.

Each lives in society only as the bearer of labor power, and

each is thus the equivalent of all others of his class. His

concern to exist is not the concern of a given group, class,

or nation, but is truly universal and 'world historical.' 'The

proletariat can thus only exist world-historically . . .' 70

The communist revolution, its movement, is therefore

necessarily a world revolution. 71

The prevailing social relations that the revolution up-

sets are everywhere negative because they everywhere re-

sult from a negative ordering of the labor process that

perpetuates them. The labor process itself is the life of

the proletariat. Abolition of the negative ordering of

labor, alienated labor as Marx terms it, is hence at the

same time the abolition of the proletariat.

The abolition of the proletariat also amounts to the

abolition of labor as such. Marx makes this an express

formulation when he speaks of the achievement of revo-

lution. Classes are to be abolished 'by the abolition of

private property and of labor itself.' 7 * Elsewhere, Marx

says the same thing: 'The communistic revolution is di-

rected against the preceding mode of activity, does away

with labor.' 7S And again, 'the question is not the libera-

tion but the abolition of labor/ 74 The question is not

the liberation of labor because labor has already bfeen

made 'free'; free labor is the achievement of capitalist

society. Communism can cure the 'ills' of the bourgeois

and the distress of the proletarian only 'by removing their

cause, namely, "labor." ' 78

TO p. a6. P. *B. P. 40. TS p. 69.

M Sankt Max, in the Marx-Engels Gcsamtausgabe, op. cit., vol. v, p. 185.

fIbid., p. 198.

MARX: THE ABOLITION OF LABOR 293

These amazing formulations in Marx's earliest writings

all contain the Hegelian term Aufhebung, so that aboli-

tion also carries the meaning that a content is restored to

its true form. Marx, however, envisioned the future mode

of labor to be so different from the prevailing one that

he hesitated to use the same term 'labor* to designate alike

the material process of capitalist and of communist so-

ciety. He uses the term 'labor* to mean what capitalism

actually understands by it in the last analysis, that activity

which creates surplus value in commodity production, or,

which 'produces capital.' " Other kinds of activity are not

'productive labor* and hence are not labor in the proper

sense. Labor thus means that free and universal develop-

ment is denied the individual who labors, and it is clear

that in this state of affairs the liberation of the individ-

ual is at once the negation of labor.

An 'association of free individuals* to Marx is a society

wherein the material process of production no longer de-

termines the entire pattern of human life. Marx's idea of

a rational society implies an order in which it is not the

universality of labor but the universal satisfaction of all

individual potentialities that constitutes the principle of

social organization. He contemplates a society that gives

to each not according to his work but his needs. Mankind

becomes free only when the material perpetuation of life

is a function of the abilities and happiness of associated

individuals.

We can now see that the Marxian theory has developed

a full contradiction to the basic conception of idealist

philosophy. The idea of reason has been superseded by

the idea of happiness. Historically, the first was interlaced

into a society in which the intellectual forces of produc-

tion were detached from the material ones. Within this

f Theorien fiber den Mehrwert, ed. Karl Kautsky, Stuttgart 1905, vol. i,

pp. 258, *6o ff.

294 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

framework of social and economic iniquities, the life of

reason was a life of higher dignity. It dictated individual

sacrifice for the sake of some higher universal independent

of the 'base' impulses and drives of individuals.

The idea of happiness, on the other hand, roots itself

firmly in the demand for a social ordering that would set

aside the class structure of society. Hegel had emphatically

denied that the progress of reason would have anything

to do with the satisfaction of individual happiness. Even

the most advanced concepts of the Hegelian philosophy,

as we have shown, preserved and in the last analysis con-

doned the negativity of the existing social system. Reason

could prevail even though the reality shrieked of individ-

ual frustration: idealist culture and the technological prog-

ress of civil society bear witness of that. Happiness could

not. The demand that free individuals attain satisfaction

militated against the entire set-up of traditional culture.

The Marxian theory consequently rejected even the ad-

vanced ideas of the Hegelian scheme. The category of hap-

piness made manifest the positive content of materialism.

Historical materialism appeared at first as a denunciation

of the materialism prevalent in bourgeois society, and the

materialist principle was in this respect a critical instrument

of expos^ directed against a society that enslaved men to

the blind mechanisms of material production. The idea of

the free and universal realization of individual happiness,

per contra, denoted an affirmative materialism, that is to

say, an affirmation of the material satisfaction of man.

We have dwelt rather extensively upon Marx's early

writings because they emphasize tendencies that have been

attenuated in the post-Marxian development of his critique

of society, namely, the elements of communistic individ-

ualism, the repudiation of any fetishism concerning the

socialization of the means of production or the growth

of the productive forces, the subordination of all these

THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS 2 95

factors to the idea of the free realization of the individ-

ual. Under all aspects, however, Marx's early writings are

mere preliminary stages to his mature theory, stages that

should not be overemphasized.

6. THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS

Marx rests his theories on the assumption that the labor

process determines the totality of human existence and

thus gives to society its basic pattern. It now remains for

him to give the exact analysis of this process. The early

writings took labor to be the general form of man's strug-

gle with nature. 'Labor is at first a process between man

and nature, a process in which man mediates, regulates,

and controls the material reactions between himself and

nature by his own action.' 7T In this respect labor is basic

to all forms of society.

The capitalistic ordering of labor is designated in

Marx's early essays as 'alienation,' and hence as an 'un-

natural,' degenerated form of labor. The question arises,

how has such a degeneration become possible? And this

is more than a quaestio jacti, since alienated labor appears

as a fact only in the light of its abolition. The analysis of

the prevailing form of labor is simultaneously an analysis

of the premises of its abolition.

In other words, Marx views the existing conditions of

labor with an eye to their negation in an actually free

society. His categories are negative and at the same time

positive: they present a negative state of affairs in the

light of its positive solution, revealing the true situation

in existing society as the prelude to its passing into a new

form. All the Marxian concepts extend, as it were, in

these two dimensions, the first of which is the complex of

" Capital, op. dt., vol. I, p. 197 (our version).

296 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

given social relationships, and the second, the complex of

elements inherent in the social reality that make for its

transformation into a free social order. This twofold con-

tent determines Marx's entire analysis of the labor proc-

ess. We shall now deal with the conclusions he draws. 78

In the prevailing social system, labor produces commod-

ities. Commodities are use-values to be exchanged on the

market. Every product of labor is, as a commodity, ex-

changeable for every other product of labor. It has an

exchange value that equates it with all other commodi-

ties. This universal homogeneity, by which all commodi-

ties are equated with all others, cannot be ascribed to the

use-values of commodities, for, as use-values, they are ex-

changed only in so far as they are different from one an-

other. Their exchange value, on the other hand, is a

'purely quantitative relation.' 'As exchange value, one

kind of use-value is worth as much as another kind, if

taken in the right proportion. The exchange value of a

palace can be expressed in a certain number of boxes of

shoe blacking. Vice versa, London manufacturers of shoe

blacking have expressed the exchange value of their many

boxes of blacking, in palaces. Thus, entirely apart from

their natural forms, and without regard to the specific

kind of wants for which they serve as use-values, com-

modities in certain quantities equal each other, take each

other's place in exchange, pass as equivalents, and, in

spite of their variegated appearance/ 79 are all of a piece.

The reason for this homogeneity must be sought in the

nature of labor.

All commodities are products of human labor; they are

'materialized [vergegenstdndlichte] labor/ As embodi-

78 The fundamental tendencies of Marxian economic theory are best

expounded by Henryk Grossmann in his Das Akkumulations- und Zusam-

menbruchsgeseti des kapitalistischen Systems, Leipzig igag.

it A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. ai.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS 2 97

ments of social labor, 'all commodities are the crystalliza-

tion of the same substance.' " At first this labor appears to

be just as diversified as the use-values produced by it. La-

bor performed in the production of wheat is quite differ-

ent from that used in the production of shoes or cannon.

'What in reality appears as a difference in use-values is, in

the process of production, a difference in the work creat-

ing those use-values.' 81 If, then, the property common to

all commodities is labor, it must be labor stripped of all

qualitative distinctions. That would leave labor as the

quantity of labor-power expended in the production of a

good. This quantity is Indifferent to the form, content,

and individuality' of the labor; it is therefore ready for a

purely quantitative measurement, equally applicable to

all kinds of individual labor. The standard of such meas-

urement is given by time. 'Just as the quantitative exist-

ence of motion is time, so the quantitative existence of

labor is labor-time.' If all specificity of labor is abstracted,

one act of labor is distinguished from another only by its

duration. In this 'abstract, universal' form, labor repre-

sents the common property of all commodities that be-

comes constitutivi of their exchange value. 'Labor creat-

ing exchange value is ... abstract, general labor.' M

But even the time-measurement of labor still leaves an

individual factor. The amount of labor-time spent by

different workers in the production of one and the same

kind of commodity varies according to their physical and

mental condition and their .technical equipment. These

individual variations are cancelled in a further step of

reduction. The labor-time is computed for the average

technical standard prevailing in production, hence, the

time that determines exchange value is 'socially necessary

labor time.' The 'labor time contained in a commodity

so ibid., p. . P. s. " P. 23.

298 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

is the labor-time necessary for its production, i.e. it is the

labor-time which is required for the production of another

specimen of the same commodity under the same general

conditions of production.' M

Marx thus comes to the fact that the phenomenon of

labor covers two entirely different kinds of labor: (i)

concrete specific labor, correlative to concrete specific use-

values (carpentry, shoemaking, agricultural labor, etc.)

and (2) abstract universal labor, as expressed in the re-

spective exchange values of commodities. 84 Every single

act of labor in commodity production comprises both ab-

stract and concrete labor just as any product of social

labor represents both exchange value and use-value. The

social process of production, however, when it determines

the value of commodities, sets aside the variety of concrete

labor and retains as the standard of measurement the pro-

portion of necessary abstract labor contained in a com-

modity.

Marx's conclusion that the value of commodities is de-

termined by the quantity of abstract labor socially neces-

sary for their reproduction is the fundamental thesis of

his labor theory of value. It is introduced not as a the-

orem, but as the description of a historical process. The

reduction of concrete to abstract labor 'appears to be an

abstraction, but it is an abstraction that takes place daily

in the social process of production/ 85 Since it is the theo-

retical conception of a historical process, the labor theory

of value cannot be developed in the manner of a pure

theory.

It is a well-known fact that Marx considered the dis-

covery of the twofold character of labor to be his original

contribution to economic theory, and to be pivotal for a

clear comprehension of political economy. 86 His distinc-

8 P. 2 6. a* P. 33. 8 P. *4< 8 Capital, vol. I, p. 48.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS 2Q9

tion between concrete and abstract labor allows him in-

sights to which the conceptual apparatus of classical po-

litical economy was necessarily blind. The classical econo-

mists designated 'labor* as the sole source of all social

wealth, and overlooked the fact that it is only abstract,

universal labor that creates value in a commodity-produc-

ing society, while concrete particular labor merely pre-

serves and transfers already existing values. In the produc-

tion of cotton, spinning, for example, the concrete ac-

tivity of the individual worker merely transfers the value

of the means of production to the product. His concrete

activity does not increase the value of the product. The

product, however, does appear on the market with a new

value in addition to that of the means of production. This

new value results from the fact that a certain quantity of

abstract labor-power, that is, labor-power irrespective of

concrete form, has been added in the process of produc-

tion to the object of labor. Since the worker does not do

double work in the same time, the double result (pres-

ervation of value and the creation of new value) can be

explained only by the dual character of his labor. 'By the

simple addition of a certain quantity of labor, new value

is added, and by the quality of this added labor, the orig-

inal values of the means of production are preserved in

the product/ 8T

The process in which labor-power becomes an abstract

quantitative unit characterizes a 'specifically social form

of labor* to be distinguished from that form which is *the

natural condition of human existence/ a8 namely, labor as

productive activity directed to the adaptation of nature.

This specifically social form of labor is that prevalent in

capitalism.

Under capitalism, labor produces commodities, that is,

87 ibid., p. 223.

MA Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 33.

300 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

the products of labor appear as exchange values. But how

does this system of universal commodity production, which

is not directly oriented to the satisfaction of individual

needs, tend to fulfill these needs? How do the independ-

ent producers know that they produce actual use-values?

Use-values are means for the gratification of human

wants. Since every form of society must satisfy the needs

of its members in some degree, in order to maintain their

lives, 'the use-value of things remains a prerequisite* to

commodity production. Under the commodity system, the

individual's need is a fraction of the 'social need' made

manifest on the market. The distribution of use-values

takes place according to the social distribution of labor.

The satisfaction of a demand presupposes that the use-

values are available on the market, while the latter will

appear on the market only if society is willing to de-

vote a portion of its labor-time to producing them. A

certain amount of production and consumption goods is

required to reproduce and maintain society at its prevail-

ing level. 'The social need, that is the use-value on a social

scale, appears here as a determining factor for the amount

of social labor which is to be supplied by the various par-

ticular spheres' of production. 89 A definite quota of labor-

time is spent in the production of machines, buildings,

roads, textiles, wheat, cannon, perfumes, etc. Marx says

that 'society' allots the available labor-time needed for

these. Society, however, is not a conscious subject. Capi-

talist society provides for no complete association or plan-

ning. How, then, does it distribute labor-time to various

types of production in accordance with social needs?

The individual is 'free.' No authority may tell him how

he is to maintain himself; everyone may choose to work

at what he pleases. One individual may decide to -produce

* Capital, vol. m, p. 745.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS JO1

shoes, another books, a third rifles, a fourth golden but-

tons. But the goods each produces are commodities, that

is, use-values not for himself but for other individuals.

Each must exchange his products for the other use-values

that will satisfy his own needs. In other words, the satis-

faction of his own needs presupposes that his own prod-

ucts fill a social need. But he cannot know this in advance.

Only when he brings the products of his labor to the

market will he learn whether or not he expended social

labor-time. The exchange value of his goods will show

him whether or not they satisfy a social need. If he can sell

them at or above his production cost, society was willing

to allot a quantum of its labor-time to their production;

otherwise, he wasted or did not spend socially necessary

labor-time. The exchange value of his commodities de-

cides his social fate. The 'form in which this proportional

distribution of labor operates, in a state of society where

the interconnection of social labor is manifested in the

private exchange of the individual products of labor, is

precisely the exchange value of these products/ 90 and

thus determines the proportional fulfillment of the social

need.

Marx calls this mechanism by which the commodity

producing society distributes the labor-time at its disposal

among the different branches of production the law of

value. The different branches that have been made inde-

pendent in the development of modern society are inte-

grated through the market, where the exchange value of

the commodities produced yields the measure of the social

need they satisfy.

The supplying of society with use-values is thus gov-

erned by the law of value, which has superseded the free-

dom of the individual. He depends, for the gratification

o Mane, Letters to Dr. Kugelmann, International Publishers, New York

1934. July 1868 (pp. 73-4).

JO2 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

of his needs, on the market, for he buys the means for

this gratification in the form of exchange values. And he

finds the exchange values of the goods he desires to be

a pre-given quantity over which he, as an individual, has

no power whatever.

Moreover, the social need that appears on the market

is not identical with the real need, but only with 'solvent

social need/ The various demands are conditional upon

the buying power of the individuals, and therefore, upon

'the mutual relations of the different social classes and

their relative economic position.' 91 The individual's de-

sires and wants are shaped and, with the vast majority,

restricted by the situation of the class to which he belongs,

in such a way that he cannot express his real need. Marx

summarizes this state of affairs when he says: 'The need

for commodities on the market, the demand, differs quan-

titatively from the actual social need! 92

Even if the market were to manifest the actual social

need, the law of value would continue to operate as a blind

mechanism outside the conscious control of individuals. It

would continue to exert the pressure of a 'natural law'

(Naturgesetz), 99 the necessity of which, far from precluding,

would rather insure the rule of chance over society. The

system of relating independent individuals to one another

through the necessary labor-time contained in the com-

modities they exchange may seem to be one of utmost ra-

tionality. In reality, however, this system organizes only

waste and disproportion.

Society buys the articles which it demands by devoting to

their production a portion of its available labor-time. That

means, society buys them by spending a definite quantity of

the labor-time over which it disposes. That part of society, to

which the division of labor assigns the task of employing its

9i Capital, vol. HI, p. 114. 92 ibid., p. 3x3.

Letters to Kugelmann, July n, 1868.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS $03

labor in the production of the desired article, must be given

an equivalent for it of other social labor, incorporated in

articles which it wants. There is, however, no necessary, but

only an accidental, connection between the volume of society's

demand for a certain article and the volume represented by

the production of this article in the total production, or the

quantity of social labor spent on this article . . . True, every

individual article, or every definite quantity of any kind of

commodities, contains, perhaps, only the social labor required

for its production, and from this point of view the market-

value of this entire mass of commodities of a certain kind rep-

resents only necessary labor. Nevertheless, if this commodity

has been produced in excess of the temporary demand of so-

ciety for it, so much of the social labor has been wasted, and

in thftt case this mass of commodities represents a much smaller

quantity of labor on the market than is actually incorporated

in it."

From the point of view of the individual, the law of

value asserts itself only ex post; waste of labor is inevitable.

The market provides a correction and a punishment for

individual freedom; any deviation from the socially neces-

sary labor-time means defeat in the economic competitive

struggle through which men maintain their lives in this

social order.

The guiding question of Marx's analysis was, How does

capitalist society supply its members with the necessary

use-values? And the answer disclosed a process of blind

necessity, chance, anarchy and frustration. The introduc-

tion of the category of use-value was the introduction of

a forgotten factor, forgotten, that is, by the classical po-

litical economy which was occupied only with the phe-

nomenon of exchange value. In the Marxian theory, this

factor becomes an instrument that cuts through the mys-

tifying reification of the commodity worlcj* For, restora-

tion of the category of use-value to the center of economic

w Capital, vol. HI, pp. a*o-ai.

304 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

analysis means a sharp questioning of the economic process

as to whether and how it fills the real needs of individuals.

Behind the exchange-relations of capitalism it shows the

actual human relations, warped to a 'negative totality*

and ordered by uncontrolled economic laws. 98 Marx's

analysis showed him the law of value as the general 'form

of Reason 1 in the existent social system. The law of value

was the form in which the common interest (the perpetu-

ation of society) asserted itself through individual free-

dom. That law, though it manifested itself on the market,

was seen to originate in the process of production (the

socially necessary labor-time that lay at its root was pro-

duction time). For this reason, it was only an analysis of

the process of production that would yield a yes or no

answer to the question, Can this society ever fulfill its

promise: individual liberty within a rational whole?

Marx's analysis of capitalist production assumes that cap

italist society has actually emancipated the individual, that

men enter the productive process free and equal, and that

the process turns from its own inner rationale. Marx grants

the most favorable conditions to civil society, disregards

all complicating disturbances. The abstractions that un-

derlie the first volume of Capital (for example, that all

commodities are exchanged according to their values, that

external trade is excluded, etc.) put the reality so that it

'conforms with its notion.' 96 This methodological pro-

cedure is in keeping with the dialectical conception. The

inadequacy between existence and essence belongs to the

very core of reality. If the analysis were to confine itself

When Marx declares that use-values lie outside the scope of economic

theory, he is at first describing the actual state of affairs in classical po-

litical economy. His own analysis begins by accepting and explaining the

fact that, in capitalism, use-values appear only as the 'material depositories

of exchange value' (op. tit., vol. i, p. 43). His critique then refutes the

capitalist treatment of use-values and sets its goal on an economy in

which this relation is entirely abolished.

w See e.g. Capital, vol. in, pp. 169, 106, taj.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS 305

to the forms in which reality appears, it could not grasp the

essential structure from which these forms and their in-

adequacy originate. Unfolding the essence of capitalism

requires that provisional abstraction be made from those

phenomena that might be attributed to a contingent and

imperfect form of capitalism.

From the beginning, Marx's analysis takes capitalist

production as a historical totality. The capitalist mode of

production is a specifically historical form of commodity

production that originated under the conditions of 'pri-

mary accumulation/ such as the wholesale expulsion of

peasants from their land, the transformation of arable soil

into pasture in order to furnish wool for a rising textile

industry, the accumulation of large pools of wealth through

the plunder of new colonies, the breakdown of the guild

system when it met the power of the merchant and indus-

trialist. There arose in the process the modern laborer,

freed of all dependence on feudal lords and guild masters,

but likewise cut off from the means and instruments

through which he might utilize his labor-power for his own

ends. 97 He was free to sell his labor-power to those who

held these mearis and instruments, to those who owned

the soil, the materials of labor, and the proper means of

production. Labor-power and the means for its material

realization became commodities possessed by different own-

ers. This process took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth

centuries and resulted, with the universal expansion of

commodity production, in a new stratification of society.

Two main classes faced each other: the beneficiaries of

primary accumulation and the impoverished masses de-

prived of their previous means of subsistence.

They were really emancipated. The 'natural' and per-

sonal dependencies of the feudal order had been abol-

I, pp* 631-3*

306 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

ished. 'The exchange of commodities of itself implies no

other relations of dependence than those which result

from its own nature/ Everyone was free to exchange the

commodities he owned. The first group exercised this free-

dom when it used its wealth to appropriate and utilize the

means of production, whereas the masses enjoyed the free-

dom of selling the only good left to them, namely, their

labor-power.

The primary conditions of capitalism were herewith at

hand: free wage labor and private property in the means

of commodity production. From this point on, capitalist

production could go its course entirely under its own

power. Commodities are exchanged by the free will of

their owners who enter the market free of all external

compulsion, in the full joy of knowledge that their com-

modities will exchange as equivalents, and that perfect

justice will prevail. Also, the exchange value of every

commodity is determined by the necessary labor-time re-

quired for its production; and the measurement of this

labor-time is apparently the most impartial social stand-

ard. What is more, production starts with a free contract.

One party sells his labor-power to the other. The labor-

time necessary for the production of this labor-power is

the labor-time that goes into making enough commodities

to reproduce the worker's existence. The buyer pays the

price of this commodity. Nothing interferes with the per-

fect justice of the labor contract; both parties are treated

equally as free commodity owners. They 'deal with each

other as on the basis of equal rights, with this difference

alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore,

equal in the eyes of the law/ The labor contract, the basis

of capitalist production, is ostensibly the realization of

freedom, equality, and justice.

a Vol. i f p. 186.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS 307

But labor-power is a peculiar kind of commodity. It is

the only commodity whose use-value it is to be 'a source

not only of value, but of more value than it has itself.' '*

This 'surplus value/ created by the abstract universal

labor hidden behind its concrete form, falls to the buyer

of labor-power without any equivalent, since it does not

appear as an independent commodity. The value of the

labor-power sold to the capitalist is replaced in part of the

time the laborer actually works; the rest of this time goes

unpaid. Marx's statement of the way surplus value arises

may be summarized in the following argument: that the

production of the commodity, labor-power, requires part

of a labor day, whereas the laborer really works a full day.

The value paid by the capitalist is part of the actual

value of the labor-power in use, while the other part of

the latter is appropriated by the capitalist without re-

muneration. This argument, however, if isolated from

Marx's entire conception of labor, retains an accidental

element. Actually, Marx's presentation of the production

of surplus value is intrinsically connected with his analy-

sis of the twofold character of labor and must be inter-

preted in the light of this phenomenon.

The capitalist pays the exchange value of the com-

modity, labor-power, and buys its use-value, namely, labor.

'The value of labor-power, and the value which that labor-

power creates in the labor process, are two entirely differ-

ent magnitudes/ 10 The capitalist puts the labor-power

he bought to work at the machinery of production. The

labor process contains both an objective and a subjective

factor: the means of production on the one hand and

labor-power on the other. The analysis of the twofold

character of labor has shown that the objective factor cre-

ates no new value the value of the means of production

wp. *i6. 100 pp. ^-rt.

308 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

simply reappears in the product. It is otherwise with

the subjective factor of the labor process, with labor-

power in action. While the laborer, by virtue of his labor

being of a specialized kind that has a special object (durch

die zweckm&ssige Form der Arbeit), preserves and trans-

fers to the product the value of the means of production,

he at the same time, by the mere act of working, creates

each instant an additional or new value/ m The quality

of preserving value by adding new value is, as it were, a

'natural gift* of labor-power, 'which costs the laborer noth-

ing, but which is very advantageous to the capital-

ist/ 10 * This property possessed by abstract, universal la-

bor, hidden behind its concrete forms, though it is the

sole source of new value, itself has no proper value. The

labor contract thus necessarily involves exploitation.

The twofold character of labor, then, is the condition

that makes surplus value possible. By virtue of the feet

that labor has this dual form, the private appropriation

of labor-power inevitably leads to exploitation. The result

issues from the very nature of labor whenever labor-power

becomes a commodity.

For labor-power to become a commodity, however, there

must be 'free' labor: the individual must be free to sell his

labor-power to him who is free and able to buy it. The

labor contract epitomizes this freedom, equality, and jus-

tice for civil society. This historical form of freedom,

equality, and justice is thus the very condition of exploi-

tation. Marx summarizes the whole in a striking para-

graph:

[The area] within whose boundaries the sale and purchase

of labor-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate

rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property

and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a

commodity, say of labor-power, are constrained only by their

loi P. 131. 101 p. 48 o.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS 309

own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement

they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expres-

sion to their common will. Equality, because each enters into

relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodi-

ties, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property,

because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham,

because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings

them together and puts them in relation with each other, is

the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. Each

looks to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the

rest, and just because they do so, do they all, in accordance

with the pre-established harmony of things, or under the

auspices of an all-shrewd providence, work together to their

mutual advantage, for the common weal and, in the interest

of all.* '

The labor contract, from which Marx derives the essen-

tial connection between freedom and exploitation, is the

fundamental pattern for all relations in civil society.

Labor is the way men develop their abilities and needs in

the struggle with nature and history, and the social frame

impressed on labor is the historical form of life mankind

has bestowed upon itself. The implications of the free

labor contract lead Marx to see that labor produces and

perpetuates its oWn exploitation. In other words, in the

continuing process of capitalist society, freedom produces

and perpetuates its own opposite. The analysis is in this

wise an immanent critique of individual freedom as it

originates in capitalist society and as it develops pan passu

with the development of capitalism. The economic forces

of capitalism, left to their devices, create enslavement,

poverty, and the intensity of class conflicts. The truth of

this form of freedom is thus its negation.

'Living* labor, labor-power, is the only factor that in-

creases the value of the product of labor beyond the value

of the means of production. This increase in value trans-

it P. 195.

310 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

forms the products of labor into components of capital.

Labor, therefore, produces not only its own exploitation,

but also the means for this exploitation, namely, capital. 104

Capital, on the other hand, requires that the surplus

value be converted anew into capital. If the capitalist were

to consume his surplus value instead of reinvesting it in

the process of production, the latter would cease to yield

him any profit, and the incentive of commodity produc-

tion would vanish. 'Accumulation resolves itself into the

reproduction of capital on a progressively increasing

scale/ 105 and this in turn is rendered possible only by a

progressively increasing utilization of labor-power for

commodity production. Capitalist production on a pro-

gressively increasing scale is identical with exploitation

developing on the same scale. The accumulation of capi-

tal means growing impoverishment of the masses, 'increase

of the proletariat/ loe

With all these negative features, capitalism develops

the productive forces at a rapid pace. The inherent re-

quirements of capital demand that surplus value be in-

creased through increase in the productivity of labor (ra-

tionalization and intensification). But technological ad-

vance diminishes the quantity of living labor (the subjec-

tive factor) used in the productive process, in proportion

to the quantity of the means of production (the objective

factor). The objective factor increases as the subjective

factor decreases. This change in the technical composition

of capital is reflected in the change of its Value-composi-

tion': the value of labor-power diminishes as the value

of the means of production increases. The net result is an

increase in 'the organic composition of capital/ With the

progress of production goes an increase in the mass of

capital in the hands of individual capitalists. The weaker

1< P. 6$S. P. 636. 106 p. 673.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR PROCESS 31 1

is expropriated by the stronger in the competitive strug-

gle, and capital becomes centralized in an ever smaller

circle of capitalists. Free individual competition of the

liberalise stamp is transformed into monopolist competi-

tion among giant enterprises. On the other hand, the in-

creasing organic composition of capital tends to decrease

the rate of capitalist profit, since the utilization of labor-

power, the sole source of surplus value, diminishes in ratio

to the means of production employed.

The danger of the falling rate of profit aggravates the

competitive struggle as well as the class struggle: political

methods of exploitation supplement the economic ones,

which slowly reach their limit. The requirement that

capital be utilized, that there be production for produc-

tion's sake, leads, even under ideal conditions, to inevi-

table disproportions between the two spheres of produc-

tion, that of production goods and that of consumption

goods, resulting in constant overproduction. 107 The profit-

able investment of capital becomes increasingly difficult.

The struggle for new markets plants the seed of constant

international warfare.

We have just summarized some of the decisive conclu-

sions of Marx's analysis of the laws of capitalism. The pic-

ture is that of a social order that progresses through the

development of the contradictions inherent in it. Still, it

progresses, and these contradictions are the very means

through which occur a tremendous growth in the produc-

tivity of labor, an all-embracing use and mastery of nat-

ural resources, and a loosing of hitherto unknown capaci-

ties and needs among men. Capitalist society is a union

of contradictions. It gets freedom through exploitation,

wealth through impoverishment, advance in production

through restriction of consumption. The very structure

107 Cf. Henryk Grossmann, op. cit., pp. 179 ff.

31* THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

of capitalism is a dialectical one: every form and institu-

tion of the economic process begets its determinate ne-

gation, and the crisis is the extreme form in which the con-

tradictions are expressed.

The law of value, which governs the social contradic-

tions, has the force of a natural necessity. 'Only as an

internal law, and from the point of view of the individual

agents as a blind law, does the law of value exert its in-

fluence here and maintain the social equilibrium of pro-

duction in the turmoil of its accidental fluctuations.' 108

The results are of the same blind sort. The falling rate of

profit inherent in the capitalist mechanism undermines

the very foundations of the system and builds the wall

beyond which capitalist production cannot advance. The

contrast between the abundant wealth and power of a few

and the perpetual poverty of the mass becomes increas-

ingly sharper. The highest development of the productive

forces coincides with oppression and misery in full flood.

The real possibility of general happiness is negated by

the social relationships posited by man himself. The ne-

gation of this society and its transformation become the

single outlook for liberation.

7. THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC

We may now attempt to summarize the qualities that

distinguish the Marxian from the Hegelian dialectic. We

have emphasized that Marx's dialectical conception of re-

ality was originally motivated by the same datum as He-

gel's, namely, by the negarivecharacter of. reality. In th6

social world, this negativity carried forward the contra-

dictions of class society and thus remained the motor of

the social process. Every single fact and condition was

108 Capital, vol. m, p. 1026.

THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC

drawn into this process so that its significance could be

grasped only when seen in this totality to which it be-

longed. For Marx, as for Hegel, 'the truth* lies only in the

whole, the 'negative totality.'

However, the social world becomes a negative totality

only in the process of an abstraction, which is imposed

upon the dialectical method by the structure of its subject

matter, capitalist society. We may even say that the ab-

straction is capitalism's own work, and that the Marxian

method only follows this process. Marx's analysis has

shown that capitalist economy is built upon and perpetu-

ated by the constant reduction of concrete to abstract

labor. This economy step by step retreats from the con-

crete of human activity and needs, and achieves the inte-

gration of individual activities and needs only through a

complex of abstract relations in which individual work

counts merely in so far as it represents socially necessary

labor-time, and in which the relations among men appear

as relations of things (commodities). The commodity world

is a 'falsified' and 'mystified' world, and its critical analysis

must first follow the abstractions which make up this

world, and must then take its departure from these ab-

stract relations in order to arrive at their real content. The

second step is thus the abstraction from the abstraction,

or the abandonment of a false concreteness, so that the

true concreteness might be restored. Accordingly, the

Marxian theory elaborates first the abstract relations that

determine the commodity world (such as commodity, ex-

change value, money, wages) and returns from them to the

fully developed content of capitalism (the structural tend-

encies of the capitalist world that lead to its destruction).

We have said that for Marx, as well as for Hegel, the

truth lies only in the negative totality. However, the to-

tality in which the Marxian theory moves is other than

3 14 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

that of Hegel's philosophy, and this difference indicates

the decisive difference between Hegel's and Marx's dia-

lectics. For Hegel, the totality was the totality of reason,

a closed ontological system, finally identical with the ra-

tional system of history. Hegel's dialectical process was

thus a universal ontological one in which history was pat-

terned on the metaphysical process of being. Marx, on the

other hand, detached dialectic from this ontological base.

In his work, the negativity of reality becomes a historical

condition which cannot be hypostatized as a metaphysical

state of affairs. In other words, it becomes a social con-

dition, associated with a particular historical form of so-

ciety. The totality that the Marxian dialectic gets to is

the totality of class society, and the negativity that under-

lies its contradictions and shapes its every content is the

negativity of class relations. The dialectical totality again

includes nature, but only in so far as the latter enters and

conditions the historical process of social reproduction. In

the progress of class society, this reproduction assumes vari-

ous forms at the various levels of its development, and

these are the framework of all the dialectical concepts.

The dialectical method has thus of its very nature be-

come a historical method. The dialectical principle is not

a general principle equally applicable to any subject mat-

ter. To be sure, every fact whatever can be subjected to

a dialectical analysis, for example, a glass of water, as in

Lenin's famous discussion. 109 But all such analyses would

lead into the structure of the socio-historical process and

show it to be constitutive in the facts under analysis. The

dialectic takes facts as elements of a definite historical

totality from which they cannot be isolated. In his refer-

ence to the example of a glass of water, Lenin states that

'the whole of human practice must enter the "definition"

lot- Selected Works, New York 1954, International Publishers, vol. ix,

p. 6t ff.

THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC 315

of the object'; the independent objectivity of the glass of

water is thus dissolved. Every fact can be subjected to

dialectical analysis only in so far as every fact is influenced

by the antagonisms of the social process.

iThe historical character of the Marxian dialectic em-

braces the prevailing negativity as well as its negation.

The given state of affairs is negative and can be rendered

positive only by liberating the possibilities immanent in it.

This last, the negation of the negation, is accomplished by

establishing a new order of things. The negativity and its

negation are two different phases of the same historical

process, straddled by man's historical actiop. The 'new 9

state is the truth of the old, but that truth does not

steadily and automatically grow out of the earlier state;

it can be set free only by an autonomous act on the part

of men, that will cancel the whole of the existing negative

state. Truth, in short, is not a realm apart from historical

reality, nor a region of eternally valid ideas. To be sure,

it traiiscends the given historical reality, but only in so far

as it crosses from one historical stage to another *The nega-

tive state as well as its negation is a concrete event within

the same totality. *

The Marxian dialectic is a historical method in still an-

other sense: it deals with a particular stage of the histori-

cal process. Marx criticizes Hegel's dialectic for general-

izing the dialectical movement into a movement of all be-

ing, of being-as-such, and getting therefore merely 'the

abstract, logical, speculative expression of the movement

ofTustory.' ^^TMorebvefTtKe movement to which Hegel

gave such abstract expression, and which he thought was

general, actually characterizes only a particular phase of

man's history, namely, 'the history of his maturing' (Ent-

stehungsgeschichte). ul Marx's distinction between the

no <Okonomisch*phi!osophische Manuskripte,' op. tit., pp. 158-3.

in Ibid., p. 153.

$l6 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

history of this maturing and the 'actual history* of man-

kind amounts to a delimitation of the dialectic. The Ent-

stehungsgeschichte of mankind, which Marx calls his pre-

history, is the history of class society. Man's actual history

will begin when this society has been abolished. The

Hegelian dialectic gives the abstract logical form of the

pre-historical development, the Marxian dialectic its real

concrete movement. Marx's dialectic, therefore, is still

bound up with the pre-historical phase.

The negativity with which Marxian dialectic begins is

that characterizing human existence in class society; the

antagonisms that intensify this negativity and eventually

abolish it are the antagonisms of class society. It is of the

very essence of the Marxian dialectic to imply that, with

the transition from the pre-history represented by class so-

ciety to the history of classless society, the entire structure

of historical movement will change. Once mankind has be-

come the conscious subject of its development, its history

can no longer be outlined in forms that apply to the pre-

historical phase.

Marx's dialectical method still reflects the sway of blind

economic forces over the course of society. The dialectical

analysis of social reality in terms of its inherent contra-

dictions and their resolution shows this reality to be over-

powered by objective mechanisms that operate with the

necessity of 'natural' (physical) laws only thus can the

contradiction be the ultimate force that keeps society mov-

ing. The movement is dialectical in itself inasmuch as it is

not yet piloted by the self-conscious activity of freely as-

sociated individuals. The dialectical laws are the devel-

oped knowledge of the 'natural' laws of society, and there-

fore a step towards their annulment, but they are still a

knowledge of 'natural' laws. To be sure, the struggle with

the 'realm of necessity* will continue with man's passage

to the stage of his 'actual history,' and the negativity and

THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC

the contradiction will not disappear. Nevertheless, when

society has become the free subject of this struggle, the

latter will be waged in entirely different forms. For this

reason, it is not permissible to impose the dialectical struc-

ture of pre-history upon the future history of mankind.

The concept that definitely connects Marx's dialectic

with the history of class society is the concept of necessity.

The dialecticaTlaws art necessary laws; the various forms

of class society necessarily perish from their inner contra-

dictions. The laws ofcapitahsm work with 'iron necessity

towards inevitable results/ Marx says. This necessity does

not, however, apply to the positive transformation of capi-

talist society. It is true, Marx assumed that the same

mechanisms that bring about the concentration and cen-

tralization of capital also produce 'the socialization of

labor.' 'Capitalist production begets, with the inexorabil-

ity of a law of Nature, its own negation,' namely, prop-

erty based 'on co-operation and the possession in common

of the land and of the means of production.' ul Neverthe-

less, it would be a distortion of the entire significance of

Marxian theory to argue from the inexorable necessity

that governs the development of capitalism to a similar

necessity in the matter of transformation to socialism.

When capitalism is negated, social processes no longer

stand under the rule of blind natural laws. This is pre-

cisely what distinguishes the nature of the new from the

old. The transition from capitalism's inevitable death to

socialism is necessary, but only in the sense that the full

development of the individual is necessary. The new so-

cial union of individuals, again, is necessary, but only in

the sense that it is necessary to use available productive

forces for the general satisfaction of all individuals. It is

the realization of freedom and happiness that necessitates

11* Capital, op. dt., vol. I, p. 897.

318 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

the establishment of an order wherein associated individ-

uals will determine the organization of jS^r-Hife. We

have already emphasized that the qualities of the future

society are reflected in the current forces that are driving

towards its realization. There can be no blind necessity in

tendencies that terminate in a free and self -conscious so-

ciety. The negation of capitalism begins within capital;

ism itself, but even in the phases that precede revolution

there*Tsractive the rational spontaneity that will animate

the post-revolutionary phases. The revolution depends in-

deed upon a totality of objective conditions: it requires a

certain attained levelj>f material and intellectual culture,

a self-conscious and organized working class on an inter-

national scale, acute class^ struggle. These become revolu-

tionary conditions, however, only if seized upon and di-

rected by a conscious activity that has in mind the socialist

goal. Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic in-

evitability guarantees the transition from capitalism to

socialism.

Capitalism has itself extended the scope and power of

rational practices to a considerable degree. The 'natural

laws' that make capitalism work have been counteracted by

tendencies of another kind, which have retarded the ef-

fect of the necessary processes and thereby protracted the

life of the capitalist order. 118 Capitalism lias been sub-

jected in certain areas tcL large-scale political and admin-

istrative regulatiom^ Planning, for example, is not an ex-

clusive feature of socialist society. 114 The natural necessity

of the social laws Marx expounded implied the possibility

of such planning under capitalism, when they referred to

an interplay of order and chance, of conscious action and

blind mechanisms. The possibility of rational planning

under capitalism does not, of course, impair the validity of

"Ibid., vol. Hi, pp. 178-81.

n* Critique of the Gotta Program, 1891, New York 1938.

THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC

the fundamental laws that Marx discovered in this system

-the system is destined to perish by virtue of these laws.

But the process might involve a long period of barbarism.

The latter can be preventecTonly by free action. The revo-

lution requires the maturity of many forces, but the great-

est among them is the sutjectiyejprce, namely, the revo-

lutionary class itself. 115 The realization of freedom and

reason reqiiireslKe free rationality of those who achieve it.

Marxian theory is, then, incompatible with fatalistic de-

terminism. True, historical materialism involves the de-

terminist principle that consciousness is conditioned by

social existence. We have attempted to show, however,

that the necessary dependence enunciated by this princi-

ple applies to the 'pre-historical' life, namely, to the life of

class society. The relations of production that restrict and

distort man's potentialities inevitably determine his con-

sciousness, precisely because society is not a free and con-

scious subject. As long as man is incapable of dominating

these relations and using them to gratify the needs and

desires of the whole, they will assume the form of an ob-

jective, independent entity. Consciousness, caught in and

overpowered by tfiese relations, necessarily becomes idea:

logical.

OF course, the consciousness of men will continue to

be determined by the material processes that reproduce

their society, even when men have come to regulate their

social relations in such a way that these contribute best

to the free development of ajl. But when these material

processes have been made rational and have become the

conscious work of men, the blind dependence of con-

sciousness on social conditions will cease to exist. Reason,

when determined by rational social conditions, is deter-

mined by itself. Socialist freedom embraces both sides of

" The Poverty of Philosophy, trans. H. Quelch, Chicago 1910, p. 190.

320 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

the relation between consciousness and social existence.

The principle of historical materialism leads to its self-

negation.

The labor process, which shows forth as fundamental in

the Marxian analysis of capitalism and its genesis, is the

ground on which the various branches of theory and prac-

tice operate in capitalist society. An understanding of the

labor process, therefore, is at the same time an under-

standing of the source for the separation between theory

and practice, and of the element that re-establishes their

interconnection. Marxian theory is of its very nature an

integral and integrating theory of society. The economic

process of capitalism exercises a totalitarian influence over

all theory and all practice, and an economic analysis that

shatters the capitalist camouflage and breaks through its

'reification' will get down to the subsoil common to all

theory and practice in this society.

Marxian economics leaves no room for an independent

philosophy, psychology, or sociology. 'Morality, religion,

metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their correspond-

ing forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the sem-

blance of independence . . . When reality is depicted,

philosophy, as an independent branch of activity loses its

medium of existence. At the best its place can only be

taken by a summing-up of the most general results, ab-

stractions which arise from the observation of the histori-

cal development of men/ U6

With the separation of theory from practice, philosophy

became the sanctuary of true theory. Science was either

pressed 'into the service of capital' 11T or degraded to the

position of a leisurely pastime remote from any concern

"' The German Ideology, pp. 14-15.

T Capital, vol. i, p. 397.

THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC 3*1

with the actual struggles of mankind, while philosophy

undertook in the medium of abstract thought to guard

the solutions to man's problem of needs, fears, and de-

sires. Ture Reason,' reason purified of empirical contin-

gencies, became the proper realm of truth.

Towards the conclusion of his Critique of Pure Reason,

Kant raises the three questions with which human reason

is most vitally concerned: How can I know? What shall I

do? What may I hope? These questions and the attempts

at their solution indeed comprise the very core of philoso-

phy, its concern for the essential potentialities of man

amid the deprivations of reality. Hegel had placed this

philosophic concern in the historical context of his time,

so that it became manifest that Kant's questions led into

the actual historical process. Man's knowledge, activity,

and hope were referred in the direction of establishing a

rational society. Marx set out to demonstrate the concrete

forces and tendencies that prevented and those that pro-

moted this goal. The material connection of his theory

with a definite historical form of practice negated not only

philosophy but sociology as well. The social facts that

Marx analyzed (for example, the alienation of labor, the

fetishism of the commodity world, surplus value, exploita-

tion) are not akin to sociological facts, such as divorces,

crimes, shifts in population, and business cycles. The fun-

damental relations of the Marxian categories are not

within the reach of sociology or of any science that is pre-

occupied with describing and organizing the objective

phenomena of society. They will appear as facts only to a

theory that takes them in the preview of their negation.

According to Marx, the correct theory is the consciousness

of a practice that aims at changing the world.

Marx's concept of truth, however, is far from relativ-

ism.TThere is only one truth and one practice capable

of realizing it. Theory has demonstrated the tendencies

322 THE DIALECTICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

that make for the attainment of a rational order of

life, the conditions for creating this, and the initial steps

to be taken. The final aim of the new social practice has

been formulated: the abolition of labor, the employment

of the socialized means of productionjorjhe free develop-

ment of all individuals. The rest is the task of man's own

liberated activity. Theory accompanies the practice at

every moment, analyzing the changing situation and for-

mulating its concepts accordingly. The concrete conditions

for realizing the truth may vary, but the truth remains

the same and theory remains its ultimate guardian. Theory

will preserve the truth even if revolutionary practice de-

viates from its proper path. Practice follows the truth,

not vice versa.

This absolutism of truth completes the philosophical

heritage of the Marxian theory and once for all separates

dialectical theory from the subsequent forms of positivism

and relativism.

II

*))) W KC KC

The Foundations of Positivism and the Rise of

Sociology

i. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

IN the decade following Hegel's death, European thought

entered an era of 'positivism.' This positivism announced

itself as the system of positive philosophy, taking a form

quite different from that which later ppsitivism assumed.

Comte's Cours de philosophic positive was published be-

tween 1830 and 1842, Stahl's positive philosophy of the

state between 1830 and 1837, and Schelling began in 1841

his Berlin lectures on the positive Philosophic that he had

been elaborating ever since 1827.

While there can be no doubt about Comte's contribu-

tion to positivism (Comte himself derived the positivistic

method from the foundations of positive philosophy), it

may seem preposterous to relate Schilling's and Stahl's

positive philosophy to that movement. Was Schelling not

an exponent of metaphysics in its most transcendent form,

and did Stahl not expound a religious theory of the state?

True, Stahl is recognized as a representative of positivism

in legal philosophy, but what has Schelling's philosophy

of mythology and revelation which furnished some basic

concepts for Stahl's doctrine to do with positivism?

We find, however, in Schelling's Philosophie der Offen-

barung the opinion that the traditional metaphysics, since

it was occupied only with the notion of things and their

pure essence, could not get at their actual existence and

thus could not provide real knowledge. In contrast, Schel-

ling's philosophy aims at the truly actual and existent,

3*3

3*4 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

and by that token claims to be 'positive.' He raises the

question whether the rationalistic metaphysics was not

a purely 'negative* philosophy, and whether, following

Kant's destruction of this metaphysics, 'the positive should

not now organize itself, free and independent of the

former, into a science of its own.' 1 Moreover, in 1827,

at the conclusion of his lectures on the history of modern

philosophy, Schelling undertook to justify the emphasis

laid upon experience by the British and French philoso-

phers and defended this empiricism against its German

foes. He went so far as to declare that, 'if we had only a

choice between empiricism and the oppressive apriorism

[Denknotwendigkeiten] of an extreme rationalism, no free

mind would hesitate to decide for empiricism.' * He ended

by stating that the great task German philosophy would

have would be to overcome aprioristic metaphysics

through a 'positive system,' which would finally transform

philosophy into a true 'science of experience.'

In its fundamental aspects, Schelling's positive philoso-

phy is certainly greatly different from Comte's. The 'posi-

tives,' to Comte, are the matters of fact of observation,

while Schelling stresses that 'experience' is not limited to

the facts of outer and inner sense. Comte is oriented to

physical science and to the necessary laws that govern all

reality, while Schelling attempts to expound a 'philosophy

of freedom' and maintains that free creative activity is the

ultimate matter of fact of experience. Nevertheless, de-

spite these essential differences, there is a common tend-

ency in both philosophies to counter the sway of apriorism

and to restore the authority of experience. 8

i Schelling, Sdmmtliche Werke, sect. 2, vol. HI, Stuttgart 1858, p. 83.

'Ibid., sect, i, vol. x, Stuttgart 1861, p. 198.

BConftantin Frantz, a leading German conservative political philos-

opher, already recognized in 1880 that the 'positivistic school in France*

and Schelling s positive philosophy 'are, in a certain sense, directed to the

same end* (Schelling's positive Philosophic, Cttthen 1880, Part HI, p. 877).

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY 385

This common tendency might best be understood by

considering what the new positive philosophy was di-

rected against. Positive philosophy was a conscious reac-

tion against the critical and destructive tendencies of

French and German rationalism, a reaction that was par-

ticularly bitter in Germany. Because of its critical tenden-

cies, the Hegelian system was designated as 'negative phi-

losophy.' Its contemporaries recognized that the principles

Hegel enunciated in his philosophy led him 'to a critique

of everything that was hitherto held to be the objective

truth.' 4 His philosophy 'negated' namely, it repudiated

any irrational and unreasonable reality. The reaction saw

a challenge to the existing order in Hegel's attempt to

measure reality according to the standards of autonomous

reason. Negative philosophy, it was claimed, tries for the

potentialities of things, but is incapable of knowing their

reality. It stops short at their 'logical forms' and never

reaches their actual content, which is not deducible from

these forms. As a result, so the critique of Hegel ran, the

negative philosophy can neither explain nor justify things

as they are. This led to the most fundamental objection

of all, that negative philosophy, because of its conceptual

make-up, 'negates* things as they are. The matters of fact

that make up the given state of affairs, when viewed in

the light of reason, become negative, limited, transitory

they become perishing forms within a comprehensive proc-

ess that leads beyond them. The Hegelian dialectic was

seen as the prototype of all destructive negations of the

given, for in it every immediately given form passes into

its opposite and attains its true content only by so doing.

This kind of philosophy, the critics said, denies to the

given the dignity of the real; it contains 'the principle of

revolution' (Stahl said). Hegel's statement that the real is

Moses Hess, 'GegenwSrtige Krisis der deutschen Philosophic/ 1841,

in Sozialistiche Aufstitze, Berlin 1991, pp. 9, 11.

POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

rational was understood to mean that only the rational is

real.

Positive philosophy made its counter-attack against criti-

cal rationalism on two fronts. Comte fought against the

French form of negative philosophy, against the heritage

of Descartes and the Enlightenment. In Germany, the

struggle was directed against Hegel's system. Schelling re-

ceived an express commission from Frederick William IV

4 to destroy the dragon seed' of Hegelianism, while Stahl,

another anti-Hegelian, became the philosophic spokesman

of the Prussian monarchy in 1840. German political lead-

ers clearly recognized that Hegel's philosophy, far from

justifying the state in the concrete shape it had taken,

rather contained an instrument for its destruction. Within

this situation, positive philosophy offered itself as the ap-

propriate ideological savior.

The history of post-Hegelian thought is characterized

by this twofold thrust of positive philosophy, which we

have just summarized. 8 Positive philosophy was supposed

to overcome negative philosophy in its entirety, that is,

to abolish any subordinating of reality to transcendental

reason. Moreover, it was to teach men to view and study

the phenomena of their world as neutral objects governed

by universally valid laws. This tendency became particu-

larly important in social and political philosophy. Hegel

had considered society and the state to be the historical

work of man and interpreted them under the aspect of

freedom; in contrast, positive philosophy studied the so-

cial realities after the pattern of nature and under the

aspect of objective necessity. The independence of matters

of fact was to be preserved, and reasoning was to be di-

In the following discussion, we shall disregard Schelling's positive

philosophy, since it had no relevance to the development of social thought

and influenced the political philosophy only through the use which Stahl

made of it.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

rected to an acceptance of the given. In this way positive

philosophy aimed to counteract the critical process in-

volved in the philosophical 'negating 1 of the given, and to

restore to facts the dignity of the positive.

This is the point at which the connection between posi-

tive philosophy and positivism (in the modern sense of

the term) becomes clear. Their common feature, apart

from their joint struggle against metaphysical apriorism,

is the orientation of thought to matters of fact and the

elevation of experience to the ultimate in knowledge.

The positivist method certainly destroyed many theo-

logical and metaphysical illusions and promoted the march

of free thought, especially in the natural sciences. The

positivistic attack on transcendent philosophy was rein-

forced through great strides in these sciences around the

first half of the last century. Under the impact of the new

scientific temper positivism could claim, as Comte put it,

to be the philosophic integration of human knowledge;

the integration was to come through the universal appli-

cation of the scientific method and through excluding all

objectives that, in the last analysis, could not be verified

by observation. ,

The positivistic opposition to the principle that the

matters of fact of experience have to be justified before

the court of reason, however, prevented the interpretation

of these 'data* in terms of a comprehensive critique of the

given itself. Such a criticism no longer had a place in sci-

ence. In the end, positive philosophy facilitated the sur-

render of thought to everything that existed and mani-

fested the power to persist in experience. Comte explicitly

stated that the term 'positive* by which he designated his

philosophy implied educating men to take a positive atti-

tude towards the prevailing state of affairs. Positive philos-

ophy was going to affirm the existing order against those

who asserted the need for 'negating' it. We shall see that

328 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

Comte and Stahl emphatically stressed this implication of

their work. The political aims thus expressed link the

positive philosophy with the doctrines of the French

counter-revolution: Comte was influenced by De Maistre,

Stahl by Burke.

Modern social theory got its greatest impetus from posi-

tivism during the nineteenth century. Sociology originated

in this positivism and through its influence developed into

an independent empirical science. Before we continue this

line of analysis, however, we must briefly consider the

trend in social theory exemplified by the so-called early

French socialists, who had different roots from those of

the positivists and who led in another direction, although,

in their beginnings, they associated themselves with the

positivist position.

The early French socialists found the decisive motives

for their doctrines in the class conflicts which conditioned

the after-history of the French Revolution. Industry made

great strides, the first socialist stirrings were felt, the prole-

tariat began to consolidate. The social and economic con-

ditions that prevailed were seen by these thinkers to con-

stitute the real basis of the historical process. Saint-Simon

and Fourier focused their theoretical implements upon

the totality of these conditions, thus making society, in

the modern sense of the word, the object upon which their

theory worked. Sismondi concluded that the economic

antagonisms of capitalism were the structural laws of mod-

ern society; Proudhon saw society as a system of contradic-

tions. A number of English writers, beginning in 1821,

carried their analyses of capitalism so far that they saw

the class struggles as the driving motor of social develop-

ment.'

All these doctrines aimed at a critique of the prevailing

Marx, Theorien tiber den Mchrwert, Stuttgart 1991, vol. in, pp. t8i ff.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY 329

social forms, with the fundamental concepts serving as in-

struments for transforming and not for stabilizing or justi-

fying the given order.

Between the positivist and the critical streams, however,

there lay a connecting link in the form of a systematic

attempt to fuse the principle of class struggle with the

idea of objective scientific sociology. Von Stein's work,

Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung in Frankreich von 1789

bis auf unsere Tage (1850) made this attempt. He con-

ceived the social antagonisms in terms of the dialectic

the class struggle was the negative principle by which so-

ciety proceeds from one historical form to another. Von

Stein considered himself an orthodox Hegelian. Building

on Hegel's separation of state from society, he found that

the actual content of historic progress was made up of

changes in social structure and that the objective of the

warring classes was to possess state power. But he inter-

preted these tendencies as general sociological laws, so

that it was by virtue of some 'natural' mechanism that the

class conflicts were supposed to lead to social order and

to progress on ever higher levels. The force of the dialectic

was thus neutralised and made part of a sociological sys-

tem in which social antagonisms were just means for estab-

lishing social harmony. In the end, von Stein's doctrine is

not so far removed from the social theory of positive phi-

losophy.

We shall begin our discussion of the development of

post-Hegelian social thought with a brief sketch of the

main trends in Saint-Simon's work and in the critical so-

cial theory that developed in France. We shall then turn

to an analysis of the two most influential writings of the

positivist social school: Comte's Sociology and Stahl's

Philosophy of Right, ending with von Stein's study, which

reconciles Hegel's dialectical conceptions with the system

of positive philosophy.

JJO POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

2. SAINT-SIMON

Saint-Simon, like Hegel, begins with the assertion that

the social order engendered by the French Revolution

proved that mankind had reached the adult stage. 1 In

contrast to Hegel, however, he described this stage pri-

marily in terms of its economy; the industrial process was

the sole integrating factor in the new social order. Like

Hegel, again, Saint-Simon was convinced that this new

order contains the reconciliation of the idea and reality.

Human potentialities are no longer the concern of theory

apart from practice; the content of theory has been trans-

ferred to a plane of rational activity carried on by indi-

viduals in direct association with one another. 'Politics,

morals, and philosophy, instead of terminating in leisurely

contemplation detached from practice, have eventually ar-

rived at their veritable occupation, namely, to create so-

cial happiness. In a word, they are ready to realize that

liberty is no longer an abstraction, nor society a fiction/ 2

The process of realizing this is an economic one. The new

era is that of industrialism, which brings with it a guar-

antee that it can fulfill all human potentialities. 'Society

as a whole is based on industry. Industry is the only guar-

antor of its existence, and the unique source of all wealth

and prosperity. The state of affairs which is most favorable

to industry is, therefore, most favorable to society. This

is the starting point as well as the goal of all our efforts.' '

The progress of economic conditions necessitates that phi-

losophy pass into social theory; and the social theory is

none other than political economy or 'the science of pro-

duction.' 4

At first Saint-Simon contented himself with proclaim-

i(Euvrcs de Saint-Simon, ed. Enfcmtin, Paris 1868 ff., vol. n, p. 118.

i Ibid., p. 13. a Ibid. 4 P. 188.

SAINT-SIMON 33 1

ing the principles of radical liberalism. Individuals had

been set free in order that they might work, while society

was the natural integer that sewed their independent ef-

forts into a harmonious whole. Government was an evil

necessary to cope with the danger of anarchy and revolu-

tion that lurk behind the mechanisms of industrial capi-

talism. Saint-Simon began with a predominantly optimis-

tic view of industrial societythe rapid progress of all pro-

ductive forces, he thought, would soon blot out the grow-

ing antagonisms and the revolutionary upheavals within

this social system. The new industrial order was above

all a positive one, representing the affirmation and fruition

of all human endeavor for a happy and abundant life. It

was not necessary to go beyond the given; philosophy and

social theory needed but to understand and organize the

facts. Truth was to be derived from the facts and from

them alone. Saint-Simon thus became the founder of

modern positivism. 5

Social theory, Saint-Simon held, would use 'the same

method that is employed in the other sciences of observa-

tion. In other words, reasoning must be based upon the

facts observed and discussed, instead of following the

method adopted by the speculative sciences, which refer

all facts to reasoning.' 6 Astronomy, physics, and chemistry

had already been established on this 'positive basis'; the

time had now come for philosophy to join these special

sciences and make itself entirely positive.

Saint-Simon promulgated this positivism as the ultimate

principle of his philosophy: 'In all portions of my work,

I shall be occupied with establishing series of facts, for I

am convinced that this is the only solid part of our knowl-

edge.' 7 Theology and metaphysics, and, moreover, all

*M4moire tur la science de I'homme, written in 1813; op. cit., vol. xi;

see Weill, Saint-Simon et son auvre, Paris 1894, pp. 55 ff.

* Saint-Simon, op. cit., vol. xi, pp. 8 f.

f P. it.

332 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

transcendental concepts and values were to be tested by

the positivistic method of exact science. 'Once all our

knowledge is uniformly founded on observations, the di-

rection of our spiritual affairs must be trusted to [conferee

a] the power of positive science/ 8

The 'science of man/ another name for social theory,

thus was launched on the pattern of a natural science; it

had to be impressed with a positive 'character, by found-

ing it on observation and by treating it with the method

employed by the other branches [I] of physics/ 9 Society

was to be treated like nature. This attitude involved the

sharpest deviation from and opposition to Hegel's philo-

sophic theory. The interest of freedom was removed from

the sphere of the individual's rational will and set in the

objective laws of the social and economic process. Marx

considered society to be irrational and hence evil, so long

as it continued to be governed by inexorable objective

laws. Progress to him was equivalent to upsetting these

laws, an act that was to be consummated by man in his

free development. The positivist theory of society followed

the opposite tendency: the laws of society increasingly re-

ceived the form of natural objective laws. 'Men are mere

instruments' before the omnipotent law of progress, in-

capable of changing or charting its course. 10 The deifica-

tion of progress into an independent natural law was com-

pleted in Comte's positive philosophy.

Saint-Simon's own work did contain elements that ran

counter to the tendencies of industrial capitalism. Accord-

ing to him, the progress of the industrial system presup-

posed that the struggle between classes was first trans-

formed and diverted into a struggle against nature, in

which all the social classes joined. 11 The form of govern-

ment he envisaged was not one in which rulers command

Vol. iv, p. 83. 10 p. 119.

P. 187. "Vol. iv, pp. 147, i6t.

SAINT-SIMON 333

their subjects, but one in which the government exercises

a technical administration over the work to be done. 12 We

might say that Saint-Simon's philosophy developed in just

the reverse way to Hegel's. It began with the reconciliation

of idea and reality and ended by viewing them as irrecon-

cilable.

Economic crises and class struggles intensified in France

as the revolution of 1830 approached. 'By 1826 it was evi-

dent that the nation and the monarchy were moving in

opposite directions; the monarch was preparing to estab-

lish a despotism while the nation was drifting toward revo-

lution.' 18 The lectures that Saint-Simon's pupil, Bazard,

gave in these years on his master's doctrine turned it into

a radical critique of the existing social order.

Bazard's presentation holds to the basic assumption that

philosophy must be made identical with social theory, that

society is conditioned by the structure of its economic

process, and that rational social practice alone will even-

tually produce a genuine social form oriented to human

needs. The given form of society is no longer adequate

to progress and harmony as far as Bazard is concerned.

He stigmatizes the industrial system as one of exploita-

tion, as the last but by far not the least example of the

'exploitation of man by man/ which has run the gamut

of civilization's history. In all its relations, the industrial

system is molded by the inevitable struggle between the

proletariat on the one hand and the owners of the instru-

ments and machinery of production on the other.

The whole mass of workers is today exploited by those

whose property it utilizes . . . The entire weight of this exploi-

tation falls upon the working class, that is, upon the immense

majority who are workers. Under such conditions, the worker

i P. 150.

i Frederick B. Am, Reaction and Revolution, New York 1954, Harper

and Brothers, p. 830 t

334 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

has become the direct descendant of the slave and the serf. He

is, as a person, free, and no longer attached to the soil, but

this is all the freedom he has got. He can exist in this state

of legal freedom only under the conditions imposed upon him

by that small class which a legislation born of the right to

conquest has invested with the monopoly of wealth, with the

power to command the instruments of labor at will and at

leisure. 14

Saint-Simon's positivism was thus turned into its oppo-

site. Its original conclusions had glorified liberalism, but

it now knew that the system underlying this liberalism

holds within it the seed of its own destruction. Bazard

showed, as Sismondi had before him, that the accumula-

tion of wealth and the spread of poverty, with their at-

tendant crises and growing exploitations, follow from the

economic organization in which 'the capitalists and pro-

prietors' are the ones to arrange the social distribution

of labor. 'Every individual is left to his own devices' in

the process of production, and no common interest or col-

lective effort exists to combine and administer the multi-

tude of works. When 'the instruments of labor are utilized

by isolated individuals' subject to the rule of chance and

the fact of power, industrial crises are made inevitable. 15

The social order, then, Bazard said, has become general

disorder 'as a result of the principle of unlimited compe-

tition.' 16 Progressive ideas like the ones with which capi-

talist society justified its social scheme at the beginning,

ideas of general freedom and of the pursuit of happiness

within a rational scheme of life, can reach fruition only

with a new revolution 'that will finally do away with the

exploitation of man by man in all its insidious forms.

That revolution is inevitable, and until it is consummated

all the glowing phrases so oft repeated about the light of

i* Doctrine Saint-Simonienne. Exposition. Paris 1854, p. lit f.

M P. 187- "P- 145.

SAINT-SIMON 335

civilization and the glory of the century will remain mere

language for the convenience of privileged egoists.' 1T The

institution of private property will have to come to an

end, for if exploitation is to disappear the scheme of prop-

erty by which exploitation is perpetuated must also dis-

appear. 18

The Doctrine Saint-Simonienne reflects the social up-

heavals caused by the progress of industrialism under the

Restoration. During this period, machines were introduced

on an ever larger scale (especially in the textile mills), and

industry began to concentrate. However, France experi-

enced not only the industrial and commercial growth

which Saint-Simon's early writings extoll, but the re-

verse of this as well. Costly crises shook the entire sys-

tem in 1816-17 and in 1825-7. Workers banded to-

gether to destroy the machines that caused them so much

misery and unemployment. 'There could be no doubt that

the rise of large-scale industry had an unfavorable in-

fluence on the condition of the worker. Agrarian home

labor suffered from factory competition. The introduction

of machines rendered cheap female and child labor pos-

sible and these in^turn served to depress wages. Migration

to the cities created a scarcity of housing facilities, and

this condition, together with a general lack of proper

food, made for a breeding ground of rickets and tubercu-

losis. Epidemics like the cholera epidemic of 1832 took

their toll particularly among workers. Misery fosters dip-

somania and prostitution. Industrial centers have a mor-

tality far above the average, especially among children.' 19

Government intervened with repressive measures

against workers. The Lex Le Chapelier of 1789 had pro-

hibited organization of workers. Strikes were now answered

IT Pp. 1*5 f. it P. 1*7.

10 Henri See, Franidsische Wirtschaftsgeschichtc, Jena 1936, vol. n, p.

*44-

336 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

with a call of the army. Leaders were given lengthy

prison sentences. Increasing restrictions were placed on

the freedom of workers. 20 'While pledging the entire

power of the state against the workers, the authorities are

extremely lenient with the entrepreneurs.' In 1829 *e

ship owners of Grenouille associated themselves for the

purpose of lowering the wages of their seamen. The judi-

ciary and the ministry of the navy declared their pro-

cedure contrary to law, but refused any legal action be-

cause they feared 'that the seamen could be driven to

rebellion/ 2I

Occurrences like these made it obvious that the eco-

nomic process, or factors in it, reached its tentacles into

the totality of social relations and held them in grip.

Smith and Ricardo had treated this economic process as a

specialized science, where wealth, poverty, labor, value,

property, and, all its other paraphernalia appeared as

strictly economic conditions and relations, to be derived

from or explained by economic laws. Saint-Simon had

made the economic laws the foundation of the whole proc-

ess of society. Now, when his socialist successors in France

were building social theory on an economic base, they

were changing the conceptual character of political econ-

omy. It ceased to be a 'pure* and specialized science, be-

coming instead an intellectual force for exposing the an-

tagonisms of the modern social structure and for guiding

action in the direction of resolving them. By the same

token, the commodity world ceased to be conceived in

terms of its own reification. When Sismondi, for instance,

argued against Ricardo that 'political economy is not a

science of calculus but a moral science,' he was not ad-

vocating a regress from scientific to moral criteria in rea-

soning, but was indicating that the focus of economic

op p .

SAINT-SIMON 337

theory should be upon human wants and desires. 88 Sis-

mondi's statement belongs in the last analysis with the

tendency that operated in Hegel when he gave to social

theory a philosophic construction. Hegel was getting at

the point that society, which was the historical stage in

the self-development of men, had to be interpreted as

the totality of human relations, and this with an eye to

its role in advancing the realization of reason and free-

dom. It was precisely this philosophic interpretation of

social theory that turned the latter into a critical theory

of political economy. For, as soon as it was viewed in the

light of reason and freedom, the prevailing form of so-

ciety appeared as a complex of economic contradictions

that bred an irrational and enslaved order. Because the

philosophic interpretation of society carried the critical

implications that it did, any disjunction between philoso-

phy and social theory was held to weaken these critical

motives, which pushed philosophical concepts to see be-

yond and to go beyond the given state of affairs. Proudhon

saw the reason for the apologetic conclusions of economic

theory and its consequent frustration of any principle of

action to consist in 'the separation of philosophy from

political economy/ 'Philosophy/ he said, 'is the algebra of

society, and political economy is the application of this

algebra/ Philosophy to him, then, was 'the theory of rea-

son/- 38 Following out this beginning, Proudhon defined

social theory as 'the accord between reason and social prac-

tice/ 2 * and in stating the subject matter of social theory

he placed great stress on its comprehensive area of appli-

cation; it deals with 'the entire life of society/ with 'the

wNouveaux principes d'Jconomie politique, 2nd ed., Paris 1827, vol. i,

P- Si3>

a Systtmc des contradictions Jconomiques, ed. C. Bougll and H. Moys-

set, Paris 1923, vol. n, pp. 392 f.

a* Ibid., p. 391.

338 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

ensemble of its successive manifestations/ 25 thus reaching

far beyond the range of the special science of economics.

Emphasis on the philosophic nature of social theory,

however, does not attenuate the importance of its eco-

nomic foundation. Quite the contrary, such emphasis

would expand the scope of economic theory beyond the

limits of a specialized science. 'The laws of economy are

the laws of history/ Proudhon says. 26

The new political economy was quite different from

the classical objective science of Adam Smith and Ri-

cardo. It differed from this in that it showed the economy

to be contradictory and irrational throughout its struc-

ture, with crisis as its natural state and revolution as its

natural end. Sismondi's work, the first thoroughgoing im-

manent critique of capitalism, amply illustrates the con-

trast. It held to the criterion of a truly critical theory of

society. 'We shall take society in its actual organization,

with its workers deprived of property, their wages fixed

by competition, their labor dismissed by their masters as

soon as they no longer have need of it for it is to this

very social organization that we object/ aT

All forms of social organization, Sismondi declared,

exist to gratify human wants. The prevailing economic

system does so under continuous crisis and growing pov-

erty amid accumulating wealth. Sismondi laid bare the

mechanisms of early industrial capitalism that led to this

result.** The necessity of recurring crises, he stated, is a

consequence of the impact of capital on the productive

process. The increasing exploitation and the persistent

disproportion between production and consumption are

"Vol. i, p. 73.

**De la creation de Vordre dans I'humanitd, ed, C. Bougll and A.

Cuvillier, Paris 1927, p. 369.

* T Nouveaux principes . . ., vol. H, p. 417.

"Sec Henryk Grossmann, Sismonde de Sismondi et ses theories 4co-

Sf Bibliothcca universitatis liberae Poloniae, Warsaw 1914.

SAINT-SIMON

consequences of the system of commodity exchange. Sis-

mondi went on to sketch the hidden relations behind ex-

change value and use-value and the various forms for ap-

propriating surplus value. He demonstrated the connec-

tion between the concentration of capital, overproduction,

and crisis. 'Through the concentration of wealth among a

small number of proprietors the internal market contin-

ues to shrink and industry is ever increasingly compelled

to sell on external markets where even greater concussions

threaten/ 29 Free competition falls far short of giving full

development to all productive capacities and to the great-

est satisfaction of human needs; it brings wholesale exploi-

tation and repeated destruction of the sources of wealth.

To be sure, capitalism brought immense progress to so-

ciety, but the advance resulted in 'a constant increase in

the working population and in a labor supply that usually

surpassed the demand/ 80 The economic mechanisms of

commodity production is responsible for these antago-

nisms. Were the tendencies of the system given their full

expression, the result would be 'to transform the nation

into a huge factory* that, 'far from creating wealth, would

cause general misery/ 81

Only six years after Saint-Simon had inaugurated posi-

tivism, social theory gave this radical refutation to the so-

cial order by which he had justified his new philosophy.

'The system of industry* was seen as the system of capi-

talist exploitation. The doctrine of harmonious equi-

librium was replaced by the doctrine of inherent crisis.

The idea of progress was given a new meaning: economic

progress did not necessarily mean human progress, under

capitalism, progress is made at the expense of freedom

and reason. Sismondi repudiated the philosophy of prog-

ress together with the entire panoply of optimistic glorifi-

**Nouveaux principes . . . vol. I, p. 961.

BO Ibid., p. 408. "P. 78.

340 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

cation. He called upon the state to exert its protective

authority in the interest of the oppressed mass. 'The fun-

damental dogma of free and general competition has

made great strides in all civilized societies. It has resulted

in a prodigious development of industrial power, but it

has also brought terrifying distress for most classes of the

population. Experience has taught us the need for the

protective authority [ of government], needed lest men be

sacrificed for the advancement of a wealth from which

they will derive no benefit.' 82

Only a short decade after the publication of Sismondi's

work, social philosophy fell back upon the dogma of prog-

ress, and, characteristically enough, relinquished political

economy as foundational for social theory. Comte's posi-

tive philosophy ushered in this regress. We shall deal with

it now.

3. THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY: AUGUSTS COMTE

Comte severed social theory from its connection with the

negative philosophy and placed it in the orbit of positiv-

ism. At the same time he abandoned political economy as

the root of social theory and made society the object of

an independent science of sociology. Both .steps are inter-

connected: sociology became a science by renouncing the

transcendent point of view of the philosophical critique.

Society now was taken as a more or less definite complex

of facts governed by more or less general laws a sphere to

be treated like any other field of scientific investigation.

The concepts that explain this realm were to be derived

from the facts that constitute it, while the farther-reaching

implications of philosophical concepts were to be ex-

cluded. The term 'positive* was a polemical term that de-

af Pp. 5 f.

AUGUSTS COMTE 341

noted "this transformation from a philosophic theory to

a scientific one. To be sure, Comte wished to elaborate an

all-embracing philosophy, as the title of his principal work

indicates, but it is t readily visible that, in the context of

positivism, philosophy means something quite different

from what it meant previously, so much so that it repudi-

ates the true content of philosophy. 'Philosophic positive*

is, in the last analysis, a contradiction in adjecto. It refers

to the synthesis of all empirical knowledge ordered into

a system of harmonious progress following an inexorable

course. All opposition to social realities is obliterated

from philosophic discussion.

Comte summarizes the contrast between the positivist

and the philosophic theory as follows: positive sociology

is to concern itself with the investigation of facts instead

of with transcendental illusions, with useful knowledge

instead of leisured contemplation, certainty instead of

doubt and indecision, organization instead of negation

and destruction. 1 In all these cases, the new sociology is

to tie itself to the facts of the existing social order and,

though it will not reject the need for correction and im-

provement, it will exclude any move to overthrow or ne-

gate that order. As a result, the conceptual interest of the

positive sociology is to be apologetic and justificatory.

This has not been true of all positivist movements. At

the beginning of modern philosophy, and again in the

eighteenth century, positivism was militant and revolu-

tionary. Its appeal to the facts then amounted to a direct

attack on the religious and metaphysical conceptions that

were the ideological support of the ancien regime. The

positivist approach to history was developed then as proof

positive that the right of man to alter the social and po-

litical forms of life accorded with the nature and progress

iDiscours sur Ve sprit positif, Paris 1844, pp. 41-2.

34* POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

of reason. Again, the principle of sense-perception as the

basis of verification was used by the French Enlighten-

ment philosophers to protest the prevailing absolutistic

system. They held that since the senses are the organon

of truth and since the gratification of the senses is the

proper motivation of human action, the advancement of

man's material happiness is the proper end that govern-

ment and society should serve. The given form of gov-

ernment and society patently contradicted this end; in the

last analysis, this was the 'fact' to which the positivists of

the Enlightenment made their appeal. They aimed not

at a well-ordered science, but at a social and political prac-

tice, remaining rationalists in the genuine sense that they

tested human practice by the standard of a truth tran-

scendent to the given social order, the standard repre-

sented by a social ordering that did not exist as a fact but

as a goal. The 'truth* they saw, a society wherein free in-

dividuals could use their aptitudes and fulfill their needs,

was not derived from any existing fact or facts but re-

sulted from a philosophic analysis of the historical situa-

tion, which showed an oppressive social and political sys-

tem to them. The Enlightenment affirmed that reason

could rule the world and men change their obsolete forms

of life if they acted on the basis of their liberated knowl-

edge and capacities.

Comte's positive philosophy lays down the general

framework of a social theory that is to counteract these

'negative* tendencies of rationalism. It arrives at an ideo-

logical defense of middle-class society and, moreover, it

bears the seeds of a philosophic justification of authori-

tarianism. The connection between positive philosophy

and the irrationalism that characterized the later authori-

tarian ideology, ushered in with the decline of liberalism,

is quite clear in Comte's writings. Hand in hand with the

AUGUSTE COMTE 343

shackling of thought to immediate experience goes his

constant widening of the realm of experience, so that it

ceases to be restricted to the realm of scientific observa-

tion but claims also various types of supra-sensual power.

In fact, the outcome of Comte's positivism turns out to

be a religious system with an elaborate cult of names,

symbols, and signs. He himself expounded a 'positive

theory of authority* and became the authoritative leader

of a sect of blind followers. This was the first fruit of the

defamation of reason in positive philosophy.

It had been the fundamental conviction of idealism

that truth is not given to man from some external source

but originates in the process of interaction between

thought and reality, theory and practice. The function of

thought was not merely to collect, comprehend, and order

facts, but also to contribute a quality that rendered such

activity possible, a quality that was thus a priori to facts.

A decisive portion of the human world therefore con-

sisted, the idealists held, of elements that could not be

verified by observation. Positivism repudiated this doc-

trine, slowly replacing the free spontaneity of thought with

predominantly receptive functions. This was not merely a

matter of epistemology. The idealistic idea of reason, we

recall, had been intrinsically connected with the idea of

freedom and had opposed any notion of a natural necessity

ruling over society. Positive philosophy tended instead tc

equate the study of society with the study of nature, so

that natural science, particularly biology, became the

archetype of social theory. Social study was to be a science

seeking social laws, the validity of which was to be analo-

gous to that of physical laws. Social practice, especially

the matter of changing the social system, was herewith

throttled by the inexorable. Society was viewed as gov-

erned by rational laws that moved with a natural neces-

344 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

sity. This position directly contradicted the view held by

the dialectical social theory, that society is irrational pre-

cisely in that it is governed by natural laws.

The 'general dogma of the invariability of physical

laws' Comte calls the 'true spirit' of positivism. 2 He pro-

poses to apply this tenet to social theory as a means of

freeing the latter from theology and metaphysics and giv-

ing it the status of a science. 'Theological and metaphysi-

cal philosophy do not hold sway today except in the sys-

tem of social study. They must be excluded from this final

refuge. Mainly, this will be done through the basic inter-

pretation that social movement is necessarily subject to

invariant physical laws, instead of being governed by

some kind of will/ 8 The positivist repudiation of meta-

physics was thus coupled with a repudiation of man's

claim to alter and reorganize his social institutions in ac-

cordance with his rational will. This is the element

Comte's positivism shares with the original philosophies

of counter-revolution sponsored by Bonald and De Mais-

tre. Bonald wished to demonstrate that 'man cannot give a

constitution to religious or political society any more than

he can give weight to a body or extension to matter,' and

that his intervention only prevents society from attaining

its 'natural constitution.' * De Maistre wished to show that

'human reason, or what is called philosophy, adds nothing

to the happiness of states or of individuals,' 8 that 'creation

is beyond the capacities of man' 6 and that his reason 'is

completely ineffectual not only for creating but also for

conserving any religious or political association.' 7 The

'revolutionary spirit' was to be checked by spreading an-

* Discours sur I' esprit positif, p. 17.

* Cours de philosophic positive, 4th ed., vol. iv, Paris 1877, p. 267.

* Bonald, 'Throne du pouvoir,' in (Euvres, Paris 1854, vol. I, p. 101.

De Maistre, 'Etude sur la souveraineteY in (Euvres completes, Lyon

1884, vol. i, p. 367.

Ibid., p. 373. T ibid., p. 375.

AUGUSTE COMTE 345

other teaching, that society possesses an immutable natu-

ral order to which man's will must submit.

Comte also charged sociology to make secure this teach-

ing as a means of establishing 'the general limits of all

political action.' 8 Assent to the principle of invariant

laws in society will prepare men for discipline and for

obedience to the existing order and will promote their

'resignation' to it.

'Resignation* is a keynote in Comte's writings, deriving

directly from assent to invariable social laws. 'True resig-

nation, that is, a disposition to endure necessary evils

steadfastly and without any hope of compensation there-

for, can result only from a profound feeling for the in-

variable laws that govern the variety of natural phe-

nomena.' 9 The 'positive* politics that Comte advocates

would tend, he declares, 'of its very nature to consolidate

public order,' even as far as incurable political evils are

concerned, by developing a 'wise resignation.' 10

There is no doubt as to the social groups and purposes

in whose behalf resignation is adduced. Rarely in the past

has any philosophy urged itself forward with so strong

and so overt a recommendation that it be utilized for the

maintenance of prevailing authority and for the protec-

tion of vested interest from any and all revolutionary

onset. Comte begins his propaganda for positivism by de-

claring that genuine science has no other general aim

than 'constantly to establish and fortify the intellectual

order which ... is the indispensable basis of all veritable

order.' u Order in science and order in society merge into

an indivisible whole. The ultimate goal is to justify and

fortify this social order. Positive philosophy is the only

weapon able to combat 'the anarchic force of purely revo-

lutionary principles'; it alone can succeed in 'absorbing

*Cour* de philosophic positive, vol. iv, p. *8i.

Ibid., pp. 148 f. 10 P. 149. iip. 138.

346 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

the current revolutionary doctrine/ 12 'La cause de 1'ordre,'

moreover, will bring even greater advantages. Positive

politics will tend spontaneously 'to divert from the vari-

ous existing powers . . . and from all their delegates the

greatly exaggerated attention accorded to them by public

opinion . . .' 18 The consequence of this diversion will

be to concentrate all social effort on primarily a 'moral'

renovation. Time and again, Comte stresses the 'serious

and threatening dangers' that attend 'the predominance

of purely material considerations' in social theory and

practice. 14 The innermost interests of his sociology are

much more sharply antimaterialistic than Hegel's ideal-

ism. 'The principal social difficulties are today essentially

not political but moral ones,' and their solution requires

a change in 'opinions and morals' rather than in institu-

tions. Positivism is therefore urged to give aid 'in trans-

forming political agitation into a philosophical crusade,'

which would suppress radical tendencies as, after all, 'in-

compatible with any sane conception of history.' 18 The

new philosophical movement will in due time teach men

that their social order stands under eternal laws against

which none may transgress without punishment. Accord-

ing to these laws all forms of government are 'provisional/

which means that they will painlessly adjust themselves to

the irresistible progress of mankind. Revolution under

such conditions is without sense.

The 'provisional powers' that govern society, Comte

argues, will no doubt find their security effectively in-

creased through the influence of 'positive politics which is

alone able to imbue the people with the feeling that, in

the present state of their ideas, no political change is of

real importance/ ie The lords of earth will learn, also,

"P. 140. "P. 141. "See pp. 116, 118.

i&Discours sur V esprit positif, p. 57.

"Court de philosophic positive, vol. iv, p. 141.

AUGUSTE COMTE 347

that positivism inclines 'to consolidate all power in the

hands of those who possess this power whoever they may

be/ 1T Comte becomes even more outspoken. He de-

nounces 'the strange and extremely dangerous* theories

and efforts that are directed against the prevailing prop-

erty order. These erect an 'absurd Utopia/ 18 Certainly,

it is necessary to improve the condition of the lower

classes, but this must be done without deranging class

barriers and without 'disturbing the indispensable eco-

nomic order/ 19 On this point, too, positivism offers a tes-

timonial to itself. It promises to 'insure the ruling classes

against every anarchistic invasion' 20 and to. show the way

to a proper treatment of the mass. Outlining the mean-

ing of the term 'positive* in his philosophy, Comte sum-

marizes the grounds for his recommendation of himself

to the cause de I'ordre by stressing that his philosophy is of

its very nature 'destined not to destroy but to organize'

and that it will 'never pronounce an absolute negation/ 21

We have devoted considerable space to the social and

political role of Comte's sociology because the subsequent

development of positivism has obliterated the strong con-

nection between tfie social and methodological principles.

We now raise the question, Which of its principles

makes positive philosophy the adequate guardian and de-

fender of the exsiting order? In drawing our contrast be-

tween the positivist spirit of the Enlightenment and later

positivist views, 22 we have already pointed to the latter's

negation of metaphysics and to 'the subordination of imag-

ination to observation/ 28 and we have shown that these

signified a tendency to acquiesce in the given. All scien-

tific concepts were to be subordinated to the facts. The

iiDiscours . . . , p. 78. * P. 15*.

iCowr5 ... p. 151. KDiscours . . . , pp. 42 f.

i Ibid. 22 See above, p. 348.

w Cours de philosophic positive, p. 214.

348 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

former were merely to make manifest the real connec

tions among the latter. Facts and their connections repre-

sented an inexorable order comprising social as well as

natural phenomena. The laws positivist science discov-

ered and that distinguish it from empiricism, were posi-

tive also in the sense that they affirmed the prevailing

order as a basis for denying the need to construct a new

one. Not that they excluded reform and change on the

contrary, the idea of progress loomed large in the sociology

of Comte but the laws of progress were part of the ma-

chinery of the given order, so that the latter progressed

smoothly to a higher stage without having to be destroyed

first.

Comte had little difficulty in arriving at this result, for

he saw the different stages of historical development as

stages of a 'philosophic movement* rather than of a social

process. Comte's law of three stages illustrates this quite

clearly. History, he says, takes the inevitable path of first,

theological rule, then, metaphysical rule, and finally, posi-

tivist rule. This conception permitted Comte to come for-

ward as a brave warrior against the ancien regime at a

time when the ancien regime had long been broken and

the middle class had long consolidated its social and eco-

nomic power. Comte interpreted the ancien regime pri-

marily as the vestige of theological and metaphysical ideas

in science.

Observation instead of speculation means, in Comte's

sociology, an emphasis on order in place of any rupture in

the order; it means the authority of natural laws in place

of free action, unification in place of disorder. The idea of

order, so basic to Comte's positivism, has a totalitarian

content in its social as well as methodological meaning.

The methodological emphasis was on the idea of a unified

science, the same idea that dominates recent developments

in positivism. Comte wanted to found his philosophy on

AUGUSTE GOMTE 349

a system of 'universally recognized principles' that will

draw their ultimate legitimacy solely from 'the voluntary

assent by which the public will confirm them to be the

result of perfectly free discussion/ 24 'The public/ just as

in neo-positivism, turns out to be a forum of scientists who

have the necessary equipment of knowledge and training.

Social questions, because of their complicated nature, must

be handled 'by a small group of an intellectual lite/ 25

In this way, the most vital issues that are of great moment

to all are withdrawn from the arena of social struggle and

bottled for investigation in some field of specialized scien-

tific study. Unification is a matter of agreement among

scientists whose efforts along this line will sooner or later

yield 'a permanent and definite state of intellectual unity/

All the sciences will be poured into the same crucible

and fused into a well-ordered scheme. All concepts will

be put to the test of 'one and the same fundamental

method* until, in the end, they issue forth ordered in 'a

rational sequence of uniform laws/ 28 Positivism thus will

'systematize the whole of our conceptions/ 2T

The positivist idea of order refers to an ensemble of

laws entirely different from the ensemble of dialectical

laws. The former are essentially affirmatory and construct

a stable order, the latter, essentially negative and destruc-

tive of stability. The former see society as a realm of

natural harmony, the latter as a system of antagonisms.

'The notion of natural laws entails at once the corre-

sponding idea of a spontaneous order, which is always

coupled with the notion of some harmony/ 28 Positivist so-

ciology is basically 'social statics/ quite in keeping with

the positivist doctrine that there is a 'true and permanent

2* P. 46. " P. 9*; cf. pp. 144 f. ae ibid.

HSysteme de, politique positive, Pans 1890, vol. i, p. 11; trans. J. H.

Bridges as A General View of Positivism, new ed. F. Harrison, London

1908, pp. H f.

2 Cours de philosophic positive, vol. iv, p. 848.

350 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

harmony between the various existential conditions in

society/ 29 The harmony prevails, and, because it does so,

the thing to do is 'contemplate the order, for the purpose

of correcting it conveniently, but not and nowhere to

create it.' 80

A closer scrutiny of Comte's laws of social statics dis-

closes their amazing abstractness and poverty. They center

about two propositions. First, men need to work for their

happiness; second, all social actions show that they are

overwhelmingly motivated by selfish interests. The princi-

pal task of positivist political science is to strike the right

balance between the different kinds of work to be done

and the skilful employment of self-interest for the common

good. In this connection, Comte stresses the need for

strong authority. 'In the intellectual, no less than in the

material order, men find above all the indispensable need

for some supreme directing hand capable of sustaining

their continuous activity by rallying and fixing their

spontaneous efforts.' 81 When positivism reaches its domi-

nant position in the world, in the last stage of human

progress, it changes hitherto existing forms of authority,

but it does not by any means abolish authority itself,

Comte outlines a 'positive theory of authority/ 82 envisag-

ing a society with all its activity based on the consent of

individual wills. The liberalist tinge of this picture is

shaded over, however. The instinct to submit triumphs,

as the founder of positivist sociology renders a paean to

obedience and leadership. 'How sweet it is to obey when

we can enjoy the happiness ... of being conveniently

discharged, by sage and worthy leaders, from the pressing

responsibility of a general direction of our conduct/ ts

Happiness in the shelter of a strong armthe attitude,

Ibid., p. 13*. Pp. 141-*. ss P. 489 .

"P. 5. "P. 44.

AUCUSTE COMTE 35!

so characteristic today in Fascist societies, makes juncture

with the positivist ideal of certainty. Submission to an all-

powerful authority provides the highest degree of security.

Perfect certainty of theory and practice, Comte claims, is

one of the basic attainments of positivist method.

The idea of certainty did not, of course, emerge with

positive philosophy, but had been a strong feature of ra-

tionalism ever since Descartes. Positivism did, however, re-

interpret its meaning and function. As we have indicated,

rationalism asserted that the ground of theoretical and

practical certainty was the freedom of the thinking subject.

On this foundation it constructed a universe that was ra-

tional precisely to the extent that it was dominated by the

intellectual and practical power of the individual. Truth

sprang from the subject, and the imprint of subjectivity

was upon it whatever objective form it took. The world

was real to the extent that it conformed to the subject's

rational autonomy.

Positivism shifts the source of certainty from the subject

of thought to the subject of perception. Scientific observa-

tion yields certainty here. The spontaneous functions of

thought recede, while its receptive and passive functions

gain predominance.

Comte's sociology, by virtue of the concept of order,

is essentially 'social statics'; it is also 'social dynamics' by

virtue of the concept of progress. The relation between

the two basic concepts Comte has often explained. Order

is 'the fundamental condition of progress' 84 and 'all

progress ultimately tends t6 consolidate order.' 88 The

principal reason for the fact that social antagonisms still

prevail is that the idea of order and that of progress are

still separated, a condition which has made it possible for

anarchist revolutionaries to usurp the latter idea. Positive

84 Discours . ... p. 56.

" Cours de philosophic positive, vol. iv, p. 17.

352 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

philosophy aims to reconcile order and progress, to

achieve a 'common satisfaction of the need for order and

the need for progress/ M This it can do by showing that

progress is in itself order not revolution, but evolution.

His antimaterialistic interpretation of history facilitated

Comte's undertaking. He retained the Enlightenment

conception that progress is primarily intellectual progress,

the continuous advance of positive knowledge. 87 He re-

moved from the Enlightenment conception as much of

its material content as he could, thus adhering to his

promise 'to substitute an immense intellectual movement

for a sterile political agitation.' 88 Servant of the pre-emi-

nent need to safeguard the existing order, the idea of

progress stands in the way of physical, moral, and intellec-

tual development except along lines that the given 'system

of circumstances' permits. 89 Comte's idea of progress ex-

cludes revolution, the total transformation of the given

system of circumstances. Historical development becomes

nothing more than a harmonious evolution of the social

order under perennial 'natural* laws.

'Dynamic sociology* is to present the mechanics of this

evolution. Its outlook is essentially 'to conceive each state

of society as the necessary result of the preceding one and

the indispensable motor of the succeeding one.* 40 Social

dynamics deals with the laws governing this continuity;

in other words, the 'laws of succession,' whereas social

statics treats of the 'laws of co-existence.' 41 The former

makes for 'the true theory of progress,* the latter, 'the

true theory of order.' Progress is equated with a persistent

growth of intellectual culture in history. The fundamental

law of social dynamics is that increasing power accrues to

Ibid., p. 148; cf. Discours .... pp. 53 f.

** Discours . . . , p. 59.

"Ibid., p. 76.

"Court de philosophic positive, vol. iv, p. t6s.

>P. 863. P. 164.

AUGUSTE COMTE 35J

those organic faculties by which man is differentiated ir

nature from lower organic beings, namely, 'intelligence

and sociabilitd.' 42 As civilization proceeds, it comes closei

and closer to exhibiting the nature of mankind in the

concrete; the highest grade of civilization is the one mosl

in conformity with 'nature.' 48 Historical progress is 2

natural process and is, as such, governed by natural laws.*

Progress is order.

The process of making social theory compatible Witt

existing conditions is not complete as far as we have de

veloped it. All elements that would transcend or point

beyond the validity of the given matters pf fact have yel

to be excluded; this requires that social theory be made

relativistic. The last decisive aspect of positivism, Comtt

states, as we would expect, is its tendency 'everywhere tc

substitute the relative for the absolute/ 45 From this 'irrev

ocable predominance of the relativist point of view* he

derives his basic view that social development has a nat

urally harmonious character. Every historical stage of so

ciety is as perfect as the corresponding 'age of humanity

and system of circumstance permit. 48 A natural harmony

prevails not only among the coexisting parts of the socia

scheme, but also between the potentialities of mankinc

revealed therein and the realization of these.

According to Comte, relativism is inseparable from th<

conception that sociology is an exact science dealing with

the invariant laws of social statics and dynamics. These

laws are to be discovered only by scientific observation

which, in turn, requires a constant progress in scientific

technic to cope with the highly complicated phenom

ena it has to organize. 47 The attainment of complete

knowledge coincides with the completion of scientific

**Discours ... t p. 60. "Discours . . . , p. 43.

**Cours . . . , p. 443. **Cours . . . , p. 279.

" P. 267. 4T Ibid., pp. a 16 f.

354 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

progress itself; prior to such perfection, all knowledge and

truth are inevitably partial and relative to the attained

level of intellectual development.

So far, Comte's relativism is merely methodological,

based on a necessary inadequacy in the methods of ob-

servation. Owing to the fact, however, that social develop-

ment is interpreted primarily as intellectual development,

his relativism posits a pre-established harmony between

the subjective side of sociology (the method) and the ob-

jective (the content). All social forms and institutions, as

we have mentioned, are provisional in the sense that, as

intellectual culture advances, they will pass into others

that will correspond with intellectual capacities of an ad-

vanced type. Their provisional character, though a sign

of their imperfection, is at the same time the mark of

their (relative) truth. The concepts of positivism are rela-

tivistic because all reality is relative.

Science, to Comte, is the field of theoretical relativism,

and the latter the area from which Value judgments' are

excluded. Positivist sociology 'neither admires nor con-

demns political facts but looks upon them ... as simple

objects of observation/ 48 When sociology becomes a posi-

tivist science it is divorced from any concern with the

'value' of a given social form. Man's quest for happiness

is not a scientific problem, nor is the question of the best

possible fulfillment for his desires and talents. Comte

boasts that he- can easily treat the whole realm of social

physics 'without once using the word "perfection/ 1 which

is replaced forever by the purely scientific term "develop-

ment." ' 49 Each historical level represents a higher stage

of development than the one preceding, by force of the

fact that the later is the necessary product of the earlier

one and contains a plus of experience and new knowledge.

P. 293. 49 P. t&i.

AUGUSTE COMTE 355

Comte holds, however, that his concept of development

does not exclude perfection. 60 The essential conditions of

men and their capacities have improved with social de-

velopment; this is incontestible. But the improvement of

capacities takes place primarily in science, art, morals,

and such, all of which, like the improvement in social

conditions, move 'gradually, within convenient limits.'

Accordingly, revolutionary efforts for a new order of so-

ciety have no place in the scheme. They can be dispensed

with. 'The vain search for better government' is not neces-

sary, 51 for each established governmental form has its

relative right, to be disputed only by those taking an

absolutist point of view, which is false per definitionem.

Comte's relativism thus terminates in the 'positive theory

of authority.'

Comte's reverence for established authority was easily

compatible with all-around tolerance. Both attitudes hold

equally in this brand of scientific relativism. There is no

room for condemnation. 'Without the slightest alteration

of its proper principles' positivism can 'do exact and philo-

sophical justice to all prevalent doctrines' 52 a virtue that

will make it acceptable 'to all the different existing par-

ties.' "

The idea of tolerance had changed its content and

function as positivism developed. The French Enlight-

eners who fought the absolute state gave no relativist

framework to their demand for tolerance, but asserted

that demand as part of their general effort to establish a

better form of government-^-'better' in precisely the sense

Comte repudiates. Tolerance did not mean justice to all

existing parties. It meant, in fact, the abolition of one of

the most influential of parties, that of the clergy allied

with the feudal nobility, which was using intolerance as

an instrument for domination.

60 P. 875. 51 P. M4 . 62 p. 149. 6S P. i 5 j.

356 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

When Comte came on the scene, his 'tolerance* was not

a slogan for opponents of the existing order, but for the

opponents of these. As the concept of progress was for-

malized, tolerance was detached from the standard that

had given it content in the eighteenth century. Earlier,

the positivist standard had been a new society, while toler-

ance had been equivalent to intolerance towards those

who opposed that standard. The formalized concept of

tolerance, on the other hand, amounted to tolerating the

forces of reaction and regress as well. The need for this

kind of toleration resulted from the fact that all standards

that go beyond given realities had been renouncedstand-

ards that in Comte's eyes were akin to those seeking an

absolute. In a philosophy that justified the prevailing

social system, the cry of toleration became increasingly

useful to the beneficiaries of the system.

Comte, however, does not treat all parties equally. He

says many times that there is an essential affinity between

positivism and one large social group, the proletariat.

Proletarians have an ideal disposition to positivism. 54

Comte has an entire section in the Systtme de politique

positive dedicated to the proposition that 'the new philos-

ophers will find their most energetic allies among our

proletarians/ M

The fact of the proletariat worried Comte's sociology as

well as it did its antithesis, the Marxian critique. There

could be no positive theory of civil society unless the fact

of the proletariat could be reconciled with the harmonious

order of progress it so patently contradicts. For, if the

proletariat is the foundational class in civil society, the

laws of this society's advance are the laws of its destruction,

and the theory of society must be a negative one. Sociology

must, in the face of this, present a refutation of the dia-

**Discours . . . , p. 86.

&* System? de politique positive, vol. I, p. 1*9.

AUCUSTE COMTE 357

lectical thesis that accumulation of wealth takes place

alongside an intensification of poverty.

Comte regarded the latter thesis as a 'sinister and im-

moral prejudice/ 56 one that positivism had to eradicate

if it would maintain the 'industrial discipline* the society

needs in order to function. Comte held that the theory

and practice of liberalism could not safeguard discipline.

'The vain and irrational disposition to allow for only that

degree of order that comes of itself (that is, that comes

through the free play of economic forces) amounts to a

'solemn resignation* of social practice in the face of every

real emergency in the social process. 67

Comte's belief in the necessary laws of progress did not

exclude practical efforts in the direction of such social

reform as would remove any obstacles in the path of these

laws. The positivist program of social reform foreshadows

liberalism's turn into authoritarianism. In contrast tc

Hegel, whose philosophy showed a similar tendency,

Comte slurred over the fact that the turn is made neces-

sary because of the antagonistic structure of civil society,

Classes in conflict, he held, are but vestiges of an obsolete

regime, soon tc/ be removed by positivism, without an)

threat to the 'fundamental institution of property.' 58

The rule of positivism, Comte says, will improve the

condition of the proletariat, first in education and second

through 'the creation of work/ 69 The vision entails an

all-embracing hierarchic state, governed by a cultural

llite composed of all social groups and permeated by a

new morality that unites all diverse interests into a real

whole.* Notwithstanding the many declarations that thij

hierarchy will derive its authority from the free consent

of its members, Comte's state resembles in many respect*

Coun . . . , pp. soi f. w p. joi, note.

T p. ao2. Discours . . . , p. 93.

ao Cf. especially Cours de philosophic positive, vol. iv, p. 150 ff

358 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

the modern authoritarian state. We find, for example,

that there is to be a 'spontaneous union of the brain and

the hand/ 61 Obviously, regulation from above plays an

important part in the establishment of such a union.

Comte makes the matter more explicit. He states that in-

dustrial development has already reached a point at which

it becomes necessary 'to regulate the relation between

entrepreneur and worker toward an indispensable har-

mony that is no longer sufficiently guaranteed in the free

natural antagonism between them/ 62

The act of combining entrepreneurs and workers, we

are assured, is by no means intended as a step towards

abolishing the inevitably inferior position of the worker.

The latter's activity, Comte holds, is naturally less ex-

tensive and less responsible than that of the entrepreneur.

Society is a 'positive hierarchy/ and submission to the so-

cial stratification is indispensable to the life of the whole. 68

Consequently, the new morality is to be primarily one of

'duty' to the whole. The justified claims of the proletariat

become duties, too. The worker will receive 'first educa-

tion and then work/ Comte does not elaborate on this

'work creation program/ but does speak of a system in

which all private functions become public ones, 64 so that

every activity is organized and exercised as a public service.

This 'nationalization' of labor has nothing to do, of

course, with socialism. Comte stresses that in the 'positive

order/ 'the various public enterprises can, to an increas-

ing extent, be entrusted to private industry/ provided

that such 'administrative change 1 does not tamper with

the necessary discipline. 65 He refers in this connection to

an agency that has become increasingly important in main-

taining positive orderthe army. His effort to do justice

i Ibid., p. 152. e* P. 485.

2 ibid., vol. vi, pp. 433 f. P. 503.

"3 Vol. vi, p. 497.

AUGUSTE COMTE 359

to all social groups alike prompts him to recommend his

philosophy to the 'military class/ with the reminder that

positivism, though it approves of the slow disappearance

of military action, 'directly justifies the important pro-

visional function* of the army in the 'necessary mainte-

nance of the material order/ 6a Because of the grave dis-

turbances to which the social system is prone, 'the army

has the increasingly essential task of participating actively

... to maintain the constancy of public order/ * 7 As na-

tional wars disappear, we shall witness that the army will

more and more be entrusted with the 'social mission* of a

great political gendarmerie (une grande martchaussie poll-

tique).**

In one decisive aspect, however, Comte's system retains

the emancipatory function of Western philosophy, for it

tends to bridge the gulf between isolated individuals and

to unite them in a real universal. We have attempted to

show how the positivist method engendered the quest for

unification, and we have stressed its negative implications.

But the idea of a universal positive order drove Comte be-

yond the empty conception of a unified science and the

oppressive visiorf of a government of positive high priests.

There is still another universality prevalent in Comte's

system, that of society. It emerges as the one arena in which

man acts out his historical life, and, by the same token, it

becomes the only object of social theory. The individual

plays almost no part in Comte's sociology, he is entirely

absorbed by society, and the state is a mere by-product

of the inexorable laws that govern the social process.

On this point, Comte's sociology transcends the limits

of Hegel's political philosophy. The positive theory of so-

ciety sees no reason for confining human development

within the boundaries of sovereign national states. Its idea

66 P. 5*9. 6T P. 356. P. 557.

360 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

of a universal order is consummated only through the

union of all individuals in mankind, and the positivist de-

struction of obsolete theological and metaphysical stand-

ards comes to fruition in the recognition of humanity as

the etre supreme. Humanity, not the state, is the real uni-

versal, nay, it is the only reality. 60 It is the only entity that,

in the age of mankind's maturity, is worthy of religious

reverence. 'The great conception of Humanity will irrev-

ocably eliminate that of God/ 70

It is as if Comte had tried, with this idea of humanity,

to make amends for the oppressive atmosphere in which

his positivist sociology moved.

4. THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE:

FRIEDRICH JULIUS STAHL

Notwithstanding its sinister aspects and anachronistic

orientation (calling for a struggle against the ancien re-

gime when that had already been replaced by the new mid-

dle-class regime symbolized quite clearly in the rule of

the 'bourgeois king/ Louis Philippe), Comte's positivism

expressed the consciousness of an advancing social class

that had fought its triumphant way through two revolu-

tions. The positive philosophy affirmed that the course of

human history pressed towards ultimate subordination

of all social relations to the interests of industry and sci-

ence, implying that the state would be slowly absorbed

by a society that would embrace the earth.

In contrast to its form in France, positive philosophy

in Germany was of quite a different cast. The political

aspirations of the German middle class had been defeated

without a struggle:

de politique positive, vol. I, p. 334.

T0 P. 529.

F. J. STAHL 361

While in England and France feudalism was entirely de-

stroyed, or, at least reduced, as in the former country, to a

few insignificant forms, by a powerful and wealthy middle

class, concentrated in large towns, and particularly in the

capital, the feudal nobility in Germany had retained a great

portion of their ancient privileges. The feudal system of ten-

ure was prevalent almost everywhere. The -lords of the land

had even retained the jurisdiction over their servants . . . This

feudal nobility, then extremely numerous and partly very

wealthy, was considered, officially, the first 'Order* in the coun-

try. It furnished the higher Government officials, it almost ex-

clusively officered the army. 1

The Restoration strengthened absolutism to such an ex-

tent that the bourgeoisie found itself hampered at every

turn. 2 The struggle against this absolutism, as against all

German absolutism ever since the wars of liberation, had

been confined to the demand upon the monarchy to grant

a representative form of constitution. Eventually, a prom-

ise was wrung from Frederick William III that he would

recognize some kind of popular sovereignty. This prom-

ise, however, materialized in the ridiculous reality of the

Provincial Estates, about which one historian has made

the following comment: 'This was an outmoded system

of representing special interests, with the knights holding

undisputed predominance, especially in the eastern prov-

inces. The condition for membership in the Estates was

Grundeigentum! Even in the provinces of the Rhine [the

most industrialized areas] 55 representatives of the land

stood against 25 representatives of the towns/ 8 The mid-

dle class was a hopeless minority throughout.

The interests of these Provincial Estates paralleled their

impotence, and the whole is neatly shown in their level of

i Engels, Germany: Revolution and Counter -Revolution, International

Publishers, New York 1933, p. n.

* Karl Lamprccht, Deutsche Geschichtc, vol. x, Berlin 1922, pp. 395 ff.,

402 ff.

Veil Valentin, Geschichte der Deutschen Revolution 1848-9. Berlin

>93o, vol. i, p. 97.

362 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

debate. Johann Jacoby, one of the leaders of the demo-

cratic opposition, said about them:

It would be hard to find an institution which is less popu-

lar and which the healthy sense of the people regaids as a

more useless burden than the Provincial Estates. Everyone

would gladly spare us the work of proving from the recouls

that, among all the resolutions adopted there, not a single

one could be found which was of any general interest. Flagrant

abuses were not removed, nor were steps taken against any

bureaucratic despotism. The entire work of the numerous ses-

sions was confined to setting up houses of collection, institu-

tions for deaf mutes and the insanes, fire insurance companies,

and to wiiting laws about new roads, wagon tracks, dog taxes,

and so on . . .*

When Frederick William IV's government came upon

the scene, all aspirations to a liberal reform of the state

made their exit. 5 Absolutism triumphed, accompanied by a

complete transformation of culture. 'The Prussia of von

Stein's reforms, of the wars of liberation, and of Hum-

boldt's and Hardenberg's strivings for a constitution be-

came the Prussia of romantic monarchy, of theistic irra-

tionalism, and of the Christian idea of the State. Berlin

ceased to be the university of Hegel and the Hegelians

and became that of the philosophers of the Revelation,

Schelling and Stahl.' 8

The Hegelian system, which had viewed state and so-

ciety as a 'negative' totality and had subjected both to

the historical process of reason, could no longer be ap-

proved as the official philosophy. Nothing was more sus-

pect than reason and freedom to the new government that

now took its cues from the Russian Czar and Prince

* Quoted in Franz Mehring, Zur Preussischen Geschichte von Tilsit bis

zur Reichsgriindung, Berlin 1930, p. 241.

* Friedrich Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten ]ahrhunderl,

vol. ii. Freiburg 1933, p. 31.

o Erich Kaufmann, Studttn zur Staatslehre des monarchischen Prinzips,

Leipzig 1900, p. 54.

F. J. STAHL 363

Metternich. 7 It needed a positive principle of justification

that would protect the state from rebellious forces and

shield it, more resolutely than Hegel did, from the on-

slaught of society. The positivist reaction that set in in

Germany was, in the strict sense, a philosophy of the state

and not of society. The slight breach in this development

occurred when Lorenz von Stein, fusing the Hegelian tra-

dition with the French movement, shifted the emphasis to

the structure of society. Its effect on the development of

social theory in Germany was negligible, however. The

positive philosophy of the state continued to dominate

German political theory and practice for decades.

Stahl's philosophy offered a compromise to those who

counseled personal absolutism and to the weak demands

of the German middle class. He advocated a constitutional

system of representation (though not of the people as a

whole, but only of estates), legal guarantees of civil liber-

ties, inalienable personal freedom, equality before the

law, and a rational system of laws. Stahl took great pains

to distinguish his monarchic conservatism from any de-

fense of arbitrary absolutism. 8

The import of Stahl's philosophy lay definitely in its

adjusting anti-rationalist authoritarianism to the social

development of the middle class. For example, he com-

bines the labor theory of property with the feudal doc-

trine that all property is, in the last analysis, held by the

grant of the authorities. 9 He advocates the Rechtsslaat,

but subordinates its guarantee of civil liberty to the au-

thoritative sovereignty of the monarch. 10 He was anti-

liberal, yet he did not speak only for the feudal past, but

7 Valentin, op. cit., pp. 37 f.

8 Cf. Das monarchischc Prinzip, Heidelberg 1845; and Die gcgenwarti-

gen Parteien in Staat und Kirche, 2nd ed., Berlin 1868.

Philosophic des Rechts, 3rd and 4th ed., Heidelberg 1854, vol. 11,

pp. 356, 360.

10 Ibid., vol. in, pp. 137 ff.

364 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

for that period in the historical future when the middle

class itself became anti-liberal. His arch-enemy was not

the middle class, but the revolution that threatened this

class along with the nobility and the monarchist state. His

anti-rationalism served the cause of a ruling aristocracy

that stood in the way of rational progress; it also served

the interest of all rule that could not be justified on ra-

tional grounds.

The revolution, Stahl declared, is 'the world-historic

mark of our age/ It would found 'the entire State on the

will of man instead of on the commandment and ordi-

nance of God/ n Significantly enough, the principle that

the state rests on the will of men was precisely what the

rising middle class had asserted when it carried on its fight

against feudal absolutism. Stahl's doctrine repudiated the

whole philosophy of Western rationalism 12 that had ac-

companied this struggle. He condemned modern rational-

ism as the matrix of revolution; this philosophy, he said,

is in the 'internal, religious realm what revolution is in

the external, political realm/ 1S namely, the 'estrangement

of man from God/

Since German rationalism had got its most representa-

tive expression through Hegel, Stahl concentrated his

attack on the latter. He articulated the official reply of

the ruling circles of Germany to the Hegelian philosophy.

These circles had a far deeper insight into the true char-

acter of Hegel's philosophy than had those academic inter-

preters who saw it as giving unconditional glorification to

the existing order. Hegel's doctrine is 'a hostile force/

11 'Was ist die Revolution?', in Siebzehn parlamcntarische Re den, Berlin

i86a,p. 234.

"The repudiation began in German political theory prior to Stahl,

and Haller, the influence of Burke (F. Gentz), the romanticists, and

Historische Schule contributed to it. It was only in Stahl's work, however,

that the tendencies begun in these schools and movements obtained a

systematic elaboration and a political sanction.

i Was ist die Revolution, p. 240.

F. J. STAHL 365

essentially 'destructive.' x * His dialectic cancels the reality

given, and his theory 'from the outset occupies the same

ground as the revolution.' 15 His political philosophy, in-

capable of demonstrating the 'organic unity' between sub-

jects and the 'one supreme personality [God-king-author-

ity],' 16 undermines the foundations of the prevailing so-

cial and political system. We shall not quote more of the

innumerable passages in which Stahl testifies to the sub-

versive qualities of Hegelianism, but shall seek rather to

set down the conceptions to which Stahl takes exception

and on which he sees fit to heap condemnation.

Stahl indicts Hegel along with the most outstanding

representatives of European rationalism since Descartes

a configuration that recurs in the ideological attacks of

National Socialism. 11 Rationalism construes state and so-

ciety on the pattern of reason, and in so doing lays down

standards that must inevitably lead it to oppose 'all given

truth and all given prestige.' It contains, he says, the

principle of 'false freedom* and has 'entailed all those ideas

which find their ultimate consummation in revolution.' 18

Reason is never satisfied with the truth that is 'given'; it

'spurns the niftriment offered to it.' 19

Stahl saw the most dangerous embodiment of ration-

alism to be the theory of Natural Law. He summarized

this theory as 'the doctrine that derives law and state from

the nature or reason of the [individual] man.' 20 Stahl

counterposed to it the thesis that the nature and reason

of the individual could not serve as a norm for social or-

ganization, for it had always been in the name of the in-

i* Stahl, Philosophic des Rechts, vol. I, pp. xiv and 455.

"Ibid., p. 473.

i Ibid., vol. HI, p. 6.

if See particularly H. Hcyse, Idee und Existenz, Hamburg 1935, and

F. B6hm, Anti-Car tesianismus, Leipzig 1938.

iDi> gegcnwartigen Parteien in Stoat und Kirche, p. 11.

i* Philosophic des Rechts, vol. i, p. 863.

o ibid., p. 15*. <

366 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

dividual's reason that radical demands for a revolution

had been advanced. Natural right could not be made to

coincide with the given positive right, any more than

Hegel's rational state could with the given form of state.

Stahl took the idea of natural law in its critical meaning;

he understood it to invest the individual with more and

higher rights than those the positive right gave him. He

therefore opposed to the thesis of natural law the view

that 'right and positive right are equivalent [gleichbe-

deutende] concepts/ and to Hegel's 'negative' dialectic he

opposed a 'positive philosophy' of authoritarianism.

We have sketched the disparagement of reason in the

positive philosophy, and we have stated that the method

of this philosophy implied a ready acceptance of the pow-

ers that be. Stahl's work verifies this assertion. He is a con-

scious positivist, 21 motivated by the desire 'to save the

worth of the positive, the concrete, the individual, the

worth of the facts.' 22 He reproaches Hegel's philosophy

for its alleged inability to explain the particular facts that

compose the order of reality. 28 Always preoccupied with

the universal, Hegel never gets down to the individual

contents of the given, which are its true contents.

The 'conversion of science' that Stahl advocates 24 means

a turn to positivism a peculiar brand of it, to be sure,

represented, in Stahl's view, by Schelling's 'positive phi-

losophy.' 25 Schelling is lauded for having set the right of

'the historical' against 'the logical, which is timeless and

void of action.' 26 All that has grown in history, out of the

eternal life of the nation, all that has been sanctioned by

21 Cf. Karl Mannheim, 'Das konservative Denken/ Archiv fur Sozialwis-

senschaft und Sozialpolitik, vol. LVII, 1927, pp. 84 f.; and also E. Kaufmann,

op. cit., pp. 58 ff.

22 Philosophic des Rechts, vol. n, p. 38.

2s Ibid., p. 37.

24 P. vii.

25 See the preface to the second edition of vol. 11.

26 Vol. i. p. xvii.

F. J. STAHL 367

tradition, possesses a truth of its own and is not answer-

able to reason. Stahl interprets Schelling in terms of the

Historische Schule, which had used the special authority

of the given to justify the existing positive right. In the

article that set forth the program of this' Historische

Schule, Friedrich Karl von Savigny had written (1814):

'There can be no question of a choice between good and

evil, as if the acceptance of the given were good while its

repudiation was evil and at the same time possible. The

repudiation of the given is, rather, strictly impossible.

The given inevitably dominates us; we might be mistaken

with regard to it, but we cannot change it/ 27 The pre-

vailing law and the whole gamut of rights were part of 'the

general life of the Volk* with which it had grown naturally

throughout history; law and right could not be made sub-

ject to the critical standards of reason. The historical the-

ory of Savigny rejected, as the later positivism did, the

'negative philosophy' of rationalism (and particularly the

doctrine of Natural Law), claiming that that philosophy

was hostile to the established order. It likewise shared

with the later ^positivist sociology the penchant for inter-

preting social processes in terms of natural ones. Every-

thing in the life of society was an organism, and every

organism good and right in itself. Schelling described the

legal order as a 'natural order/ so to speak, as a 'second

nature/ and he denounced all attempts to transform it in

accordance with freedom's interest. 'The legal order is

not a moral but merely a natural order over which free-

dom has as little power and authority as it has over sensu-

ous nature. It is therefore not surprising that all attempts

to make the legal order a moral one present themselves

in their own absurdity and in the most frightful form of

>T Ernst Landsberg, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswisscnschaft, vol.

HI, Mttnchen 1910, p. soi.

368 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

despotism which immediately follows from it.' 2S The

claim that nature was pre-eminent over society was in-

tended as an antidote against the claims of the 'rational

will 1 to change given forms in accordance with the inter-

est of free individuals.

Stahl embodied the principles of the 'naturalist* schools

in his positive philosophy with the express purpose of

using them as principles of justification. He did not hesi-

tate to emphasize, at the beginning of his work, that his

philosophy had a protective function:

Tor a century and a half, philosophy has founded au-

thority, marriage, and property not on God's command-

ment and ordinance, but on man's will and consent. The

peoples have followed this doctrine by defying their rulers

and the historical order, and ultimately by rising against

the just institution of property.' 29 Any philosophy that

'derives the natural and moral universe from human rea-

son, that is, from the laws and attributes of thought,' 80

undermines the given order and merits extermination.

The positive philosophy that replaces it 'will foster defer-

ence to order and to authority, such as has been invoked

by God to govern men, and to all rights and conditions

that have become legitimate through His Will.' 81 Order

and authority, the two pivotal terms of Comte's positivism,

reappear in Stahl's political philosophy. He, too, offers his

ideological services to the governing powers, no less per-

sistently than did Comte.

Stahl is particularly sensitive on the score of justifying

property. 'Should we give over the question, what is

property to the Proudhons?' he demands. 82 If, as rational-

ism had it, property is to draw its right only from man's

"Schelling, System des transcendentalen Idealismus, in S&mmtliche

Werke, Stuttgart 1858, vol. in, p. 583 f.

Philosophic des Rechts, vol. ii, p. x.

o ibid., p. xviii. si P. xxii. a P. xvii.

F. J. STAHL 369

will, it must follow 'that communism is right as against

the philosophy of right laid down from Grotius to Hegel,

. . . and is also right as against present-day society.' "

Property and the whole system of social and political rela-

tions must be withdrawn from any rationalist handling and

must be justified on a more solid ground. Stahl's political

philosophy strives to posit all the data of the prevailing

social scheme as the data of a true and just reality; its

method is to bend human will and reason to the authority

of those data.

We shall not dwell at length on the method. Essentially,

it consists in tracing, by direct and indirect means, the en-

tire social and political order to God's ordinance. The

more vital the issue in question, the more direct the deri-

vation. 'The distribution of wealth* is 'the work of God's

ordinance.' 8 * The institutions of society are based upon

'God's ordering of the world of mankind.' 85 Social in-

equality is God's will: 'There must be a different right for

man, woman, and child, for the uneducated worker who

is brought to law and the landlord who is free from trial.

The right must differ in accordance with the vocation of

the sex, age, 'estate or class.' 8e The state and its authori-

ties comprise a 'divine institution,' and though men are

free to live under this constitution or that, 'not only is the

state as such God's command, but the particular constitu-

tion and the particular authorities everywhere possess di-

vine sanction.' 8T

The method is associated with a personalistic philoso-

phy 88 that is the more insidious because it embodies the

progressive ideas of middle-class rationalism, interpreting

them in an irrationalist context. The 'personality* is ex-

alted to a 'primordial being' and a 'primordial concept.' M

88 P- 575- 8T Vol. m t P. 177.

" P. 376. ** Vol. ii, Book i.

M P. 191. P. 14.

Vol. I, p. 277.

POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

The created world culminates in the existence of the per-

sonality; the latter is an 'absolute end* and the bearer of

'primordial right/ 40 This principle yields Stahl his no-

tion of humanitarianism, namely, that the 'welfare, right,

and honor of every individual, even the lowest, is the

community's concern, that everyone must be considered,

protected, honored, and provided for in accordance with

his individuality, without distinction of descent, race,

estate, gift . . .' 4l In the anti-rationalistic texture that is

Stahl's philosophy, however, these progressive ideas take

on the opposite of their original meaning. The radiance

of 'personality* puts the drab realities of the social system

into shade and shows them forth only as a totality of per-

sonal relations emanating from the Person of God and

terminating, on earth, in the person of the sovereign mon-

arch. State and society, which in reality are dominated by

power relations and ruled by economic laws, appear as a

moral Reich governed by ethical laws and rights and du-

ties. The Restoration appears as a world made for the de-

velopment of the personality.

Stahl's premature personalism illustrates a decisive truth

about modern philosophy, that the standpoint of the con-

crete is frequently farther from the truth than the ab-

stract. The reaction against German idealism saw an in-

tellectual tendency gaining momentum, to merge philoso-

phy with the concreteness of actual life. The demand was

made that man's concrete locus in existence should replace

abstract concepts in philosophy and become the standard

of thought. But when his concrete existence bears witness

of an irrational order, the defamation of abstract thought

and the surrender to 'the concrete* amounts to a surren-

der of philosophy's critical motives, of its opposition to

an irrational reality.

* P. sia. i P. 346.

F. J. STAHL 371

Stahl offered his 'concrete personality* theory as a sub-

stitute for Hegel's abstract universalism. The substance

of the world was to be the personality in its concrete exist-

ence, and not reason. But a universalism came to the fore

that was far more dangerous than Hegel's. The totality of

existing inequalities and distinctions in the given social

and political reality were immediately posited and af-

firmed in the personality. The personality had its concrete

existence in the specific relations of subordination and

domination that held in the social reality, while in the

social division of labor the personality was an object to

be governed. All these inequalities, Stahl held, belong to

the nature of personality and may not be questioned. The

equality of men 'does not exclude distinctions and grades,

inequality of actual rights, inequality even of legal

status.' 4a

We shall indicate now only the fundamental tendencies

of Stahl's positive philosophy of the state. The personalist

principle in the universe implies that all domination has

'a personal 'character,' that is, has the character of con-

scious personal authority. In the civil order domination

is vested in the many tentacles of the state organism that

emanate from and center about the 'natural personality'

of the monarch. 48 The state is essentially a monarchy. It

may take the form of a representative government, but in

any case the sovereignty of the monarch must stand above

the various estates. 44

Stahl accepts Hegel's separation of state from society,

but renders it far less strict by interpreting all social rela-

tions as 'moral' ones. He advocates that the state exercise

a far-reaching regulation of the economy; he is opposed

"Ibid., p. 351. Ibid., vol. m, p. 9.

4* Das monarchische Prinzip, pp. is, 14, 16.

POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

to unlimited freedom of trade and commerce. 45 The state

is 'a union [Verband] of the people under authority

[Obrigkeit].' 46 As a moral realm, the state has this two-

fold aim: 'on the one hand, domination as such, namely,

the end that authority prevail among men/ and on the

other hand, 'the protection and advancement of men, the

development of the nation, and execution of God's com-

mand/ 4T

The state is no longer bound by the interest of the in-

dividual, but is 'a power and subject prior to and above

the individual members/ 48 Authority is the force that, in

the last analysis, binds the social and political relations

to the whole. The entire system functions through obedi-

ence, duty, and acquiescence. 'All domination involves

the acceptance of the ruler's thought and will in the exist-

ence of those ruled/ 49 This is a striking anticipation of

the character-type urged and molded by the modern au-

thoritarian state. Hegel would have regarded such a state-

ment as a horror. The surrender of individual thought

and will to the thought and will of some external author-

ity runs counter to all the principles of his idealist ration-

alism.

Stahl entirely detaches the state from any connection

with the autonomy of its individuals. State and society

'cannot originate from and depend on them'; its preserva-

tion requires a power that rests solely on ordinance, is

independent of the will of individuals, nay, 'is opposed to

it, and compelling it from without/ 50 Reason is displaced

by obedience, which becomes 'the primary and irremis-

sible motive and the foundation of all morality/ 81 The

liberalise philosophy is relinquished even before the social

and economic ground of liberalism has become a fact.

ttphilasophie des Rechts, vol. HI, pp. 61, 70.

Ibid., p. 191. **P. 141. <>Vol. . P- MS-

T P. 144. P. 9. i P. 106.

F. J. STAHL 373

Whereas the French social economists could look upon

the progress of industrial capitalism as a challenge calling

for the transformation of existing social and political rela-

tions into an order that might develop individual poten-

tialities, men like Stahl had to concern themselves with

the salvation of a system oriented to the past and to some

eternal and immutable hierarchy. When Stahl, therefore,

criticizes the prevailing labor processfor example, when

he appears shocked by the 'calamity of the factory system

and machine production* "and makes reference to Sis-

mondi, 58 he is nevertheless far from drawing any conse-

quences. State and society remain bound by divine com-

mand and historical tradition. They are as they ought to

be. The people is a community stronger than all class

stratification. Volksgemeinschaft is a fact; the community,

not the individual, is the final subject of right. 'Only the

Volk possesses the unity of Lebensanschauung and the

germ of creative production.' 64 Tradition and custom in-

grown among the people are the source of right. The in-

dividual's quest for freedom and happiness is diverted by

being referred to the irrational community, which is al-

ways right. That which has germinated and become pre-

served in the 'natural' growth of history is true in itself.

'Man is not an absolutely free being. He is a created and

limited one, hence dependent upon the power that gave

him his existence and on the given order of life and the

given authorities through whom this power let him into

existence. The authorities, therefore, hold full power over

him, even without his consent/ M

In all its aspects, the philosophy of Stahl stands out as

having deserted the progressive ideas that Hegel's system

had attempted to save for the society in which they had

originated and in which they were later betrayed. Reason

Vol. in, p. 73. M P. 59. Vol. ii, p. 193.

gegenw&rtigen Parlcicn . . . , p. 22.

374 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

is superseded by authority, freedom by submission, right

by duty, and the individual is put at the mercy of the

unquestionable claims of a hypostatized whole. Stahl's

philosophy of right gathers together some of the funda-

mental conceptions that later guided the preparation of

National Socialist ideology. Such are the implications of

the 'positive philosophy 1 which claimed to supplant the

negative philosophy of Hegel.

5. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE DIALECTIC INTO

SOCIOLOGY: LORENZ VON STEIN

There still remains for consideration the important in-

fluence exerted by the Hegelian philosophy on the social

theory of Lorenz von Stein. Stein's works were well known

to Marx and Engels and received criticism in their writ-

ings prior to the Communist Manifesto. Some controversy

has arisen as to whether and how far they took over Stein's

conceptions in their own theory; this problem does not

interest us here, however, for the question seems irrele-

vant in view of the fact that the structure and aims of

the Marxian theory are quite different from those of

Stein's sociology.

The influence of Stein's work on the development of

social theory was slight; he was deemed a historian of the

French Revolution and of French social theories, rather

than a theoretician. The first edition of his Der Socialis-

mus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreichs, pub-

lished in 1842, gives little indication of his sociological

concepts. The edition of 1850, however, published in

thiee volumes under the title, Geschichte der sozialen Be-

wegung in Frankrcich von 1789 bis auf unserc Tage, 1

gives full elaboration of these. The long introduction

i Edited by G. Salomon, Mtinchcn 194*. We quote from this new

edition.

LORENZ VON STEIN 375

treats 'the concept of society and the laws of social move-

ment. 1 It represents the first German sociology.

We are here using the term sociology in its exact sense,

to designate the treatment of social theory as a special

science, with a subject matter, conceptual framework, and

method of its own. Social theory is taken as 'the science

of society/ investigating the particularly social relations

among men and the laws or tendencies operating in these. 2

This implies that such 'social' relations can be distin-

guished from physical, economic, political, or religious

ones, though in reality they might never occur without

these. Sociology as a special science, though 'concerned

with the general study of society/ gives over a great num-

ber of social problems to other specialized sciences for

treatment. 'Thus problems such as the production and

distribution of wealth, the tariff and international trade

and investment are handled by economics/ 8 Other groups

of social problems are turned over to other special sciences,

for example, to political science and education, and, above

all, sociology is severed from any connection with phi-

losophy.

The emancipation of sociology from philosophy must

not be confused with the 'negation* and 'realization of phi-

losophy/ as it occurs in Marxian social theory. Sociology

does not 'negate' philosophy, in the sense of taking over

the hidden content of philosophy and carrying it into so-

cial theory and practice, but sets itself up as a realm apart

from philosophy, with a province and truth of its own.

Comte is rightly held to be the inaugurator of this separa-

tion between philosophy and sociology. It is true that

2 See Robert M. Maclver, Society, New York 1937, pp. vii f. and pp. 4-8;

The Fields and Methods of Sociology, ed. L. L. Bernard, New York 1934,

pp. 3 ff.; C. M. Case, Outlines of Introductory Sociology f New York 1934,

p. xvii and pp. 25 f!.

* William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, Sociology, Cambridge 1940,

p. 14.

376 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

Comte and other thinkers in the same tradition made a

formal equation between their social theory and philoso-

phy: thus, John Stuart Mill outlined his logic of social

science within a comprehensive general logic, and Spencer

made the principles of sociology part of his System of

Synthetic Philosophy. But these thinkers changed the

meaning of philosophy, to make it quite different from

the philosophy that originally gave birth to social theory.

Philosophy to these men was merely a synopsis of the fun-

damental concepts and principles employed in the spe-

cialized sciences (with Comte: mathematics, astronomy,

physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology; with Spencer:

biology, psychology, sociology, and morals). The synoptic

study of these sciences was 'philosophical' by virtue of its

general positivistic character, its refutation of all tran-

scendental ideas. Such philosophy thus amounted to the

refutation of philosophy.

The anti-philosophical bent of sociology is of great sig-

nificance. We have seen that, with Comte, society became

the subject-matter of an independent field of investigation.

The social relations and the laws governing them were no

longer derived as they had been in Hegel's system from

the essence of the individual; still less were they analyzed

according to such standards as reason, freedom, and right.

The latter now appeared unscientific; sociological method

was oriented to describing observable facts and to estab-

lishing empirical generalities about them. In contrast to

the dialectical conception, which viewed the world as a

'negative totality' and was therefore intrinsically critical,

the sociological method was intrinsically neutral, viewing

society in the same way physics viewed nature.

Ever since Comte, sociology has been patterned on the

natural sciences. It has been held a science precisely in so

far as its subject-matter was amenable to the same neutral

LORENZ VON STEIN 377

treatment as that of the exact sciences. John Stuart Mill's

characterization of the science of society remains typical

for its subsequent development. Mill said,

This science stands in the same relation to the social, as

anatomy and physiology to the physical body. It shows by

what principles of his nature man is induced to enter into a

state of society; how this feature of his position acts upon his

interests and feelings, and through them upon his conduct;

how the association tends progressively to become closer, and

the cooperation extends itself to more and more purposes;

what those purposes are, and what the varieties of means most

generally adopted for furthering them; what are the various

relations which establish themselves among men as the ordi-

nary consequence of the social union; what those which are

different in different states of society; and what are the effects

of each upon the conduct and character of man. 4

According to this description, the science of society is,

in principle, not to be distinguished from natural science.

Social phenomena are 'exact* to a lesser degree and more

difficult to classify than natural phenomena, but they can

be subjected to the standard of exactness and to the prin-

ciples of generalization and classification; for this reason

the theory of Society is a real science. 8 Sociology, more-

over, has this in common with the other exact sciences: it

proceeds from accumulating facts to classifying them suc-

cessfully. This is the principle of its procedure. 'All knowl-

edge that is not systematized according to this principle

must be ruled out of the science of society/ e

The very principles, however, that make sociology a

special science set it at odds with the dialectical theory of

society. In the latter, generalization and classification of

facts was at best an irrelevant undertaking. How could

such procedure have any bearing on the truth, when all

4 John Stuart Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political

Economy f London 1844, P> 1 35*

Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology, New York 1912, p. 40.

Lester F. Ward, Outlines of Sociology, New York 1898, p. 163.

378 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

facts were regarded as constituted by the unique structure

and movement of the social whole, in which the chang-

ing directions of human practice throughout history

played an essential part? The dialectical theory of society

emphasized the essential potentialities and contradictions

within this social whole, thereby stressing what could be

done with society, and also exposing the inadequacy of

its actual form. Scientific neutrality was incompatible with

the nature of the subject-matter and with the directions

for human practice derived from an analysis of it. Further-

more, the dialectical social theory could not be a special

science among other sciences, because it considered the

social relations to embrace and condition all spheres of

thought and existence. Society is the negative totality of

all given human relations (including relations to nature),

and not any part of these. For these reasons, the dialectic

was a philosophical and not a sociological method, one in

which every single dialectical notion held all of the nega-

tive totality and thus conflicted with any cutting off of a

special realm of social relations.

Any attempt at sociology first had to refute the dialecti-

cal claim, as Stahl did, or to detach it from its philosophi-

cal ground, as did von Stein, who transformed dialectical

laws and concepts into sociological ones. Von Stein called

his work 'the first attempt to set up the concept of society

as an independent concept, and to develop its content.' T

Hegel's Philosophy of Right had exposed the destructive

antagonisms within civil society (243-6) as inevitable

products of this social order. To be sure, the Hegelian

emphasis weakened the force of the social contradictions

by interpreting them as ontological ones. Nevertheless,

Hegel's dialectic had set up no inexorable 'natural' law

of history, but had quite clearly indicated that the path

T Geschichtc der toxfalen Bewegung . ... p. 6.

LORENZ VON STEIN 379

of man's historical practice lay in the direction of free-

dom. The dialectical movement of civil society in the work

of von Stein appears much more as the movement of

things (capital, property, labor) than as the movement

of men. Social development is governed by natural laws

rather than by human practice. Von Stein regards this

state of affairs not as the product of capitalist reifica-

tions but as the 'natural' state of modern society. Reifica-

tion is understood as a universal law, with which social

theory and practice need perforce comply. The dialectic

becomes part of an objective and impartial study of so-

ciety.

Owing to the circumstances in which von Stein's work

originated, however, these neutralizing tendencies were

considerably counteracted. Stein was, after all, guided by

his study of social struggles in post-revolutionary France

and paid close attention to French social critics and the-

orists of the period. This concrete historical approach

induced him to say that the economic process was basic

to the social and political process, and that the class strug-

gles were the true pivotal content of society. He saw and

admitted for a time that the irreconcilable contradictions

of modern society were the motor of its development, thus

aligning himself with Hegel's dialectical analysis of so-

ciety. But this focussing upon the antagonisms within the

economic process had to be abandoned if sociology was

to be secure as an objective science. Hence, von Stein him-

self renounced his own earlier position. As early as 1852

he foreswore the attempt to base social theory on political

economy:

It is well known that the entire science of society originated

from a study of the economic antagonism that exploitation

and competition have induced between the fourth estate espe-

cially, or labor shorn of capital, and the owners of capital.

This fact has led to a conclusion which, evident as it seemed,

380 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

necessarily brought great jeopardy to the deeper foundations

of this science. The author of these lines cannot deny that he

himself contributed greatly to the acceptance of this conclu-

sion. For, he assumed that since the present form [of society]

is essentially conditioned by the economic relations, the social

order as such could not be other than a print [Abdruck], as it

were, of the economic order . . . From this opinion, then, fol-

lowed the other that the entire movement of society is also

exclusively governed by these laws which determine economic

life, in such a manner that the whole science of society is

eventually reduced to a mere reflex of the economic laws and

developments. 8

This statement professes that establishing sociology as

a real science requires the abolition of its economic

foundation. Stein's sociology henceforth set out to up-

hold social harmony in the face of the economic contradic-

tions, and morality in the face of social struggles.

In 1856 Stein published his Gesellschaftslehre. The first

book began the construction of a 'social ethics* and the

last concluded with 'the principles of social harmony,'

showing that 'the various orders of society and its classes

are linked together so that they supplement and fulfill

one another.' 9 In place of dealing with von Stein's final

system of sociology, 10 we shall limit ourselves to a brief

summary of the foundations of his sociology as expounded

in the introduction to the Geschichte der sozialen Beweg-

ung in Frankreich. 11 The preface to the edition of 1850

advances the assumption basic to the new science of so-

ciety, that social dynamic is governed by a necessary law

which it is sociology's task to discover. This law, Stein

says, can be expressed in its most general form as the strug-

gle of the ruling class to obtain full possession of state

* Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, Stuttgart 1858, p. 145; quoted by H.

Nitzschke, Die Geschichtsphilosophie Lorenz von Steins, Munchen 1938,

pp. 13* f-

9 Gesellschaftslehre, Stuttgart 1856, p. 430.

10 See the bibliography in Nitzschke, op. cit.

11 Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung . . . , vol. i, p. 1 1 ff.

LORENZ VON STEIN 381

power and to exclude the other class from possessing such.

The social process consists at root in the class war be-

tween capital and labor for state control. 12

The antagonism between state and society is the basic

idea of Stein's sociology. The two materialize two entirely

different principles. Society is 'the organic unity of human

life as conditioned by the distribution of wealth, regu-

lated by the organism of labor, moved by the system of

wants, and joined to succeeding generations by the family

and its right/ 18 We can recognize Hegel in this definition,

as well as the early French socialists. Stein clothes the

skeleton conception that he took over from Hegel with the

material got from the French critical analysis of modern

society. In essence, society is class society. 'The general

and inalterable relation in society is that between a domi-

nant and a dependent class'; 14 the existence of classes is

an 'inevitably given fact' 15 originating in the process of

labor. 'Those who possess the material of labor as prop-

erty herewith possess what those who have no property

need in order to acquire it. In the utilization of their

labor power, the latter are dependent on this prerequisite,

namely, the n^aterial [of labor], and since this material is

property which cannot be worked on [bearbeitet] with-

out the consent of the proprietors, it follows that all who

possess nothing but labor power are dependent on those

who possess property.' " The social order is thus neces-

sarily a class order; its prime feature is self-seeking, a gen-

eral penchant of each to acquire 'the means for his own

independence and the means for making others depend-

ent.' 1T

In contrast to society, the state is 'the community of all

individual wills elevated to a personal union.' The prin-

ciple of the state is the development, progress, wealth,

12 Ibid., p. 3. i* P. 47. ie p. 23.

i*P. Q. "P. 71. IT pp. 41 f.

POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

power, and intelligence of all individuals 'without distinc-

tion/ positing all individuals as free and equal. 1 * The

state preserves the common interest, reason, and freedom,

from the conflicting private interests of society. 19

Of utmost significance for the evolution of sociology is

the manner in which Stein's separation of state and so-

ciety disposes of the actual problem of modern social the-

ory. In the first place, class antagonism is declared to be

the 'general and unalterable* law of society, and accepted

as an 'inevitable fact/ Despite the retention of Hegelian

terminology, Stein succumbs to the positivist, affirmative

tendencies of early sociology. Secondly, he neutralizes the

basic contradictions of modern society by distributing

them between two different domains, those of state and

society. Freedom and equality are reserved to the state,

while exploitation and inequality are delegated to the

'society! thus turning the inherent contradiction of society

into an antagonism between state and society. Modern so-

ciety is released from any obligation to fulfill human free-

domthe responsibility belongs to the state. The state, on

the other hand, exists only as the prize of the classes in

struggle and is incapable of 'withstanding the power and

the claims of society/ 20 The solution of the social antagon-

isms thus seems to revert to society again.

Stein declares that the process of enslavement and of

liberation is, in entirety, a social process, and that bond-

age and freedom are sociological concepts. 11 Liberty means

social independence, or the ownership of sufficient means

to enable one to fix the conditions of another's labor.

Liberty is necessarily connected with bondage; society is a

class order and hence incompatible with freedom. Stein is

thus faced with the following problem: the state is the

true field of realization of human community, but it is

LORENZ VON STEIN 383

impotent before class society. The latter, the actual field

in which men fulfill themselves, 'cannot be free, owing

to its principle.' The 'possibility of progress, therefore,

must be sought in a factor* that stands above state and

society and is more powerful than both. 22

This ultimate factor, Stein decides, is 'the personality

and its destiny/ The personality is more powerful than

state or society; it is 'the foundation and spring-board for

the development to freedom/ 28 This conception marks

Stein's volte-face from the economic foundations of social

theory and its achievements. He comes out with an ideal-

ist ethics. Not only is society, unfree in 'its very principle,

discharged from the responsibility for freedom, but the

state, which inevitably must come under the sway of so-

ciety, is similarly discharged. The process of transforming

philosophical into sociological concepts finally yields man's

historical existence to the inalterable mechanisms of the

social process and reserves his 'destiny' and goal to his

moral personality. The coast is clear for treating social

problems in the manner of wertfreie science.

We have seen that Stein views the social process as a

struggle between state and society, or as a struggle on the

part of the ruling social class for state power. 24 The state's

principle is 'to elevate all individuals to perfect freedom';

the principle of the society, 'to subjugate some individuals

to others/ 28 History is in reality the constant renewal of

this conflict on different levels, and the progress of history

takes place through the changes in social structure that

result.

Stein proceeds to establish the 'natural laws' of this

change. We have already mentioned the first law, that the

ruling class strives to make possession of state power as

exclusively its own as it can. 96 As soon as this goal is

M P. 75. " ibid. P. 3*. " P. 45. P. 49.

384 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

reached, a new dynamic begins, consisting in attempts 'to

use the state power in the positive interest of the ruling

class.' 2T There are different historic stages of this use and,

consequently, different degrees of social domination or

bondage. The first stage is characterized by 'absolute tri-

umph of society over the state/ or the complete identifica-

tion of the ruling class with 'the idea of the state/ Stein

calls this 'absolute society/ 28 It begins with class appro-

priation of the means of labor and is accompanied by an

increasing subjugation of the class deprived of these

means. Hence, 'the development of all social order is a

movement toward bondage/ 2fl

Just as the class structure of society is necessarily the

source of bondage, it is also as much the source of a de-

velopment in the direction of freedom. The process sets

in wherever the capitalist class has completed its organi-

zation of society in its own interest. We know that free-

dom is a 'social concept/ 'dependent on the acquisition

of those goods' required for the individual's growth. 80 It

follows that the subject class will strain towards getting

possession of the wherewithal to gratify its cultural as

well as material wants. This class will demand (i) general

and equal education and (2) material freedom, that is, the

opportunity to acquire property. 81 The latter demand will

conflict with the interest of the established order, the

vested interest of the ruling class.

In the last analysis, the possessor class aims to 'satisfy

its wants and desires without labor/ 82 The possessor class,

then, is a non-laboring class, and the opposition between

property and lack of property is really one between un-

earned income and labor. 88 Since labor alone makes prop-

erty a right and a value, and since unearned income is a

'dead weight' that cannot resist the onslaught of labor, it

2T p. 5 6. 29 P. 66. i Pp. 85-7. " P. 91.

2P. 6*. OP. 8l. 82 p. 90.

LORENZ VON STEIN 385

follows that the working class will increasingly become

'the master of all value/ that is, will increasingly acquire

property in the means of production and finally take over

the place of the former non-laboring class. When this oc-

curs, the legal and political structures, which have been

modelled on the interests of a non-laboring ruling class,

will openly conflict with the actual new power relations

and controls in society. 'Transformation of the established

system of right becomes an intrinsic soon also an extrinsic

necessity/ 84

Two kinds of transformation are possible, political re-

form and revolution. In the first case, 'state power would

have to yield to the demands of the dependent class and

sanction the fact of social equality by recognizing legal

equality. The major changes in history, however, have all

been effected by revolution: 'The upper class does not

grant the demand of the lower class, nor does it allow for

a legal reorganization that would conform to the new

distribution of social wealth/ 85 Revolution under such

conditions is inevitable.

Stein places, heavy stress on the fact that revolution con-

tains in its principle a contradiction that at once deter-

mines the course it will take. Every revolution proclaims

general equality for the whole class hitherto excluded

from power, but actually establishes equal right only for

that part of the class that has already got possession of

economic wealth. When the class is victorious in its revo-

lution, then, it splits inttf two conflicting strata. 'No revo-

lutionary movement is able to avert this contradiction

. . . According to its inalterable nature, every revolution

uses a social class whose interest it will not and cannot

serve. Every revolution, as soon as it is complete, thus en-

counters an enemy in the person of the very mass that

"P. 95- "P. 97-

386 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

helped achieve the result.' " In other words, every revo-

lution issues into a new class conflict and a new form of

class society. The privileges of unearned income are abol-

ished, and property based upon labor becomes the founda-

tion of the new social order, but this same property, in

the form of capital, soon stands against the potential of

acquisition, labor-power. The earning power of capital

comes to oppose capital-less labor. 87 Although this condi-

tion seems 'perfectly harmonious* and an adequate result

of the process of free acquisition, it turns out to be the

fountain of a new form of bondage, for in reality, 'labor

is excluded from acquiring capital.' " The social position

of the capitalist is a function of the aggregate of his capi-

tal. The growth of capital depends on the value of the

product over and above its production cost. The competi-

tion of capitals requires a struggle for lower production

costs and thus leads necessarily to constant pressure on

wages; this is of the essence of capital. The interest of

capital conflicts with the interest of labor; the original

harmony is dissolved into contradiction.* 9

Stein emphasized that the mechanisms of the revolu-

tion operate in the form of unalterable natural laws, that

moral indignation or similar evaluations are hence entirely

out of place. Moreover, Stein knows that the contradic-

tions he has just analyzed are distinctive of a society based

on free labor and acquisition, and that the same may not

be applied to other forms of social organization. 'It is pre-

cisely the activity of property owners that, taking the form

of competition, renders it impossible for those who do

not possess property to acquire it.' 40 He goes one step fur-

ther to declare that the proletariat will need its own

revolution to overthrow this society. The proletariat is the

class that the middle-class revolution has deprived of all

P. 100. " p. 106. P. 107. P. 108. " Pp. 109 f.

LORENZ VON STEIN 387

acquisitive power. Little wonder, then, that it claims the

right to seize that power and to reorganize society on the

pattern of real social equality. This proletarian act would

constitute 'the social revolution* as distinguished from

all preceding revolutions, which were 'political revolu-

tions/ 41

At this point, Stein's sociology veers from its dialectical

direction and follows the ideas of positive sociology.

The proletarian revolution would be a disaster, and the

victory of the proletariat, the 'triumph of bondage/ 4 *

The reason is that the proletariat is not the stronger or

the better part of the social whole. Moreover, it lacks the

right to seize the state because it 'does not possess the ma-

terial and intellectual goods which are prerequisite for

true supremacy/ 48 The idea of proletarian rule is, there-

fore, a contradiction in itself. The proletariat is incapable

of maintaining any such supremacy the old ruling class

will soon take revenge upon it and clamp down a dictator-

ship of violence. 'The successful revolution always leads

to dictatorship. And this dictatorship, setting itself above

society . . . proclaims itself an independent state power

and takes the right, mantle and halo of such. This is the

end of social revolution/ 4 *

But is it likewise the end of social process? The 'per-

sonality/ exalted to the position of the decisive factor in

social development, has prepared Stein's sudden departure

from critical analysis. The acquisitive society preserves

personality, for it establishes the principle that free per-

sonal development demands the universal opportunity to

earn. If the opportunity has been restricted in the actual

course capitalism took, it may still be restored by proper 'so-

cial reform/ In modern acquisitive society, capital expresses

man's mastery over his external life. 'The quality of

1P. 116. 41 P. 1*7. 48 Ibid. 44 P. 131.

388 POSITIVISM AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

personal freedom here is therefore to be found in the

fact that the most inferior grade of labor power is able to

get possession of capital.' 4B Also, Stein recalls his critical

analysis of the contradictions inherent in middle-class so-

ciety. He asks whether it is at all possible in an acquisi-

tive society so to organize the labor process 'that work

alone achieves a possession corresponding to its amount

and kind.' 48 The answer he gives is affirmative, resting on

an appeal to man's true interest. Man requires freedom

and will have it. It is particularly in the interest of the

possessing class 'to work for social reform, through all its

social forces, and with the aid of the state and its power.' "

Lorenz von Stein thus turned the dialectic into an en-

semble of objective laws calling for social reform as the

adequate solution of all contradictions and neutralized

the critical elements of the dialectic.

< P. 136. "Ibid. p. 138.

Ill

*MM<MK

Conclusion

The End of Hegelianism

i. BRITISH NEC-IDEALISM

HEGEL'S philosophy held to the progressive ideas in West-

ern rationalism and worked out their historical destiny.

It attempted to light up the right of reason, and its power,

amid the developing antagonisms of modern society.

There was a dangerous element in this philosophy, dan-

gerous to the existing order, that is, which derived from

its use of the standard of reason to analyze the form of

the state. Hegel endorsed the state only in so far as it was

rational, that is, in so far as it preserved and promoted

individual freedom and the social potencies of men.

Hegel attached the realization of reason to a definite

historical order, namely, the sovereign national state that

had emerged on the Continent with the liquidation of

the French Revolution. In so doing, he submitted his

philosophy to a decisive historical test. For any basic

change that might take place in this order would have to

alter the relation between Hegel's ideas and the existing

social and political forms. This means, for example, that

when civil society develops forms of organization that deny

the essential rights of the individual and abolish the ra-

tional state, the Hegelian philosophy must clash with this

new state. On its side, the state will then also repudiate

Hegel's philosophy.

One final test exists for this conclusion, that to be

found in the Fascist and National Socialist attitudes to

389

390 THE END OF HEGEUANISM

Hegel. These state philosophies exemplify the abolition

of the rational standard and the individual freedom on

which Hegel's glorification of the state depended. There

can be no meeting ground between them and Hegel. And

yet, ever since the first World War, when the system of

liberalism began to shape into the system of authori-

tarianism, a widespread opinion has blamed Hegelianism

for the ideological preparation of the new system. We

quote, for example, the dedication to L. T. Hobhouse's

important book, The Metaphysical Theory of the State: *

In the bombing of London I had just witnessed the visible

and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine, the

foundations of which lay, as I believe, in the book before me

[Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind] . . . With that work began

the most penetrating and subtle of all intellectual influences

which have sapped the rational humanitarianism of the eight-

eenth and nineteenth centuries, and in the Hegelian theory of

the God-state all that I had witnessed lay implicit.

We shall later note the curious fact that the official de-

fenders of the National Socialist state reject Hegel pre-

cisely on the ground of his 'rational humanitarianism.'

To decide more fully who is right in this controversy,

however, we must sketch the role of Hegelianism in the

later period of liberalist society. In Germany, the repre-

sentative social and political philosophy of the last half

of the nineteenth century remained anti-Hegelian or, at

best, indifferent to Hegel. There were, however, apart

from the employment of Hegelian philosophy in the

Marxian theory, two great renaissances of Hegelianism,

one in England, the other in Italy. The British move-

ment was still connected with the principles and philoso-

phy of liberalism and for this very reason lay much closer

to the spirit of Hegel than did the Italian. The latter

* London (The Macmillan Company, New York) 1918, p. 6.

BRITISH NEO-IDEALISM 391

movement was drawing nearer to the approaching current

of Fascism and was therefore becoming more and more

of a caricature of Hegel's philosophy, especially in the

case of Gentile.

At first glance, the tendencies in the British and Italian

Hegeliatiism seem to bear out Hobhouse's interpretation.

The political philosophy of the British idealists seized

upon the anti-liberal ideas in Hegel's Philosophy of Right.

From T. H. Green to Bernard Bosanquet the crescendo

of emphasis fell increasingly upon the independent prin-

ciple of the state and on the pre-eminence of the uni-

versal. The social interests of free individuals, on which

the liberalist tradition had relied for its construction of

the state, were disregarded. The state, according to Green,

is based on an 'ideal principle of its own, and the com-

mon good, which the state embodies and guards, cannot

result from the free play of individual interests. There

are no individual rights separate from the universal right

represented by the state. "To ask why I am to submit to

the power of the state, is to ask why I am to allow my

life to be regulated by that complex of institutions with-

out which I literally should not have a life to call my own,

nor should be able to ask for a justification of what I am

called to do.' *

Green comes much closer to the inner motives of

Hegel's philosophy when he attempts to understand this

universal as a historical force that operates through the

deeds and passions of men. In the state, the actions of men

'whom in themselves we reckon bad, are "overruled" for

good,' made to depend not on individual passion and mo-

tive but 'in some measure* on 'the struggle of mankind

towards perfection.' 8 The tendencies in Green to reify

the universal as against the individual are counteracted

s Lecture/ on the Principles of Political Obligation, Longmans, Green

and Co., London 1895, p. iat . * pp. 134 f.

3Q2 THE END OF HEGELIAN ISM

by his adherence to the progressive tendencies of West-

ern rationalism. He insists throughout his work that

the state be submitted to rational standards, such as imply

that the common good is best served through advancing

the interest of free individuals. He grants men the right

to dispute laws that violate their just claim to determine

their own will, but he demands that all claims against the

existing order 'must be founded on a reference to an ac-

knowledged social good/ 4

Far from being an apology for authoritarianism, Green's

political philosophy can, in a certain sense, be designated

as a super-liberalism. 'The general principle that the citi-

zen must never act otherwise than as a citizen, does not

carry with it an obligation under all conditions to con-

form to the law of his state, since those laws may be in-

consistent with the true end of the state as the sustainer

and harmonizer of social relations.' 5 Green thus grants to

every individual (qua citizen) the liberty to assert an 'il-

legal right* provided that 'its exercise should be contribu-

tory to some social good which the public conscience is

capable of appreciating/ He has no doubt that there is

such a thing as a 'public conscience/ always open to ra-

tional conviction and always willing to permit truth to

progress. 7

The material arena in which the common good has to

be realized is not 'the state as such/ but 'this or that par-

ticular state/ which might, perhaps, not fulfill the pur-

pose of a true state and, therefore, have to be 'swept away

and superseded by another/ Hence, there is no ground

for holding that a state is justified in doing 'whatever its

4 p. 148. P. 148. p. 149.

7 Green places responsibility for the antagonisms of capitalism (of

which he is fully aware) not on the liberal ist system but on the contin-

gent historical conditions under which capitalism arose. (Ibid., pp. 225,

228.) He demands certain restrictions of liberalise freedom, especially in

respect to freedom of contract, and a removal of conditions and relations

occasioned by 'the power of class interests' (pp. 209 f.).

BRITISH NEO-IDEALISM 393

interests seem to require/ 8 In contrast to Hegel, Green

holds war, even just war, to be a wrong against the indi-

vidual's right to life and liberty. 9 And in opposition to

Hegel's fundamental concept of supreme sovereignty of

the national state, Green envisages an over-arching organi-

zation of mankind, which, through an increase in the free

scope of the individual and an expansion of free trade,

will make 'the motives and occasions of international con-

flict tend to disappear/ 10

The point has sometimes been made that the develop-

ment of British idealism from Green to Bosanquet was

one in which the rationalist and liberalist ideas of earlier

days were slowly abandoned. 11 We might venture to add

to this a corollary: the more Hegelian in wording this

idealism became, the further it removed itself from the

true spirit of Hegel's thought. Bradley's metaphysics, not-

withstanding its Hegelian concepts, has a strong irration-

alist core that is entirely alien to Hegel. Bosanquet's

Philosophical Theory of the State (1899) has features that

make the individual a victim of the hypostatized state uni-

versal, so characteristic of the later Fascist ideology. The

'average individual is no longer accepted as the real self or

individuality. The center of gravity is thrown outside

him/ 12 'Outside him' means to Bosanquet outside 'his

own private interest and amusement,' outside the sphere

of his immediate want and desire. From its beginnings,

this renaissance of idealism showed a definite anti-ma-

terialist tendency, 18 a quality it shares with the tendencies

accompanying the transition from liberalism to authori-

tarianism. The ideology accompanying this movement pre-

pared the individual for more labor and less enjoyment,

P. 173. P. 169. 10 P. 177.

11 Cf. R. Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, London 1938,

pp. 283, 327 f.

" The Philosophical Theory of the State, The Macmillan Co., London

1899, p. 125. is R. Metz, op. cit., pp. 249, 267.

394 THE END OF HEGEL1ANISM

a slogan of the authoritarian economy. Gratification of

individual wants had to give way before duties to the

whole. The duties, as they came, were found to jibe less

and less with any rational standard, and the more true

this situation became, the greater stress was laid on the

doctrine that the individual's relation to the whole was a

relation between two 'ideal' entities that overrule his

empirical existence. 'We see that there is a meaning in

the suggestion that our real self or individuality may be

something which in one sense we are not, but which we

recognize as imperative upon us.' 14 Liberty for the indi-

vidual can be realized only through obedience to that

'imperative/ It is vested in the state which, as the guard-

ian of our real 'self/ is 'the instrument of our greatest

self-affirmation/ 16

The juxtaposition of a real and an empirical self is an

ambiguity. It might refer to a significant dualism, to the

actual distress of men in their empirical reality as against

a 'real' self that demands fulfillment for need and a

remedy of distress. On the other hand, the same concep-

tion may signify a deprecation of the empirical life in

favor of an unconditionally 'ideal* life of the state. Bosan-

quet's political philosophy runs from one to the other of

these two poles. He adopts Rousseau's revolutionary prin-

ciple of compulsory education towards freedom, but in

the course of discussion, the goal, freedom, dissolves be-

fore the compulsory means. 'Force, automatism, and sug-

gestion* are the very conditions for progress in intellect.

'In promoting the best life, these aids must be employed

by society as exercising absolute power viz. by the

State/ 16 'The realization of the best life' is the end set by

state and society, but that end is so far overshadowed by

the element of force involved in its attainment that the

i Bosanquet, op. cit., p. 196. " P. 183.

"P. 1*7.

BRITISH NEO-IDEALISM 395

state must be defined as 'a unit, recognized as rightly exer-

cising control over its members through absolute physical

power/ or 'recognized as a unit lawfully exercising

force/ 1T Hobhouse replies to this definition that it can

properly fit into the scheme of any authoritarian abso-

lutism. 18

The question may now be answered how far the politi-

cal theory of these British neo-idealists constitutes a genu-

ine resumption of the Hegelian philosophy. One original

motive of German idealism they certainly retained,

namely, that true liberty cannot be achieved through the

mind-set and daily practice of isolated individuals in the

competitive vortex of modern society. Freedom is rather

a condition to be sought beyond, in the state. The state

alone fulfills their real wills and their real selves. Hegel

thought that the particular kind of state that could serve

this purpose was the one that retained the decisive achieve-

ments of the French Revolution and incorporated them

into a rational whole.

When the British idealists elaborated their political

doctrine, it w&s at least obvious that the historical form

of the state that had come upon the scene was by no

means 'the realization of freedom and reason/

The great merit of Hobhouse's book lies in its exposure

of the incompatibility between Hegel's conception and

the material basis of the existing state. He points to the

fact that Bosanquet's philosophy yields the individual into

the clutches of a society as such, or to 'the state* generally,

whereas in reality the individual always has to carry on

his life in some particular historical form of society and

state. This 'central fallacy' is of the utmost importance,

for in it is implied the confusion between contingent

IT pp. 184 f.

it The Metaphysical Theory of the State, London 1918, p. ti.

THE END OF HEGELIANISM

power-relations and moral obligations. 19 State and society

as they are cannot claim the dignity of being reason's em-

bodiment: 'When we think of the actual inconsistencies

of traditional social morality, the blindness and crudity of

law, the elements of class-selfishness and oppression that

have coloured it ... we are inclined to say that no mere

philosopher, but only the social satirist, could treat this

conception as it deserves.' 20 To those who hold abstractly

to Hegel's political philosophy, Hobhouse replies that the

very fact of class society, the patent influence of class in-

terests on the state, renders it impossible to designate the

state as expressive of the real will of individuals as a

whole. 'Wherever a community is governed by one class

or one race, the remaining class or race is permanently in

the position of having to take what it can get. To say that

institutions of such a society express the private will of the

subject class is merely to add insult to injury.' 2l In place of

concern for the universal, Hobhouse puts concern for the

actual welfare of the individual; in place of the Weltgeist,

the infinite number of human lives irretrievably lost. 'If

the world cannot be made incomparably better than it

has hitherto been, then the struggle has no issue, and we

had better strengthen the doctrine of the militant state

and arm it with enough high explosive to bring life to an

end.' 22

Insistence on man's claim to universal happiness, which

is always happiness for each, so frequently found in the

pages of Hobhouse's book, renders it one of the great

documents of liberalist philosophy.

The happiness and misery of society is the happiness and

misery of human beings heightened or deepened by its sense

of common possession. Its will is their wills in the conjoint

result. Its conscience is an expression of what is noble or

ignoble in them when the balance is struck. If we may judge

P. 77- *0 P. 80. 81 P. 85. 82 P. uy.

BRITISH NEO-IDEALISM 3Q7

each man by the contribution he makes to the community, we

are equally right to ask of the community what it is doing

for this man. The greatest happiness will not be realized by

the greatest or any great number unless in a form in which

all can share, in which indeed the sharing is for each an essen-

tial ingredient. But there is no happiness at all except that ex-

perienced by individual men and women, and there is no com-

mon self submerging the soul of men. There are societies in

which their distinct and separate personalities may develop in

harmony and contribute to a collective achievement. 28

Hobhouse is of course right as against the neo-idealists,

just as liberalism is right as against any irrational hypos-

tasis of the state that disregards the fatfe of the individual.

On the other hand, the demands that Hobhouse advances

are in line with the abstract principles of liberalism, but

they conflict with the concrete form that liberalist society

took. Hegel once defined liberalism as the social philoso-

phy that 'sticks to the abstract' and is always 'defeated by

the concrete/ 24 The principles of liberalism are valid, the

common interest cannot be other in the last analysis than

the product of the multitude of freely developing indi-

vidual selves in society. But the concrete forms of society

that have developed since the nineteenth century have

increasingly frustrated the freedom to which liberalism

counsels allegiance. Under the laws that govern the so-

cial process, the free play of private initiative has wound

up in competition among monopolies for the most part:

An era of cut-throat competition, followed by a rapid proc-

ess of amalgamation, threw an enormous quantity of wealth

into the hands of a small number of captains of industry. No

luxury of living to which this class could attain kept pace with

its rise of income, and a process of automatic saving set in

upon an unprecedented scale. The investment of these savings

in other industries helped to bring these under the same concen-

28 P. 133.

** Philosophic der Wcltgcschichtc, ed. G. Lasson, vol. n, p. 925.

398 THE END OF HEGELIANISM

trative forces ... In the free competition of manufacturers

preceding combination the chronic condition is one of 'over-

production/ in the sense that all the mills or factories can

only be kept at work by cutting prices down towards a point

where the weaker competitors are forced to close down, be-

cause they cannot sell their goods at a price which covers the

true cost of production. 28

BOSANQUET'S Philosophical Theory of the State appeared

when this transition from liberal to monopolistic capital-

ism had already begun. Social theory was faced with the

alternative either of abandoning the principles of liberal-

ism so that the existing social order might be maintained,

or of fighting the system in order to preserve the princi-

ples. The latter choice was implied in the Marxian theory

of society.

2. THE REVISION OF THE DIALECTIC

The Marxian theory, however, had itself begun to un-

dergo fundamental changes. The history of Marxism has

confirmed the affinity between Hegel's motives and the

critical interest of the materialist dialectic as applied to

society. The schools of Marxism that abandoned the revo-

lutionary foundations of the Marxian theory were the

same that outspokenly repudiated the Hegelian aspects

of the Marxian theory, especially the dialectic. Revisionist

writing and thought, which expressed the growing faith

of large socialist groups in a peaceful evolution from capi-

talism to socialism, attempted to change socialism from a

theoretical and practical antithesis to the capitalist sys-

tem into a parliamentary movement within this system.

The philosophy and politics of opportunism, represented

by this movement, took the form of a struggle against

a j. A. Hotoon, Imperialism, London (The Maonillan Company, New

York) 1938, pp. 74-5.

THE REVISION OF THE DIALECTIC

what it termed 'the remnants of Utopian thinking in

Marx.' The result was that revisionism replaced the

critical dialectic conception with the conformist atti-

tudes of naturalism. Bowing to the authority of the facts,

which indeed justified the hopes of a legal parliamentary

opposition, revisionism diverted revolutionary action into

the channel of a faith in the 'necessary natural evolution*

to socialism. The dialectic, in consequence, was termed

'the treacherous element in the Marxian doctrine, the

trap that is laid for all consistent thinking/ 1 Bernstein

declared that the 'snare' of dialectic consists in its in-

appropriate 'abstraction from the specific particularities

of things/ 8 He defended the matter-of-fact quality of

fixed and stable objects as against any notion of their dia-

lectical negation. 'If we wish to comprehend the world,

we have to conceive it as a complex of ready-made ob-

jects and processes/ B

This amounted to the revival of common sense as the

organon of knowledge. The dialectical overthrow of the

'fixed and stable* had been undertaken in the interest of

a higher truth that might dissolve the negative totality

of 'ready-made' objects and processes. This revolutionary

interest was now renounced in favor of the secure and

stable given state of affairs that, according to revisionism,

slowly evolves towards a rational society. 'The class inter-

est recedes, the common interest grows in power. At the

same time, legislation becomes increasingly more power-

ful and regulates the struggle of economic forces, govern-

ing increasingly more realms which were previously left

to the blind war of particular interests/ 4

With the repudiation of the dialectic, the revisionists

i E. Bernstein, Die Voraussctzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben

der Sozialdemokratie, Stuttgart 1899, p. a6.

> E. Bernstein, Zur Theone und Geschichte des Sozialismus, Berlin 1904,

Pan in, p. 75.

Ibid., p. 74. Ibid., p. 69.

400 THE END OF HEGELIAN ISM

falsified the nature of the laws that Marx saw ruling

society. We recall Marx's view that the natural laws of

society gave expression to the blind and irrational proc-

esses of capitalist reproduction, and that the socialist

revolution was to bring emancipation from these laws. In

contrast to this, the revisionists argued that the social laws

are 'natural* laws that guarantee the inevitable develop-

ment towards socialism. 'The great achievement of Marx

and Engeis lay in the fact that they had better success than

their predecessors in weaving the realm of history into the

realm of necessity and thus elevating history to the rank

of a science.' 5 The critical Marxist theory the revisionists

thus tested by the standards of positivist sociology and

transformed into natural science. In line with the inner

tendencies of the positivist reaction against 'negative phi-

losophy,' the objective conditions that prevail were hypos-

tatized, and human practice was rendered subordinate to

their authority.

Those anxious to preserve the critical import of the

Marxian doctrine saw in the anti-dialectical trends not

only a theoretical deviation, but a serious political dan-

ger that threatened the success of socialist action at every

turn. To them the dialectical method, with its uncompro-

mising 'spirit of contradiction/ was the essential without

which the critical theory of society would of necessity be-

come a neutral or positivist sociology. And since there ex-

isted an intrinsic connection between Marxian theory and

practice, the transformation of the theory would result in

a neutral or positivist attitude to the existing societal

form. Plekhanov emphatically announced that 'without

dialectic, the materialist theory of knowledge and practice

is incomplete, one sided; nay more, it is impossible.' e The

6 Karl Kautsky, 'Bernstein und die material istische Geschichtsauffassung,

in Die Neue Zeit, 1898-9, vol. n, p. 7.

Fundamental Problems of Marxism, ed. D. Ryazanov, New York, n.d.,

p. 118.

THE REVISION OF THE DIALECTIC 401

lethod of dialectic is a totality wherein 'the negation and

.estruction of the existing* appears in every concept,

hus furnishing the full conceptual framework for under-

Landing the entirety of the existing order in accordance

dth the interest of freedom. Dialectical analysis alone

an provide an adequate orientation for revolutionary

oractice, for it prevents this practice from being over-

whelmed by the interests and aims of an opportunist phi-

Dsophy. Lenin insisted on dialectical method to such

n extent that he considered it the hallmark of revolu-

ionary Marxism. While discussing the most urgent prac-

ical political matters, he indulged in analyses of the sig-

lificance of the dialectic. The most striking example is

o be found in his examination of Trotsky's and Bu-

harin's theses for the trade union conference, written on

anuary 25, 192 i. T In this tract Lenin shows how a pov-

rty of dialectical thinking may lead to grave political

rrors, and he links his defense of dialectic to an attack

>n the 'naturalist* misinterpretation of Marxian theory.

The dialectical conception, he shows, is incompatible with

ny reliance upon the natural necessity of economic laws,

t is furthermore incompatible with the exclusive orien-

ation of the revolutionary movement to economic ends,

>ecause all economic ends receive their meaning and con-

ent only from the totality of the new social order to

vhich this movement is directed. Lenin regarded those

srho subordinated political aims and spontaneity to the

mrely economic struggle to be among the most danger-

>us falsifiers of Marxian theory. He held against these

Marxists the absolute predominance of politics over eco-

lomics: 'Politics cannot but have precedence over eco-

lomics. To argue differently, means forgetting the ABC

>f Marxism/ 8

f Selected Works, vol. ix, pp. 62 ff. See above, p. 314.

a Ibid., p. 54.

402 THE END OF HECELIANISM

g. FASCIST 'HEGELIANISM'

While the heritage of Hegel and the dialectic was being

defended only by the radical wing among the Marxists,

at the opposite pole of political thought a revival of Hegel*

ianism was taking place that brings us to the threshold

of Fascism.

The Italian neo-idealism was from the outset associated

with the movement for national unification and, later,

with the drive to strengthen the nationalist state against

its imperialist competitors. 1 The fact that the ideology

of the young national state looked to Hegelian philosophy

for its support is to be explained by the particular histori-

cal development in Italy. In its first phase, Italian nation-

alism had to contend with the Catholic Church, which

regarded the Italian aspirations as detrimental to Vatican

interests. The protestant tendencies of German idealism

provided efficient weapons for the justification of a secular

authority in the struggle with the church. Furthermore,

Italy's entry among the imperialist powers brought in an

extremely backward national economy, with a middle class

split into numerous competing groups, hardly fit to cope

with the growing antagonisms that accompanied the adap-

tation of this economy to modern industrial expansion.

Croce as well as Gentile emphasized that a petty 'positiv-

ism* and materialism held sway which made people feel

satisfied with their small private interests and unable to

understand the far-reaching sweep of nationalist aims. The

state had to assert its imperialist interest under frequent

opposition from the middle class. Also, it had yet to

achieve what other national states had already achieved,

iFor the historical position of Italian neo-idealism, see the following:

Benedetto Croce, History of Italy, 1871-1015, New York 1919, chapter x;

Giovanni Gentile, Grundlagen de$ Faschismus, Stuttgart 1936, pp. 14!.,

17 ff.; R. Michel*, Italian von Heutc, Zttrich 1930, p. 171.

FASCIST 'HECELIANISM' 403

an efficient bureaucracy, a centralized administration, a

rationalized industry, and a complete military prepared-

ness against the external and internal enemy. This positive

task of the state made Italian neo-idealism lean towards

the Hegelian position.

The turn towards Hegel's conception was an ideological

maneuver against the weakness of Italian liberalism. Sergio

Panuncio, the official theoretician of the Fascist state, has

shown that ever since Mazzini, Italian political philosophy

was predominantly anti-liberal and anti-individualist.

This philosophy found in Hegel a congenial demonstra-

tion of the state as an independent substance, existing

vis-b-vis the petty interests of the middle class. Panuncio

endorses Hegel's distinction between state and civil so-

ciety and with it his remarks on the corporation, saying

that 'those writers are right who relate so many aspects of

the Fascist State to Hegel's organic State.' *

Italian idealism, however, was Hegelian only where it

confined itself to expounding Hegel's philosophy. Spaventa

and above all Croce made essential contributions to a new

understanding , of Hegel's system. Croce's Logic and

Esthetics were attempts at a genuine revival of Hegelian

thought. In contrast, the political exploitation of Hegel

renounced the fundamental interests of his philosophy.

Moreover, the closer Italian idealism drew to Fascism,

the more it deviated from Hegelianism, even in the field

of theoretical philosophy. Gentile's main philosophical

works are a logic and a philosophy of mind. Although he

also wrote a Rifforma della Dialettica hegeliana, proclaim-

ing the mind as the only reality, his philosophy, when

judged by its content and not its language, has nothing to

do with Hegel's. The central conception of the Theory of

Mind as Pure Act (1916) might remotely resemble Kant's

* Allgemeine Theorie det Faschistischen Staates, Berlin 1954, p. 15.

404 THE END OF HEGELIANISM

notion of the transcendental consciousness, but this resem-

blance, too, is in the wording rather than the meaning. We

shall in our discussion limit ourselves to this work. Though

it appeared long before the triumph of Fascism, it shows

most clearly the affinity between Italian neo-idealism and

this authoritarian system and provides a lesson as to what

happens to a philosophy that fosters such affinity.

One important truth applies to both Gentile's works

and to the later utterances of Fascist philosophy: they can-

not be treated on a philosophic level. Comprehension and

knowledge are made part of the course of political prac-

tice, not on any rational grounds, but because no truth

is recognized apart from such practice. Philosophy is no

longer declared to hold its truth in opposition to an un-

true social practice, nor is philosophy supposed to agree

only with such practice as is directed towards realizing

reason. Gentile proclaims practice, no matter what form

it may be taking, to be the truth as such. According to him

the sole reality is the act of thinking. Any assumption of

a natural and historical world separate from and outside

this act is denied. The object is thus 'resolved* into the

subject, 8 and any opposition between thinking and doing,

or between mind and reality becomes meaningless. For,

thinking (which is 'making,' real doing) is ipso facto true.

'The true is what is in the making/ * Recasting a sentence

from Giambattista Vico, Gentile writes, 'verum et fieri

convertuntur.' And he sums up, 'the concept of truth

coincides with the concept of fact/ 6

There can be few statements more remote from Hegel's

spirit. Despite his many assertions about the reality of

mind, Gentile can be considered neither a Hegelian nor

an idealist. His philosophy is much closer to positivism.

The Theory of Mind as Pure Act, trans. H. Wildon Carr, London

(The Macmillan Company, New York) igaa, p. 10.

* Ibid., p. 15. P. 17. P. 15.

FASCIST 'HEGELIANISM* 405

The approach of the authoritarian state seems to announce

itself in an attitude that submits all too readily to the

authority of matters of fact. An integral part of totalitarian

control is the attack on critical and independent thought.

The appeal to facts is substituted for the appeal to reason.

No reason can sanction a regime that uses the greatest pro-

ductive apparatus man has ever created in the interest of

an increasing restriction of human satisfactions no reason

except the fact that the economic system can be retained

in no other way. Just as the Fascist emphasis on action

and change prevents the insight into the necessity of ra-

tional courses of action and change, Gentile's deification

of thinking prevents the liberation of thought from the

shackles of 'the given.' The fact of brute power becomes

the real god of the time, and as that power enhances itself,

the surrender of thought to the fact shows forth the more.

Lawrence Dennis, in his recent book defending Fascist

policy, shows the same abdication of thought when he ad-

vocates 'a scientific and logical' method, the 'governing as-

sumption* of which will be that 'facts are normative, that

is to say, facts should determine rules, being paramount to

rules. A rule which contradicts a fact is nonsense.' 7

Gentile discards the fundamental principle of all ideal-

ism, namely, that there is an antagonism and strain be-

tween truth and fact, between thought or mind and

reality. His whole theory is based upon the immediate

identity of these polar elements, whereas Hegel's point

had been that there is no such immediate identity but

only the dialectical process of achieving it. Before we out-

line some of the implications of the new philosophy of

'mind,' we must review the factors that brought to Gentile

the reputation of being an idealist philosopher. We shall

find them in his use of Kant's transcendental ego.

t Lawrence Dennis, The Dynamics of War and Revolution, New York

1940, p. *5.

406 THE END OF HEGELIANISM

According to Gentile, the statement that the pure act of

thinking is the only reality, does not apply to the em-

pirical but only to the transcendental /.* All the qualifica-

tions of mind (its developing unity, its identity with its

immediate manifestations, its being 'free* and 'the prin-

ciple of space/ etc.) refer only to its transcendental ac-

tivity. The distinction between empirical and transcen-

dental ego, and the description of the transcendental point

of view follow Kant's pattern with fair accuracy. But

the use to which Gentile puts the conception destroys the

very meaning of transcendental idealism. The latter had

assumed that a reality is given to consciousness but cannot

be resolved into it; the reception of sense data is the

condition for the spontaneous acts of pure understand-

ing. Hegel, too, although he rejected the Kantian no-

tion of a 'thing-in-itself,' did not abandon the objective

foundations of transcendental idealism. His principle of

'mediation* retained them the realization of mind was

the continued working out of a process between reason

and reality.

Gentile, on the other hand, claims to have 'got rid of

the illusion of a natural reality.' 10 'We do not suppose

as a logical antecedent of knowledge the reality which is

the object of knowledge; ... we cancel that independ-

ent nature of the world, which makes it appear the basis

of mind, by recognizing that it is only an abstract moment

of mind/ u Kant's transcendental ego was distinguished

by its unique relations to a pre-given reality. When this

reality is 'cancelled,' the transcendental ego must, despite

all assertions to the contrary, remain a mere word that

obtains a certain meaning only by a generalization from

the empirical ego. With the destruction of the objective

barrier, man is delivered into a world supposedly his

See particularly Theory of Mind, chapter i.

P. 6. 10 p. w . u p. t 7S .

FASCIST 'HEGELIANISM' 407

own, real only as his own act and doing. 'The individual

is the real positive* and all that is positive is 'posited by

us/ " To be sure, it is positive only in so far as 'we op-

pose it to ourselves/ recognize it 'not as our work but that

of others.' But the opposition will dissolve as soon as we

see that the individual, by virtue of the transcendental

consciousness, is also the universal. The individual makes

itself and the universal; the universal is 'the self-making

of the universal. 1 1S

Behind this rather confused heap of words, a significant

process is working itself out, a process of breakdown for

all rational laws and standards, an exaltation of action

regardless of the goal, a veneration of success. In a sense,

Gentile's philosophy retains the slight traces of the lib-

eralist scheme in which idealism originated, especially in

its insistence that 'the individual is the only positive/ But

this individuality, oscillating between the meaningless

transcendental and the empty concrete, has no other con-

tent than action. Its entire essence resolves into its acts,

which have no supra-individual laws to restrain them and

no valid principles to judge them. Gentile himself calls

his doctrine 'absolute formalism': there is no 'matter'

apart from the pure 'form* of acting. 'The only matter

there is in the spiritual act is the form itself, as activity.' "

Gentile's doctrine that true reality is action justified in

itself clearly enunciates and glorifies the conscious and

programmatic lawlessness of Fascist action. 'The mind it-

self ... in its actuality is withdrawn from every pre-

established law, and cannot be defined as a being restricted

to a definite nature, in which the process of life is ex-

hausted and completed.' " From the Hegelian dialectic

Gentile borrows the idea that reality is a ceaseless process,

but the process, detached from any pattern of universal

11 Pp. 88 f. 11 P. 107. i P. 4J. n P. 19.

408 THE END OF HEGELIANISM

reason, produces a wholesale destruction rather than any

construction of the rational forms of life. 'True life . . .

is made one by death . . .' lfl

Hegel's philosophy weaves the transitory nature of all

historical forms into the world-historical web of reason

in progress; the content of the transitory is still present

at the final inauguration of freedom. Gentile's actualism

is entirely indifferent to reason and greets prevailing

evil and deficiency as a great good. 'Our mind's real need

is not that error and evil should disappear from the world

but that they should be eternally present/ for there is no

truth without error and no good without evil. 17 Not-

withstanding, then, the paradoxical interpretation of re-

ality as 'mind,' Gentile accepts the world as it is and deifies

its horrors. Finite things, whatever and however they

may be, are 'always the very reality of God.' The philos-

ophy that eventuates 'exalts the world into an eternal

theogony which is fulfilled in the inwardness of our be-

ing.' 18 This inwardness, however, is no longer a refuge

from a miserable reality, but justifies the final dissolution

of all objective norms and values into the disorder of pure

action.

All its fundamental motives show Gentile's to be the

strict opposite of Hegel's philosophy, and it is by virtue

of its being the opposite that it passes directly into the

Fascist ideology. Identification of thought with action,

and of reality with mind prevents thought from taking a

position opposed to 'reality.' Theory becomes practice to

such a degree that all thought is rejected if it is not im-

mediate practice or immediately consummated in action.

Gentile's theory of mind praises 'anti-intellectualism,' 19

foreshadowing the typically relativistic traits of Fascist

philosophy, to be noted in the repudiation of all fixed

i P. 154. IT p. 246. i p. 277. Pp. 869, 871.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM VERSUS HEGEL 409

programs that go beyond the requirements of the immedi-

ate situation. Action sets its own aims and norms that

may not be judged by any objective ends and principles.

'The Foundations of Fascism/ published by Gentile, an-

nounce the abolition of all 'programs' to be the very

philosophy of Fascism. Fascism is bound by no principles;

'change of course/ to keep step with the changing con-

stellations of power, is its sole unchanging program. No

decision is valid for the future; 'the true decisions of the

Duce are those which are simultaneously formulated and

executed/ 20

The statement discloses one essential attribute of the

authoritarian state, the inconsistency of its ideology. Gen-

tile's actualism asserts the totalitarian rule of practice over

thought, the independence of the latter disappearing once

and for all. Loyalty to any truth that lies outside or beyond

the practical aims of Fascist politics is declared meaning-

less. Theory as such and all intellectual activity are made

subservient to the changing requirements of politics.

4. NATIONAL SOCIALISM VERSUS HEGEL

We cannot understand the basic difference between the

Hegelian and the Fascist idea of the state without sketch-

ing the historical foundations of Fascist totalitarianism.

Hegel's political philosophy was grounded on the as-

sumption that civil society could be kept functioning with-

out renouncing the essential rights and liberties of the in-

dividual. Hegel's political theory idealized the Restoration

state, but he looked upon it as embodying the lasting

achievements of the modern era, namely, the German

Reformation, the French Revolution, and idealist culture.

20 Grundlagen des Faschismus, p. 33; cf. Benito Mussolini, Relativismo

e Fascismo, in Diuturna, Scritti Pol it id, ed. V. Morel lo, Milano 1924,

pp. 374 ff.

410 THE END OF HEGELIAN ISM

The totalitarian state, on the other hand, marks the his-

torical stage at which these very achievements become

dangerous to the maintenance of civil society.

The roots of Fascism are traceable to the antagonisms

between growing industrial monopolization and the demo-

cratic system. 1 In Europe after the first World War, the

highly rationalized and rapidly expanding industrial ap-

paratus met increasing difficulties of utilization, especially

because of the disruption of the world market and because

of the vast network of social legislation ardently defended

by the labor movement. In this situation, the most power-

ful industrial groups tended to assume direct political

power in order to organize monopolistic production, to

destroy the socialist opposition, and to resume imperialist

expansionism.

The emerging political system cannot develop the pro-

ductive forces without a constant pressure on the satisfac-

tion of human needs. This requires a totalitarian control

over all social and individual relations, the abolition of

social and individual liberties, and the incorporation of

the masses by means of terror. Society becomes an armed

camp in the service of those great interests that have sur-

vived the economic competitive struggle.

The anarchy of the market is removed, labor becomes

compulsory service, and the productive forces are rapidly

expanded but the whole process serves only the interests

of the ruling bureaucracy, which constitutes itself the heir

of the old capitalist class.

The Fascist organization of society requires a change in

the entire setting of culture. The culture with which

German idealism was linked, and which lived on until

i See the analysis of National Socialism in Robert A. Brady, The Spirit

and Structure of German Fascism, The Viking Press, New York 1937, and

Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth, The Origin and Practice of National So-

cialism, to be published by Oxford University Press, New York 1941.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM VERSUS HEGEL 411

the Fascist era, accented private liberties and rights, so

that the individual, at least as a private person, could feel

safe in the state and in society. The total surrender of

human life to the vested social and political powers was

prevented not only by a system of political representation,

legal equality, freedom of contracts, but also by the allevi-

ating influence of philosophy, art, and religion. When

Hegel divided man's social life among the family, civil

society, and the state, he recognized that each of these

historical stages had a relative right of its own. Moreover,

he subordinated even the highest stage, the state, to the

absolute right of reason asserted in the world history of

mind.

When Fascism finally demolished the liberalist frame-

work of culture, it in effect abolished the last field in

which the individual could claim his right against society

and the state.

Hegel's philosophy was an integral part of the culture

which authoritarianism had to overcome. It is therefore

no accident that the National Socialist assault on Hegel

begins with the repudiation of his political theory. Alfred

Rosenberg, official keeper of National Socialist 'philoso-

phy/ opened the drive on Hegel's concept of the state.

As a consequence of the French Revolution, he says, 'a

doctrine of power, alien to our blood, arose. It reached

its apogee with Hegel and was then, in a new falsification,

taken over by Marx . . .' a This doctrine bestowed upon

the state, he continues, the dignity of the absolute and the

attribute of an end in itself. To the masses, the state came

forth as a 'soul-less instrument of force/ *

The ideological attack of National Socialism upon the

Hegelian conception of the state contrasts rather squarely

2 Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts, yth ed., MUnchen

418 THE END OF HEGELIANISM

with the Italian Fascists' seeming acceptance of it. The

difference is to be explained in the different historical

situations that the two Fascist ideologies had to meet. In

contrast to Italy, the German state had been a powerful

and firmly established reality, which even the Weimar

Republic had not shaken in its foundations. It was a

Rechtsstaat, a comprehensive rational political system with

distinctly demarcated and recognized spheres of rights and

liberties that could not be utilized by the new authori-

tarian regime. Moreover, the latter could discard the state

form because the economic powers who stood behind the

National Socialist movement were long since strong

enough to govern directly, without the unnecessary media-

tion of political forms that would have to grant at least

a minimum of legal equality and security.

Consequently, Rosenberg, like all the other National

Socialist spokesmen, turns against 'the State* and denies

its supreme authority. 'Today we view the State no longer

as an independent idol before which men must kneel.

The State is not even an end, but is only a means for pre-

serving the people/ 4 and 'the authority of the Volkheit is

above that of the State. He who does not admit this fact

is an enemy of the people . . .' 8

Carl Schmitt, the leading political philosopher of the

Third Reich, likewise rejects the Hegelian position on

the state, declaring it incompatible with the substance of

National Socialism. Whereas the political philosophy of

the last century had been based upon a dichotomy be-

tween state and society, National Socialism substitutes the

triad of state, movement (the party), and people (VolK).

The state is by no means the ultimate political reality in

* P. 5*6; sec Hitler, Mein Kampf, Reynal and Hitchcock, New York

1939, p. 59*: 'The basic realization is that the state represents not an

but a means.'

Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 597.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM VERSUS HEGEL 413

the triad; it is superseded and determined by the 'move-

ment* and its leadership. 6

Alfred Rosenberg's statement sets the stage for the Na-

tional Socialist rejection of Hegel's political philosophy.

He says Hegel belonged to the line of development that

produced the French Revolution and the Marxian critique

of society. Here, as in many other instances, National So-

cialism reveals a far deeper understanding of the realities

than many of its critics. Hegel's state philosophy held to

the progressive ideas of liberalism to such an extent that

his political position became incompatible with the totali-

tarian state of civil society. The state as reasonthat is, as

a rational whole, governed by universally valid laws, calcu-

lable and lucid in its operation, professing to protect the

essential interest of every individual without discrimina-

tionthis form of state is precisely what National Social-

ism cannot tolerate.

This is the supplementary institution of economic lib-

eralism that had to be crushed as soon as that form of

economy went under. The Hegelian triad of family, so-

ciety, and state has disappeared, and in its place is the

over-arching unity that devours all pluralism of rights

and principles. The government is totalitarian. The in-

dividual championed in the Hegelian philosophy, he who

bore reason and freedom, is annihilated. 'The individual,

so we teach today, has as such neither the right nor the

duty to exist, since all rights and all duties derive only

from the community.' 7 This community, in turn, is

neither the union of free individuals, nor the rational

whole of the Hegelian state, but the 'natural' entity of

the race. National Socialist ideologists emphasize that the

'community' to which the individual is completely sub-

ordinate constitutes a natural reality bound together by

Stoat, Bewcgung, Volk, Hamburg 1933, p. la.

T Otto Dietrich, in the Vdlkische Beobachter, December 11, 1937.

414 THE END OF HEGELIAN ISM

'blood and soil' and subject to no rational norms or

values.

The focussing upon 'natural* conditions serves to divert

attention from the social and economic basis of totalitar-

ianism. The Volksgemeinschaft is idolized as a natural

community precisely because and in so far as there is

no actual social community. Since the social relations

demonstrate the lack of any community, the Volksgemein-

schaft has to be set apart in the dimension of 'blood and

soil/ which does not hamper the real play of class interests

within society.

The elevation of the Volk to the position of the original

and ultimate political entity shows once again how dis-

tant National Socialism is from the Hegelian conception.

According to Hegel, the Volk is that part of the state

that does not know its own will. This attitude of Hegel's,

though it may seem a reactionary one, is closer to free-

dom's interest than the popular radicalism of the Na-

tional Socialist utterances. Hegel rejects any notion that

'the people' are an independent political factor, because,

he maintains, political efficacy requires the consciousness

of freedom. The people, Hegel said time and again, have

not as yet achieved this consciousness, they are still lack-

ing the knowledge of their true interest, and constitute

a rather passive element in the political process. The es-

tablishment of a rational society presupposes that the peo-

ple have ceased to exist in the form of 'masses' and have

been transformed into an association of free individuals.

National Socialism, in contrast, glorifies the masses and

retains the 'people' in their pre-rational, natural condi-

tion. 8 Even in this condition, however, the Volk is not

See Otto Dietrich, Die philosophischen Grundlagen des National-

sozialismus, Breslau 193$, p. 39; Otto Koellreutter, Vom Sinn und Wesen

der national Revolution, TQbingen 1953, pp. so f.; and the same au-

thor's Volk und Stoat in der Weltanschauung des Nationalsoiialitmui.

Berlin 1935, p. 10.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM VERSUS HEGEL 415

allowed to play an active political role. Its political reality

is supposed to be represented by the unique person of

the Leader, who is the source of all law and all right and

the sole author of social and political existence.

The German idealism that culminated in the Hegelian

teaching asserted the conviction that social and political

institutions should jibe with a free development of the

individual. The authoritarian system, on the other hand,

cannot maintain the life of its social order except by

forcible conscription of every individual, regardless of

his interest, into the economic process. The idea of in-

dividual welfare gives way to the demand for sacrifice.

'The duty of sacrifice for the whole has no limit if we

regard the people as the highest good on earth/' The

authoritarian system cannot considerably or permanently

raise the standard of living, nor can it enlarge the area

and means of individual enjoyment. This would under-

mine its indispensable discipline and, in the last analysis,

would annul the Fascist order, which, of its very nature,

must prevent any free development of productive forces.

Consequently Fascism 'does not believe in the possibility

of "happiness" on earth/ and it 'denies the equation that

well-being equals happiness/ 10 Today, when all the tech-

nical potentialities for an abundant life are at hand, the

National Socialists 'consider the decline of the standard

of living inevitable' and indulge in panegyrics on im-

poverishment. 11

The total victimization of the individual that takes

place is encouraged for the specific benefit of the indus-

trial and political bureaucracy. It therefore cannot be

justified on the ground of the individual's true interest.

National Socialist ideology simply states that true human

Koellreutter, Vom Sinn und Wesen . . . , p. 17.

10 Mussolini, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions, Rome 1955, pp. 10,11.

u Volk im Werden, cd. Ernst Krieck, 1933, No. i, p. 14.

416 THE END OF HEGELIAN ISM

existence consists in unconditional sacrifice, that it is of

the essence of the individual's life to obey and to serve

'service which never comes to an end because service and

life coincide/ 12

Ernst Krieck, one of National Socialism's representative

spokesmen, devoted a considerable portion of his writing

to a repudiation of German idealism. In his periodical,

Volk im Werden, he published an article called 'Der

Deutsche Idealismus zwischen den Zeitaltern/ in which

the following sweeping declaration occurs: 'German ideal-

ism must ... be overcome in form and in content if we

are to become a political and active nation.' 18 The reason

for the condemnation is clear. German idealism protested

the wholesale surrender of the individual to ruling social

and political forces. Its exaltation of mind and its in-

sistence on the significance of thought implied, National

Socialism correctly saw, an essential opposition to any

victimization of the individual. Philosophic idealism was

part and parcel of idealist culture. And this culture recog-

nized a realm of truth that was not subject to the authority

of the order that is and of the powers that be. Art, philoso-

phy, and religion envisioned a world that challenged the

claims of the given reality. Idealist culture is incompatible

with Fascist discipline and control. 'We live no longer in

the age of education, culture, humanity, and pure spirit,

but in the necessity for struggle, for political visions of

reality, for soldiery, national discipline, for the national

honor and future. It is, therefore, not the idealist but the

heroic attitude which is demanded of men as the task and

need of life in this epoch.' 14

Krieck makes no attempt to point to any specific sins

in the thought-structure of German idealism. Although a

Der Deutsche Student, August 1933, p. i.

18 1933. No. 3, p. 4. See Krieck, ., Die deutsche Staatsidce, Leipzig 1934.

"P. i; see also No. 5, 1933; PP* ^9 7

NATIONAL SOCIALISM VERSUS HEGEL 417

philosopher and holding Hegel's chair at the University

of Heidelberg, he finds difficulty in coping with the sim-

plest philosophical idea. We must turn for specific state-

ments to those who by profession are still engaged in philo-

sophical work. Franz Bohm's Anti-Cartesianismus, which

offers a National Socialist interpretation of the history of

philosophy, contains a chapter on 'Hegel und Wir.' Hegel

is here made the symbol of all that National Socialism

abhors and rejects; the 'emancipation from Hegel' is

hailed as forerunner of a return to a true philosophy. Tor

a century, Hegel's universalistic conception . . . buried

the motivations of the German history, in philosophy/ 15

What is this anti-German orientation in Hegel? First, his

stress on thought, his attack on action for action's sake.

Bohm gets to the center of Hegelianism when he criti-

cizes its 'humanitarian ideals.' He recognizes the intrinsic

connection between the notions of reason and mind and

the 'universalistic conception' of humanity. 16 To view

the world as mind, he says, and to measure existing forms

according to reason's standard is tantamount in the end

to transcending contingent and 'natural' distinctions and

conflicts among men, and passing beyond these to the

universal essence of man. It is tantamount to upholding

the right of humanity as against the particular claims of

politics. Reason implies the unity of all men as rational

beings. When reason finally fulfills itself in freedom, the

freedom is the possession of all men and the inalienable

right of every individual. Idealistic universalism thus im-

plies individualism.

The National Socialist critique harps on the tendencies

in Hegel's philosophy that contradict all totalitarianism.

By virtue of these tendencies it declares Hegel to be the

'symbol of a centuries-old, superseded past* and 'the philo-

sophic counter-will of our time.'

IB Leipzig 1938, p. 25. i Ibid., pp. 28 f.

418 THE END OF HEGELIAN ISM

Bohm's criticism recurs in a somewhat milder and more

elaborate form in another representative document of the

National Socialist philosophy, Hans Heyse's Idee und Ex-

istenz, which declares Hegel 'the source of all liberal,

idealistic as well as materialistic philosophies of history.' 1T

The National Socialists, in contrast to many Marxists,

take the connection between Hegel and Marx seriously.

The fact that the development towards authoritarian

forms was an about-face from Hegelian principles, rather

than any consequence of these, was recognized within and

outside of Germany as early as the period of the first

World War. Muirhead in England declared at that time

that 'it is not in Hegelianism, but in the violent reaction

against the whole idealist philosophy that set in shortly

after his death, that we have to look for the philosophical

foundations of present-day militarism.' " The statement

holds with all its implications. The ideological roots of

authoritarianism have their soil in the Violent reaction'

against Hegel that styled itself the 'positive philosophy.'

The destruction of the principle of reason, the interpre-

tation of society in terms of nature, and the subordination

of thought to the inexorable dynamics of the given op-

erated in the romanticist philosophy of the state, in the

Historical School, in Comte's sociology. These anti-Hegel-

ian tendencies joined forces with the irrational philoso-

phies of Life, history and 'existence' that arose ia the last

decade of the nineteenth century and built the ideological

framework for the assault on liberalism. 10

The social and political theory responsible for the

development of Fascist Germany was, then, related to

Hegelianism in a completely negative way. It was anti-

17 Hamburg 1995, p. 884.

i J. H. Muirhead, German Philosophy in Relation to the War, quoted

in R. Metz, op. cit., p. >8s.

"See my article 'Der Ramp! gegen den Liberaliimus in der totalit&ren

Staatoauffastung,' in Zeitschrtft J&r Sozialforschung, 1994, pp. 161-94.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM VERSUS HEGEL 419

Hegelian in all its aims and principles. No better witness

to this fact exists than the one serious political theorist of

National Socialism, Carl Schmitt. The first edition of his

Begriff des Politischen raises the question of how long 'the

spirit of Hegel' lived in Berlin, and he replies, 'in any

case, the school that became authoritative in Prussia after

1840 preferred to have the "conservative" philosophy of

F. J. Stahl, while Hegel wandered from Karl Marx to

Lenin and to Moscow/ 20 And he summarizes the entire

process in the striking statement that on the day of Hit-

ler's ascent to power 'Hegel, so to speak, died.' 2l

so Munchen 1939, p. 50.

Staat, Bewegung, Volk, op. cit., p. 32.

Bibliography

PART ONE

HEGEL

Samtliche Werke, ed. G. Lasson and J. Hoffmeister, Felix

Meiner, Leipzig 1928 ff.

Samtliche Werke, ed. H. Glockner, Jubilaumsausgabe, 26 vols.,

Fr. Fromraann, Stuttgart 1927 ff.

Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Fr.

Fromrnann, Stuttgart 1936.

Hegels Theologische Jugendschriften, ed'. H. Nohl, J. C. B.

Mohr, Tubingen 1907.

Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. K. Hegel, 2 vols., Leipzig 1887.

Hegel-Archiv, ed. G. Lasson, 4 issues, F. Meiner, Leipzig

1912 ff.

The Phenomenology of Mind, transl. J. J. B. Baillie, 2 vols.,

Swan Sonnenschein (The Macmillan Co., New York),

London 1910.

Science of Logic, transl. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers,

2 vols., The Macmillan Co., New York 1929.

Hegel's Doctrine of Reflection, being a paraphrase and a com-

mentary '. . . of the second volume of Hegel's Larger

Logic, by W. T. Harris. D. Appleton and Co., New York

1881.

Hegel's Doctrine of Formal Logic, being a translation of the

first section of the Subjective Logic, by H. S. Macran,

Clarendon Press, Oxford 1912.

Hegel's Logic of World and Idea, being a translation of the

second and third parts of the Subjective Logic, by H. S.

Macran, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1929.

The Logic of Hegel, transl. from the Encyclopaedia of the

Philosophical Sciences, by W. Wallace, 2. ed., Clarendon

Press, Oxford 1892.

Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, transl. from the Encyclopaedia

of the Philosophical Sciences, by W. Wallace, Clarendon

Press, Oxford 1894.

421

4S8 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Philosophy of Right, transl. S. W. Dyde, George Bell and Sons,

London 1896.

The Philosophy of History, transl. J. Sibree, The Colonial

Press, New York 1899.

The Philosophy of Fine Arts, transl. F. P. R. Osmaston, 4 vols.,

George Bell and Sons, London 1920.

Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, transl. E. B. Speirs

and J. B. Sanderson, 3 vols., K. Paul, Trench, Trubner

and Co., London 1895.

Lectures on the History of Philosophy, transl. E. S. Haldane

and F. H. Simson, 3 vols., K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and

Co., London 1899 ff.

SECONDARY WORKS

i. General

Besides the older standard works of Rosenkranz, Haym,

Stirling, Caird, and Fischer, we mention only:

Croce, B., What is Alive and What is Dead in Hegel's Philos-

ophy, transl. D. Ainslie, London 1915.

Hartmann, N., Hegel, Berlin 1929.

Heimann, B., System und Methods in Hegels Philosophic,

Berlin 1927.

Kroner, R., Von Kant zu Hegel, 2 vols., Tubingen 1921-24.

Moog, W., Hegel und die Hegelsche Schule, Munchen 1930.

Mure, G. R. G., An Introduction to Hegel, London 1940.

Stace, W. T., The Philosophy of Hegel, London 1924.

Steinbiichel, Th., Das Grundproblem der Hegelschen Philo-

sophic, Bonn 1933.

The Philosophical Review, 1931, no. 3, Commemorative Issue,

with ankles by R. M. Cohen, S. Hook, and G. H. Sabine.

2. On Hegel's Early Writings

Dilthey, W., Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels (Gesammelte

Schriften, vol. iv), Leipzig 1921.

Haering, Th., Hegel. Sein Wollen und Werk. 2 vols., Leipzig

1989-38.

Maier, J., On Hegel's Critique of Kant, New York 1939.

Schwarz, J., Hegels Philosophische Entwicklung, Frankfurt M.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Wacker, H., Das Verh&ltnis dcs jungen Hegel zu Kant, Berlin

193*-

3. On the Phenomenology of Mind

Busse, M., Hegels Phaenomenologie des Geistes und der Staat,

Berlin 1931.

Loewenberg, J., 'The Exoteric Approach to Hegel's Phenom-

enology of Mind/ The Comedy of Immediacy in Hegel's

Phenomenology of Mind/ in: Mind, vol. XLIII and

XLIV, 1934-35-

Purpus, W., Zur Dialektik des Bewussteins nach Hegel, Berlin

1908.

4. On the Science of Logic

Baillie, J. B., The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic,

London 1901.

Gunther, G., Grundziige einer neuen Theorie des Denkens in

Hegels Logik, Leipzig 1933.

MacTaggert, J. E., Studies in the Hegelian Dialectics, Cam-

bridge 1896.

A Commentary on Hegel's Logic, Cambridge 1931.

Marcuse, H., Hegels Ontologie und die Grundziige einer The-

orie der Geschichtlichkeit, Frankfurt M. 1932.

Noel, G., La logique de Hegel, Paris 1933.

Wallace, W., Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy

and Especially of his Logic, 2. ed., Oxford 1894.

5. On the Political Philosophy and the Philosophy of History

Heller, H., Hegel und der nationale Machtstaatsgedanke,

Berlin 1921.

Lowenstein, J., Hegels Staatsidee; ihr Doppelgesicht und ihr

Einftuss im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, Berlin 1927.

Rosenzweig, F., Hegel und der Staat, 2 vols., Miinchen 1920.

The chapters on Hegel in: Sabine, G. H., History of Political

Theory, New York 1937, and Vaughan, C. A., Studies in

the History of Political Philosophy Before and After

Rousseau, 2 vols., Manchester 1939.

'La Revolution de 1789 et la pensle moderne/ Special issue

of the Revue philosophique de la France et de V Stranger,

Paris 1939.

484 BIBLIOGRAPHY

6. From Hegel to Marx

Hess, M., Sozialistische Aufsatze, ed. Th. Zlocisti, Berlin 1921.

Hook, S., From Hegel to Marx, New York 1935.

Lowith, K., Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, Zurich 1940.

Lukdcs, G., Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Berlin 1923.

Plenge, J., Marx und Hegel, Tubingen 1911.

Vogel, P., Hegels Gesellschaftsbegriff und seine geschichtliche

Fortbildung durch Lorenz Stein, Marx, Engels und Las-

salle, Berlin 1925.

PART TWO

Schelling, F., W. J. v., Sammtliche Werke, 14 vols., Stuttgart

1856 ff.

Kierkegaard, S., Gesammelte Werke, ed. H. Gottsched and

Ch. Schrempf, 12 vols., Jena igi^ff.

Feuerbach, L., Sammtliche Werke, 10 vols., Leipzig 1846 ff.

Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, ed. Marx-Engels Institute Mos-

cow, Frankfurt M. 1927 ff.

Marx-Engels, Selected Works, 2 vols., ed. Marx-Engels Insti-

tute, Moscow 1935.

Marx, K., Capital, transl. S. Moore, E. Aveling, and E. Unter-

mann, 3 vols., Charles H. Kerr and Co., Chicago 1906-09.

A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,

transl. N. I. Stone, Charles H. Kerr and Co., Chicago 1904.

Letters to Dr. Kugelmann, International Publishers, New

York 1934.

The Poverty of Philosophy, transl. H. Quelch, Charles H.

Kerr and Co., Chicago 1910.

Theorien iiber den Mehrwert, ed. K. Kautsky, 3 vols.,

Stuttgart 1905 ff.

and Engels, F., Critique of the Gotha Program, Interna-

tional Publishers, New York 1933.

The German Ideology, ed. R. Pascal, International

Publishers, New York 1933.

Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, In-

ternational Publishers, New York 1933.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 4*5

Lenin, Selected Works, 12 vols., International Publishers, New

York i934ff.

Saint-Simon, (Euvres, ed. Enfantin, 11 vols., Paris 1868-76.

Doctrine Saint-Simonienne. Exposition. Paris 1854.

Sismondi, S., Nouveaux principes d* economic politique, 2 vols.,

2. ed., Paris 1827.

Proudhon, P.-J., Systeme des contradictions e'conomiques, ed.

C. Bougte and H. Moysset, 2 vols., Paris 1923.

De la creation de I'ordre dans I'humanite, ed. C. Bougl

and A. Cuvillier, Paris 1927.

Comte, A., Discours sur I'esprit positif, Paris 1844.

Cours de philosophic positive, 4. ed., ed. E. Littr, 6 vols.,

Paris 1877.

Systeme de politique positive, 4 vols., 'Paris 1890 (English

translation London 1870-75).

The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, freely transl.

and condensed by H. Martineau, 3. ed., 2 vols., London

1893-

Mill, J. St., A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive,

8. ed., New York 1884.

Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy,

London 1844.

Auguste Comte and Positivism, 3. ed., London 1882.

Spencer, H., The Study of Sociology, New York 1912.

The Principles of Sociology, 3 vols., New York 1884-97.

Stahl, F. J., Philosophic des Rechts, 3. and 4. ed., 3 vols.,

Heidelberg 1854.

Das monarchische Prinzip, Heidelberg 1845.

Die gegenwartigen Parteien in Stoat und Kirche, 2. ed.,

Berlin 1868.

Siebzehn parlamentarische Reden, Berlin 1862.

Stein, L. v., Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung in Frankreich

von 1789 bis auf unsere Tage, ed. G. Salomon, 3 vols.,

Munchen 1923.

Gesellschaftslehre, Stuttgart 1856.

Green, L. T., Lectures on the Principles of Political Obliga-

tion, Longmans, Green and Co., London 1895.

Bosanquet, B., The Philosophical Theory of the State, London

(The Macmillan Co., New York) 1899.

426 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hobhouse, L. T., The Metaphysical Theory of the State,

London (The Macmillan Co., New York) 1918.

Gentile, G., The Theory of Mind as Pure Act, transl. H. Wil-

don Carr, The Macmilian Co., London-New York 1928.

Grundlagen des Fascismus, Stuttgart 1936.

Panuncio, S., Allgemeine Theorie des faschistischen Staates,

Berlin 1934.

Mussolini, B., Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions, Rome 1935.

Hitler, A., Mein Kampf, Reynal and Hitchcock, New York

>939-

Rosenberg, A., Der Mythos des so. Jahrhunderts f 7. ed.,

Munchen 1933.

Gestaltung der Idee, Munchen 1936.

SECONDARY WORKS

i. On the Dialectical Theory of Society

Adams, H. P., Karl Marx in his Earlier Writings, London 1940.

Adoratsky, V., Dialectical Materialism, New York 1934.

Bukharin, N. I., Historical Materialism, New York 1925.

Cornu, A., Karl Marx. De L'he'ge'lianisme au mate'rialismc his-

torique, Paris 1934.

Croce, B., Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl

Marx, transl. C. M. Meredith, New York 1914.

Hook, S., Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx, New

York 1933.

Jackson, T. H., Dialectics. The Logic of Marxism and its

Critics, London 1936.

Korsch, K., Marxismus und Philosophic, 2. ed., Leipzig 1930.

Karl Marx, London 1938.

Lenin, Aus dem philosophischen Nachlass, ed. V. Adoratski,

Wien-Berlin 1932.

Lukdcs, G., Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Berlin 1923.

Paschukanis, ., Allgemeine Rechtslehre und Marxismus,

Wien-Berlin 1929.

Plekhanov, G. V., Fundamental Problems of Marxism, ed. D.

Ryazanov, New York 1929.

Troeltsch, ., Die marxistische Dialektik, in Gesammelte

Schriften, vol. HI, Tubingen 1922.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 4*7

Revisionism

Bernstein, E., Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die

Aufgaben dcr Sozialdemokratie, Stuttgart 1899.

Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Sozialismus, Berlin 1904.

Kautsky, K., Bernstein und die materialistische Geschichts-

auffassung, in Die Neue Zeit, 1898-99, vol. 11.

2. On the Foundations of Positivism

Artz, F. B., Reaction and Revolution, 1814-32, Harper and

Brothers, New York and London 1934.

Booth, A., Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism, London 1871.

Caird, E., The Social Philosophy and Religion of Auguste

Comte, 2. ed., Glasgow 1893.

Grossmann, H. Sismonde de Sismondi et ses theories Jcono-

miques, Warsaw 1925.

L^vy-Bruhl, L., La philosophie d'Auguste Comte, Paris 1900

(English transl. New York 1903).

Se, H., Franzosische Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 11, Jena 1936.

La vie iconomique de la France sous la monarchic ccnsi-

taire, Paris 1927.

Weill, G., Saint-Simon et son ceuvre, Paris 1894.

3. On the Philosophy of the Restoration

Brie, S., Der Volksgeist bei Hegel und in der historischen

Rechtsschule, Berlin 1909.

Frantz, C., Schellings positive Philosophie, 3 parts, Cothen

1880.

Kantorowicz, H., Volksgeist und historische Rechtsschule, in

Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 108, 1912.

Kaufmann, E., Studien zur Staatslehre des monarchischen

Prinzips, Leipzig 1906.

Landsberg, E., Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft,

vol. n, Munchen 1910.

Mannheim, K., Das konservative Denken, in Archiv fur Sozial-

wissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, vol. LVII, 1927.

Mehring, F., Zur preussischen Geschichte von Tilsit bis zur

Reichsgrundung, Berlin 1930.

Schnabel, F., Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhun-

dert, 4 vols., Freiburg 1933-7.

428 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Treitschke, H. v., Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahr-

hundert, 5 vols., Leipzig 1890-96.

Valentin, V., Geschichte der deutschen Revolution von 1848-

49, 2 vols., Berlin 1930.

4. Philosophy under Fascism and National Socialism

Brady, R. A., The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism,

The Viking Press, New York 1937.

Croce, B., History of Italy, 1871-1915, New York 1929.

Hobson, J. A., Imperialism f The Macmillan Co., London 1938.

Michels, R., Italien von Heute, Zurich 1930.

Silone, I., Der Fascismus, Zurich 1934.

Baumler, A., Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte, Berlin

1937-

Bohm, F., Anti-Car tesianismus. Deutsche Philosophic im

Widerstand, Leipzig 1938.

Der Deutsche Student, 1933 ff.

Dietrich, O., Die philosophischen Grundlagen des National-

sozialismus, Breslau 1935.

Heidegger, M., Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Univer-

sitat, Breslau 1933.

Heyse, H., Idee und Existenz, Hamburg 1935.

Koellreutter, O., Vom Sinn und Wesen der nationalen Revolu-

tion, Tubingen 1933.

Volk und Staat in der Weltanschauung des National-

sozialismus, Berlin 1935.

Krieck, E., Nationalpolitische Erziehung, Leipzig 1932.

Die deutsche Staatsidee, Leipzig 1934.

Volkisch-politische Anthropologie, part in, Leipzig 1938.

(ed.) Volk im Werden, Leipzig 1933 ff.

Schmitt, C, Der Begriff des Politischen, Munchen 1932.

Staat, Bewegung, Volk, Hamburg 1933.

Ueber die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denk-

ens, Hamburg 1934.

Dennis, L., The Dynamics of War and Revolution, New York

1940.

Kolnai, A., The War Against the West, New York 1938.

Marcuse, H., Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totali-

taren Staatsauffassung, in Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung,

vol. in, Paris 1935.

Index

Absolute, The, 47, 164 f.

Abstraction, Dialectical, 157 .,

3*3

Actuality, 149 ff.

Alienation (Entfrcmdung), 34^

246, 273 ff.

Anti-rationalism, 266 ., 342 .,

364 ff.

Aristotle, 40!., 121, i66f.

Am, F. B., 333

Authority, 350 ., 372

Bazard, 333 ff.

Becoming, 130

Being, 40 f., 129, 165

Bernstein, ., 398 .

Bohm, F., 365, 417

Bonald, 344

Bosanquet, B., 393 .

Bradley, F. H., 393

Brady, R. A., 419

Burke, ., 328, 364

Case, C. M., 375

Civil Society, 58, 78 f., 80 f.,

204 ff.

Communism, Socialism, 286 ff.,

3'7 *

Comte, A., 323 ., 327, 332,

340 ff., 376

Consciousness, 74 ff., 94

Contract, 81 ., 196

Croce, B., 402 .

Culture, idealistic, i4ff., 96,

410 ., 416

De Maistre, 328, 344

Democracy, 85, 242

Dennis, L., 221, 405

Descartes, R., 17, 182

Dialectic, 27, 37, 43 ., 46, 66 .,

100 ., i23., i3of., 146 ff.,

157 ff., 238 ff. (in history);

Marxian, 282, 312 ff., 377 .,

398 .

Dietrich, O., 413 .

Empiricism, British, i8ff.

English Reform Bill, 247 .

Enlightenment, French, 342, 355

Essence, no, 142 ff.

Feuerbach, L., 267 ff.

Finitude, i36.

Force, 109

Frantz, C., 324

Frederick William IV, 326, 362

Freedom, 9, 96, u8f., 154 ff. (as

the notion), 163, 1859., 1898.,

199, 217, 229, 235, 308 ., 317 .

Fries, J. F., 178

Gentile, G., 403 ff.

Green, T. H., 391 ff.

Haller, K. L. von, 181, 364

Hess, M., 325

Heyse, H., 365, 418

Historical Laws, 231, 317 ., 332,

344 f-

Historical School, 237, 364, 367

Hitler, A., 412

Hobbes, T., 79, 172, 177, 197,

202, 221

Hobhouse, L. T., 390, 595

Hobson, J. A., 397 .

429

430 INDEX

Holderlin, F., 51

Hume, D., 19, 22

Idealist Philosophy, 138, 163,

182, 190!., 343, 405 ff., 416

Infinity, 68, isyf.

Introversion (Verinnerlichung),

14* 99* 5 6

Kant, L, 21 ff., 48, 63, 96, 122,

*5 6 ' *34 3* 1 ' 4 06

Kaufmann, ., 362 f .

Kautsky, K., 400

Kierkegaard, S., 262 ff.

Koellreutter, O., 414 f.

Krieck, .,415 f.

Labor, 58, 75!., 77!., n6ff.,

272 ff., 297 ff., 38 iff.

Language, 75

Law, i8off., 206 ff., 218

Lenin, 314, 401

Life, 37 ., 162

Locke, J., 19, 210

Lordship and Bondage, 1 15 ff.

Luther, M., 14, 199

Maclver, R. M., 375

Mannheim, K., 366

Marx, K., 115, 136 f., 148, 158!.,

230, 258 ff., 332, 400

Materialism, Historical, 273 f.,

*94> 39

Mathematical Method, 98, 144 f.,

160 1.

Metz, R., 393

Mill,J. St., 376 .

Mind, 10, 39, 56 ff., 91 f., 404 ff.

Monarchy, 851., *i7f., 235 .,

37 1

Montesquieu, 32

Mussolini, B., 415

Napoleon, 169!.

Natural Law, 60, 201, 365

Negative Philosophy, 26 ., 325

Negative Totality, 159, 313 .

Negativity, 26 ff., 65 ., 123, 135 .,

141 ., 282, 313 .

Nimkoff, M. F., 375

Notion, 25, 64 f., i25., 128,

155 ff., 24 iff.

Ogburn, W. F., 375

Order, 345, 348 ff., 359 f.

Otherness, 67 ff.

Panuncio, S., 403

Perception, 106 f.

Plekhanov, G., 400

Positive Philosophy, 27, 3235.,

34 iff., 366 .

Positivism, 27, 113, 145, 323, 327,

SS 1 * 34* &

Progress, 226, 231, 332, 339, 348,

35' *

Proletariat, 261, 291 ., 356 .,

386 .

Property, 34, 53, 76, 176, 187,

190, i93 * 10 ' 3 68

Proudhon, P.-J., 328, 337 f.

Race,

Reason, 4 ff., 9, 20 ., 24, 27, 42,

45 ff., 198, 224, 233 . (the cun-

ning of -), 253 ff., 293 ., 319,

321

Reflection, 143 f.

Reformation, German, 14, 245

Reification, 112, *79f. 379

Relativism, 353 .

Revisionism, Marxist, 398 ff.

Revolution, French, 3 ff., 96, 164,

169 ., 186

Ricardo, D., 336, 338

Right, 55, 191, 194, 206 ., 221 .

Robespierre, M., 5

Rosenberg, A., 411 .

Rousseau, J. J., 186, 395

INDEX

43*

Saint-Simon, 4, 3x8, 330 ff.

Savigny, F. K. v., 367

Schelling, F. W. J. v., 3x5 .,

366 f.

Schmitt, Cart, 419, 419

Schnabel, F., 36*

Self-Consciousness, noff., 155!.

Sense-Certainty, 103 ff., 271

Sismondi, S. de, 3*8, 334, 336 .,

338 .

Social Contract, 60, 84, 173*.,

185 ., 196

Sociology, 375

Socrates, 949 .

Sovereignty, 172 ff., 919, xxi

Speculative Thinking, 46, 101

Spencer, H., 376 .

Stahl, F. J., 3*3, 326, 360 ff.

State, 39 ., 52, 58 . (in the Sys-

tem of Morality); 83 . (in the

Jcncnser system); 87, 178, 923

(relation to art, religion, phi-

losophy); 173 ff., 180, xox.,

813 ff., 835 ., 369* 37ff-.

381 ff., 391 ff., 410 ff., 413 f.

Stein, L. v., 3x9, 363, 374 ff.

Subject, 8, X5, 38 (=lie), 63,

69, 95, 111, i4x. (as essence),

154 ff. (as the notion), 238, 943

(in history)

Time, 1x4, 840

Tolerance, 355 .

Treitschke, H. v., 180

Truth, xs, 98., 156, 315, 3x1 .,

404

Understanding (Common Sense),

44, 108 .

Universality, 17, 5X, 71 ., 9gt.,

104, 108, 185 *> *7 * ( of Jaw )'

888, 841, 875 ., 884 ., 887 .

Valentin, V., 361 .

Volksgeist, 38, 837

War, 55, 88i f.

Ward, L. F., 377

Weltgeist, 84, 883, 838 .

Will, 185 ff.

SUPPLEMENTARY EPILOGUE

WRITTEN IN 1954

Epilogue

The defeat of Fascism and National Socialism has not

arrested the trend toward totalitarianism. Freedom is on

the retreat in the realm of thought as well as in that of

society. Neither the Hegelian nor the Marxian idea of

Reason have come closer to realization; neither the develop-

ment of the Spirit nor that of the Revolution took the form

envisaged by dialectical theory. Still, the deviations were in-

herent in the very structure which this theory had discovered

they did not occur from outside; they were not unexpected.

From the beginning, the idea and the reality of Reason

in the modern period contained the elements which endan-

gered its promise of a free and fulfilled existence: the en-

slavement of man by his own productivity; the glorification

of delayed satisfaction; the repressive mastery of nature

in man and outside; the development of human potentiali-

ties within the framework of domination. In Hegel's phi-

losophy, the triumph of the Spirit leaves the State behind

in the reality unconquered by the Spirit and oppressive

in spite of its commitment to Right and Freedom. Hegel

accepted Civil Society and its State as the adequate historical

realization of Reason which meant that they were not the

ultimate realization of Reason. The latter was relegated to

metaphysics: Hegel concluded the encyclopedic presentation

of his system with Aristotle's description of the Nous as

Theos. At the beginning and at the end, Western philoso-

phy's answer to the quest for Reason and Freedom is the

same. The deification of the Spirit implies acknowledgment

of its defeat in the reality. Hegel's philosophy was the last

which could dare to comprehend reality as manifestation of

the Spirit. The subsequent history made such an attempt

impossible.

Hegel saw in the "power of negativity" the life element

of the Spirit and thereby of Reason. This power of Nega-

tivity was in the last analysis the power to comprehend and

Written in 1954

434

alter the given facts in accordance with the developing po-

tentialities by rejecting the "positive" once it had become a

barrier to progress in freedom. Reason is in its very es-

sence contra-diction, opposition, negation as long as freedom

is not yet real. If the contradictory, oppositional, negative

power of Reason is broken, reality moves under its own

positive law and, unhampered by the Spirit, unfolds its re-

pressive force. Such decline in the power of Negativity has

indeed accompanied the progress of late industrial civili-

zation. With the increasing concentration and effectiveness

of economic, political, and cultural controls, the opposi-

tion in all these fields has been pacified, co-ordinated, or li-

quidated. The contradiction has been absorbed by the affir-

mation of the positive. In 1816, when the wars of national

liberation had ended, Hegel exhorted his students against

the "business of politics" and the State which had "swal-

lowed up all other interests into its own," to uphold the

"courage of truth," of thought, the power of the Spirit as the

highest value. Today, the Spirit seems to have a different

function: it helps to organize, administer, and anticipate the

powers that be, and to liquidate the "power of Negativity."

Reason has identified itself with the reality: what is actual

is reasonable although what is reasonable has not yet become

actuality.

Has the other, the Marxian attempt to redefine Reason

suffered a similar fate? Marx believed that industrial so-

ciety had created the preconditions for the realization of

Reason and Freedom while only its capitalistic organization

prevented this realization. Full maturity of the productive

forces, mastery over nature, and a material wealth great

enough to fulfil at least the basic needs of all members of

society at the attained cultural level were the prerequisites

for socialism, and these prerequisites had been created.

However, in spite of this substantive link between capitalist

productivity and socialist freedom, Marx thought that only

a revolution and a revolutionary social class could accom-

435

plish the transition. For in this transition, far more was in-

volved than the liberation and rational utilization of the

productive forces, namely, the liberation of man himself:

abolition of his enslavement to the instruments of his labor,

and thereby the complete transvaluation of all prevailing

values. Only this "more" would turn quantity into quality

and establish a different, non-repressive society the deter-

minate negation of capitalism. These new principles and

values could ofily be realized by a class which was free from

the old and repressive principles and values, whose existence

embodied the very negation of the capitalist system and

therefore the historical possibility of opposing and over-

coming this system. Marx* idea of the proletariat as the ab-

solute negation of capitalist society telescopes in one notion

the historical relation between the preconditions and the

realization of freedom. In a strict sense, liberation presup-

poses freedom: the former can be accomplished only if un-

dertaken and sustained by free individuals free from the

needs and interests of domination and repression. Unless

the revolution itself progresses through freedom, the need

for domination and repression would be carried over into

the new society, and the fateful separation between the

"immediate" and the "true" interest of the individuals

would be almost inevitable; the individuals would become

the objects of their own liberation, and freedom would be

a matter of administration and decree. Progress would be

progressive repression, and the "delay" in freedom would

threaten to become self-propelling and self-perpetuating.

The decisive importance of the relation between the pre-

revolutionary and post-revolutionary proletariat has been

demonstrated only after the death of Marx, in the transfor-

mation of free into organized capitalism. It was this devel-

opment which transformed Marxism into Lenism and deter-

mined the fate of Soviet Society - its progress under a new

system of repressive productivity. Marx* conception of the

"free" proletariat as die absolute negation of the established

436

social order belonged to the model of "free" capitalism: a

society in which the free operation of the basic economic

laws and relations would increase the internal contradictions

and make the industrial proletariat their principal victim

as well as the self-conscious agent of their revolutionary solu-

tion. When Marx envisaged the transition to socialism from

the advanced industrial countries, he did so because not

only the maturity of the productive forces, but also the ir-

rationality of their use, the maturity of the internal contra-

dictions of capitalism and of the will to their abolition were

essential to his idea of socialism. But precisely in the ad-

vanced industrial countries, since about the turn of the cen-

tury, the internal contradictions became subject to increas-

ingly efficient organization, and the negative force of the

proletariat was increasingly whittled down. Not only a

small "labor aristocracy" but the larger part of the laboring

classes were made into a positive part of the established

society. It was not simply the overflow of productivity into

a rising standard of living which caused this transformation.

When Engels died in 1895, the living and working condi-

tions of the laboring classes in the advanced capitalist

countries had shown a long range tendential improvement

far above the level described and anticipated in Marx*

Capital. Still, Engels saw no reason for a fundamental re-

vision of the Marxian prediction. Engels' emphasis on the

growing legal-parliamentary power of organized labor seems

to indicate that he counted on a further improvement in the

condition of labor, as the direct result of growing working

class power within the functioning capitalist system. Nor did

the trend seem to refute the Marxian conception. The "su-

pra-profits" of the monopolistic period could serve as an ex-

planation for the rise in real wages at the expense of

"supra-exploited" groups and regions, and at the cost of

recurrent war-preparation and wars. Not just impoverish-

ment, but impoverishment in the face of growing social pro-

ductivity was supposed to make the proletariat a revolu-

437

tionary force. Marx' notion of impoverishment implies con-

sciousness of the arrested potentialities of man and of the

possibility of their realization consciousness of alienation

and de-humanization. But then the development of capi-

talist productivity stopped the development of revolutionary

consciousness. Technological progress multiplied the needs

and satisfactions, while its utilization made the needs as well

as their satisfactions repressive: they themselves sustain sub-

mission and domination. Progress in administration reduces

the dimension in which individuals can still be "with them-

selves" and "for themselves" and transforms them into

total objects of their society. The development of conscious-

ness becomes the dangerous prerogative of outsiders. The

sphere in which individual and group transcendence was

possible is thus being eliminated and with it the life ele-

ment of oppostion. Here we can indicate only a few of the

principal factors which enabled late industrial civilization

to absorb its negativity.

The increase in the apparatus of production and distri-

bution outgrew individual and group control and generated

a hierarchy of public and private bureaucracies, with a high

degree of neutralization of responsibility. Even at the top

of the hierarchy, where responsibility is identifiable and

final, the specific individual and group interest can assert

itself only within the overriding interest of the preservation

and expansion of the apparatus as a whole. The latter is in-

deed the incarnation of the general will, the collective need.

Since it keeps, at least in the advanced industrial countries,

society going under improving conditions and with better

satisfaction of needs, the rationality of opposition appears

even more spurious, if not senseless. Considering the given

facts and tendencies, there is no reason to assume that fur-

ther progress demands the destruction of its present basis.

This reconciliation of the opposition was operative long

438

before the first World War revealed the extent to which the

"objectively" revolutionary classes had been integrated into

the national interest.

The tremendous rise in the productivity of labor within

the framework of the prevailing social institutions made

mass production inevitable but also mass manipulation.

The result was that the standard of living rose with the con-

centration of economic power to monopolistic proportions.

Concurrently, technological progress fundamentally changed

the balance of social power. The scope and effectiveness of

the* instruments of destruction controlled by the government

made the classical forms of the social struggle old-fashioned

and romantic. The barricade lost its revolutionary value

just as the strike lost its revolutionary content. The econ-

omic and cultural coordination of the laboring classes was

accompanied and supplemented by the obsolescence of their

traditional weapons.

The consolidation of the capitalist system was greatly en-

hanced by the development of Soviet society. This develop-

ment influenced the situation of the Western world in two

ways: (1) The failure of the Central European revolutions

after the first World War isolated the Bolshevik Revolution

from its anticipated economic and political base in the ad-

vanced capitalist countries and led it on the road of terror*

istic industrialization by virtue of its own resources. What

Marx had branded as the repressive and exploitative features

of capitalist industrialization was thus reproduced, on a

new basis, in Soviet society in order to obtain as rapidly as

possible the achievements of Western industrialization.

Compared with the Marxian idea of socialism, Stalinist so-

ciety was not less repressive than capitalist society but

much poorer. The image of freedom which Marxism had

upheld against the prevailing unfreedom seemed to have

lost its realistic content. In the Western world. Communism

came to be identified, not with a higher but with a lower

439

stage of the historical development, and with a hostile for-

eign power. As against this power, the national cause also

appeared as the cause of freedom. (2) Then the Soviet state

grew into a highly rationalized and industrialized society,

outside the capitalist world and powerful enough to compete

with the latter on its own terms, challenging its monopoly

in progress and its claim to shape the future of civilization.

The Western world answered with total mobilization, and

it was this mobilization which completed national and inter*

national control over the danger zones of society. The West-

ern world was unified to an extent unknown in its long his-

tory. The common interest, which had already successfully

organized the internal contradictions, now proceeded to or-

ganize the external ones. The international coordination

in turn helped to intensify the national co-ordination. Con-

formity becomes a question of life and death not only for

individuals but also for nations.

The tendencies which were here just enumerated have been

often and amply described in terms of "mass democracy,"

"popular culture," etc. Such terminology lends itself easily to

a wrong focus: as if these tendencies were due to the rise of

"masses," or to the decline of certain cultural values and in-

stitutions. They rather seem to grow out of the historical

structure of late industrial society once this society had

succeeded in controlling its own dialectic on the ground of

its own productivity. Nor are these tendencies confined to

any specific cultural or political area. The pre-conditioning

of the individuals, their shaping into objects of administra-

tion, seem to be universal phenomena. The idea of a differ-

ent form of Reason and Freedom, envisioned by dialectical

idealism as well as materialism, appears again as Utopia.

But the triumph of regressive and retarding forces does not

vitiate the truth of this Utopia. The total mobilization of

society against the ultimate liberation of the individual,

which constitutes the historical content of the present period,

indicates how real is the possibility of this liberation.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

HEGEL

The only real event in the recent history of Hegel's philosophy is the

post-war revival of Hegel-studies in France. Focussed on the "Phenomeno-

logy" and the actual content of its dialectic, the new French Hegel-inter-

pretation shows clearer than any previous one the inner connection be-

tween the idealistic and materialistic dialectic:

Hyppolite. Jean, Gencse et Structure de la Phenomenologie de F Esprit

de Hegel. Aubier, Paris 1946

Hyppolite, Jean, "Situation de 1'Homme dans la Phenomenologie Hegel-

ienne", in Les Temps Modernes, II, 19, 1947

Kojeve, Alexandra, Introduction a la Lecture de Hegel. Lecons sur la

Phenomenologie de 1'Esprit, e*d. R. Queneau. Gallimard, Paris 1947

Tran-Duc-Thao, "La 'Phenomenologie de 1'Espirit' et son contenu reel,*'

in: Les Temps Modernes, III, 36, 1948

On Hegel's political philosophy:

Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies. 2 vols. G. Routledge,

London 1945; Princeton 1950.

vol. II: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath

Weil, Eric, Hegel et FEtat. J. Vrin. Paris 1950

Hegel's philosophy plays a decisive part in the foundation of

Sartre's existentialism:

Sartre, Jean-Paul, L'Etre et le Neant, Gallimard, Paris 1943

Heidegger's Hegel-interpretation:

Heidegger, Martin, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung," in: Holswage, Kloster-

mann, Frankfurt/Main 1950

Luklcs, George, Der junge Hegel. Ueber die Beziehungen von Dialektik

und Oekonomie. Europa Verlag, Zurich 1948

MARX

Most important is the first publication of Marx' manuscript "Grand-

risse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie" written in 1857-1858. This

is actually the first version, previously unknown, of Das Kapital. It is

far more "philosophical" than the final version and shows how Marx*

mature economic theory grows out of his philosophical conception.

Marx, Karl, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie. Marx-

Engels-Lenin Institut Moskau, 2 vols. 1939 and 1941. Re-issued in

one volume by Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1953

(See: Rosdolsky, R., "Das 'Kapital im allgemeinen und die vielen Kapi-

talien'", in: KMos, VI, no 2.)

The following titles are relevant to the problems of Marxian theory dis-

cussed in this volume. Literature on the post-Marxian development of

Marxian theory is not included:

Bekker, Konrad, Marx 9 philosophised Entwicklung t sein VerhaUnis zu

Hegel. Zurich and New York 1940

Goran, Auguste, Karl Marx et la Pensee Moderne. Paris 1948

Cornu, Auguste, Easai de Critique Marxiste. Paris 1951

Morf, Otto, Da$ Verhaltni* von Wvtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftsges-

ehiekte bei Karl Marx. Bern 1951

Popitt, Hetarich, Der entfremdete Menich. Basel 1953

Schlesinger, Rudolph, Marx, His Time and Ours. London 1950

Somerhausen, Luc, UHumanisme Agissant de Karl Marx. Paris 1946

Thier, Erich. "Die Anthropologie dea jungen Marx", introduction to Marx,

NationaUkonomie un7Ph%osopkie~Ko\n-BeT\in 1950

Venable, Veroon, Human Nature: the Marxian View. New York 1946

(See alto the 2 volume of Karl Popper's The Open Society quoted above)